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This thesis explores the development of European Union’s model of protecting its 
citizens in the world, demonstrating it to be a unique and complex mixture of EU internal and 
external policies and instruments that is unlike any other international, regional, or domestic 
model of protecting individuals abroad. The thesis will critically assess the three main stages 
of development of the EU model until the present day.  
The first stage started in 1993, when the Maastricht Treaty introduced an EU 
citizenship right to equal protection abroad and this continued for the following decade. It will 
be shown that during this period the EU model of protecting the Union citizens abroad 
consisted of a purely horizontal form of cooperation among the Member States that 
materialised in a sui generis type of international agreement that has restricted the efficiency 
of the EU citizenship right, due to the Member States’ reluctance to lose their State 
prerogatives in favour of the EU.  
The second stage of development started in 2004 when a number of international 
disasters affecting EU citizens in third countries led the Member States to accept cooperation 
with EU institutions and external policy instruments for the purpose of complementing their 
capacity to secure the effective protection of unrepresented Union citizens abroad.  
The third stage started with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, which conferred 
an unprecedented power to an international organisation (the EU) to exercise State-like 
consular protection functions directly with respect to the Union citizens in the world.  
The thesis will offer a critical assessment of two decades of application of the least-
researched EU citizenship right (to consular and diplomatic protection), its nexus with other 
EU external relations policies and its implementation by the Member States.  It will show the 
added value of the EU model of protecting citizens abroad for the EU citizens, the Member 
States and the Union, while also making policy recommendations addressing the 
shortcomings in its current implementation. The thesis will demonstrate that, in spite of the 
scholarly critiques of the incompatibility of the Union model with public international law, 
the international community has widely accepted the Union model which has indeed become 
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I. The Research Theme 
The ‘EU citizenship’ has been a vastly researched topic, approached from different legal 
angles, and disciplines.1 A particular EU citizenship right has so far been largely ignored by 
academia, and when it has been addressed, it has been approached primarily from a single 
perspective – whether from a public international legal conception, EU citizenship, or the 
EU’s capabilities.2 Since the establishment of the EU citizenship in 1993, the right to equal 
protection by consular and diplomatic authorities of any of the Member States represented in 
situ has been attached to the legal status of ‘European Union citizenship’ recognised to all 
citizens of the Member States.3 Several EU countries recognise to their citizens some sort of a 
right to be protected abroad by the State’s authorities, enshrined in their constitutions, 
legislation, or established practice.4 The novelty of the EU citizenship right to protection 
abroad consists in the fact that it is not a classical citizenship right, but a right conferred by a 
sort of supranational citizenship that is based on a pooling of consular and diplomatic 
protection functions among the EU countries, and recently also on consular and diplomatic 
                                                 
1 Inter alia, A. Raymond, ‘Is Multinational Citizenship Possible?’, (1974) Soc. Res. 638. On the connection 
existing between the concepts of ‘citizenship’ and the ‘nation-state’, see Ulrich K. Preuß, ‘Problems of a 
Concept of European Citizenship’, (1995) EUR. L.J., 267; C. Schönberger, ‘European Citizenship as Federal 
Citizenship: Some Citizenship Lessons of Comparative Federalism’, (2007) Revue européenne de droit public, 
61. See also J. Shaw, ‘Political Rights and Multilevel Citizenship in Europe’ in E. Guild, K. Groenendijk, and 
Sergio Carrera (eds), Illiberal Liberal States: Immigration, Citizenship and Integration in the EU, Ashgate 
(2009); J. Shaw, ‘Citizenship: Contrasting Dynamics at the Interface of Integration and Constitutionalism’ in P. 
Craig and G. de Búrca (eds), Evolution of EU Law, Oxford University Press (2011); R. Bauböck and V. 
Guiraudon, ‘Introduction: Realignments of Citizenship: Reassessing Rights in the Age of Plural Memberships 
and Multi-Level Governance’, (2009) Citizenship Stud., 439; D. Kochenov, ‘The Present and the Future of EU 
Citizenship: A Bird’s Eye View of the Legal Debate’, NYU Jean Monnet Working Paper 02/12. 
2 See P. Vigni, ‘Diplomatic and consular protection: Misleading Combination or Creative Solution’, EUI Law 
Working Paper 2010/11 and by the same author, ‘The Protection of EU Citizens: The Perspective of 
International Law’ in J. Larik and M. Moraru (eds), Ever-Closer in Brussels—Ever-Closer in the World? EU 
External Action after the Lisbon Treaty, EUI Working Paper 2011/10, 91–107; A. Vermeer-Künzli, ‘Where the 
Law Becomes Irrelevant: Consular Assistance and the European Union’, (2011) ICLQ, 965; S. Touzé, ‘Aspects 
récents (et choisis) de la protection consulaire des citoyens de l’Union européenne’, (2011) Revue des affaires 
européennes, 79; J. Wouters and S. Duquet, ‘The EU and International Diplomatic Law: New Horizons?’ (2012) 
Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 31; other papers have approached the topic largely from an EU external relations 
perspective, Ramses A. Wessel, ‘Can the European Union Replace its Member States in International Affairs? 
An International Law Perspective’, in I. Govaere, E. Lannon, P. Van Elsuwege, S. Adam (eds.), The European 
Union in the World: Essays in Honour of Marc Maresceau, Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (2013), 
129-147; or from an EU fundamental rights perspective, e.g., E. Denza, ‘Commentary to Art. 46 of the EU 
Charter’, in S. Peers, T. Hervey, J. Kenner, A. Ward (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A 
Commentary, Hart Publishing (2014); or from the perspectives of the EU’s capabilities, see K. Raik, ‘Serving 
the citizens? Consular role of the EEAS grows in small steps’, EPC Working Paper of 30 April 2013. 
      3 See Art. 8c of the Maastricht Treaty. 
4 See more details in Chapter 4, section VII. Mapping the Member States’ national systems of ensuring 
protection of citizens abroad and the top-down impact of the EU model of protecting Union citizens abroad. 
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protection functions exercised by the EU’s institutions and bodies for the benefit of EU 
citizens in the world. 
The EU’s legal arrangement of protecting EU citizens abroad is a complex 
intertwining of various EU policies and instruments, where aspects of EU citizenship and 
fundamental rights mix with EU external relations and policies. The peculiar EU model, 
which includes certain traditional State-like functions exercised by the EU institutions and 
bodies for the purpose of ensuring protection of EU citizens abroad,5 challenges the classical 
norms of public international law recognising an exclusive power to exercise consular and 
diplomatic protection of individuals abroad to the State of nationality, and exceptionally to an 
international organisation in relation to its agents. 
The present thesis aims to assess the different horizontal inter-connections between the 
various EU legal policies, instruments and institutions in ensuring protection of EU citizens 
abroad, as well as the vertical relations between the EU legal framework and public 
international law and the domestic legal orders of the Member States, in an attempt to fill the 
gap in the legal literature and present a complete picture of the EU’s model of ensuring 
protection of (unrepresented) Union citizens abroad. The starting premise of the thesis is that 
the introduction of the peculiar EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad in 1993 has 
spurred the development of a unique model of protecting EU citizens abroad, which although 
initially divergent with public international law, is now widely accepted by the international 
community and highly attractive to other regional organisations. 
The objective is to study the EU citizenship right to equal protection of unrepresented 
Union citizens abroad, and its implementation by the Union and the Member States within the 
wider context of different EU instruments that have been used for similar purposes, i.e. 
protection of (unrepresented) EU citizens in third countries. The specific extra-Union 
application of this right requires close assessment of the implementation of the right within 
the general international legal framework, which has itself experienced a significant evolution 
in recent decades, and continues to do so. The EU model of protection of EU citizens in third 
countries has inevitably impacted on the domestic legal frameworks and practice of the 
Member States, however only to a limited extent, which proved to be insufficient to ensure a 
fully effective EU model. This process is nevertheless on-going in light of the current debate 
                                                 
5 The State’s power to exercise consular and diplomatic protection of nationals abroad has been traditionally 
perceived as falling under the ‘Act of State’ or ‘acte du government’ doctrines of powers reserved to the State’s 
executive, over which the judiciary had no power of review. See more in W. Bolewski, Diplomacy and 
International Law in Globalized Relations, Springer (2007). 
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between the EU institutions and the Member States on the evolution of the EU’s model and, 
particularly, the divisions of roles between the EU and the Member States.6  
This thesis will often use the terms - the ‘EU legal regime’ or ‘EU model’ on 
protection of EU citizens abroad, since the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad7 
and the fundamental right of the EU citizen to diplomatic and consular protection8 are not the 
sole legal bases that confer to the EU and the non-national Member States competences to 
protect the EU citizens abroad.9 There are several other legal provisions within the CFSP 
(Treaty on the European Union) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, as 
well as secondary legislation on the basis of which the EU, independently or jointly with the 
Member States, can exercise consular and diplomatic protection and assistance to the EU 
citizens in the world. 
The thesis will start with an evaluation of almost two decades of application of the EU 
citizenship right to equal protection abroad, from Maastricht (1993) until Lisbon (2009). The 
first substantive chapter (Chapter 1) aims to uncover the specific legal context introducing 
this unusual EU citizenship right, unlike any of the other EU citizenship rights that have an 
internal application. In particular, it explores the reasons for the introduction of such a right, 
the different views of the Member States towards what the essence of this right should be and, 
most importantly, the novelty of the right when it was first introduced. The history of 
European cooperation dates long before the Maastricht Treaty and some of the European 
countries have shared long historical ties for centuries which would inform the later 
development of the EU model of protecting EU citizens abroad. In its first section, Chapter 1 
will assess whether EU citizenship builds on any of the regional bilateral or multilateral 
cooperation created among some of the European countries and, if yes, it will attempt to 
discover the added value of the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad to the 
cooperation existing between these Member States outside the Maastricht Treaty.  
Following this comparative assessment, Chapter 1 progresses to a critical assessment 
of the implementation of the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad during the post-
Maastricht Treaty period. It will be demonstrated that during the first decade of 
                                                 
6 See the discussion regarding the adoption of a Council Directive on consular protection of Union citizens in 
third countries, and in particular Chapter 4, Section VII ‘Mapping the Member States’ national systems of 
ensuring protection of citizens abroad and the top-down impact of the EU model of protecting Union citizens 
abroad’ and Section VIII ‘Policy and institutional recommendations to increase the efficiency of protection of 
the EU citizens in the world’. 
7 Arts. 20(2)(c) and 23 TFEU. 
8 Art. 46 EU Charter. 
9 For a discussion of the additional legal bases during the pre-Lisbon Treaty period, see Chapter 1, while for the 
relevant legal basis post-Lisbon Treaty, see Chapter 4. 
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implementation, the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad was governed by purely 
intergovernmental sui generis kind of acts adopted by the Member States (Decisions of the 
Representatives of the Governments of the Member States). The Chapter will critically assess 
the legal content, nature, and effects of these acts, which are uncommon in the field of EU 
citizenship, or any other EU policies that might directly affect the rights of the individuals. It 
will be revealed that although the Decisions aimed to clarify the content of the right, their 
added value is minimal, if not even prejudicial to the effectiveness of the EU citizenship right. 
Unlike the other EU citizenship rights, the external dimension of the EU citizenship was left 
in the hands of a COCON Council Working Group, composed of consular and diplomatic 
officials whose proposals consist of only soft law guidelines and recommendations. The 
particular soft law regulatory vision of the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad 
corresponded to a view of this right as pertaining exclusively to the field of consular and 
diplomatic protection of natural persons, which is traditionally conceptualised as falling under 
the States’ discretionary decision-making power. Although partially true, the right is an EU 
citizenship right which ought to be effective in practice and governed by EU legal acts and 
not international legal instruments.10 The application of the EU citizenship right was anything 
but effective.  
Until 2004 this sui generis intergovernmental framework of implementation worked 
well due to the low number of requests from EU citizens, however the increase in 
international disasters affecting third countries, the increasing number of travelling EU 
citizens, and the start of the financial crises started to show the inadequacies of the EU’s 
model. The chapter will highlight the main events that triggered a change in the 
implementation of the right, such as the emergence of forms of vertical cooperation of 
consular cooperation for the purpose of ensuring an effective protection of EU citizens 
abroad. Instances of vertical cooperation between the Member States and the Community 
policies, instruments, and institutions thus started to form what is the current day EU model of 
protection of EU citizens abroad. It is a period when the EU slowly develops other EU 
policies that, like the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad, respond to challenges 
posed by international disasters, inter alia, ensuring protection of EU citizens in consular 
crises situations. The chapter will assess the nexus between these different Community 
policies, to show that, ultimately, due to the growing consular challenges, the Member States 
agreed to complement the purely horizontal framework of cooperation to ensure protection of 
                                                 
10 See Chapter 1, section III.1 Implementing the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad - securing 
effective protection of EU citizens abroad without encroaching on the Member States’ sovereign powers. 
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the EU citizens abroad with vertical cooperation instruments, such as the Civil Protection 
Mechanism adopted within the civil protection policy, and humanitarian aid capabilities. This 
positive framework of cooperation, as well as some of the deficiencies registered by the 
implementation in practice of the EU model, such as the divergent, intransparent 
implementing framework of the EU citizenship right, and other factual circumstances such as 
the Member States’ budgetary cuts, have led to some of the Lisbon Treaty amendments, 
which will be assessed in the last section of Chapter 1. 
The Lisbon Treaty has strengthened the EU’s role in ensuring protection of citizens 
abroad, introducing actors with competences very similar to the core prerogatives of the State. 
The EU now has a clearly expressed objective of protecting its citizens in the world.11 It has 
an impressive external relations institutional machinery formed of the High Representative for 
Foreign Affairs and supported by the European External Action Service and Union 
delegations,12 which cover more third countries than any of the Member States’ consulates 
and embassies, separately or jointly.13 The EU now has a network of 140 delegations, which 
can exercise consular and diplomatic protection functions for private individuals.  
This particular legal innovation raises serious problems within the public international 
legal framework. The classical consular and diplomatic protection mechanisms of public 
international law, which have been used by States since Antiquity, have very little in common 
with the EU mechanisms of equal protection of EU citizens abroad. According to the 
traditional public international concept of consular and diplomatic protection of individuals, 
the State of nationality enjoys a discretionary, exclusive right to exercise them, in relation to 
which the individual has no right whatsoever.14 The mechanism of diplomatic protection 
requires, under public international law, the fulfilment of three exhaustive pre-requisites of 
strict application: nationality of claims, existence of an international wrongful act and 
exhaustion of local remedies.15 The EU model does not follow this traditional international 
legal model of protecting citizens abroad. Its premise is the ‘European Union citizenship’, 
which has been defined as ‘supranational’ or ‘a plurality of nationalities’, but certainly not as 
a nation State citizenship.16 The Member States have an EU primary law obligation to equally 
                                                 
11 Art. 3(5) TEU. 
12 Art. 27 TEU, 221 TFEU and the EEAS Council Decision. 
13 See Annex 1 – ‘Member States’ External Representations and EU Delegations in third countries’. 
14 See, in particular, the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain), Judgment, 
I.C.J. Reports 1970, p. 3, and paras. 77-79. 
15 See Arts. 1-4 of the 2006 ILC Articles on Diplomatic Protection. 
16 See more in Chapter 3, in the section entitled ‘The relation between the ‘Union citizenship’ and the 
‘nationality of claims’ requirements for the exercise of consular and diplomatic protection of individuals’.  
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protect the EU citizens, to which a corresponding right is recognised to all unrepresented 
Union citizens. The conditions for the exercise of the fundamental and EU citizenship right 
are specifically established by the EU, and have nothing in common with the conditions for 
the exercise of diplomatic protection or the minimal conditions required for consular 
protection under public international law.17 
The State-centred public international legal conceptions of consular and diplomatic 
protection developed in a time when international law did not recognise any role to the 
individual, and other non-State actors. Current international law has departed from those days, 
and individuals, international organisations, and other non-State actors have been recognised 
a place in international relations.18 Additionally, international human rights law has developed 
direct access means to judicial and quasi-judicial forums for the individuals. These legal 
developments have made imperative the updating of the traditional definition of consular and 
diplomatic protection of individuals under the contemporary public international law.  
Chapter 2 will re-consider the classical international legal conception of consular and 
diplomatic protection of individuals in light of the recent State practice, jurisprudence 
delivered by international, regional and domestic courts and the legal academic writings. In 
particular it will look at the international and national practice after 2006,19 to see whether 
there has been additional evidence that could indicate a change in the States practice on the 
perception of consular and diplomatic protection which, coupled with the evidence previously 
gathered by the International Law Commission in its project on codification of international 
norms on diplomatic protection,20 might have built a more ‘extensive’, ‘uniform’ and 
‘representative’ customary practice21 indicating a change in the legal nature, conditions and 
objectives of consular and diplomatic protection of natural persons under the public 
international legal framework.  
                                                 
17 See more in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, Sections III, IV and V. 
18 See R. McCorqoudale, ‘The individual and the international legal system’ and D. Akande, ‘International 
organisations’ in M. Evans (eds), International Law (3rd ed), Oxford University Press (2010). 
19 The moment when the ILC approved the final version of the Articles on Diplomatic Protection, and when 
States confirmed the refusal of including a State duty to exercise diplomatic protection, see more details in 
Chapter 2, section II. Reconsidering the Conditions for the Exercise of Consular and Diplomatic Protection of 
Individuals under the International Legal Framework. 
20 In 1995 the International Law Commission decided to include in the Commission’s agenda the topic of 
‘Diplomatic Protection’. At its 58th session, the International Law Commission adopted 19 Draft Articles on the 
topic of diplomatic protection. The Draft Articles were approved by the United Nations in 2007, see Resolution 
A/62/451 of 6 December 2007, available online at 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/62/67  
21 ILA, Final Report of the Committee on the Formation of Customary (General) International Law, Statement of 
Principles Applicable to the Formation of General Customary International Law, Report of the Sixty-Ninth 
Conference, London, 2000, Principle 4, 734. 
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The chapter will conclude with a short summary of the changes brought by current 
international law to the international institutions of consular and diplomatic protection of 
individuals, and will establish whether their current faces have the potential for diminishing 
the gap between the international legal framework and the Union legal regime on the 
mechanisms of protecting citizens abroad. 
Chapter 2 will show that consular and diplomatic protection of natural persons is no 
longer an exclusive discretionary right of the State of nationality, and a certain State duty to 
exercise consular and diplomatic protection on behalf of nationals subject to grave violations 
of fundamental rights is currently in formation. The exclusivity and discretion characterising 
the exercise of consular and diplomatic protection of individuals under the traditional public 
international legal framework has diminished under the development of international human 
rights law and the recognition of non-State international actors. The modern conception of 
consular and diplomatic protection of individuals has made an important leap since the 
‘romantic’22 days of international law and currently recognises a foundational role to the 
individual’s rights in the definition of consular and diplomatic protection.23 Current customary 
international law recognised several important exceptions from the strict nationality of claims 
rule which has been the foundational premise of both consular and diplomatic protection, and 
has the potential of drawing closer the international and EU model of protecting citizens in 
third countries. For instance, the elimination of the Nottebohm24 ‘genuine’ and ‘effective link’ 
requirement which the ‘nationality of claims’ had to fulfil under the traditional international 
customary law is simplifying the conditions which the Union citizenship has to fulfil and is 
further accommodating of the Union specific regional framework within the general 
international legal norms. States can now exercise diplomatic protection for various other 
categories than nationals, such as on behalf of stateless persons, refugees, persons benefiting 
of subsidiary protection,25 and of course for other categories as long as the Panevezys based 
requirements are fulfilled.26 The current public international legal concept of diplomatic 
                                                 
22 The term was used by Advocate General Tesauro in relation to the public international law existent at the time 
the Nottebohm judgment was delivered, see his Opinion in the Micheletti case, (Case C-369/90 Micheletti v 
Delegacion del Gobierno en Cantabria, [1993] ECR I-4239), para. 5 
23 See Art. 1 of the ILC Articles on Diplomatic Protection; the LaGrand Case (Germany v United States of 
America), Judgment of 27 June 2001, ICJ Reports (2001), 466; Case concerning Avena and Other Mexican 
Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America), Judgment of 31 March 2004, ICJ Reports (2004), 12; Diallo 
(Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Provisional Measures, the Judgment of the ICJ of 24 
May 2007; Merits, Judgment of 30 November 2010; Compensation Judgment of 19 June 2012, nyr. 
24 Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v Guatemala) (Second Phase) [1955] ICJ Rep 4. 
25 See Art. 8 of the 2008 ILC Articles on Diplomatic Protection. 
26 Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway Case (Estonia v. Lithuania), Judgment of 28 February 1939, PCIJ Reports 
(1939), Ser.A/B, No. 76; Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions Case. 
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protection has a broader material and personal scope meant to ensure protection of more 
individuals in an international environment characterised by a high migratory flow. 
In light of the cosmeticized international look of consular and diplomatic protection of 
individuals, the specific question about the conformity of the EU’s model of protecting EU 
citizens abroad with the general international legal framework might receive a different 
answer than under the previous traditional public international legal framework. In this 
context, Chapter 3 will examine the relation between the EU regime of protecting EU citizens 
in third countries and the current international legal framework on consular and diplomatic 
protection of individuals, in an attempt to understand whether the allegations that the EU-
specific regime is divergent, and on certain aspects even incompatible, with the international 
legal regime are legally founded,27 and if so, what could be the possible solutions. 
Regardless of which scholarly opinion we choose to embrace in regard to the legal 
nature of the European Union, we cannot deny the legal truism that the EU is not a State, and 
it exists and operates within the broader international legal system, where it needs to respect 
the principles of international law,28 and thus observe the specific international norms 
governing the exercise of consular and diplomatic protection of natural persons,29 which do 
not yet expressly recognise functions of consular and diplomatic protection of private 
individuals to regional international organisations.30 For more than 20 years, the EU countries 
have established a specific regional legal framework on ensuring protection of EU citizens 
abroad, which is not following the traditional legal nature, personal and material scope of the 
                                                 
27 See, inter alia, A. Vermeer-Künzli, ‘The Legal Framework of consular assistance: Some inconsistencies 
between EU law and international law on consular assistance’ in by S. Faro, Mario P. Chiti and E. Schweighofer 
(eds), European Citizenship and Consular Protection New Trends in European Law and National law edited, 
Editura scientifica Napoli (2012), 101-111; A. Vermeer-Künzli, ‘Where the Law becomes Irrelevant: Consular 
Assistance and the European Union’, (2011) International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 965; See J. Dugard, 
Seventh Report on diplomatic protection, United Nations General Assembly, A/CN.4/567, United Nations, New 
York, 7 March 2006, p. 10; A. Vermeer-Künzli, ‘Exercising Diplomatic Protection, the fine line between 
litigation, demarches and consular assistance’, (2008) ZaöRV, 339; T. Stein, ‘Interim Report on “Diplomatic 
Protection Under the European Union Treaty”’, in: ILA Committee on Diplomatic Protection of Persons and 
Property, Second Report, New Delhi, 2002, 36-7; P. Vigni, ‘The Protection of EU Citizens: The Perspective of 
International law’ in: J. Larik and M. Moraru (eds.), Ever-Closer in Brussels – Ever-Closer in the World? EU 
External Action after the Lisbon Treaty, EUI Working Paper 2011/10, 91-107. 
28 See Arts. 3(5) and 21 TEU. 
29 See Chapter 2. 
30 The customary international law governing the exercise of consular and diplomatic protection of EU citizens is 
still an exclusive inter-States system, see the 2006 ILC Articles on Diplomatic Protection. The still preponderant 
inter-States relations nature of the international legal order is a more general problem that the EU has to confront 
in many areas of activity. See for instance H. Bruyninckx, J. Wouters, S. Basu and S. Schunz (eds.), The 
European Union and Multilateral Governance: Assessing EU Participation in United Nations Human Rights 
and Environmental Fora, Palgrave Macmillan (2012); J. Wouters, Anna-Luise Chané, ‘Brussels meets 
Westphalia: The European Union and the United Nations’, KU Leuven Working Paper No. 144/August 2014, 




international legal mechanisms of consular and diplomatic protection of natural persons. The 
Member States have agreed to limit their internationally recognised discretionary power of 
exercising consular and diplomatic protection of individuals for the purpose of advancing the 
protection of the EU citizens abroad, and in this way enlarging the territorial effectiveness of 
EU citizenship and strengthening the Union’s visibility outside the EU.31 For this purpose the 
founding Treaties have established three main exceptions from the general international legal 
framework. Unlike the international legal framework, where the States have a right to exercise 
consular and diplomatic protection of individuals, the EU Member States have an EU primary 
legal obligation to provide protection to all unrepresented Union citizens on the same 
conditions as to their own citizens, in a third country where they have a consular or 
diplomatic representation.32 Second, the EU enables non-nationality Member States, and EU 
institutions and a sui generis body (EEAS)33 to exercise consular and diplomatic protection on 
behalf of unrepresented Union citizens, thus replacing the State of nationality premise and 
pre-requisite for the exercise of the international consular and diplomatic protection with a 
supranational kind of citizenship. Chapter 3 will explore the conformity of the specific 
characteristics of the EU model of protecting Union citizens abroad with the relevant public 
international legal norms. It will demonstrate that, in spite of the scholarly debates on the 
incompatibility between the EU and the international legal framework, the EU model of 
ensuring the protection of EU citizens abroad has long been accepted by the international 
community, and similar models are gradually developing, signalling an increasing recognition 
of its international legitimacy. 
The last substantive chapter of the thesis (Chapter 4) will explore the added value of 
the Lisbon Treaty to the EU’s role of ensuring protection of unrepresented Union citizens 
abroad,34 the current legal status, nature and effects of the EU citizenship right to equal 
protection abroad,35 the question of the extent of consular and diplomatic functions entrusted 
                                                 
31 The reasons for adopting the Union citizenship right to protection abroad of unrepresented Union citizens are 
to be found in the Adonnino Committee Report of 1984, which provided that the Committee was made 
responsible of adopting Community measures ‘to strengthen and promote its identity and its image both for its 
citizens and for the rest of the world’. See Bull. EC 6-1984, 11: ‘A People’s Europe’. 
32 Arts. 20(2)(c) and 23 TFEU, and Art. 46 EU Charter. 
33 On the legal nature of the EEAS, see Bart Van Vooren, ‘A Legal Institutional Perspective on the European 
External Action Service’, (2011) CMLRev., 475. 
34 Section II.The Added Value of the Lisbon Treaty - Strengthening the EU’s Role to Ensure Protection of its 
Citizens in the World. 
35Section III. The legal status of equal protection abroad – (fundamental) EU citizenship right or entitlement to 
legitimate expectations?; Section IV. What’s in the EU citizen’s right to equal protection abroad? Challenges to 
establish the substantive content of the EU citizenship right; Section V. The legal effects of the Union citizenship 
right to equal protection abroad. 
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to the EU36, the impact of the EU legal regime on the Member States consular and diplomatic 
protection functions37, and it will conclude with assessing possible future developments of the 
EU’s role in the field of protecting unrepresented Union citizens in the world.38 This Chapter 
aims, inter alia, to fill the gap of the current legal literature, which has explored the issue of 
the EU’s diplomatic network from diverse angles, but not specifically from the perspective of 
ensuring protection of EU citizens abroad.  
In the 1990s and early 2000s the question of the specific function of Commission 
delegations and their establishment and evolution in time was analysed.39 Later the issue 
started to be addressed from the perspective of the constitutional construction of the EU.40 The 
institutional setting of the EU’s diplomatic representation and its practice was compared with 
those of the Member States’ external representations41 and later the literature concentrated on 
the impact of EU integration on the foreign ministries in the EU.42 Chapter 4 aims to assess 
topics that have not been specifically addressed by legal scholars, namely: the precise 
competence of the Union to ensure protection of its citizens abroad, the type of services it can 
confer to the EU citizens in third countries, and the relation with the Member States’ consular 
and diplomatic functions. In spite of the Member States’ resistance to taking full advantage of 
the EEAS and EU delegations’ potential in ensuring protection of EU citizens in the world, 
the increasing number of international disasters,43 the growing number of EU citizens 
                                                 
36 Section VI. The complex EU institutional architecture ensuring protection of EU citizens abroad. 
37Section VII. Mapping the Member States’ national systems of ensuring protection of citizens abroad and the 
top-down impact of the EU model of protecting Union citizens abroad.  
38Section VIII. Policy and institutional recommendations to increase the efficiency of protection of the EU 
citizens in the world. 
39 M. Bruter, ‘Diplomacy without a state: the external delegations of the European Commission’, (1999) Journal 
of European Public Policy, 183-205, on the latter see, G. Edwards and D. Rijks, ‘Taking Europe to the World: 50 
years of the European Commission’s External Service’, 2004, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publication of 
the European Communities; C. Carta, The European Union Diplomatic Service: Ideas, Preferences and 
Identities, Routledge, 2012. 
40 J. Bátora, ‘Does the European Union transform the institution of diplomacy?’, (2005) Journal of European 
Public Policy, 44-66.; M. K. Cross, The European Diplomatic Corps: Diplomats and International Cooperation 
from Westphalia to Maastricht, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan (2007); Bart Van Vooren, ‘A Legal 
Institutional Perspective on the European External Action Service’, op.cit.. 
41 F. Austermann, The EU Delegations in EU Foreign Policy: A Diplomatic Service of Different Speeds, 
Palgrave Macmillan (2014). 
42 B. Hocking and D. Spence, ‘Foreign Ministries in the EU. Integrating Diplomats ad Towards a European 
Diplomatic System’, Discussion Paper in Diplomacy NNIR 2005, available at 
http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/20050600_cli_paper_dip_issue98.pdf ; ‘The EU Foreign Service: 
how to build a more effective common policy’, EPC Working Paper No. 28/2007, available at 
http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/555858396_EPC%20Working%20Paper%2028%20The%20EU%20Forei
gn%20Service.pdf  
43 According to the European Commission, ‘since 1975 the recorded annual number of crises has increased 
fivefold and is likely to further increase’, see Executive summary of the Impact assessment accompanying the 
document proposal for a Directive of the Council on consular protection for citizens of the Union abroad, SEC 
(2011) 1555, 14.12.2011, 2. 
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travelling and residing abroad,44 and the serious financial cuts affecting the national Ministries 
of Foreign Affairs45 will, sooner or later, probably lead to further advancement of the vertical 
cooperation and increasing role of the EU delegations in this field. 
The topic of protection of Union citizens abroad entails a discussion of several 
different EU policies: Union citizenship (Articles 20(2)(c) and 23 TFEU), CFSP (Article 35 
TEU), general EU’s external relations (Article 3(5) TEU), CSDP (Article 43 TEU), and 
incidentally also parts of several other EU external policies (e.g. humanitarian aid - Article 
218 TFEU). Although the topic of ‘protecting EU citizens abroad’ is principally treated from 
the sole perspective of the Union citizenship and fundamental right to equal protection 
abroad, it involves mechanisms and institutions that are specific to the Union’s external 
relations. If the other three main Union citizenship rights have commonly involved issues 
related to the Union market and the Area of Freedom Security and Justice, this particular right 
is not characterised by the paradigms that governed the application of some of the Union 
citizenship rights, such as the cross-border and economically active paradigms46, since the 
right to equal protection by the consular and diplomatic authorities of the Member States does 
not require the pre-condition of cross-border movement or a certain degree of integration in 
the Member State providing help.47 The premise of this right is the principle of non-
discrimination based on nationality which is an essential attribute of the EU citizenship 
recognised to the citizens of all the Member States. 
Combining international, EU, national and comparative legal analysis, the objective of 
this thesis is to offer a holistic research approach aimed at answering the main question of 
what kind of protection do EU citizens currently enjoy when they are outside the Union 
territory. In short, what benefits does the EU citizenship confer outside the border of the 
European Union, and how has the EU model of protecting its citizens abroad developed 
throughout the years, dealt with deficiencies and problems, and what are the future avenues? 
                                                 
44 From 2005 until 2008, the number of trips made by EU citizens to third countries increased threefold, and it is 
expected to further increase. More than 30 million EU citizens were estimated to permanently live in a third 
country in 2008, but only in four countries are all of the Member States represented, see more in Annex 1. 
45 See the CARE Report, Chapter 3. It was noted that in 2012 the Spanish Foreign Ministry suffered a 54% 
budgetary cut, and as a consequence agreed to a co-location of diplomatic premises with the EU delegation in 
Yemen. As a result, 500,000 euros were saved during the first year. See, Igor Merheim-Eyre, ‘Review of the 
Balance of Competences: Foreign & Commonwealth Office - Consular Services Evidence from Stakeholders’, 
available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/387877/Consular_Evidence.pdf  
46 See D. Kochenov, ‘The Present and the Future of EU Citizenship: A Bird’s Eye View of the Legal Debate’, 
NYU Jean Monnet Working Paper 02/12. 
47 See more details on this issue in Chapter 3, section IV.1. The relation between the ‘Union citizenship’ and the 
‘nationality of claims’ requirements for the exercise of consular and diplomatic protection of individuals. 
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These questions are topical in light of the current day decreasing external representation 
network of the Member States, which makes the topic of alternative ways of ensuring 
protection of EU citizens abroad, as the EU model offers, particularly pertinent.  
 
II. Methodology 
To answer the aforementioned questions, the thesis has used mainly a legal dogmatic 
methodology, assessing mostly legislative acts, soft law documents and jurisprudence on 
consular and diplomatic protection of individuals or incidentally touching on these topics, and 
on the implementation of the relevant EU policies. The fact that the thesis adopts a 
predominantly legal methodology does not make the research any easier due to the scarcity of 
public legal sources, especially those on national legislation and practice on consular and 
diplomatic protection of individuals and practice on the implementation of the EU citizenship 
right. The author collected valuable legislative and jurisprudential evidence during her work 
as a researcher for the CARE (Citizens Assistance Regulation in Europe) Project. The 
opinions of EU officers, informally gathered during the same period, provide another valuable 
source. 
Chapter 1 will present the three main stages of development of the EU model of 
protecting EU citizens abroad. For this purpose, EU official and publicly unavailable 
materials and international agreements concluded by the EU countries touching on consular 
and diplomatic protection of individuals as well as the national legal frameworks and practice 
of almost all the Member States were assessed. Legislative databases of the Member States, 
web pages of the competent national Ministries, embassies and consulates have served also as 
sources of information. The majority of these materials are now available in the CARE 
database. 
Chapter 2 will depict the current face of consular and diplomatic protection of 
individuals within the public international legal framework. The following materials were 
collected and assessed: those demonstrating the attitudes of States; the case law of the 
International Court of Justice and other regional and domestic courts; the work of other 
bodies, such as the International Law Association and the International Law Commission; and 
the views of legal scholars and practitioners publishing on the topic.48 
                                                 
48 The methodology follows the evidence requirement, as suggested by the First Report of the ILC on the 
formation of customary international law, see First report on formation and evidence of customary international 
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Chapter 3 assesses the relationship between the EU model of protecting EU citizens 
abroad and the international legal framework in an attempt to answer the academic critiques 
regarding the alleged incompatibility of the EU model with the relevant international legal 
norms on consular and diplomatic protection of individuals. The research methodology of this 
Chapter is partially based on conclusions reached in the previous Chapter on the evolution of 
the written and customary legal norms on consular and diplomatic protection of individuals. 
Since the Chapter addresses the legal question of compatibility and normative influence 
between the general international legal regime and a specific regional legal regime (EU), the 
research methodology is predominantly legal and desk research based. Several sociological 
studies were consulted for the purpose of comprehending the EU citizenship contribution to 
the current relationship between the EU citizens and the EU countries, and the EU.49  
Chapter 4 focuses on assessing the current role of the EU in ensuring protection of EU 
citizens and its relation with the Member States’ legal and institutional settings on consular 
and diplomatic protection of nationals abroad. In order to present a complete and 
comprehensive picture of the EU role and the impact of EU policies on domestic legal, policy 
and institutional frameworks, this Chapter used several methodological tools. First, a desk 
research of EU legal acts and soft law documents, in particular, information and data from the 
minutes of the COCON meetings, served for a first collection of data. Second, a comparative 
analysis of legal rules and practices of the EU countries in providing consular and diplomatic 
protection of their own citizens and non-national EU citizens was conducted on the basis of 
the National Reports drafted by national legal experts following the instructions of the CARE 
Coordination team. The identified problems and gaps in the EU model of ensuring protection 
of EU citizens abroad were discussed during several workshops with various stakeholders: 
mainly academics and few EU policy-makers representatives (2010 CARE Workshop in 
Bologna and 2011 RELEX Workshop in Florence); mainly national practitioners and policy-
makers and several academics of different background (2011 Brussels). The latter Workshop 
was also an occasion to discuss policy options with both EU officials and national 
                                                                                                                                                        
law by Michael Wood, Special Rapporteur, International Law Commission Sixty-fifth session Geneva, 6 May-7 
June and 8 July-9 August 2013. 
49 See, in particular See the European Commission report on progress towards effective EU citizenship 2011 – 
2013, available online at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/citizen/files/com_2013_270_en.pdf ; European Commission, 
Directorate-General for Research and Innovation Socio-economic Sciences and Humanities, Policy Review – Co-
creating the European Union Citizenship, available at http://ec.europa.eu/research/social-sciences/pdf/co-
creating_eu_citizenship.pdf; A. Favell, E. Recchi, T. Kuhn, Janne S. Jensen and J. Klein, ‘The Europeanisation 
of Everyday Life: Cross-Border Practices and Transnational Identifications Among EU and Third-Country 




representatives of Ministries of Foreign Affairs on how the EU could better assist 
unrepresented citizens and Member States, and how the EU could better support the Member 






























Chapter 1: The Emergence of an EU Model for Protecting 




The protection of citizens in foreign countries, whether ensured through diplomatic or 
military means, has traditionally been considered the preserve of the State(s) of nationality.50 
Protection ensured by way of the peaceful mechanisms of consular and diplomatic protection 
of individuals, or by forceful, military means are some of the oldest institutions of public 
international law, which have been commonly perceived as part of the specific consular and 
diplomatic branches of international law.51 In spite of the public international law 
developments under the changing international relations and participation of new international 
actors as subjects of international law,52 international consular and diplomatic law has 
remained a States-dominated field of public international law.53 The State’s exercise of 
protection of citizens in third countries has followed unwritten, customary international norms 
until relatively recently, in the 1960s54, when two multilateral treaties55 on the conduct of 
consular and diplomatic relations were concluded by States, laying down reciprocal rules for 
                                                 
50 See the Commentaries to the ILC Articles on Diplomatic Protection. 
51 L. T. Lee and J. Quigley, Consular Law and Practice, Third Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008; 
A. James and M. Warren, A Universal Safeguard: Providing Consular Assistance to Nationals in Custody An 
Introductory Guide for Consular Officers, available at: 
<http://www.internationaljusticeproject.org/pdfs/GenericVCCRprint.pdf> (accessed July 2014). See also ICJ, 
Case concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran of 24 May 1980 (US v. Iran), para. 86. 
52 J. Melissen, Innovation in Diplomatic Practice, Palgrave Macmillan (2013); A.F. Cooper, ‘The changing 
nature of diplomacy’, in A.F. Cooper, J. Heine and R. Thakur (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Modern 
Diplomacy, Oxford University Press (2013). 
53 P. Okowa, ‘Issues of Admissibility and the Law of International Responsibility’ in M. Evans (ed), Oxford 
University Press (2014), 477-509; R. Wessel, Bart van Vooren, ‘The EEAS’ Diplomatic Dreams and the Reality 
of European and International Law’, paper presented at the UACES Conference Exchanging Ideas on Europe 
2012, Old Borders–New Frontiers, 3-5 September 2012, Passau, Germany, available 
http://doc.utwente.nl/82239/1/Wessel_EEAS.pdf; J. Wouters and S. Duquet, ‘The EU and International 
Diplomatic Law: New Horizons?’, (2012) The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 31. 
54 The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations was signed in Vienna on 18 April 1961 and entered into 
force on 24 April 1964, see: United Nations Treaty Series (UNTS), vol. 500, p. 95, no. 310. The Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations signed on 24 April 1963, entered into force on 19 March 1967, UN Treaty 
Series, vol. 596, p. 261. 
55 187 States are party to the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and 176 are party to the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations. They have by now become part of the general customary international law, 
enjoying a global application (see, ICJ, Case concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran 
(US v. Iran), Judgment of 24 May 1980, ICJ Reports (1980), 1-3; Case concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 
April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Judgment of 14 February 2002, ICJ Reports (2002), 
1, para. 52). 
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the receiving and the sending States to follow, inter alia, in the treatment of aliens in foreign 
countries. 
 The Vienna Conventions on Consular and Diplomatic Relations provide, as primary 
consular and diplomatic functions of the State, the protection of the interests of the State’s 
own nationals.56 The precise consular and diplomatic protection services which can be 
exercised by a State for the benefit of its citizens abroad are not detailed in the Vienna 
Conventions, they have developed in practice based on the changing needs of international 
society, conduct of international relations and development of technology used by consular 
and diplomatic officials. Consular and, in certain circumstances, also diplomatic officials57 
can now provide a long list of consular services that contribute to ensuring the protection of 
citizens of their sending State, such as: facilitating administrative procedures pertaining to 
repatriation in cases of death or serious illness; the exercise of notary and public register 
functions; observance of the individuals’ trial, detention or other legal proceedings, 
international judicial co-operation related services; assistance in cases of renewal or loss of 
passports and identity cards; and the protection of the interests of minors and other persons 
lacking full capacity.58 Some of the situations in which consular assistance is most important 
are those where there are indications that individuals have been subjected to torture or other 
illegal mistreatment, or face a real risk of being subjected to such treatment, and, especially in 
cases of detention or incarceration, where such abuses are more likely to occur.59 In these 
latter situations, the role of the consuls and diplomats is of the utmost importance in ensuring 
the integrity of the judicial proceedings, and in preventing or stopping mistreatment or abuses 
from being perpetrated upon citizens. The consular and diplomatic officials can provide 
information and advice on local legal proceedings and may also protest and seek redress when 
a wrong is committed against one of their co-nationals by local authorities.  
The overall purpose of consular assistance in situations of deprivation of liberty is to 
provide necessary humanitarian assistance or access to legal assistance to nationals in 
custody, and to ensure that the public authorities of the receiving third country respect the 
minimum standards of international human rights protection throughout the legal 
                                                 
56 See Art. 3(1)(a) VCDR and Art. 5(1)(a) VCCR. 
57 Arts. 3 and 70 VCCR. 
58 However, according to Article 5(m) VCCR, the list is not intended to be exhaustive and consuls can perform 
functions ‘which are not prohibited by the laws and regulations of the receiving State or to which no objection is 
taken by the receiving State’. 
59 See the REDRESS Report Tortured Abroad: The UK’s obligations to British Nationals and Residents, 
September 2012, available at: <http://www.redress.org/downloads/publications/121001tortured_abroad.pdf>. 
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proceedings.60 Timely consular assistance is essential for ensuring that foreign nationals 
facing prosecution and imprisonment receive fair and equal treatment by domestic courts and 
penal authorities. In third countries which still apply the death penalty, receiving prompt 
consular assistance ensures not only the foreigner’s absolute human rights, such as the 
freedom from torture and inhumane and degrading treatment, and procedural human rights, 
such as the right to a fair trial, but also the most fundamental of human rights, i.e., the right to 
life. The importance of the assistance that consular and diplomatic officials can offer to 
nationals in a foreign country, and the dramatic consequences of the absence of such timely 
consular support were clearly revealed in the LaGrand case.61 In this case, the fate of two 
German citizens might well have been different, and their execution could possibly have been 
prevented, if consular assistance had been provided more promptly by the consular missions 
of their State of nationality.62  
It can therefore be concluded that the absence of an external representation of a State 
in a third country not only deprives the national of mere administrative services, or endangers 
his fundamental rights, but in certain urgent circumstances it can actually endanger his life, or 
even lead to his death.  
Several factors internal and external to the Union have prompted the need to speed up 
the solidarity among Member States, but also the vertical cooperation with the Union, for the 
purpose of securing the protection of the Union citizens outside the Union borders. The 
various enlargement waves of the Union brought new Member States with less extensive 
external representation, which led to an increasing number of unrepresented Union citizens in 
third countries. The increasing budgetary constraints and the growing number and gravity of 
disasters affecting third countries, revealed that Member States’ traditional public 
international use of consular and diplomatic protection of nationals abroad can no longer 
                                                 
60 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights described the assistance of nationals in foreign countries, 
especially in situations where they are facing criminal proceedings, to be one of the paramount functions of a 
consular officer: ‘It is evident that the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations recognizes assistance to a 
national of the sending State for the defence of his rights before the authorities of the host State to be one of the 
paramount functions of a consular officer…the real situation of the foreign nationals facing criminal proceedings 
must be considered. Their most precious juridical rights, perhaps even their lives, hang in the balance’. The 
Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law, 
Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, October 1, 1999, Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Ser. A) No. 16 (1999). 
61 LaGrand Case (Germany v United States of America), International Court of Justice (ICJ), 27 June 2001. 
62 See the LaGrand case. For more legal literature on the LaGrand judgment and other similar jurisprudence, 
see: A. James, M. Cross and M. Warrant (eds.), Equal Protection: Consular Assistance and Criminal Justice 
Procedures in the USA. An Introductory Guide for Consulates, third edition, available at: 
http://www.internationaljusticeproject.org/pdfs/VCCRguide.pdf (accessed February 2013); Note, ‘Too 
Sovereign but Not Sovereign Enough: Are U. S. States beyond the Reach of the Law of Nations?’, (2003) 
Harvard Law Review, 2654; P. Van Alstine, ‘The Death of Good Faith in Treaty Jurisprudence and a Call for 
Resurrection’, (2005) GEO. L.J., 1885. 
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effectively secure the protection of their citizens in third countries. At the same time these 
citizens were also Union citizens, thus reflecting the image of the Union in the world. 
Therefore a failure of one of the Member States to protect its citizens abroad would negatively 
affect the image of both the Member State of nationality and the Union. In the 1980s the 
Member States started to discuss ways of guaranteeing the protection and security of their 
citizens outside the Union, within the framework of the elaboration of the Maastricht Treaty. 
These solidarity endeavours were meant to ensure at the same time the objectives of 
increasing solidarity among the peoples of the Union and the external image of the Union as a 
powerful international actor. 
The first coordination endeavour entailed a sort of delegation of consular 
representation tasks among the Member States, whereby they agreed to share consular and 
diplomatic responsibilities for the purpose of ensuring that none of their citizens is left 
unprotected outside the EU.63 This protection of citizens outside the Union by pooling the 
Member States’ consular and diplomatic functions and resources was conceptualised as a 
right attached to the EU citizenship. Among the four EU citizenship rights, the unrepresented 
Union citizens were guaranteed a right to equal protection outside the Union. Thus, since 
1993, the EU citizens located in third countries who did not have an external representation of 
their Member State of nationality to resort to for help have had an EU citizenship right to 
receive protection from the consular or diplomatic authorities of the other Member States 
represented in loco on the same conditions as the nationals of these Member States. This 
particular right is the least researched of all the EU citizenship rights, and it is also the most 
unusual in light of its features, implementation, and interplay with other EU policies.  
After several years of being completely neglected, recent events have brought this 
right to the fore, and have showed its potential for the EU citizens located in third countries 
and the Member States overburden with consular tasks. The recent natural and man-made 
disasters that have occurred across the globe, from the countries of North Africa and the 
Persian Gulf (Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Bahrain) to Japan64, have shown the importance of 
the EU citizenship right to equal protection in third countries, highlighting its practical 
benefits, not only for the EU citizens, but also for the Member States. 
                                                 
63 See more details in the following sub-section. 
64 Many regions of the world have been hit by major natural or man-made disasters in the last five or six years 
which have caused a great number of deaths and injuries. For instance, the democratic uprising of the spring of 
2011 in the Southern Neighbourhood, the earthquake and the tsunami that hit Haiti in January 2010, the 
Icelandic volcanic ash cloud of 2010, acts of local or international terrorism (Sharm el-Sheikh 2005, the 11 
September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York), military conflicts (Lebanon conflict of 
summer 2006, the Georgian conflict of August 2008). 
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For instance, when Haiti was hit by a tsunami in 2010, less than half of the Member 
States had a consular or diplomatic mission in loco to which their nationals could have 
resorted to for help. When the democratic revolution shook Libya in the spring of 2011, only 
8 Member States were represented, while a total of 6,000 EU citizens were in need of 
protection.65 The aforementioned crises are not isolated events, but they are part of a 
phenomenon that has developed over the last decade. More and more EU citizens travel 
outside of the Union,66 while, increasingly, a certain number of them establish themselves in 
third countries and thus need protection abroad on a regular basis.67 While the number of EU 
citizens in need of protection abroad is increasing, the number of consular and diplomatic 
representations of the Member States is decreasing, mainly due to the financial crisis that has 
recently affected them all.68 The result is that a higher number of EU citizens than ever before 
cannot obtain protection in third countries from their home Member States. The increasing 
international threats post 9/11, the further enlargement of the Union including Member States 
with less extensive external representations and the financial crisis affecting all the Member 
States have led to a second development in the EU legal framework on the protection of 
Union citizens abroad. Since the inter-governmental cooperation among the Member States 
proved insufficient to guarantee the security of Union citizens in the world, efforts were 
directed towards increasing vertical cooperation, i.e. between the Member States and the 
Union, for the purpose of complementing the Member States’ capabilities with the Union’s 
resources, leading thus to a supporting role of the Union in ensuring protection of Union 
citizens in third countries. 
This chapter traces the main lines of the development of the EU legal framework on 
the protection of EU citizens outside the Union. It starts with a historical account of the pre-
Maastricht Treaty forms of consular and diplomatic cooperation established among the 
European countries. The main reason for assessing the pre-Union forms of cooperation among 
                                                 
65 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council - Consular protection for 
EU citizens in third countries: State of play and way forward, COM (2011) 149/2 of 23 March 2011. 
66 According to a 2007 survey, there are around 7 million Union citizens travelling in a third country where their 
home Member State is not represented. See Action Plan 2007-2009 and related Impact Assessment, European 
Commission, Communication to the European Parliament, the EU Council, the Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of Regions, Document COM (2007) 767 final of 5 December 2007 and Document SEC 
(2007) 1600 of 5 December 2007. 
67 According to the European Commission 2010 Report on Union citizenship ‘more than 30 million EU citizens 
live permanently in a third country, but only in three countries (United States, China, and Russia) are all 27 
Member States represented.’ See European Commission, EU citizenship Report 2010 - Dismantling the 
obstacles to EU citizens’ rights, doc. COM (2010) 603 of 27 October 2010, p. 9. 
68 Igor Merheim-Eyre, ‘Review of the Balance of Competences: Foreign & Commonwealth Office - Consular 
Services Evidence from Stakeholders’, EPIN Working Paper No. 34/2012. 
 20 
 
the European countries is to establish whether the EU citizenship right to equal protection 
abroad introduced by the Maastricht Treaty was inspired by previous regional forms of 
cooperation, or if it constitutes a completely novel legal construction. It then continues with 
the assessment of the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad as introduced by the 
Maastricht Treaty, and the subsequent implementation of this right by the Member States and 
the Union until the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty. The last section will critically assess the 
amendments and innovations brought by the Lisbon Treaty to the field of protection of EU 
citizens in third countries.  
The first section will attempt to answer the question of whether the EU citizenship 
right is a novel legal construction with no previous legal equivalent or if it builds on previous 
similar legal concepts or mechanisms. It will be shown that the EU citizenship right to equal 
protection abroad was not a completely new concept in Europe, since European countries had 
offered their citizens a similar right even before the creation of the European Community, or 
their accession to the Union, based on bilateral or multilateral consular and diplomatic 
cooperation agreements concluded between certain European countries sharing long-
established close diplomatic ties. The main added value of the Maastricht Treaty consisted in 
extending the solidarity existing among certain European countries to all the Member States 
of the EU under the form of an obligation incumbent upon on all Member States to provide 
equal protection abroad to all unrepresented Union citizens in third countries.  
The second section will explore the history and content of the EU citizenship right to 
equal protection abroad within the former Union’s pillar structure and will unveil the nexus 
between this policy and other relevant Union policies and instruments that have in time been 
used for the purpose of ensuring protection of Union citizens abroad.  
The third section will critically assess the specific implementation of the EU 
citizenship right to equal protection abroad immediately after its introduction by the 
Maastricht Treaty and continuing throughout the different phases of the EU integration 
process. The legal nature, content, effects and remedies of the EU citizenship right to equal 
protection abroad will be revealed, as well as the reactions of the Member States towards the 
transposition of the implementing measures into domestic laws. The various stages of 
implementation of the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad, starting with the sui 
generis intergovernmental forms and slowly advancing to accepting also the involvement of 
the Community and Union institutions and instruments will be chronologically assessed. This 
section will also explore the interplay between the internal and external dimensions of the EU 
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citizenship right to equal protection abroad, and the nexus with other complementary EU 
external relations policies that have been deployed for the purpose of ensuring the protection 
of Union citizens in cases of crises and emergencies.  
Having presented the positive aspects of the implementation of the EU citizenship 
right to equal protection abroad, particularly the benefits accrued by the EU citizens and 
increased Member States’ solidarity, but also the deficiencies in implementation, the section 
will continue to critically assess the relevant amendments brought by the Lisbon Treaty. This 
section will flesh out the changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty and the legal innovations 
as regards the EU legal framework on the protection of EU citizens abroad. The impact of the 
Lisbon Treaty on the EU’s role in ensuring protection of EU citizens abroad will be discussed 
in detail in the final chapter (Chapter 4), which focuses particularly on the Union’s role in 
ensuring protection of EU citizens abroad and its impact on the Member States’ consular and 
diplomatic policies and practice. 
In addition to the critical assessment of the relevant legal provisions, policies and 
practices on ensuring the protection of EU citizens in the world, this chapter also aims to offer 
a comprehensive overview of the evolution of cooperation among the Member States and 
between the Member States and the Union, and the divisions of roles between the Member 
States and the Union. The pre-Lisbon Treaty legal framework, policies and practice are 
furthermore relevant due to the fact that much of that legal framework is still currently in 







                                                 
69 See in particular Decision 95/553/EC, regarding protection for citizens of the European Union by diplomatic 
and consular representations, [1995] OJ L 314/73 and Decision 96/409/CFSP, on the establishment of an 
emergency travel document, [1996] OJ L 168/11. 
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II. The history of the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad70 
 
Since 1993, EU citizens travelling to or living in a third country, which does not have an 
embassy or consulate of their Member State of nationality to resort to for help, have had an 
EU citizenship right to receive protection from any of the Member States represented in the 
those third countries, under the same conditions as the citizens of these Member States. 
Unlike the traditional conception of international law, whereby consular and diplomatic 
protection of individuals in foreign countries is a mere discretionary right of the State of 
nationality,71 and individuals do not enjoy consular and diplomatic protection related rights 
from their State of nationality or other States, the Maastricht Treaty on the European Union 
introduced within the international legal framework an obligation incumbent upon all the 
Member States of the EU to ensure equal protection to unrepresented Union citizens outside 
the Union. Introduced as part of the EU citizenship package, the right to equal protection of 
EU citizens in third countries represented a novelty on the international scene, although it did 
not confer to the unrepresented Union citizens a right to consular and diplomatic protection as 
such from the non-nationality Member States. Its main substantive content, as argued by the 
present thesis, is, so far, the extension of the EU principle of non-discrimination based on 
nationality to a number of consular and diplomatic protection activities of the Member States. 
The Maastricht Treaty thus restricted the discretion which international72 and also domestic 
law73 had recognised to States over consular and diplomatic protection matters.  
                                                 
70 The conclusions made here are based on empirical data that I collected while I was working as a Legal Expert 
responsible for drafting the comparative analysis of the national legal frameworks and practice of the then 27 EU 
Member States on consular and diplomatic protection of citizens, which have been collected within the CARE 
database and 2012 Report. Some of the conclusions herein advanced have been presented, though in a different 
structure and form, in previously published work for the Commission, European Parliament or academic 
purposes. 
71 See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain), Merits, Judgment of 5 
February 1970, ICJ Reports (1970), p. 4 at p. 44. As to the exercise of consular protection of individuals, Article 
36 of the VCCR recognises an international individual right to consular assistance only between the foreigner 
and the receiving State and not between the individual and her State of nationality,   see: Case concerning the 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguay v. United States of America), Provisional Measures, Order 
of 9 April 1998, ICJ Reports (1998), 426; Case concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. 
United States of America), Judgment of 31 March 2004, ICJ Reports (2004), 12 Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. 
Democratic Republic of the Congo), Provisional Measures, the Judgment of the ICJ of 24 May 2007; Merits, 
Judgment of 30 November 2010; Compensation Judgment of 19 June 2012. See also, Edwin M. Borchard, The 
Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad, The Banks Law Publishing, New York (1916); B. Sen, A Diplomat’s 
Handbook of International Law and Practice, Third Revised ed., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (1988); J. Dugard, 
‘Diplomatic Protection’ in W. Rüdiger (ed.), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Amsterdam 
(2009). 
72 See more details in Chapter 2. 
73 See more details in Chapter 4, section VII. Mapping the Member States’ national systems of ensuring 
protection of citizens abroad and the top-down impact of the EU model of protecting Union citizens abroad. 
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This right attached to a supranational type of citizenship74 did not at that time have an 
exact correspondent right within other international organisations or regional legal orders.75 It 
is also unusual compared to the individual rights recognised by the Union directly to the EU 
citizens, whether of a citizenship76 or fundamental nature77, or derived from EU secondary 
legislation.78 The EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad is to be exercised purely 
outside the borders of the Union.79  
The novelty of the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad is given by the legal 
benefits attached to it by the EU legal orders, namely the EU principle of primacy, direct 
effect and effective legal remedies conferred directly to the individuals both within the 
domestic legal orders and before the EU institutions and courts, rather than the legal content 
of the right. The extension of the equal treatment based on nationality of the EU citizens 
outside the Union territory80 follows the model of previous agreements on the sharing of 
consular and diplomatic representation functions concluded among some of the European 
countries that share a similar culture, language and/or have long-established diplomatic ties. 
These partnerships were included in bilateral or multilateral agreements concluded among 
European countries on various subject matters, ranging from formal international treaties to 
                                                 
74 Namely the EU citizenship. 
75 Similar examples of individual’s rights have started to occur in other regional organisations only very 
recently. For instance, regional consular sharing agreements have been signed in the framework of other regional 
international organisations, such as the ASEAN (see the Guidelines for the Provision of Emergency Assistance 
by ASEAN Missions in Third Countries to Nationals of ASEAN Member Countries in Crisis Situation, Manila, 
Philippines, 29-30 July 2007) and Andean countries (see the Decision 548, the Andean Cooperation Mechanism 
on Consular Assistance and Protection and Migratory Matters, adopted in 2003, which provides that ‘This 
instrument stipulates that any national of an Andean Community Member Country who is within the territory of 
a third State where his/her country of origin has no Diplomatic or Consular Representation, may avail him or 
herself of the protection of the diplomatic or consular officials of any other Member Country.’ However, 
Decision 548/2003 has not yet been implemented). The ASEAN and Andean consular sharing agreements 
primarily target emergency situations. None of these provisions is so far a legally binding provision, since the 
ASEAN includes the consular sharing in a soft law instrument. While, within the Andean framework, the said 
Decision is not yet in force. These provisions do not enshrine an individual right identical to the EU citizenship 
right to equal protection abroad recognised within the EU legal order, but rather keep the partnership in consular 
sharing at a purely inter-governmental framework of cooperation, similar to Decision 95/553/EC and Decision 
96/409/CFSP. 
76 See, the free movement and residence rights (Art. 21 TFEU), political representation and voting rights (Art. 22 
TFEU), rights related to the communication with the EU institutions (Art. 24 TFEU). 
77 As established later on by the EU Charter. 
78 See, inter alia, Directive 2004/58/EC on   the   right   of   citizens   of   the   Union   and   their   family   
members   to   move   and   reside   freely   within the   territory   of   the   Member   States [2004] OJ L 229/35 
of 29 June 2004. 
79 E. Denza, ‘Commentary to Art. 46 of the EU Charter’, in S. Peers, T. Hervey, J. Kenner, A. Ward (eds), The 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary, Hart Publishing (2014). 
80 The substantive scope of the equal treatment does not cover all possible situations of consular and diplomatic 
assistance and protection, since Decisions 95/553/EC and 96/409/CFSP restricted it to a certain minimum 
required consular assistance cases. See more on this in the following sub-sections. 
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informal ad hoc agreements, and covering a wide range of areas of cooperation,81 from quite 
precise consular and diplomatic representation functions to more general consular and 
diplomatic matters.82 At the time when the Maastricht Treaty was adopted, similar agreements 
on the sharing of consular and diplomatic representation tasks existed not only within the 
European continent but were also spread among States around the world.83  
It could thus be argued that the creation of the EU citizenship right was inspired by 
previous regional and bilateral consular and diplomatic cooperation agreements concluded 
between some of the European countries. Prior to the establishment of the European 
Community or the accession of the Member States to the Union, several European countries 
shared consular and diplomatic arrangements similar to former Article 20 EC Treaty type of 
protection agreement.84 This Article builds upon the previous bilateral or regional consular 
and diplomatic co-operation agreements concluded between the European countries, and 
extends the cooperation to all the States that are party to the European Union, for the purpose 
of ensuring that none of their citizens is left unprotected when travelling or residing in third 
countries.  
The Benelux countries85, some of the Central and Eastern European countries, the 
Nordic countries86 and the Baltic States87 adopted agreements whose substantive scope 
                                                 
81 See, for instance, the Helsinki Convention on Nordic Co-operation, the Convention on consular cooperation 
between the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg and the Kingdom of Belgium of 30 September 1965, available at 
http://www.careproject.eu/database/scheda.php?trans=_en&caseother=10005   . 
82 For instance, the Nordic Cooperation Treaty of 23 March 1962 concluded between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, 
Norway and Sweden; Agreement between Austria and Switzerland on Cooperation in consular matters of 3 
September 1979; the Convention on consular cooperation between the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg and the 
Kingdom of Belgium of 30 September 1965. For more details, see Chapter Three, Section 2.1.2 of the Final 
Report of the CARE (Consular and Diplomatic Protection: Legal Framework in the EU Member States) Project 
(hereinafter the CARE Report), Section 2.1.2, available at: http://www.careproject.eu. 
83 See the Agreement between Bolivia, Colombia, Equator, Peru and Venezuela regarding attributions of 
consular officials of 18 July 1911. Additional examples are mentioned by Lee and Quigley, for example consular 
services for Libyans were provided by Jordan in Spain, by Lebanon in France and Ghana, by Iraq in Iran and 
Pakistan, and by the UK in other countries. See G. Haynal, M. Welsh, L. Century and S. Tyle, The Consular 
Function in the 21st Century’, A Report for Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada, 27 March 2013,1-
11, available online at http://munkschool.utoronto.ca/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/The-Consular-Function-in-
the-21st-Century-.pdf. 
84 See, inter alia, the Helsinki Convention on Nordic Co-operation (hereinafter the Helsinki Treaty), concluded 
on 23 March 1962 between the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Iceland and Norway), or the 
Agreement on Consular Assistance and Cooperation signed between the three Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania, before they acceded to the EU on 5 February 1999. For the entire list of bilateral and regional 
agreements between the European countries on consular cooperation, see Chapter Three, Section 2.1.2 of the 
CARE Report.  
85 The Convention on the field of consular cooperation between the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg and the 
Kingdom of Belgium is available in the CARE database, see 
http://www.careproject.eu/database/scheda.php?trans=_en&caseother=10018  




included the obligation of the consular and diplomatic officials of the Contracting States to 
provide assistance and protection, compatible with their functions, to the citizens of another 
Contracting State that was not represented in certain third countries. The substantive scope of 
these inter-States cooperation agreements was often broader than the protection envisaged 
later on by Article 8(c) of the Maastricht Treaty, which was limited by secondary legislation 
to a minimal number of distress situations.88 
Each of these agreements governs, inter alia, the management of delegation and 
sharing of consular and diplomatic representational tasks, which also includes delegation of 
the function of protecting the interests of the nationals by a non-nationality State. These 
agreements share certain similar traits: first, the principle that the Contracting Parties shall 
assist citizens of any of the other Contracting Party to the Agreement, should this Party not be 
represented in the receiving State (which is similar to the principles envisaged by the EU 
founding Treaties89); a second principle is that assistance can only be granted if the receiving 
State90 does not object to this assistance (similar to the principle laid down in Article 8 of the 
VCCR). The substantive scope of consular assistance of the Baltic and the Benelux 
Agreements extended to consular services in natural and man-made disasters as well as to 
consular notarial services. For instance, Article 3 of the Baltic Agreement signed in 1999 
includes also notary services within the right of the unrepresented individual to receive 
protection abroad from a non-nationality Contracting State.91 The 1965 Agreement concluded 
among the Benelux countries has a similar wide scope of application.92  
                                                                                                                                                        
87 The Baltic cooperation is dedicated entirely to issues of consular assistance. For example, Article 3 of the 
Baltic Agreement reiterates the cases set out in Article 5(1) of Decision 95/553/EC and adds a new consular 
function in Article 3(g) – [the consular and diplomatic officials of the Contracting Parties] acting as notary in 
capacities and performing certain functions of an administrative nature, in conformity with the laws and 
regulations of the receiving State. The Agreement is available in the CARE database, see 
http://www.careproject.eu/database/scheda.php?trans=_en&caseother=150  
88 Article 34 of the Helsinki Treaty reads as follows: ‘Public Officials in the Foreign Services of any of the High 
Contracting Parties who are serving outside the Nordic countries shall, to the extent that it is compatible with 
their duties and when no objection is lodged by the country in which they are serving, also be of assistance to 
citizens of the other Nordic countries, should the latter not be represented in the territory concerned’. See also 
Art. 3 of the Baltic cooperation agreement. 
89 See Article 8(c) of the Maastricht Treaty, which later became Articles 20(2)(c) of the EC Treaty and currently 
Article 20(2)(c) TFEU. 
90 The receiving State is the State where the person is located, which is a country other than the country of 
nationality and in the framework of this research it is usually a non-EU Member State. 
91 See Article 3(g) which reads as follows: ‘[the consular and diplomatic officials of the Contracting Parties] 
acting as notary in capacities and performing certain functions of an administrative nature, in conformity with 
the laws and regulations of the receiving State’. The entire content of the Baltic Agreement as well as other 
similar consular and diplomatic cooperation agreements can be accessed in the CARE database, available at: 
<http://www.careproject.eu/database/browse.php>  
92 According to Arts. 2-9 of the Agreement, Belgian consular and diplomatic officials can provide extended 
consular protection to unrepresented citizens of Luxembourg: e.g., registration of the Belgian citizens, notarial 
services, representation and help before the administrative authorities from the receiving State 
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In light of this context, it seems that the added value of the EU citizenship right to 
equal protection abroad introduced by the Maastricht Treaty consists, first, in the geographical 
extension of the previously scattered consular and diplomatic cooperation among some of the 
European countries to all the States of the European Union. Second, it ensured a stronger 
protection for the Union citizens, since the EU citizenship right enjoys primacy, direct effect 
and effective legal guarantees before national courts, features which lacked in regard to the 
international rights recognised by some of the Member States’ arrangements concluded 
outside the Union’s institutional framework. Although the EU citizenship right is not 
innovative in terms of its substantive scope of application,93 the legal effects and guarantees 
with which it is endowed, under the EU legal framework, bring the pre-Union or pre-
accession inter-States consular and diplomatic cooperation to a new (Union) level of 
integration, which adds more stringent obligations on the Member States for the benefit of all 
EU citizens.94 This precise legal nature, as an EU citizenship right, comes with additional 
benefits concerning the legal effects and remedies from which the EU citizens can benefit in 









                                                 
93 EU law currently requires Member States to ensure consular protection to unrepresented Union citizens in 
only six mandatory circumstances. See Article 5(1) of Decision 95/553/EC and Decision 96/409/CFSP, more 
details in the following Section. 
94 See the Preamble of founding Treaties, Art. 1(2) TEU: ‘in which decisions are taken as openly as possible and 
as closely as possible to the citizen.’ A phrase that has been included in all the different versions of the founding 
Treaties; see also Opinion 1/91, First EEA Agreement, [1991] ECR I-6079. 
95 For more details see Chapter 4, section: The legal effects of the Union citizenship right to equal protection 
abroad.                                  
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III. The Maastricht Treaty – introducing the EU citizenship right to 
equal protection of unrepresented Union citizens in third countries96  
 
The introduction of an EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad by the Maastricht 
Treaty, when most of the Member States had already in force similar consular and diplomatic 
cooperation international treaties, is due to the specific context of the time. The increasing 
amount of travel made by EU citizens in third countries and the rising number of European 
citizens who were not represented in third countries drew the attention of EU officials, such as 
Pietro Adonnino,97 who identified the need for a wider solidarity pact among the EU countries 
to ensure protection for all EU citizens in distress abroad. It was perceived also as a more 
strategic opportunity to strengthen the solidarity among all the EU Member States, instead of 
preserving regional division of consular and diplomatic interests and ties, and contribute to 
the construction of an external image of a unified Union and peoples. 
The previous sharing of consular and diplomatic responsibilities was conceived as a 
Union citizenship right to equal protection abroad, which required from the Member States to 
ensure protection by their consular or diplomatic authorities represented in the third country 
where the unrepresented EU citizen was located.98 At that time, the international legal 
framework did not establish an obligation on States to exercise protection of individuals 
abroad. International customary law categorised consular and diplomatic assistance and 
protection of individuals as discretionary rights of the State, particularly of the State of 
nationality, over which the executive enjoyed an exclusive competence.99 A similar approach 
towards consular and diplomatic protection of individuals was endorsed by the then EU 
Member States, within their domestic legal orders. Of the then Member States, only Portugal 
                                                 
96 A more detailed version of this chapter can be found in Madalina B. Moraru and Mario P. Chiti, ‘The right to 
consular protection before and after Lisbon’ in S. Faro, Mario P. Chiti, E. Schweighofer (eds.), European 
Citizenship and Consular Protection –New Trends in European Law and National Law, Editoriale Scientifica 
(2012), 17-41. 
97 The president of the Committee in charge with the conceptualisation of the EU citizenship. The establishment 
of a common protection of EU citizens in third countries was put forward for the first time by his Committee, 
‘Europe des citoyens’, after the meeting of the Fontainebleau European Council held in 1984, see Bull. CE supp. 
7/85, 22. 
98 See Point 2.6. of the Report of the ad hoc Committee on a People’s Europe to the European Council in Milan, 
28 and 29 June 1985, which reads as follows: ‘The citizen as traveller outside the Community - A Community 
citizen in need of assistance during a temporary stay in a third country where his own country is not represented 
by an embassy or a consulate should be able to obtain assistance from the local consular representation of 
another Member State. The Committee recommends that the European Council invite Member States to 
intensify work for such consular cooperation in third countries and to formulate more precise guidelines.’ 
99 Richard B. Lillich, International Law of State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens, Charlottesville: University 
Press of Virginia, (1983). 
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recognised a constitutional right to protection abroad for its citizens.100 Denmark101 and Italy102 
had legislative provisions interpreted as conferring an individual right to protection abroad to 
their citizens, while the majority of the Member States regarded the area of consular and 
diplomatic protection of individuals as a matter of policy over which the executive enjoyed 
exclusive power of decision, with no right recognised to the citizen to receive consular and 
diplomatic protection services.103 
There were several reasons why all the Member States agreed to restrict their 
international discretionary rights in consular and diplomatic matters in spite of the majority 
opinion that consular and diplomatic protection of individuals are matters falling under the 
exclusive sovereign competence of the Member States, namely: the numerous examples of 
successful sharing of consular and diplomatic functions among the European countries based 
on their previous consular and diplomatic protection international agreements; the fact that 
there were only five third countries where all of the then Member States were represented;104 
the fact that the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad was seen as contributing to 
strengthening the connection between the EU citizens and all the EU countries, as well as 
with the newly created Union105, due to the fact that in crisis situations, the individual is 
furthermore connected to the State or body providing help. 
The idea of a ‘European citizenship’ started to materialise in the 1970s,106 and a first 
version of Article 8 (c) of the Maastricht Treaty referring to the EU citizenship right to 
protection abroad would come to light with the adoption of a decision of the Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs meeting within the European Political Cooperation providing that ‘Etats 
membres examineront la possibilité de prêter aide et assistance dans les pays tiers aux 
ressortissants des Etats membres qui n’y ont pas de representations’107. The idea was further 
developed in the ‘Guidelines for the Protection of Non-Represented EC Nationals by EC 
                                                 
100 Art. 14 of the Constitution, see more details in the National Report on Portugal, section 4, in the CARE 
Report. 
101 Section 1(3) of Act No. 150/13 April 1983. 
102 Art. 45 of Decree of the President of the Republic No 18/1967. 
103 See the CARE Report, Chapter Three – Comparative Analysis, Section 4.1 Right to consular protection. 
104 Second Report on the Citizenship of the Union issued by the Commission, COM/97/230 final, 11. 
105 Misson L. Berthe, E. Delcree, C. Kaens, ‘La protection diplomatique et consulaire est-elle un droit 
fondamental?’, available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/25999685/La-Protection-Diplomatique-Et-Consulaire-
Est-elle-Un#scribd  
106 Olsen argues that the idea of a European citizenship preceded the launch of the ‘official’ European citizenship 
discourse in the 1970s, see Espen D.H. Olsen, ‘The origins of European citizenship in the first two decades of 
European integration’, (2008) Journal of European Public Policy, 40. 
107 See decision of 28 February 1986 of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs meeting within the European Political 
Cooperation; see more details in F. Poirat, ‘Comment on Art 46 of the EU Charter’, in Laurence Burgogne-
Larsen, AN. Levade, F. Picod (eds.), Traité etablissant une Constitution pour l’Europe, Commentaire article par 
article, Tome 2, Bruylant (2005), 578-585. 
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Missions in Third Countries’, which were provisionally applied as of 1 July 1993108, several 
months before the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty.109 These initiatives were not 
legally binding, but mere political acts, which were explicitly formalised by the Maastricht 
Treaty, by way of conferring a legal individual EU citizenship right to equal protection in 
third countries to all the unrepresented Union citizens.  
A new supranational phase of the European integration project was opened by the 
1992 Maastricht Treaty, which created the European Union and its flagship citizenship110 (a 
sort of supranational citizenship that was supposed to complement the classical State 
citizenship, which all the citizens of the Member States would enjoy). Article 8 of the 
Maastricht Treaty codified the previous political acts adopted in the inter-governmental 
framework of the European Political Cooperation and raised it from a mere political concept 
or a Union policy to an effective legal status of the individual, complementary to the status of 
citizen of a Member State.111 This new fundamental status conferred specific Union rights to 
all EU citizens, in addition to those deriving from national citizenship, such as: freedom of 
movement and stay (former Article 8a); the right to vote and stand in local and European 
elections (former Article 8b); the right to petition the European Parliament (former Article 
8d); and, finally the right to equal protection abroad (former Article 8c). 
Article 8c of the Maastricht Treaty112 provided specifically that Union citizens that are 
not represented by their home Member States in the territory of a third country have the right 
to be protected by the consular and diplomatic authorities of another Member State that is 
represented in the particular place in which the Union citizen is located. Contrary to the 1993 
Guidelines for the Protection of Non-Represented EC Nationals by EC Missions in Third 
                                                 
108 Decision of 241st Political Committee 29-30 March 1993 ‘Guidelines for the Protection of Unrepresented EC 
Nationals by EC Missions in Third Countries’, in force since 1 July 1993. The Guidelines were mentioned by the 
first Report drafted by the Commission on the European Citizenship of 21 December 1993, COM(93)702 final, 
p. 7. It has to be noted that the title of the Guidelines refers to the protection of unrepresented Union citizens by 
the EC Missions, and not the missions of the represented Member States. The Maastricht Treaty clarified that 
protection of unrepresented EU citizens outside the Union falls on the responsibility of the represented non-
nationality Member States, and only incidentally by the EC missions. 
109 The Maastricht Treaty entered into force on 1st November 1993.  
110 See Art. 8 of the Maastricht Treaty. 
111 Madalina B. Moraru and Mario P. Chiti, ‘The right to consular protection before and after Lisbon’ in S. Faro, 
Mario P. Chiti, E. Schweighofer (eds.), European Citizenship and Consular Protection –New Trends in European 
Law and National Law, Editoriale Scientifica, (2012), 19. 
112 Art. 8c of the Maastricht Treaty read as follows: ‘Every citizen of the Union shall, in the territory of a third 
country in which the Member State of which he is a national is not represented, be entitled to protection by the 
diplomatic or consular authorities of any Member State, on the same conditions as the nationals of that State. 
Before 31 December 1993, Member States shall establish the necessary rules among themselves and start the 
international negotiations required to secure this protection.’ 
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Countries113, which enabled the EC Missions to protect the unrepresented Union citizens, 
Article 8c followed to a certain extent the international approach by establishing that the 
responsibility to protect the Union citizens still remained a State responsibility, although, in 
this particular situation, it was not the responsibility of the State of nationality, but the 
responsibility of a non-nationality Member State. The Maastricht Treaty thus followed the 
regional model of sharing consular and diplomatic functions, which were in force among 
certain of the EU Member States. Unlike the consular and diplomatic cooperation regional 
agreements, Article 8c placed the emphasis on the equal treatment in the provision of 
assistance. The Article described the ‘protection abroad’ function as an entitlement of the EU 
citizens to equal treatment outside the borders of the Union market. The principle of non-
discrimination based on nationality, essential to the construction of the internal market,114 was 
thus extended outside the Union, contributing to the creation of a link between the citizens of 
the Member States and the Union. In addition to the bilateral or regional consular and 
diplomatic cooperation agreements, the construction of the EU citizenship right was inspired 
also by the domestic legal orders of some of the Member States, such as Portugal, which had 
provided for a constitutional citizenship right to protection abroad.115 The EU citizenship right 
to equal protection abroad is thus mixing features taken from the domestic legal orders of 
some of the EU member States, i.e. the constitutional legal nature of protection abroad of 
individual citizens; the international legal order, by preserving the main responsibility of 
protection to the State of nationality; and specific feature of the EU legal order constructed on 
non-discrimination based on nationality, by conceptualising the EU citizenship right to 
protection of EU citizens abroad on the principle of equal treatment based on nationality 
among the EU citizens. 
Compared to the other EU citizenship rights, the right to equal protection abroad of 
unrepresented Union citizens is unique due to the fact that it extends the application of the 
principle of equal treatment characteristic of the internal market to the territory of non-EU 
                                                 
113 T. Kostakopoulou, Citizenship, Identity and Immigration in the EU: Between Past and Future, Manchester 
University Press, 2001, 56; Madalina B. Moraru and Mario P. Chiti, ‘The right to consular protection before and 
after Lisbon’, in S. Faro, Mario P. Chiti, E. Schweighofer, European Citizenship and Consular Protection, New 
Trends in European Law and National Law, Editoriale Scientifica, 2012, 17-41. 
114 The principle of non-discrimination based on nationality is one of the general principles of EU law, see Case 
C-1/72 Frilli v Belgium [1972] ECR 457, para.19; Case C-103 and 145/77 Royal Scholten-Honig (Holdings) Ltd 
v Intervention Board for Agricultural Produce [1978] ECR 2037, para.26. As to the significant importance of the 
principle of non-discrimination based on nationality to the creation and advancement of the internal market, see 
N. Reich, C. Goddard, K. Vasiljeva, Understanding EU law: Objectives, Principles and Methods of Community 
Law, Intersentia (2005), 191ff. 
115 See Art. 14 of the Portuguese Constitution which states that Portuguese citizens abroad benefit from the 
protection of the State for the exercise of their rights. See the CARE Report, Portuguese Report, 377. 
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countries, and confers it with an independent status, dissociated from the exercise of 
fundamental economic freedoms. The citizens were to be protected for the mere fact of being 
citizens of the Union, without the need to prove the exercise of one of the fundamental 
freedoms, the cross-border element or financial resources which the CJEU has made the EU 
citizenship dependent upon.116 The ambitious objectives of enhancing the Union’s visibility on 
the international sphere117 and instilling trust in the peoples of the Member States on the 
advancement of the European integration process were not the only reasons behind the 
provision of this atypical right. The Member States’ limited executive capacity, which 
gradually became insufficient to effectively respond to all the consular and diplomatic 
demands of their citizens abroad constituted an equally significant reason for the 
establishment of a shared obligation of ensuring protection of unrepresented Union citizens 
outside the Union.  
The Maastricht Treaty did not, however, define what was meant by ‘protection of the 
unrepresented Union citizens abroad’, and the term has not been clarified by the several 
subsequent Treaty amendments. The term ‘protection abroad’ of citizens is also to be found in 
the Constitutions118 and national laws119 of some of the Member States and has usually been 
interpreted by academics as encompassing both consular and diplomatic protection and 
assistance.120 During the preparation of the Maastricht Treaty some of the Member States 
proposed more concrete terms, such as consular and/or diplomatic protection.121 Following the 
proposal of the Luxembourg Presidency, the final text of the Maastricht Treaty replaced the 
‘consular’ and ‘diplomatic’ protection with a more general term: ‘protection by the diplomatic 
or consular authorities of any Member States.’ This replacement of terms could have been 
determined by the different conceptual approaches of the Member States to the provision of 
                                                 
116 For more details, see Chapter 3 IV.2.a section: The relation between Union citizenship and Member State(s) 
citizenship(s) – derivative or autonomous Union citizenship?. 
117 The significant role of the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad for attaining the objective of 
enhancing the Union’s international image clearly results from the Adonnino Reports and documents preceding 
the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty and also from the Decisions implementing Art. 8c of the Maastricht Treaty. 
Decision 95/553/EC provides in its preamble that the ‘common protection arrangements’ adopted for the purpose 
of implementing Art. 8c will ‘strengthen the identity of the Union as perceived in third countries.’ In addition, 
the objective of ‘strengthening the idea of European solidarity as perceived by the citizens in question’ is also 
mentioned. 
118 Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal and Romania; see the CARE Report, Chapter 
three, point 4.1 at 608. 
119 Denmark, Finland, Greece, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 
120 See S. Faro and M. Moraru, ‘Comparative analysis of legislation and practice on consular protection and 
assistance of the 27 EU countries’, in S. Faro, M. P. Chiti and E. Schweighofer (eds.), European Citizenship and 
Consular Protection. New Trends in European Law and National Law, Naples: Editoriale Scientifica Napoli 
(2012), 157-291. 
121 See for example, Spain’s proposal, available in Documentation de la RIE, Vol. 18, 1991, 333-338 and 405-
409; L. Nuergas, ‘De la ciudadania europea a la ciudadania de la Union, (1992) Gaceta Juridica, 93-94. 
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consular and diplomatic protection of nationals. A general term would ensure the exercise of 
the EU right to equal protection abroad in spite of the different domestic administrative legal 
frameworks.122 Second, the broad phrasing would not unnecessarily limit the substantive 
ambit of the right from the start, but leave the door open to include different forms of 
protection of individuals depending on the future evolution of the Member States and their 
peoples’ needs.  
In addition to the right conferred to the Union citizens, Art. 8c of the EC Treaty 
provided the means of implementation of the Article: ‘Before 31 December 1993 the Member 
States shall establish the necessary rules among themselves and start the international 
negotiations required to secure this protection.’ The prescribed date was not respected by the 
then Member States in regard to any of the required positive actions, that is: the internal 
measures of implementation (‘the necessary rules among themselves’) and the external 
measures (‘start the international negotiations’). In regard to the latter positive obligation, 
some of the Member States considered the Presidency verbal note sent to third countries on 
the newly consented consular functions of the Member States as already fulfilling their 
obligation to start the international negotiations.123 In regard to the former positive obligation 
of adopting ‘necessary rules’ for the implementation of Article 8c, the Member States 
envisaged them in the form of intergovernmental type of instruments subject to the 
unanimous consent of the Member States. Until the Lisbon Treaty, all the Treaty 
amendments124 maintained the same wording of this article, only its number was changed. The 
main reason behind its immutable nature is most probably the fact that, despite accepting to 
limit their international discretionary right to exercise consular and diplomatic protection of 
individuals, the Member States still perceived this field as a core element of their Statehood, 
falling under their exclusive competences. Therefore the Member States excluded for more 
than a decade any amendments that would lead to a transfer of their decision-making powers 
to the Union institutions. 
                                                 
122 The choice of general concepts for the definition of the EU citizenship right to equal protection of 
unrepresented EU citizens abroad is not an exception within the process of EU law formation. Similar examples 
can be traced in many other EU law related areas, and particularly those touching upon foreign policy matters, 
where Member States have few commonalities and the area is perceived as State reserved. The agreed EU rules 
are thus a product of complex political bargaining, and the law therefore usually contains a degree of - 
sometimes even intentional - politically necessary fuzziness. See, K. Koskinen, Beyond Ambivalence. 
Postmodernity and the Ethics of Translation, Tampere: Tampereen yliopistopaino (2000), 86. 
123 See the National Report on Germany in the CARE Report, 165. 
124 Art. 8c of the Maastricht Treaty became Art. 17 when the EC Treaty was amended by the Treaty of 
Amsterdam signed in 1997 and its content and number were preserved entirely by the Treaty of Nice. Art. 8c 
became the subject of a separate Article, Art. 20 of the ex EC Treaty. 
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In addition to Article 8c of the Maastricht Treaty, which later became Article 20 EC 
Treaty,125 the then Union pillar structure included other relevant provisions aimed at securing 
the effective implementation of the EU citizenship right. Under the ambit of the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy, which was one of the three pillars of the then European Union, 
‘the diplomatic and consular missions of the Member States and the Commission delegations 
in third countries and international conferences, and their representations to international 
organisations’ were required to engage in constant cooperation by way of, inter alia, 
‘exchanging information, carrying out joint assessments and contributing to the 
implementation of the provisions referred to in Article 8c of the Treaty establishing the 
European Community.’126 The Article was a specific application of the more general principle 
of systematic cooperation among the Member States and the Union institutions governing the 
CFSP127 in the field of securing protection abroad of unrepresented Union citizens. It indicated 
that the objective of securing the effective implementation, in practice, of the EU citizenship 
right was dependent on the close vertical cooperation among the EU and Member States, and 
not just the Member States’ themselves. The Article did not refer to a precise type of 
implementing instrument. However, being placed within the ambit of the CFSP Chapter, it 
could be assumed that one of the specific CFSP instruments, i.e. Joint Actions, Common 
Positions, Common Strategies or Decisions128, could have been a legitimate option for the 
Council to choose for implementing the obligation of vertical consular cooperation (then 
Article 20 EU Treaty) for the purpose of securing an effective EU citizenship right to equal 
protection abroad (Article 20 EC Treaty). 
The issue of the exact content of the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad 
has been the subject of fervent critiques in the legal literature129 and also from certain Member 
                                                 
125 Following the Treaty of Amsterdam amendment. 
126 See Article J.6 of the Treaty of Maastricht. 
127 Art. 16 TEU (current Art. 32 TEU). 
128 The Treaty on the EU provided the possibility for the EU to act by way of CFSP Decisions when 
implementing a joint action, common position, or common strategy (Art. 12 EU Treaty), and when appointing a 
special representative (Art. 18 EU Treaty). However, in the CFSP practice, the Council acted also by way of sui 
generis Decisions, meaning Decisions that were adopted on the basis of Art. 13 of the EU Treaty. 
129 See, inter alia, A. Vermeer-Künzli, ‘The Legal Framework of consular assistance: Some inconsistencies 
between EU law and international law on consular assistance’ in by S. Faro, Mario P. Chiti and E. Schweighofer 
(eds), European Citizenship and Consular Protection New Trends in European Law and National law edited, 
Editura scientifica Napoli (2012), 101-111; A. Vermeer-Künzli, ‘Where the Law becomes Irrelevant: Consular 
Assistance and the European Union’, (2011) International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 965; See J. Dugard, 
Seventh Report on diplomatic protection, United Nations General Assembly, A/CN.4/567, United Nations, New 
York, 7 March 2006, p. 10; A. Vermeer-Künzli, ‘Exercising Diplomatic Protection, the fine line between 
litigation, demarches and consular assistance’, (2008) ZaöRV, 339; T. Stein, ‘Interim Report on “Diplomatic 
Protection Under the European Union Treaty”’, in: ILA Committee on Diplomatic Protection of Persons and 
Property, Second Report, New Delhi, 2002, 36-7; P. Vigni, ‘The Protection of EU Citizens: The Perspective of 
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States.130 The main allegations concern the lack of clarity of former Article 20 EC Treaty in 
relation to its substantive scope of application. It was argued that it is not clear whether the 
drafters of the Treaties intended to confer both a right to consular and diplomatic protection 
and, if they did intend to confer also a right to diplomatic protection, it was contended that the 
EU provisions would be incompatible with the international legal framework. An additional 
critique referred to the lack of clarity of whether the drafters of Maastricht referred to consular 
protection or assistance131, since in certain Member States, consular assistance and consular 
protection are two distinct concepts. The personal scope of the Article was also not very 
detailed, since the EU Treaty provisions did not clarify whether ‘representation’ included 
consulates, embassies and Honorary Consuls, and whether they could be located anywhere in 
the third country of residence of the unrepresented Union citizen.  
The issues of the substantive and personal scope of application of the EU citizenship 
right to equal protection abroad were addressed, to a certain extent, by the subsequent 
implementing norms, which the Member States were required to adopt to ensure the effective 






                                                                                                                                                        
International law’ in: J. Larik and M. Moraru (eds.), Ever-Closer in Brussels – Ever-Closer in the World? EU 
External Action after the Lisbon Treaty, EUI Working Paper 2011/10, 91-107. 
130 See the national Reports on France, Ireland, Poland, and the UK in the CARE Report. In addition, see also the 
contribution of the Portuguese delegation during the written and oral stages of the public hearing held in 
Brussels on the European Commission’s Green Paper on Diplomatic and Consular Protection of Union Citizens 
in Third Countries, available at 
http://www.careproject.eu/database/schedaEU.php?eulex=EUpublichearing&lang=6  
131 Portugal has such a difference, see National Report on Portugal in the CARE Report. 
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1. Implementing the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad - 
securing effective protection of EU citizens abroad without encroaching 
on the Member States’ sovereign powers 
 
a. A critical legal assessment of the scope of the implementing measures 
Former Article 20 of the EC Treaty provided that the Member States shall establish the 
necessary measures amongst themselves to secure the protection required under that 
Article. Following this EU primary law positive obligation to adopt implementing 
measures, the Member States have adopted three measures in the peculiar legal form of 
Decisions of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting 
within the Council.132 The first of these Decisions was adopted on 19 December 1995, and 
clarified to a certain extent the personal and substantive scope of the EU citizenship right 
to equal protection. Although the right is recognised to all EU citizens, only those 
unrepresented by their Member State in the territory of a third country can exercise it. 
Former Article 20 EC Treaty did not offer further details on what ‘unrepresented’ actually 
means in practice. For instance whether only embassies and consulates qualify under the 
ambit of consular and diplomatic authorities, or also the Honorary Consuls, and what is 
the territorial area to be taken into consideration, i.e. the entire third country or the city 
close to the place where the EU citizen is located. Article 1 of Decision 95/553 clarified to 
a certain extent the meaning of ‘unrepresented’ by including both permanent 
representations and Honorary consuls, as long as they are competent to ensure consular 
protection, of the Member State of nationality or of ‘other States representing it on a 
permanent basis’ within the ambit of the ‘representation’ of the Member State of 
nationality. 
 As to the territorial coverage, the decisive criterion is the inaccessibility of the 
permanent representation or Honorary Consul from ‘the place in which he [the EU 
citizen] is located.’133 This criterion ensures that those EU citizens located hundreds of 
                                                 
132 Decision 95/553/EC, regarding protection for citizens of the European Union by diplomatic and consular 
representations, [1995] OJ L 314/73; Decision 96/409/CFSP, on the establishment of an emergency travel 
document, [1996] OJ L 168/11; Decision of the representatives of the Governments of the Member States, 
meeting within the Council, Measures implementing protection for EU citizens by diplomatic and consular 
representation (doc. 11107/95), 19 December 1995 (source: Council of the European Union, CFSP handbook – 
Compilation of selected texts applicable in CFSP, doc. 16074/06.) 
133 See Art. 1 of Decision 95/553/EC. 
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kilometres away from a permanent representation or Honorary Consul will benefit from 
protection through the representation of another Member State that is situated closer to 
them. In practice, these favourable provisions have not been properly implemented by the 
Member States, since none of the Member States have used specific criteria concerning 
the geographic distance or travel time to define the term ‘accessible permanent 
representation’. The criterion used most frequently is the concept of ‘considerable 
geographic distance’, which is interpreted on a case-by-case basis depending on pragmatic 
motivations justifying or not the provision of consular assistance.134  
As to the material scope of the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad, 
although the title of the Decision (95/553/EC) refers to the protection in general of 
citizens of the European Union by diplomatic and consular representations, its content 
refers only to consular assistance functions in five limited situations. Therefore Decision 
95/553/EC limited the substantive scope of the Treaty based EU citizenship right to equal 
protection abroad to consular protection in the following five mandatory situations: death; 
serious accident or serious illness; arrest or detention; victims of violent crime; and relief 
and repatriation of distressed citizens. The short Decision did not include details on the 
steps to be followed in providing consular assistance and protection in the aforementioned 
situations. Detailed guidelines are provided by way of a separate Decision of the 
Representatives of the Member States (11107/95).135 For instance, a list of the Member 
States pursuing the impounded or marked passport practice in case of repatriation of the 
unrepresented Union citizen, as a guarantee following an advance of public funds, is 
provided therein, alongside other very specific consular assistance guidelines such as: the 
extent to which excess baggage costs can be covered; details of the detainee which the 
consular or diplomatic officials would have to provide to his home country officials; the 
international human rights standards which the consular and diplomatic official of the 
represented Member State would need to observe throughout the detention period; the 
particular assistance to be given in cases of visits, legal representation, and the procedure 
to be followed in cases of petitions for pardons, easy releases and transfer of detainees. 
                                                 
134 See more details in Chapter III of the CARE Report, Section 4.1. 
135 Decision of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within the Council, 
Measures implementing protection for EU citizens by diplomatic and consular representation (doc. 11107/95), 
19 December 1995 (not published, source CARE Database, 
http://www.careproject.eu/database/upload/EUeu11107/EUeu11107_en_Text.pdf ). The Decision can be found 
in the CARE Database, or in the Annex of S. Faro, M. P. Chiti and E. Schweighofer (eds.), European Citizenship 
and Consular Protection. New Trends in European Law and National Law, Editoriale Scientifica Napoli (2012). 
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Article 5(2) of Decision 95/553/EC permits the Member States to offer consular 
assistance in situations other than the five mandatory situations. The reaction of the 
Member States to the exercise of this discretionary power has, so far, diverged. While 
certain Member States opine that consular assistance under former Article 20 EC Treaty 
must be distinguished from the provision of visa, passport and notarial services,136 and 
that the ‘Member States are under no obligation to provide these services to 
unrepresented nationals on a non-discriminatory basis, but approached as limited to the 
list of services under Article 5 of Decision 95/553/EC which does not include other 
consular services (with the exception of crisis situations)’,137 other Member States were 
willing to provide assistance to Union citizens beyond the limited circumstances laid 
down in Article 5(1) of Decision 95/553/EC. Certain Member States manifested this 
intention even prior to their accession to the Union138, while others have extended the 
scope of consular protection within the framework of the national measure implementing 
the aforementioned Decisions.139 Although, so far, this fragmented regime has not created 
many problems in practice, it is recommended that for the elaboration of future 
instruments on this matter, a more careful balancing assessment should be carried out 
between: the advantages of increased consular protection of certain unrepresented Union 
citizens, with the disadvantages of lack of clarity and an ultimately discriminatory regime 
whereby several unrepresented Union citizens in similar situations and the same third 
                                                 
136 See the National Report on the UK in the CARE Report. 
137 Ibid.  
138 According to the bilateral agreements concluded by certain Member States after the entry into force of the 
Maastricht Treaty, such as Austria and Hungary (see the Agreement between the Federal Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Austria and the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Hungary on cooperation of 
foreign representatives which entered into force on 20 December, 2005). See more details in Chapter Three of 
the CARE Report. 
139 Such as: the Czech Republic (According to Art. 4(2) of the Guidelines on consular assistance of EU citizens, 
‘Moreover, the mission can assist – in accordance with its competences – citizens of the European Union which 
have requested for it in other situations.’), Estonia (Although section 53 of the 2009 Consular Act is not clear 
enough about whether paragraph 2 should be interpreted as restricting the material scope of paragraph 1: 
‘Provision of consular assistance to citizens of Member States of European Union: (1) A representation of the 
Republic of Estonia protects the interests of a citizen of a Member State of the European Union if the Member 
State of the European Union where the person is a citizen does not have a representation in the receiving State 
and if the receiving State has no objections thereto. (2) At the request of a Member State of the European Union, 
consular assistance shall be provided if a citizen of the country is in an emergency, has been detained or is 
serving sentence, also in the event of death or other unforeseeable and extraordinary circumstances.’ On the 
other hand it has to be noticed that Estonia has very few representations and it is probably more likely to be in a 
situation of requesting consular assistance then providing it, which limits the relevance of the aforementioned 
question of interpreting the two paragraphs of section 53), Latvia (Art. 11(2) of the Consular Statute provides 
that consuls should assist and protect personal, material and other rights and interests of those EU citizens who 
have no consular representative in a specific area), Lithuania, Spain (See Circular Order n. 3.213, available in the 
CARE Database) and Sweden (According to Regulation (UF 1996:9) regarding Assistance to Citizens in the 
European Union, Swedish embassies and consulates may assist Union citizens in other matters. See more on this 
in the CARE National Report on Sweden). 
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country receive different consular assistance from different Member States represented in 
loco. 
The purpose of Decisions 95/553 and 11107/95 was to ensure a minimum common 
denominator of the type of consular services and practices to be followed by all the 
Member States’ consular and diplomatic officials in the specific five mandatory 
circumstances where unrepresented EU citizens should be equally protected abroad. The 
consular services and practices established by Decision 11107/95 are commonly provided 
by the State consular missions. Although, at first value, these Decisions seem to restrict 
the substantial scope of the Treaty based EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad 
and consequently take a step backward for the effectiveness of the EU citizenship right,140 
it has to be remembered that the Member States follow very different consular and 
diplomatic protection approaches.141 These divergent domestic legal frameworks 
complicate the process of establishing common rules on the exercise of consular and 
diplomatic protection within the ambit of a provision that does not require harmonisation 
of consular and diplomatic protection rules, but establishes a mere prohibition of 
discriminatory protection based on nationality by the consular and diplomatic authorities 
of the different Member States. In this light, the common detailed consular conduct 
prescribed by Decision 11107/95, which establishes a considerable number of detailed 
minimum standard rules on the consular protection of EU citizens in third countries, is 
quite an achievement. 
A second implementing measure was adopted on 25 June 1996 focusing on a 
precise consular problem, namely repatriation in cases where citizens have lost their 
passport. On the basis of Decision 96/409/CSFP establishing a common European 
Emergency Travel Document, the Member States agreed to offer assistance in cases of 
loss of travel documents by issuing a European Travel Document that would allow the EU 
citizen to return to his EU country of residence.142 All Member States offered some kind of 
                                                 
140 Certain authors have contended that Decision 95/553 is incompatible with the Treaty based EU citizenship 
right due to the restriction of the substantive scope of the protection abroad to the prescribed consular situations. 
See, in particular, T. Stein, ‘Diplomatic Protection under the European Union Treaty’ (Interim Report on 
International Law Association Report on the 70th Conference, New Delhi, 2002), 277, 278. 
141 See, in detail, Chapter three of the CARE Report. 
142 Decision 967409/CFSP of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting within the 
Council of 25 June 1996 on the establishment of an emergency travel document, [1996] OJ L 1684 of 6.7.1996.  
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assistance for nationals in financial need, although this assistance tended to be very 
restrictive.143  
It can thus be noticed that the substantive scope of the Member States’ obligation 
to equal protection abroad of the unrepresented Union citizens does not include all the 
internationally prescribed consular functions.144 Consular functions such as passport and 
visas, refugees, marriage and divorce, extradition and civil procedure, child abduction, 
other notarial functions, international, cultural, scientific and tourist functions, shipping 
and aviation, promotion and protection of trade are not included under the mandatory 
consular services list which the Member States’ consular and diplomatic authorities have 
to provide as required by the EU citizenship right. These functions may be covered by 
other Union provisions145, or be included by the Member States within the services that 
they decide to provide to unrepresented Union citizens under the discretionary power 
recognised to them under Article 5(2) Decision 95/553. 
Decisions 95/553 and 96/409 entered into force in 2002 and were subject to a 
mandatory requirement of amendment after five years from the moment of their entry into 
force.146 So far, there has been no amendment of the Decisions, and following the entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the amendment plan seems to have been dropped and 
replaced with a proposal for a completely different instrument, i.e. a Council Directive.147 
However, until the Directive is adopted, the two Decisions will continue to be in force as 
the main measures adopted by the Member States for the purpose of implementing the EU 
citizenship right to equal protection abroad of the unrepresented Union citizens. 
In addition to these three Decisions adopted by the Representatives of the 
Governments of the Member States acting within the Council, an impressive amount of 
                                                 
143 This kind of financial aid is provided mainly for the purposes of helping citizens to return to their home 
country (repatriation), and on condition that a reimbursement commitment is undertaken by the EU citizen; more 
on the comparative analysis of the Member States’ practice in this area can be found in the CARE Report, 
Section 4.5.6. 
144 As enumerated under Art. 5 VCCR. Although the exercise of consular functions is the prerogative of consular 
officials, under certain circumstances, diplomatic officials can also exercise consular functions (Arts. 3 and 70 
VCCR). 
145 See A. M. Fernandez, ‘Consular Affairs in the EU: Visa Policy as a Catalyst for Integration?’, (2008) The 
Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 21. However, as rightly pointed out by Denza, in some of the Art. 5 VCCR cases, 
the diplomatic or consular officer would not be competent or entitled to perform services, in regard to non-
nationals, such as visas or registration related functions (see E. Denza, Commentary to Art. 46 EU Charter, 
op.cit., para. 46.42. 
146 See Art. 7 of Decision 95/553/EC, which reads as follows: ‘Five years after its entry into force, this Decision 
shall be reviewed in the light of experience acquired and the objective of Article 8c of the Treaty establishing the 
European Community’. A similar Article was incorporated into Decision 96/409/CFSP. 
147 For more details see the last section of this Chapter: The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty - innovating the 
EU citizenship right to equal protection of (unrepresented) Union citizens abroad. 
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soft law was adopted by the Council, in particular the COCON148 Working Group, and the 
Commission, during the period from the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty until the 
adoption of the Lisbon Treaty: Council Conclusions and Guidelines149 and numerous 
papers issued by the Commission.150 However the measures do not have legally binding 
effect on the Member States.151 Both the COCON Working Group and the Commission 
proposals concentrated on the implementation of the consular assistance and protection 
aspect of the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad. The Commission adopted 
soft law documents in the form of: Green Paper, Action Paper, Assessment Paper of the 
envisaged Action Plan and a considerable number of Communications made to the other 
Union Institutions concentrating on proposals on how to tackle the problems of lack of 
awareness of the EU citizens of their right to equal protection abroad, the increasing 
                                                 
148 The COCON (Groupe Affaires Consulaire) Working Group began to function within the Council in 1993, its 
main task being that of organising exchanges of information on best national practices, see Green Paper 
‘Diplomatic and Consular Protection of Union citizens in third countries’, COM (2006) 712 final, 28 November 
2006. 
149 The COCON committee has adopted in its 15 years of existence an impressive number of conclusions and 
guidelines in the field of consular protection, which however maintain a very broad language, sometimes simply 
limited to reiterating the relevant Treaty provisions: see Guidelines approved by the Interim PSC on 6 October 
2000, Cooperation between Missions of Member States and Commission Delegations in Third Countries and to 
International Organisations, 12094/00; Consular Guidelines on the protection of EU citizens in third countries 
adopted by the COCON and endorsed by the PSC 15613/10, of 5.11 2010; Guidelines on Protection of EU 
citizens in the event of a crisis in a Third Country adopted by the COCON on 26 June 2006 – 10109/2/06 REV 
2; ‘Lead State Concept in Consular Crises’, Conclusions adopted by COCON, 10715/07, 12.07.2006; ‘Common 
Practices in Consular Assistance’ and ‘Crisis Coordination’ adopted by the COCON, 10698/10, 9.06.2010; 
Guidelines for further implementing a number of provisions under Decision 95/553/EC adopted by COCON, 
11113/08, 24.06.2008. The initial work of the COCON was not disclosed to the public. 
150 Green Paper - Diplomatic and consular protection of Union citizens in third countries (COM/2006/712 final), 
28/11/2006; Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - Effective consular protection in third 
countries: the contribution of the European Union - Action Plan 2007-2009 - Communication from the 
Commission, 05/12/2007; Accompanying document to the Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee - Effective consular 
protection in third countries: the contribution of the European Union - Action Plan 2007-2009 - Summary of the 
Impact Assessment (SEC/2007/1601) - Commission staff working document, 05/12/2007; Accompanying 
document to the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the 
European Economic and Social Committee - Effective consular protection in third countries: the contribution of 
the European Union - Action Plan 2007-2009 - Impact Assessment (SEC/2007/1600) - Commission staff 
working document, 05/12/2007; European Commission, EU citizenship Report 2010 - Dismantling the obstacles 
to EU citizens’ rights – 27/10/2010; Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and 
the European Economic and Social Committee under Article 25 TFEU On progress towards effective EU 
Citizenship 2007-2010 – 27/10/2010. 
151 See, for example, the emphasis that the Commission places on the principle of equality in the implementation 
of the right to consular and diplomatic protection by the Member States in its Green Paper, Action Plan, and 
Assessment of the Action Plan. The facts revealed in the press regarding the evacuation of Union citizens in 
Libya in February 2011 showed that initially the Foreign Ministries were not thinking in terms of giving equal 
help to the Union citizens in the evacuation procedure. Only later, after making sure that all their citizens had 
been given a means of transport, did they offer the spare places to other Union citizens on a first-come first-
served basis and not necessarily on the principle of equal number of places for the Member States. 
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number of unrepresented EU citizens travelling abroad and problems concerning the 
fragmented domestic legal framework of the implementation of the EU citizenship right.152  
The COCON Working Group proposals were commonly entitled Conclusions or 
Guidelines and focused on the division of responsibilities among the Member States’ 
consular and diplomatic authorities, and increasing efficiency of consular burden sharing, 
particularly in consular crisis situations. Following a series of consular crises affecting 
third countries which were triggered by both natural and man-made disasters, the COCON 
Working Group decided to adopt recommendations that would complement the Decisions 
95/553 and 11107/95 in the specific circumstances of consular crises affecting third 
countries. Although Article 5(1)(e) of Decision 95/553 included the relief and repatriation 
of distressed citizens among the mandatory situations where non-nationality Member 
States have to provide consular protection, the implementing Decision 11107/95 did not 
include any guidelines to be followed in consular crises situations, where urgent 
evacuation of a high number of EU citizens would be required. For the purpose of 
covering this particular scenario, Council Guidelines were adopted in 2006 aiming to 
encourage the Member States to adopt rules and procedures to be followed during the 
different phases of a consular crisis153: a pre-crisis phase organisation by establishing 
contingency plans among the consular and diplomatic authorities of the Member States in 
the particular third country, and during the crisis phase by drafting emergency plans in 
order to secure an efficient protection of EU citizens. The Guidelines proposed that the 
Member States adopt rules regarding the sharing of responsibility between the represented 
Member States in terms of information, management of the consular protection services 
such as: evacuation and handling the reimbursement of cost procedure, maintaining 
contact with the Member States and other States and institutions represented in the 
locality. The responsibility of drafting the contingency and emergency plans was left to 
the discretionary power of the consular and diplomatic authorities of the Member States, 
to be decided on the basis of the specific local circumstances. A recommendation of 
review on a regular basis was inserted. These plans, like the majority of the soft law 
                                                 
152 See fn 148. 
153 The Council Conclusions did not address all four stages of a disaster (prevention, mitigation, relief, and 
recovery), but concentrated only on pre-crisis, prevention type of measure and handling the emergency during 
the crisis. For the four stages, see more in F. Forni, ‘The Consular Protection of EU Citizens during Emergencies 
in Third Countries’, in A. de Guttry, M. Gestri and G. Venturini (eds.), International Disaster Response Law, 
TMC Asser Press (2012), 164-172. 
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documents adopted by the Council, were not made publicly available in the Official 
Journal or the relevant website of the Institution.  
Despite the fact that these soft law documents do not have a binding legal effect, 
the Member States have followed them closely. For instance, in 2007, the ‘Lead State’ 
concept was introduced by the Council Conclusions154, whereby a Member State that is 
represented in a particular third country accepts primary responsibility on behalf of all the 
other represented Member States for the purpose of securing consular assistance to all the 
unrepresented EU citizens. The mechanism was first put into practice by France in Chad, 
in early 2008, when it evacuated more than 1,200 citizens from 12 Member States and 
several third countries (60 nationalities in all).155 According to the Council Guidelines, the 
responsibility of the Lead State is limited to transporting the Union citizens to a place of 
safety. Once the evacuation of all Union citizens in need of assistance has been 
accomplished the mission of the Lead State ends.156  
Independently of the Lead State role, both small and large Member States have 
continued to assume the responsibility of evacuating EU citizens of other nationalities 
than their own, when they are in urgent need of help. For instance, Estonia, in spite of its 
limited consular capabilities, evacuated non-national EU citizens during the 2008 
Georgian conflict. After the earthquake that hit Haiti in 2010, Italy arranged the 
evacuation of 1,300 EU citizens of which around 250 were not represented by diplomatic 
or consular authorities of their EU country of nationality.157 More recently, when the 
democratic revolution shook Libya in the spring of 2011, only 8 Member States were 
                                                 
154 Council Conclusions, General Affairs and External Relations, 2808th Council meeting, 10654/07, Presse No. 
137. 
155 Madalina B. Moraru, ‘Practical and Legal Consequences of Absence of EU and Member States’ External 
Representations for the Protection of EU Citizens in Third Countries’, in Jean T. Arrighi, R. Bauböck, M. 
Collyer, D. Hutcheson, M. Moraru, L. Khadar and J. Shaw (eds.), Franchise and Electoral Participation of Third 
Country Citizens Residing in the European Union and of European Citizens Residing in Third Countries. Study 
of the European Parliament, Policy Department of Citizens' rights and Constitutional Affairs, 2013. 
156 Madalina B. Moraru, ‘Securing Consular Protection of the EU Citizens Abroad: what Role for the EU?’ in I. 
Govaere and S. Poli (eds.), EU Management of Global Emergencies: Legal Framework for Combating Threats 
and Crises, Brill Nijhoff (2014), 147, 166. 
157 As happened, for example, during the 2008 Georgian conflict, when Estonia secured the repatriation of non-
national EU citizens. After the earthquake that hit Haiti in 2010, Italy arranged the evacuation of 1,300 EU 
citizens of which around 250 were not represented by diplomatic or consular authorities of their EU country of 
nationality. Numbers and facts come from the CARE Report and from the European Commission 
Communication Consular protection for EU citizens in third countries: State of play and way forward, COM 
(2011) 149/2 of 23 March 2011. 
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represented, while a total of 6,000 EU citizens, many of whom were not represented, were 
evacuated.158 
In addition to Decisions of the Representatives of the Member States and soft law 
documents adopted by the Commission and the Council, the Member States have also 
adopted an ad-hoc type of common agreement on the basis of Article 4 of Decision 
95/553.159 These arrangements have not commonly been made public, not even in 
situations where the Member States decided to make use of the Lead State mechanism160 
and decided to attribute responsibility for consular protection to one particular Member 
State. The Lead State was announced either by way of press releases announcing which 
Member State will assume the Lead State responsibility161 or attached as an Annex to 
Council soft law documents.162 These co-sharing agreements are established on a 
pragmatic and case-by-case basis, their content and the precise responsible Member States 
are not easily accessible to the EU citizens.163  
The implementation of Article 4 Decision 95/553 by way of these ad-hoc 
arrangements has been criticised164 for restricting the personal scope of the former Article 
20 EC Treaty based obligation of the Member States to secure protection by shifting the 
choice of the protecting Member State from the EU citizen to the Member State, although 
the Treaty provision clearly gives the choice to the EU citizen. Another criticism regards 
the fact that the lack of transparency of these arrangements delays the protection an 
unrepresented Union citizen is entitled to receive, since he is not aware of the existence 
and content of the restrictive agreement. There are also no clear guidelines on the basis of 
which the responsible Member State for providing consular protection is established. 
Therefore, reasons other than the effective protection of unrepresented Union citizens 
                                                 
158 European Commission - ECHO, Libyan Crisis, Factsheet, 21 June 2011, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/libya_factsheet.pdf 
159 Art. 4 of Decision 95/553 reads as follows: ‘Without prejudice to Article 1, diplomatic and consular 
representations may agree on practical arrangements for the effective management of applications for 
protection.’ 
160 Lead State Concept in Consular Crises, Conclusions adopted by COCON, 10715/07, 12.07.2006. 
161 Sometimes published on the website of the European Commission DG Humanitarian Aid and Civil 
Protection, http://ec.europa.eu/echo/ 
162 See Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on Consular protection for citizens of the European Union 
abroad, Explanatory Memorandum, Brussels, 14.12.2011 COM(2011) 881 final, 4. Accordingly, ‘Lead States 
are currently established in 29 third countries out of 146 where at least one Member State is represented.’ 
163 According to the Report on Austria within the CARE Report, ‘Austria is – jointly with Denmark – a “Lead 
State” for Bhutan. No particular practice has been reported so far. Co-sharing arrangements are followed on a 
pragmatic basis. Resources are pooled with Hungary, Czech Republic and Switzerland in Podgorica 
(Montenegro).’ 
164 See Madalina B. Moraru, Mario P. Chiti, S. Faro and E. Schweighofer, ‘Consular protection of EU citizens: 
State of the art, current challenges and the future prospects’ in Chapter four Conclusions and Recommendations 
of the CARE Report. 
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abroad and reasonable sharing of the financial burden among the represented Member 
States might be the criteria for designating the responsible Member State. For instance, 
preference could be given to those Member States that treat the protection abroad of 
citizens as a discretionary matter of policy, instead of those Member States that recognise 
an individual right to consular protection endowed with clear domestic judicial remedies 
guarantees, thus purposely and discretionally restricting the scope of application of the EU 
citizenship right to equal protection abroad. The responsible Member State should not be 
chosen on the basis of whether it recognises a right to consular protection under its 
domestic legislation, and the extent of the executive’s discretionary decision-making 
power, since the aim of the Decision is to implement an EU citizenship right and not a 
discretionary power of the Member States to deliver the protection of individuals abroad. 
This particular State-driven situation should in practice be avoided, and instead ensure the 
publicity of these arrangements and not lose focus of the primary objective of these local 
arrangements which should be to ensure effective protection of the unrepresented Union 
citizens, while trying to additionally ensure a balanced consular burden sharing among the 
Member States. 
b. A critical assessment of the legal nature, effects and remedies of the 
implementing measures 
The measures adopted by the Member States for implementing their EU primary obligation to 
‘establish the necessary rules’ for securing the equal protection abroad of EU citizens are of a 
special nature,165 not falling under any of the classical Community or ex-EU type of 
instruments.166 They are entitled ‘Decision of the Representatives of the Government of the 
Member States meeting within the Council’, and should be distinguished from Decisions 
adopted by the Council under any of the ex-pillars of the Union. These Decisions are 
international agreements, different from the category of Decisions that were adopted by the 
Council on the basis of former Article 249 EC Treaty or former Article 12 EU Treaty.167 As 
                                                 
165 According to former Art. 20 EC Treaty. 
166 The type of EU secondary legal instruments that were available under the ex Community pillar were the 
following: Regulations; Directives, Decisions, Recommendations, and Opinions. The instruments available 
under the second and third pillar were: Joint Actions, Common Strategies, Common Positions, and Decisions. 
167 For a detailed comment on this type of legal act, see B. de Witte, ‘Chameleonic Member States: 
Differentiation by Means of Partial and Parallel International Agreements’, in B de Witte, D. Hanf and E. Vos 
(eds), The Many Faces of Differentiation in EU law, Intersentia (2001), 261-62; and for a legal assessment of the 
nature of these two particular Decisions (95/553/EC and 96/409/CFSP), see Mario P. Chiti and M. Moraru, ‘The 
right to consular protection before and after Lisbon’, in S. Faro, Mario P. Chiti and E. Schweighofer (eds.), 
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suggested by the title, Decisions 95/553/EC and 96/409/CFSP are Decisions adopted by 
national governmental representatives within the Council, by switching their hats from 
Council representatives to representatives of their Member States.  
Four different types of Decisions were available under the former pillar structure, one 
under each of the EU’s pillar competence and one outside the EU’s competence although 
adopted within the institutional framework of the Council. Sometimes both types of Decisions 
were adopted during the same meeting of the Member States within the Council, by way of a 
single act, which was split into two separate parts, one adopted and signed by the Member 
States’ representatives in their capacity of Council representatives, and the other part adopted 
and signed in their capacity of representatives of the national governments.168 It can thus be 
extremely difficult to establish in which capacity the Member State acted and consequently 
determine the correct legal nature of the instrument.  
The use of the labels ‘EC and ‘CFSP’ in the title of these Decisions has misled even 
renowned legal scholars, confusing their legal nature with Decisions adopted under former 
Article 249 EC Treaty169 or with Decisions adopted within the CFSP framework.170 This 
category of Decisions constitute international agreements concluded in a simplified form,171 in 
the sense that there is no need for formal ratification acts to be adopted by the Member States 
for their entry into force.172 The added value of the simplified format of adoption173 consists in 
                                                                                                                                                        
European Citizenship and Consular Protection. New Trends in European Law and National Law, Naples: 
Editoriale Scientifica Napoli (2012), 17 – 41. 
168 These are ‘hybrid acts’, as mentioned by AG Sharpston in Case C-114/12, European Commission v Council 
of the European Union, Judgment of 4 September 2014, nyr. ‘Hybrid acts’ are decisions that purport to merge a 
decision of the Council acting as an EU institution and a decision of the Representatives of the Member States 
into one single document. 
169 For instance, see Wyatt & Dashwood, EU Law, fifth edition, Oxford University Press (2006), footnote 5 at 
701; S. Kadelbach, ‘Part V – The Citizenship Rights in Europe’, in D. Ehlers (eds), European Fundamental 
Rights and Freedoms, De Gruyter Recht – Berlin, (2007), 567 and footnote 133 at 565; P. O'Neill and Susan R. 
Sandler, ‘The EU Citizenship Acquis and the Court of Justice: Citizenship Vigilante or Merely Vigilant Treaty 
Guardian?’, (2008) Richmond Journal of Global Law & Business, see footnote 69, 21; M. Lindstrom, ‘EU 
Consular Cooperation’ in S. Olsson (eds.), Crisis Situations in Crisis Management in the European Union – 
Cooperation in the Face of Emergencies, Springer (2009), 113. 
170 See Siofra O’Leary, ‘EU Citizenship – The Options for Reform’, (1996) IPPR, 63. 
171 They are simplified international agreements because first, they are concluded by the Representatives of the 
Governments of the EU Member States and not by the Heads of States and second, they do not require formal 
ratification. On the distinction between formal and informal ratification, which differentiates formal from 
simplified international agreements, see also Fuad S. Hamzeh, ‘Agreements in simplified form – Modern 
Perspective’, (1968-9) BYIL, 179. 
172 A ‘simplified international agreement’ or ‘executive agreement’ is an international agreement that is 
immediately operational upon signature by the representatives of the governments without the need to go 
through formal ratification by their national parliaments. For the specific topic of Decisions of Representatives 
of the Member States as executive agreements, see B. de Witte, ‘Chameleonic Member States: Differentiation by 
means of partial and parallel international agreements’ in B. de Witte, D. Hanf and E. Vos (eds), The Many 
Faces of Differentiation in EU Law, Intersentia (2001) and by the same author, ‘The emergence of a European 
system of public international law: The EU and its Member States as strange subjects’ in J. Wouters, A. 
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a speedier entry into force, avoiding tedious and long-drawn international and domestic 
ratification procedures. Although the Member States aimed to secure the speedy entry into 
force by concluding the Decisions in a simplified format, in practice, the entry into force of 
the two Decisions took seven years after their signing, ‘due to the cumbersome legislative 
procedures required for its adoption in Member States.’174 
Decisions of the Representatives of the Member States have been adopted since the 
very beginning of the European Community175, following an express legal provision in 
primary176 or secondary177 EU legislation or when there were no other appropriate Union or 
Community measures for the implementation of a particular EU matter.178 This type of non-
EU instrument adopted for the purpose of implementing an EU related subject is a sort of 
oddity, an exception from the main rule according to which the functioning of the Union is 
governed primarily by acts of the Union Institutions benefiting from the principles of 
supremacy over the Member States’ legislations, and of a wide panoply of specific legal 
remedies.179 Decisions of the Representatives of the Member States have so far commonly 
                                                                                                                                                        
Nollkaemper, Erika de Wet (eds), The Europeanisation of International Law, Cambridge University Press 
(2008), 39-55; B. de Witte, ‘Using International Law in the Euro Crisis Causes and Consequences’, ARENA WP 
4/2013, available at http://www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/publications/arena-
publications/workingpapers/working-papers2013/wp4-13.pdf 
173 An international treaty is concluded in a simplified format if it is concluded on the basis of an exchange of 
notes/letters. See Linda A. Malone, International Law, Aspen Publishers (2008), 9. 
174 Fifth Report from the European Commission of 15 February 2008 on Citizenship of the Union, COM (2008) 
85 final. 
175 The first Decision of this type dates from 1954. See T.C. Hartley, The Foundations of European Union Law, 
Oxford University Press, 7th edition (2010), 94. 
176 See Art. 253 TFEU (former Art. 223 TEC), which provides that the procedure for appointing members of the 
Court of Justice is taken by common accord of the governments of the Member States; Art. 341 TFEU (former 
Art. 289 TEC) provides that the seat of the institutions of the Union shall be determined by common accord of 
the governments. 
177 Art. 26 of the Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP of 12.07.2004 on the establishment of the European Defence 
Agency provides that the privileges and immunities necessary in the performance of the duties of the Agency 
shall be provided for in an agreement between participants Member States. The Member States thus are invited 
to adopt by way of agreement the act providing the privileges and immunities of the European Defence Agency 
staff. 
178 Under the duty of loyal cooperation (current principle of sincere cooperation), see: Decisions adopted 
pursuant to Art. 218 TFEU for establishing the position of the Member States in a body set up by a mixed 
agreement, e.g.: Internal Agreement of 18 September 2000 between the Representatives of the Governments of 
the Member States meeting within the Council on measures to be taken and procedures to be followed for the 
implementation of the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement (Published in [2000] OJ L/317/376); and the Internal 
Agreement of 10 April 2006 amending the Internal Agreement of 18 September 2000 (published in [2006] OJ 
L/247/48). Internal Agreements concern the adoption of the positions under the Partnership Agreement on 
matters for which the Member States are competent; the decision of the Representatives of the Government of 
the Member States meeting within the Council approving the accession of Vietnam to the WTO adopted 
pursuant to former Art. 133(6) EC Treaty (COM/2005/0659 final-ACC 2006/0215). This Agreement was 
assessed by the AG Kokott in Case 13/07 Commission v Council, case withdrew on 10 June 2010. 
179 R. Barents, The autonomy of Community law, The Hague, Kluwer Law International (2004), European 
monographs, 45; C.W.A. Timmermans, in P.J.G. Kapteyn c.s. (eds.), The Law of the European Union and the 
European Communities, Kluwer Law International (2008), 71-82. 
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been adopted for the purpose of operational, administrative reasons, and have not directly 
affected the rights of the individuals. In the course of the evolution of the European 
integration, the number of international agreements between the EU Member States has 
gradually declined: firstly due to the deletion from the founding Treaties of the provisions 
enabling the Member States to act by way of international agreements180 and secondly due to 
the creation of the possibility of the EU Member States to pool their cooperation within the 
EU’s institutional framework, under the enhanced cooperation mechanism as first introduced 
by the Treaty of Amsterdam.181 In spite of this evolution, as long as Member States retain 
powers to act internally and externally, they will continue to use the option of concluding 
international agreements in matters connected with EU law matters, especially when 
consensus is not reached among all the EU Member States,182 or in areas that they perceive as 
pertaining to their core sovereign powers.183 
It has to be noticed that the three main EU citizenship rights, which apply within the 
Union internal market, were implemented by way of Directives.184 In regard to the 
implementation of the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad, the Member States 
decided to use the classical international legal toolbox of instruments, excluding even the 
possibility of acting by way of an inter-governmental CFSP act. The main reason behind this 
choice of legal instrument is not an express legal provision requiring implementation by 
Decisions of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, but the fear of 
certain Member States of losing one of their last remaining prerogatives in favour of the 
Union, which has also determined the allocation of the topic of ensuring protection of EU 
citizens abroad to the COCON Working Group. This particular Council’s Working Group is 
                                                 
180 Former Articles 293 EC Treaty and 34(2)(d) EU Treaty were deleted by the Lisbon Treaty. 
181 According to Bruno de Witte, the provision was designed to make inter se agreements concluded outside the 
EU legal framework unnecessary. See more in by Bruno de Witte, ‘Using International Law in the Euro Crisis 
Causes and Consequences’, ARENA Working Paper 4/2013, 
http://www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/publications/arena-publications/workingpapers/working-
papers2013/wp4-13.pdf 
182 As happened in the case of the financial crisis, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM) were concluded in the form of Decisions of the Representatives of the Member 
States meeting within the Council. 
183 As in the case of the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad which impacts on the consular and 
diplomatic protection of citizens by the Member States. 
184 The right to free movement and residence – Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and 
their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States published in [2004] OJ 
L 158/77 of 30.04.2004; electoral rights - Council Directive 94/80/EC of 19 December 1994 laying down 
detailed arrangements for the exercise of the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in municipal elections by 
citizens of the Union residing in a Member State of which they are not nationals published in [1994] OJ L 
368/23 of 31.12.1994; the right to petition the European Parliament, to apply to the European Ombudsman, and 
to address the institutions and advisory bodies of the Union in any of the Treaty languages and to obtain a reply 
in the same language – related EU secondary legislation, Regulation 1049/2001 of 30 May 2001 regarding public 
access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, [2001] OJ L 145/43. 
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composed only of consular or diplomatic officials of the Member States, approaching thus the 
topic from the perspective of their specific training and formation in public international law. 
It will be shown in the second Chapter that under public international law, the field of 
consular and diplomatic protection of nationals has remained under the exclusive competence 
of the States. Consequently, it is no surprise that the COCON Working Group chose a type of 
legal instrument that is more faithful to the public international legal framework than to the 
Union legal order, thus reflecting the principal training, formation and views of the Working 
Group’s members. The COCON Working Group seems to follow the same pattern of 
‘implementation’ in all its documents: sharing experiences between the diplomatic and 
consular representatives so as to establish common practice. All the documents adopted by the 
COCON Working Group mention from the very start that the guidelines/conclusions are not 
legally binding and that primary responsibility in consular matters falls on the national 
authorities.185 
The EC and CFSP Decisions have been harshly criticised by legal academics186 for 
being an inadequate legal measure for the implementation of an EU citizenship right to equal 
protection abroad, and for substantially and personally limiting the scope of application of this 
Treaty-based right. Usually, this format of legal measure does not regulate substantive 
matters, nor does it have legal effects on individuals.187 The EC and CFSP Decisions, on the 
other hand, establish the substantive scope of a Treaty based right of the Union citizen to 
equal protection abroad, and the conditions that Union citizens have to fulfil in order to 
exercise this right. Acting in this way, it seems the Member States aimed to sidestep the 
complex institutional balance of the EU and the jurisdiction of the Court over the 
implementation of the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad,188 and keep the area 
under their exclusive and discretionary control, in spite of having already been included in the 
founding Treaties. 
                                                 
185 See documents enumerated in fn 147. 
186Alessandro I. Saliceti, ‘The Protection of EU Citizens Abroad: Accountability, Rule of Law, Role of Consular 
and Diplomatic Services, (2011) European Public Law, 91-109; Madalina B. Moraru, ‘Protection of EU citizens 
abroad: A legal assessment of the EU citizen’s right to consular and diplomatic protection’, (2011) Perspectives 
on Federalism, 67; E. M. Poptcheva, ‘Judicial and non-judicial guarantees of the right to consular protection’, in 
S. Faro, Mario P. Chiti and E. Schweighofer, (eds.), European Citizenship and Consular Protection –New Trends 
in European Law and National Law, Editoriale Scientifica (2012), 111 – 123. 
187 See R. H. Lauwaars, ‘Institutional Structure’ (Chapter IV) in P. J. G. Kapteyn, A. M. McDonnell, K. J. M 
Moterlmans and C. W. A. Timmermans (eds.), The Law of the European Union and the European Communities, 
fourth edition, Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International (2008), 221; B. de Witte, ‘Chameleonic Member 
States: Differentiation by means of partial and parallel international agreements’ in, op. cit., 261-65. 
188 See more details on this issue in the followin sub-section. 
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By restricting the substantive scope of the Treaty based right of the unrepresented EU 
citizens to equal protection abroad in five consular protection situations,189 these two 
Decisions clearly create legal effects for EU citizens, even though this type of Decision is not 
designed to directly affect the rights of individuals. This category of act is commonly used for 
regulating procedural, EU institutional matters, and therefore, even if, in certain limited 
circumstances, such acts have produced binding legal effects, these were limited to the 
Member States, having no direct impact on the rights and obligations of individuals.190 
Therefore, in the light of their limited legal effects, the fact that individuals enjoyed limited 
judicial guarantees against these international agreements did not create any problems, in 
practice, for the protection of the individual rights of the EU citizens.  
On the other hand, the two Decisions adopted in the field of protection of EU citizens 
abroad are exceptions from this rule since they directly affect the EU citizens’ right to equal 
protection abroad by restricting the substantive and personal scope of the EU citizen’s right,191 
without conferring upon the EU citizens sufficient legal remedies to challenge them before 
national and European courts.192 Despite being part of EU law, the legal nature of international 
agreements under these Decisions excludes the list of legal remedies which were commonly 
available in relation to the then Community and Union secondary legislative measures, such 
as: the infringements procedures which the Commission or another Member States can start 
against a Member State that fails to conform to the EU secondary legislation, preliminary 
references, direct action of annulment, or actions for damages submitted by the EU citizens 
before national courts or the Court of Justice.193 EU legal remedies were available only in 
regard to the implementation of the EU primary law provisions, and not the sui-generis 
Decisions. Therefore, the Commission could start infringement procedures against a Member 
States for inappropriate implementation of the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad 
                                                 
189 See Art. 5 of Decision 95/553/EC and Art. 1 of Decision 96/409/CFSP. 
190 For a detailed analysis of this type of act, see B de Witte, op.cit., 261-62. 
191 The EU primary law right guaranteeing equal protection to EU citizens abroad has been substantially limited 
by Decision 95/553/EC to five mandatory cases of consular assistance: death; serious accident or serious illness; 
arrest or detention; victims of violent crime; and relief and repatriation of distressed citizens. In addition 
Decision 96/409/CFSP include the consular services of issuing an ETD within the mandatory list of consular 
protection services under the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad. 
192 Since these Decisions are not an EU law act, they are not among the acts whose (in)validity the Court of 
Justice can establish, either in a direct action for annulment or in a preliminary reference on validity. See R. H. 
Lauwaars, op. cit., p. 221, and Bruno de Witte, ‘Using International Law in the Euro Crisis Causes and 
Consequences’, ARENA Working Paper 4/2013, http://www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/publications/arena-
publications/workingpapers/working-papers2013/wp4-13.pdf 
193 See R. H. Lauwaars, ‘Institutional Structure’ (Chapter IV) in P. J. G. Kapteyn, A. M. McDonnell, K. J. M 
Moterlmans and C. W. A. Timmermans (eds.), The Law of the European Union and the European Communities, 
fourth edition, Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, (2008), 221; B. de Witte, ‘Chameleonic Member 
States: Differentiation by means of partial and parallel international agreements’ in, op. cit.. 
 50 
 
by way of adopting simplified international agreements. The main effective judicial remedy 
that the EU legal order conferred upon individuals, namely the direct action of annulment, is 
not available to the injured EU citizens against these Decisions. Domestic courts can refer 
preliminary questions to the CJEU on the interpretation and application of these Decisions, 
only insofar as their adoption constitutes a violation of the institutional balance of the EU 
legal framework and substantive allocation of competences between the Union and the 
Member States.194 Additionally, national courts cannot afford damages to individuals on the 
basis of claims seeking the civil liability of the State, unless related directly to the EU Treaty 
provision enshrining the EU citizenship right.195  
The limited judicial guarantees enjoyed by individuals under the EU and national legal 
framework have prevented the citizens of the EU from lodging complaints against domestic 
violation of their EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad, and this also contributed to 
the minimal exercise and knowledge of this right by EU citizens.196  
The questions that follow are: first, does the formal denomination of the Decision of 
the Representatives of the Member States give the final reply to what the legal nature and 
effects of an act adopted in relation to EU law matters should be, or are there other criteria on 
the basis of which to establish the legal nature of an act to be adopted within a particular EU 
law related area; second, is the Member States’ choice of implementing act, namely an 
international agreement, respecting the vertical division of competence between the Union 
and the Member States, or was it designed to exclude the supranational institutions of the 
EU?; third, are there plausible reasons explaining the use of the international legal toolbox, or 
are the Member States sidestepping the Union institutional framework infringing the 
competence allocation and thus damaging the constitutional integrity of the European Union?  
                                                 
194 See Case C-370/12, Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland, Ireland, The Attorney General, Judgment of 
the Court of Justice (Full Court) of 27 November 2012. See also Case C-13/07 Commission v Council, case 
withdrawn, see the Opinion of the AG (concerning the legal basis of the Union’s decision on the approval of 
Vietnam’s accession to the WTO); Case 114/12 Commission v Council, Judgment of 4 September 2014 
(concerning an action of annulment brought by the Commission against a hybrid act, partially a Council 
Decision, and the other part adopted as Decision of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of 
the Member States meeting within the Council, on the participation of the European Union and its Member 
States in negotiations for a Convention of the Council of Europe on the protection of the rights of broadcasting 
organisations). 
195 On the legal status, effects and judicial remedies against Decisions of the Representatives of the Governments 
of the Member States concluded within the Council, in general, see R. H. Lauwaars, op. cit., 221; and B. de 
Witte, op. cit., 261-62. 
196 According to the information collected by the following surveys: Eurobarometer No. 188 of July 2006 and 
Flash Eurobarometer No. 213 of February 2008. Along the same line, see also the more recent Flash 
Eurobarometer No. 294 'EU citizenship' of March 2010. 
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The formal denomination – Council Decision or Decision of the Representatives of the 
Member States – has never constituted the final answer to the question of the legal nature of 
an act, since the legal content and effects of the act might indicate the need to use a different 
legal basis determining thus a different legal nature of the measure.  
The legal issue of establishing the correct legal nature of an act adopted by the 
Member States within the Council is one of the recurrent issues in the CJEU jurisprudence on 
the law of EU external relations, commonly dealt with under the broader constitutional issue 
of establishing the correct legal basis of the act.197 As early as the 1970s, in the famous ERTA 
case198, the Court had to establish whether a contested Council Decision was an act of the 
Council acting in its capacity of an institution of the European Economic Community or an 
act of the Member States whereby the latter coordinated their external powers.199 The Council 
Decision was a peculiar act, since even though it bears the title of ‘Council Decision’, its 
content referred to the position that the Member States were to adopt in regard to the revision 
of an international agreement to which only the Member States were parties. The Court 
established the leading principles, confirmed by its subsequent jurisprudence, which should 
guide the legal assessment of a particular instrument adopted by the Member States within the 
Council. 
First of all the formal label of an instrument adopted by the Member States within the 
Council, namely a ‘Decision’, whether adopted on the basis of the former Community or 
CFSP basis200 or outside the EU legal framework, should not be considered as an irrevocable 
presumption indicating the correct legal nature of the act and the remedies that injured parties 
benefit of.201 The Member States might have erroneously adopted a Member States’ instead of 
a Union Decision, due to their desire to preserve their sovereign powers over a particular 
                                                 
197 The issue of establishing the legal basis of an EU act is a significantly important constitutional issue, since it 
determines whether the EU has competence to act, sets the limits of that competence, the role of the EU 
institutions in the elaboration of that act, the voting rules in the Council and the scope of judicial review by the 
CJEU (see Case C-370/07 Commission v Council [2009] ECR I-8917; Opinion 2/00 Cartagena Protocol [2001] 
ECR I-9713; and Opinion 1/08 (GATS) [2009] ECR I-11129). 
198 Case C-22/70 The European Road Transport Agreement (ERTA): Commission of the European Communities 
v Council of the European Communities [1971] ECR 263. 
199 The issue of distinguishing between an act of the Council and an act of the Member States acting within the 
Council arose as a result of a plea of inadmissibility of the action of annulment, invoked by the Council. 
200 The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty has only to a certain extent unified the category of acts that the 
Union can adopt. The division between CFSP and non-CFSP matters in relation to the adoption of the Decision 
was maintained, in spite of the abolition of the pillar structure. 
201 The CJEU clearly held that ‘Consequently, it is not enough that an act should be described as a "decision of 
the Member States" for it to be excluded from review under Article 173 of the Treaty. In order for such an act to 
be excluded from review, it must still be determined whether, having regard to its content and all the 
circumstances in which it was adopted, the act in question is not in reality a decision of the Council.’, see Joined 




subject area or because they were not aware of the EU’s evolving competence or consensus 
which precludes the Member States from acting outside the EU legal framework.202 According 
to the ERTA doctrine, the legal nature of an act is the result of a legal assessment that starts 
with the question of whether the Union has the competence to act, what types of competence 
and whether the act produces legal effects towards third parties. The legal assessment will 
have to take into consideration the content203, context204, and aim of the act.205 Following this 
legal assessment, if the Union has been conferred or has acquired exclusive competence, or 
reached consent on a certain aspect falling under the scope of shared competence,206 then the 
Member States are prohibited from acting separately outside the Union framework and, are 
instead required to use the established Union institutional and procedural mechanisms.207 
Following the aforementioned jurisprudential guidelines, the first question that would 
need to be answered is whether the Union had, in the first place, the competence to act in 
relation to the EU citizenship to equal protection abroad. Certain legal academics and EU 
officials have argued that the phrasing of former Article 20 EC Treaty excluded the 
Community competence from the field of consular and diplomatic protection of the Union 
citizens.208 However the general provision of the Member States adopting the necessary 
implementing measure cannot be interpreted as expressly or implicitly prohibiting the 
                                                 
202 Case C-246/07 Commission v Sweden, Judgment of 20 April 2010. 
203 See C-45/86 Commission v Council, [1987] ECR I-1493, para. 11; Case C-300/89 Commission v Council (the 
‘Titanium dioxide case’) [1991] ECR I-2867, para. 10; Case C-268/94 Portugal v Council [1996] ECR I-6177, 
para. 22; Opinion 2/00 Conclusion of the Cartagena Protocol on Living Modified Organisms [2001] ECR I-
9713, para. 22; and Case C-176/03 Commission v Council [2005] ECR I-0000, para. 45; Case C-94/03 
Commission v Council (Rotterdam Convention), [2006] ECR I-1, para. 34. 
204 Initially the only objective factors amenable to judicial review established by the CJEU were the aim and 
content of the measure. In Opinion 2/00 (Conclusion of the Cartagena Protocol on Living Modified Organisms) 
[2001’ ECR I-9713, the Court added an additional objective factor amenable to judicial review, i.e. the context 
of the adoption of the act. 
205 Case C-300/89 Commission v. Council [1991] ECR I-2867 (‘Titanium Dioxide’), para. 10: ‘The choice of the 
legal basis for a measure may not depend simply on an institution’s conviction as to the objective pursued but 
must be based on objective factors which are amenable to judicial review. Those factors include in particular the 
aim and content of the measure.’ 
206 Case C-246/07 Commission v Sweden, Judgment of 20 April 2010. 
207 Case 22/70 The European Road Transport Agreement [1971] ECR 263; Joined Cases C-181/91 and C-248/91 
Parliament v Council and Commission (‘Bangladesh’) [1993] ECR I 3685; Case C-316/91 Parliament v Council 
[1994] ECR I-625; Case C-13/07 Commission v Council (Accession of Vietnam to WTO) removed from 
registry; Case C-370/07 Commission v Council, Judgment of 01 October 2009. 
208 See the declaration of the President-in-Office of the Council during the debate within the European 
Parliament of 4th February 2009 on the topic of consular protection given to the EU citizens: ‘The 1995 decision 
is a decision between the Member States, reflecting the fact that consular assistance and protection is an 
exclusive national responsibility and that consular relations are governed mainly by the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations.’ [emphasis added]. On the same vein see S. Kadelbach, ‘Part V – The Citizenship Rights in 
Europe’, op.cit.; H. U. J. d’Oliveira, ‘Union Citizenship: Pie in the Sky?’ Chapter 4 in Allan Rosas and Esko 
Antola (eds), A Citizens’ Europe, In Search of a New Order, SAGE Publications (1995), 75; Alessandro I. 
Saliceti, ‘The Protection of EU Citizens Abroad: Accountability, Rule of Law, Role of Consular and Diplomatic 
Services, (2011) European Public Law, 91. 
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Community’s competence, but rather as the absence of mentioning a precise legal act and 
procedure to follow in the implementation process. It could be argued that if the intention of 
the drafters was ‘exclusion’, then the Article would have been drafted similar to former 
Articles 149(1) and 151 of Chapter three on Education, Vocational training and youth of the 
EC Treaty. These Articles209 clearly provide that certain aspects of the educational and culture 
policies will be left to the Member States’ responsibility. Therefore, in the absence of a clear 
exclusion of the Community’s competence or exclusive allocation to the Member States’ 
competences, the only certain conclusion resulting from the general phrasing of former 
Article 20 EC Treaty is that the Community does not have an exclusive competence. It can 
also be interpreted as a restatement of the Member States’ obligation of ‘conform 
implementation’ of the Union norms.  
The Treaty drafters were aware that they could not envisage all possible specific 
situations where action by the Community would prove necessary. For this purpose they 
created former Article 308 of the former EC Treaty, which allowed the Community to adopt 
the necessary action in the form of one of the traditional Community instruments as laid down 
in former Article 249 EC Treaty but also any other form of action which might be 
appropriate210 if the following four conditions were cumulatively fulfilled: 1) action by the 
Community was necessary since action taken by the Member States cannot achieve the 
pursued aim (added value condition or a restatement of the principle of subsidiarity211); 2) 
there was no specific legal basis in the former EC Treaty that could have been used to achieve 
the objective (negative condition)212; 3) the general competence can be used by the 
Community only for the purpose of achieving Community objectives (positive condition)213; 
4) action under Article 308 EC Treaty should relate to the ‘operation of the common market’ 
                                                 
209 Art. 149(1) EC Treaty provides: ‘[…] fully respecting the responsibility of the Member States for the content 
of teaching and the organisation of education systems and their cultural and linguistic diversity.’ Art. 151 (2) 
EC Treaty provides: ‘Action by the Community shall be aimed at encouraging cooperation between Member 
States and, if necessary, supporting and supplementing their action in the following areas […].’ 
210 See R. H. Lauwaars, ‘Institutional Structure’ (Chapter IV) in P. J. G. Kapteyn, A. M. McDonnell, K. J. M. 
Moterlmans, C. W. A. Timmermans (eds), fourth edition, Kluwer Law International (2008), 221. 
211 The Edinburgh European Council underlined what is already stated in the wording of Art. 308 EC Treaty, 
namely that the principle of subsidiarity must be respected in the application of Art. 308 EC Treaty. See Bull. EC 
12-1992 point 15. 
212 See Case 45/86 Commission v Council (generalized tariff preferences) where the Court stated: ‘it follows from 
the very wording of Article [308] that its use as the legal basis for a measure is justified only where no other 
provision of the Treaty gives the Community institutions the necessary power to adopt the measure in question’; 
Case C-295/90 European Parliament v Council (Students residence case) [1992] ECR I-4193. This conclusion 
has been restated by the Court’s more recent cases, see Case C-166/07 Parliament v Council [2009] ECR I-7135 
(dual legal basis for internal legislation, Art. 308 EC Treaty can be used when the scope of the Community’s 
action exceeds that of the specific legal basis), Case C-436/03 Parliament v Council [2006] ECR I-3733 (use of 
Art. 308 EC Treaty when the specific requirements of Art. 95 EC Treaty cannot be used). 
213 Opinion 2/94 [1996] ECR I-1759; See Case T-315/01 Kadi v Council [2005] ECR II-3649, paras. 16-17. 
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(Community conditionality – exclusion of Union objectives).214 It could be argued that the 
general Community competence under former Article 308 EC Treaty could have been used 
for the purpose of implementing the EU citizenship right. We will now assess whether the 
aforementioned conditions for having had recourse to the fall-back Community competence 
were fulfilled so as to have justified the use of Article 308 EC Treaty for adopting a 
Community instrument, instead of the Decisions of the Representatives of the Governments 
of the Member States for the purpose of implementing the Union citizen’s right to equal 
protection in third countries.  
The first condition was indisputably fulfilled, as the EC Treaty provision introducing 
the right to equal protection abroad of unrepresented Union citizens did not expressly confer 
legislative competence to the Community, but included only a general provision referring to 
the Member States’ obligation to adopt the necessary implementing measures. There was no 
other provision in the EC Treaty or Community act adopted by the Union Institutions, which 
could have been interpreted as conferring an implied power to the Union.215 As to the second 
condition - the existence of a Community objective- it has to be noticed that Article 20 EC 
Treaty provided a clear objective to ensure effectiveness of equal protection of the 
unrepresented Union citizens in third countries.  
Use of former Article 308 EC Treaty was further conditioned by the principle of 
subsidiarity and necessity of a Community action for the operation of the internal market. The 
principle of subsidiarity could not have been endangered in this particular case if a 
Community rather than a Member State international agreement was adopted, since an 
implementing measure was necessary and the objective of ensuring the effectiveness of an EU 
citizenship right was better fulfilled by a Community measure rather than an international 
agreement with a cumbersome ratification, entry into force, and amendment procedure 
touching on what is a Union, and not a domestic, right and with an impact on the image of the 
Union in third countries.  
In principle, former Article 308 EC Treaty could have been used as the appropriate 
legal basis to adopt implementing measures by way of a possible Community Decision. There 
                                                 
214 See Case T-315/01 Kadi v Council [2005] ECR 11-3649, para. 120; Cases T-306/01 Ahmed Ali Yusuf and Al 
Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Commission [2005] ECR II-3533, para. 156. See also T. 
Tridimas and Jose A. Gutierrez-Fons, ‘EU Law, International Law, and Economic Sanctions Against Terrorism: 
The Judiciary in Distress?’ (2008) Fordham International Law Journal, 668, where it is argued that ‘Article 308 
EC cannot be used to attain one of the objectives of the Treaty of the European Union on the ground that its 
elevation to an inter-pillar basis would run counter to the constitutional architecture of the distinct pillars.’ 
215 Former Art. 20 EU Treaty also referred to the effective implementation of the EU citizenship right to equal 
protection, however it expressly referred only to the obligation of vertical cooperation between the Member 
States’ consular and diplomatic missions and the Union’s external missions. 
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is a significant difference between a Decision adopted under former Article 308 EC Treaty 
and a Decision of the Representatives of the Member States in terms of guarantees conferred 
to the EU citizens. While the former act was fully subject to the Union legal regime, the latter 
legal instrument is an international agreement, which despite having a close link with the 
functioning of the Union law, it is not entirely subject to the Union legal regime. Due to the 
direct connection of the Decisions of the Representatives of the Member States with the 
founding Treaties or Union secondary legislation216, they are subject to certain Union legal 
remedies, such as: infringement proceedings brought by the Commission against the Member 
States for not adopting the necessary measures for the implementation of the EU citizenship 
right;217 preliminary references addressed by the national courts on the interpretation of the 
relevant founding Treaties’ provisions;218 action of annulment founded on the argument of 
incorrect legal basis and action of damages brought by the individual against a Member State 
on the basis of damages caused to the applicant as a result of a breach of Union obligations by 
the Member State.219  
The choice of a Decision of the Representatives of the Member States adopted within 
the Council instead of a Community Decision disrupts the institutional balance within the 
European Union, since the Commission and the European Parliament are excluded from the 
decision-making procedure. Furthermore, the CJEU has a limited role220 since, according to its 
settled case law221, it has no competence to review actions of annulment brought against this 
type of Decision. There is also a limited judicial review of the national courts in regard to the 
provisions and implementation of these Decisions, since first of all it is not clear whether they 
                                                 
216 See the assessment of Decisions of Representatives of the Member States acting within the Council in section 
2 of this Chapter. 
217 Usually the Member States are not required, but have only a possibility to act by way of decisions of the 
representatives of the Member States. However, there are also cases, as with Art. 20 EC Treaty, where the 
Member States are required to act by means of common measures. 
218 See Art. 234(1)(a) EC Treaty, maintained under current Art. 267(1)(a) TFEU; hybrid acts and decisions of the 
representatives of the Member States can be subject to the preliminary reference procedure, although they are not 
EU legal acts, due to the CJEU circumlocutory approach of establishing jurisdiction, whereby ‘the Court has 
jurisdiction to provide the national court with all the criteria for the interpretation of European Union law which 
may enable it to assess whether the provisions of [a non-EU legal act] are compatible with European Union law’ 
(the CJEU judgment in the Pringle case C-370/12, para. 80). 
219 Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Andrea Francovich and Danila Bonifaci and others v. Italian Republic 
[1991] ECR I-05357, paras. 33 and 34. 
220 The CJEU is part of the Institutions of the Union, pre-Lisbon this conclusion resulted from the place of the 
rules on the CJEU in the EC Treaty: Part Five (Institutions of the Community), Chapter one (The Institutions). 
The Lisbon Treaty clarifies this issue, and in Art. 13 TEU, the Union courts are provided as Union Institutions. 
221 See the jurisprudence discussed in section 2 of this chapter. 
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have the obligation of conform interpretation with the EU general principles of EU law, while 
disapplication and other judicial tools required by the EU law are completely excluded.222  
The choice of action of the Member States between acting unanimously in the Council 
through Community acts and acting unanimously outside of the Union framework has 
important legal consequences on the role of the Union Institutions and the effective judicial 
guarantees of human rights. These different legal consequences raise the question of whether 
the Member States had the option of choosing between the two forms of actions, or whether 
they were compelled by Union law to use the Community general competence and 
Community/Union secondary instruments for ensuring the implementation of consular 
protection of the Union citizens.  
Since the first years of the Community’s existence, the CJEU has developed the 
principle that the Member States and the Union Institutions cannot evade the procedures 
prescribed by the EC Treaty (later on TFEU) as to decision-making and roles of the 
Institutions.223 The extensive jurisprudence on the correct legal basis of Community/Union 
actions has raised the aforementioned principle to the level of a general EU law principle, 
which the Union Institutions or the Member States cannot disregard to serve their own 
interests of increasing/preserving their powers, or avoiding delays in action. The principle of 
respecting the constitutional order established by the founding Treaties has been reaffirmed 
by the Court in relation to the choice between different Community competences, between 
Community and Union competences and between the Community and Member States 
competences.224 
So far, the Court has only indirectly addressed the legal question of Member States’ 
options for action between Decision of Representatives of the Member States and Council 
Decision under Art. 308 EC Treaty.225 The main conclusion was that by their action, the 
Member States cannot prejudice the constitutional setting envisaged by the Treaty, and the 
Member States have to conform to the long-standing principle of respecting ‘the rules of the 
Treaty on the forming of the Council’s decisions and on the division of powers between the 
                                                 
222 On the different judicial tools which a national judge can use directly on the basis of EU law, see Madalina B. 
Moraru and K. Podstawa, Handbook on Judicial Interaction Techniques – Their potential and use in the field of 
the European Fundamental Rights available at 
http://www.eui.eu/Projects/CentreForJudicialCooperation/Documents/2FinalHandbook.pdf  
223 Former Art. 47 EU Treaty, current Art. 40 TEU. 
224 See, particularly, Opinion 2/00 Cartagena Protocol [2001] ECR I-9713 and Opinion 1/08 GATS [2009] ECR 
I-11129; Case C-114/12 Commission v Council, Judgment of the CJEU 4 September 2014. 
225 See C-181/91 Bangladesh and C-316/91 EDF. 
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Institutions’.226 Since Article 308 EC Treaty is part of the Treaty rules, and the strict 
conditions of Article 308 EC Treaty are cumulatively fulfilled, then, in principle, the Member 
States would have had to adopt implementing measures in the form of Community 
instruments on the direct basis of former Article 20 EC Treaty or jointly with Article 308 EC 
Treaty instead of the Decisions of Representatives, as this latter choice disregarded the Treaty 
rules on the ‘division of powers between the Institutions.’ For instance, the European 
Parliament did not have a role, while the Court did not enjoy full jurisdiction in relation these 
Decisions, which directly impacted on the EU rights of the Union citizens. The fact that these 
Decisions restricted the substantial and personal scope of the EU citizenship right to equal 
protection abroad would have reasonably required its implementation by way of a Community 
act, since only in these circumstances would those affected by these limitations have the legal 
means to challenge the choices made by the Member States.  
The fact that the Member States failed to use the fall-back competence of the 
Community and implement the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad by way of a 
Community secondary legislative act does not absolve the Member States from bearing the 
legal consequences of their decisions. It was previously pointed out that the Court of Justice 
emphasised that the true legal nature and effects of Decisions of the Representatives of the 
Member States are not established on the basis of the formal name of the act, but also on the 
basis of the legal effects these Decisions produce. The fact that the content matter of 
Decisions 95/553/EC and 96/409/CFSP could have been implemented by using the former 
Community fall back competence to adopt Community Decisions and that these Decisions 
clearly produce direct effects on the EU citizens indicate that their formal title of ‘Decisions 
of the Representatives of the Member States’ does not correspond to their content. Thus 
Member States cannot hide behind their formal choice to avoid the jurisdiction of the Court of 
Justice or legal remedies that EU law would normally make available to individuals suffering 
injuries of their EU rights derived from EU secondary legislative measures. 
In addition to former Article 20 EC Treaty, the former EU Treaty included a provision 
requiring close cooperation between the Member States’ consular and diplomatic missions 
and the Commission delegations for the purpose of securing an effective implementation of 
the EU citizenship right to equal protection in third countries. The Article was placed under 
the ambit of the CFSP, however no CFSP measure has been adopted, so far, for the purpose of 
implementing the said requirement. Furthermore due to the strict prohibition imposed by 
                                                 
226 Case C-8/73 Hauptzollamt Bremerhaven v Massey-Ferguson [1973] ECR I-897, para. 4. See also in the same 
vein, H. R. Lauwaars, Institutional Structure, op.cit., 220. 
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former Article 47 EU Treaty of using Union competences, when Community competences are 
available, it is questionable whether the CFSP measures could have been used as first and sole 
measure implementing the EU citizenship right.227 From the point of view of the legal 
remedies available to the individuals, a CFSP measure would not have offered significantly 
more legal guarantees to the EU citizens compared to the Decisions of the Representatives of 
the Member States, since actions of annulment and infringement procedure were not available 
in regard to this category of acts. Moreover, if the preliminary reference could, in principle, be 
used against the national measures implementing the Decisions on the basis of the argument 
of its objective of implementing former Art. 20 EC Treaty, the preliminary reference 
procedure was clearly not a possible legal means in relation to former CFSP measures.228 
The ‘informal’ nature of the Decisions have meant that certain Member States have not 
adopted specific legislative provisions or amended the existing consular and diplomatic 
related domestic legal provisions. Most of the Member States decided to implement the 
Decision by way of amending their existing executive acts on consular protection of 
individuals,229 or adopting internal circulars informing the consular and diplomatic officials 
and the staff of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, which were, for the most part, not made 
publicly available. Only two Member States adopted specific legislative measures230 and a few 
amended their existing legislative provisions.231 The number of EU countries adopting 
measures transposing Decision 96/409/CFSP is even lower, and the status regarding the legal 
force and transparency of these implementing measures is similar to those domestic measures 
implementing the EC Decision.232  
                                                 
227 See former Art. 47 TEU and the CJEU relevant jurisprudence: Case C-70/94 Fritz Werner Industrie-
Ausrüstungen v Germany [1995] ECR I-3189, and the famous statement of the CJEU on the delimitation 
between CFSP and non-CFSP matters during the pre-Lisbon Treaty: ‘Article 47 EU precludes the Union from 
adopting, on the basis of the EU Treaty, a measure which could properly be adopted on the basis of the EC 
Treaty, the Union cannot have recourse to a legal basis falling within the CFSP in order to adopt provisions 
which also fall within a competence conferred by the EC Treaty on the Community.’ (Case C-91/05 Commission 
v Council (ECOWAS) [2008] ECR I-3651, para. 77). 
228 See former Art. 46 EU Treaty, with the only exception provided by former Art. 47 EU Treaty. See also P. 
Eeckhout, External Relations of the European Union - Legal and Constitutional Foundations, Oxford University 
Press (2004), 417; E. Denza, The Intergovernmental Pillars of the European Union, Oxford University Press 
(2002), 337. 
229 Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovakia, Spain, and Sweden. See Chapter Three, Comparative analysis of legislation and practice of EU 
countries in the CARE Report, Section 2.2.1. - Implementation of Decision 95/553/EC. 
230 Belgium and Greece. 
231 See, for instance, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania and Slovenia. 
232 Examples of good practice can be found in the Austrian, Greek, Czech, Latvian, Luxembourg, Portuguese, 
and Slovenian legislation, which implemented the Decision by way of precise and transparent legislative or 
executive national provisions. 
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This specific fragmented transposition framework seems not to have created problems 
in practice, to date. However it can also be interpreted that due to the lack of transparency in 
relation to the implementation of Decisions 95/553/EC and 96/409/CFSP, of the lack of 
publicity of the ad hoc arrangements establishing the responsible Member States, many of the 
EU citizens have not been aware of their right to equal protection while in third countries, and 
thus the Member States have not been confronted with an increased number of requests for 
ensuring consular protection in both day-to-day and crisis situations. The duty of cooperation 
in good faith places the Member States under a duty to exercise their international powers 
without detracting from EU law or from its effectiveness, which, in the specific case of 
implementing the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad, would have probably 
required them to have recourse to the Community secondary legislation tools, instead of the 
sui-generis international agreements.233 It seems that the initial political enthusiasm of the 
Member States to establish a workable Europe wide-cooperation to ensure protection of all 
their citizens abroad, under the umbrella of the Union integration project, gradually 
diminished after the introduction of the EU citizenship right, when they realised the legal 
repercussions of their initiative. 
At the time of writing, the EC and CFSP Decisions are still in force without ever 






                                                 
233 To a certain extent, this problem has been remedied by the Lisbon Treaty which expressly provides that the 
Council can adopt by way of special legislative procedure Directives to ensure the effective implementation of 
the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad, see Art. 23(2) TFEU. 
234 Article 7 of Decision 95/553/EC reads as follows: ‘Five years after its entry into force, this Decision shall be 
reviewed in the light of experience acquired and the objective of Article 8c of the Treaty establishing the 
European Community’. A similar Article was incorporated into Decision 96/409/CFSP. Furthermore, the 
Commission’s proposal for a Council Directive on the Consular Protection of Union citizens abroad has not yet 
passed the qualified majority voting in the Council. Several Member States, in particular the UK are fervently 
opposing this initiative, in spite of several Member States holding the EU Presidency pushing for the approval of 
this necessary endeavour. For a short summary of the evolution of negotiations for the adoption of the Directive 
at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmeuleg/219-v/21910.htm  
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2. The nexus between the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad 
and EU external relations policies 
The previous sections addressed the protection of EU citizens abroad from the perspective of 
the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad, as part of the internal former Community 
related EU citizenship policy. The specific territorial application of this right outside the 
Union’s borders, and the fact that the embassies and consulates of the Member States were 
required to cooperate with the Commission delegations to ensure the effective implementation 
of this right235 connect the implementation of the EU citizenship right with the EU external 
relations policies and law. Since the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty, the Union 
developed several external relations policies addressing the consequences of man-made and 
natural disasters affecting third countries for the purpose of managing disaster response, and 
providing, inter alia, relief, rescue and humanitarian aid to the population of the affected third 
country, but also to the EU citizens in loco.236 The EU currently has a wide variety of crisis 
management instruments used for a broad range of purposes, such as state-building, 
protecting ships, to repatriating EU citizens.237  
During the evolution of the European integration process, the Union extended the 
scope of application of some of its external relations policies targeting the protection of the 
population of the affected third countries to include also the protection of its own citizens 
located in these parts of the world. Gradually, the protection of unrepresented Union citizens 
in third countries has come to be secured by all the Member States not only as a Union 
obligation based on the EU citizenship right and implementing sui generis international 
agreements238, but also via other former Community external relations policies, such as the 
civil protection policy and Mechanism239, incidentally the humanitarian aid policy,240 and 
                                                 
235 See former Art. 20 EU Treaty. 
236 See more in M. Cremona, ‘The EU and Global Emergencies: Competence and instruments’, in A. Antoniadis, 
R. Schutze and E. Spaventa (eds.), The European Union and Global Emergencies: A Law and policy analysis, 
Oxford/Portland, Hart Publishing (2011), 11-31. 
237 For a more detailed analysis of the EU’s capacity to address crisis, see A. Boin, M. Ekengrem, M. Rhinard, 
The European Union as a Crisis Manager: Patterns and Prospects, Cambridge University Press (2013). 
238 Decisions 95/553/EC and 96/409/CFSP. 
239 See Council Decision of 8 November 2007 establishing a Community Civil Protection Mechanism (recast) 
(2007/779/EC, Euratom), replaced now by Council Decision 1313/2013 of the European Parliament and Council 
on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism, [2013] OJ L 347/924, 17.12.2013. 
240 See the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, December 2007; Commission Communication of 5 
March 2008 on Reinforcing the Union’s Disaster Response Capacity: COM (2008) 130 final; Commission 
Communication ‘Towards a stronger European disaster response: the role of civil protection and humanitarian 
assistance’, COM/2010/0 600 final. 
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Union policies such as the CFSP and ESDP military and civilian missions241.242 Of all these 
external relations policies, the civil protection policy has been the most often employed policy 
for the purpose of securing consular assistance of EU citizens abroad, and through it consular 
assistance has been provided also by CFSP and ESDP missions.243 
In the pre-Lisbon Treaty period, the exercise of consular protection of EU citizens 
outside the Union under the different internal and external policies of the Union was initially 
characterised by insufficient coordination of the different policies and instruments and 
tensions between the principles of solidarity and state sovereignty that characterises this field. 
The insufficient coordination translated into a missed opportunity to effectively exploit the 
Union capabilities, while the Member States’ resistance to delegating authority to the Union 
over a matter perceived as being reserved to States has led to the development of policies that, 
although bearing the ‘Community’ or ‘Union’ label, were largely based on horizontal inter-
governmental cooperation. 
Under external and internal factors, the Member States have slowly accepted the 
involvement of the Community and Union with their instruments for the purpose of 
effectively implementing the EU citizenship right. The conferral of power to the Union, 
although very limited, has come at the Member States’ own initiative, following a realisation 
of their insufficient national and collective capabilities to efficiently cope with the increasing 
consular demands of EU citizens abroad. For the purpose of fulfilling the growing consular 
demand of national citizens, without incurring additional budgetary costs, the Member States 
have consented to the expansion of the personal and substantive scope of the civil protection 
policy and mechanism, humanitarian aid and the use of the CSDP civil and military 




                                                 
241 According to the Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in International Disaster Relief 
— ‘Oslo Guidelines’ (re-launched by UN OCHA in November 2006). 
242 See more details in the following sub-section of this chapter. 
243 See more details in Florika F-Hooijer, ‘The EU’s Competence in the Field of Civil Protection (Articles 196, 
Paragraph 1, a-c TFEU)’ in I. Govaere and S. Poli (eds), EU Management of Global Emergencies Legal 
Framework for Combating Threats and Crises, Brill Nijhoff (2014), 137-147. 
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a. The Civil Protection policy and Mechanism as instruments securing the 
protection of Union citizens both within and outside the Union borders 
 
The pre-Lisbon Treaty model of implementing the EU citizenship right of equal protection of 
Union citizens abroad was carried out primarily by way of horizontal consular cooperation 
among the Member States. The choice of this model was determined by the Member States’ 
desire to preserve their full powers in the field of consular protection of citizens abroad. 
Slowly, the Member States started to feel overwhelmed by the growing demand for consular 
assistance coming from their EU citizens located in third countries affected by an increasing 
number of devastating disasters. 
Following several major consular crises occurring at the beginning of the 21st 
century,244 it became evident that the EU citizens’ need of urgent relief and evacuation from 
third countries exceeds the single or horizontally coordinated capabilities of the represented 
Member States. One of the consular functions that is most difficult to fulfil is the immediate 
consular help to citizens abroad in cases of natural and man-made crises affecting the 
receiving State. In these situations, the citizens may be in need of urgent medical help and 
repatriation, which is technically difficult to ensure due to the deteriorated infrastructure of 
the affected third country. Furthermore, in these situations, the Member States have multiple 
concomitant tasks to secure in addition to rescuing EU citizens, such as providing 
humanitarian aid and relief to the population of the affected third country. Very often the 
burden of providing consular protection of EU citizens outside the Union would fall on a 
small group of Member States that have a more extensive external representation network. 
This fact might have additionally played a role in changing the Member States’ resistance 
towards recognising a role for the Union in securing consular protection of Union citizens 
abroad. 
 Forms of vertical consular cooperation started to appear in the aftermath of the 2004 
tsunami that hit South East Asia, when the Council Presidency requested the involvement of a 
Community instrument and bodies in securing the relief and evacuation of the EU citizens. At 
the Presidency’s request, the Commission’s Monitoring and Information Centre (‘MIC’) 
                                                 
244 For instance, the 2004 South East Asia tsunami, the July 2006 Lebanon crisis, the January 2007 Chad 
evacuation, and the 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai. 
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established within the Civil Protection Mechanism245 was asked to become involved in the 
process of evacuating EU citizens. As a result of this additional request, the MIC transmitted 
to the Member States that there is additional need for medical assistance, and search and 
rescue teams for evacuating the EU citizens246 and the Member States together with the 
Commission managed to pool all their available resources so as to evacuate all Union 
citizens.247 This positive experience, showed the Member States the clear added value of using 
the relevant Community instruments and institutions for the purpose of securing an aspect of 
the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad. These successful evacuation procedures 
made the Member States to realise that the Community Civil Protection cooperation, which 
mostly takes place within the borders of the Union for the purpose of helping one of the 
Member States affected by natural disasters, can successfully be extended also outside the 
borders of the Union, namely in the territory of third countries as a tool serving to ensure the 
protection of Union citizens.  
In November 2007 the Member States formalised this extra-EU territorial application 
of the civil protection cooperation by adopting a Council Decision that extends the 
geographical scope of application of the Community Civil Protection Mechanism to the 
affected third country and its population248 for the purpose of ensuring consular assistance of 
the EU citizens.249 Following a series of positive experiences in the application of the 
Community Civil Protection Mechanism for the purpose of securing the effective 
implementation of the EU citizenship right, the Member States agreed to recognise certain 
powers to the Union institutions, formalised in a Community instrument. It thus took the 
Member States 15 years to accept delegation of authority to the Union in the field of consular 
protection of Union citizens abroad. The Member States finally agreed to extend the 
                                                 
245 Council Decision of 23 October 2001 establishing a Community mechanism to facilitate reinforced 
cooperation in civil protection assistance interventions (2001/792/EC, Euratom), [2001] OJ L 297/7 of 
15/11/2001. 
246 M. Ekengren, N. Matzen, M. Rhinard, M. Svantesson, ‘Solidarity or Sovereignty? EU Cooperation in Civil 
Protection’, (2006) European Integration, 468. The initial information was taken by the authors from 
Commission (2005b) EU Civil Protection Assistance in South East Asia, Memorandum, MEMO/05/6, Brussels, 
11 January 2005, which is no longer available online. 
247 This experience was repeated during latter consular conflicts, such as in 2006, in Lebanon (for a comparative 
analysis of the Member States’ and the Union’s efforst during theis conflict, see the CARE Report, Chapter 3 – 
Comparative Analysis, Section 4.6.4 Military conflicts); the Mumbai terrorist attack in November 2008. 
248 The application of the civil protection cooperation for relief given to third countries and their population 
affected by disasters was already formalised in 2001. See Council Decision 2001/792/EC, Euratom of 23 
October 2001 establishing a Community Mechanism to facilitate reinforced cooperation in civil protection 
assistance [2001] OJ L 297, p.7. However, this Council Decision did not provide for the use of this civil 
protection tool for the population of the Union located in these third countries, but only to ensure protection of 
the population of the affected third country. 
249 See Article 2(10) and recital 18 of the preamble of Council Decision 2007/779/EC of 8 November 2007 
published in [2007] OJ L 314/9 of 1.12.2007. 
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application of a Community Decision for the purpose of ensuring an effective implementation 
of the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad.250 This change in the Member States’ 
conduct can be explained firstly by the increase of prompt consular assistance demands of 
their citizens and secondly, by the nature of the Civil Protection Mechanism implementation. 
The Mechanism is principally based on ad-hoc251 cooperation among the Member States, 
where the Commission is involved mostly for coordination of the Member States, which has 
probably made the Member States accept the limited delegation of authority to the 
Commission, via a type of instrument - Community Decision – that was previously rejected 
for the implementation of the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad.  
The adoption of the 2007 Council Decision is the result of a gradual evolution 
experienced by the civil protection Community policy. The first stage of development was the 
adoption of the Maastricht Treaty, which in Article 3(1)(u) EC Treaty enumerated civil 
protection as one of the Community fields of activity serving the main Community objective 
of strengthening the internal market.252 It can be noticed that the Maastricht Treaty established 
the Community civil protection activity as a purely internal activity. Unfortunately, the 
Maastricht Treaty did not define the concept of civil protection, nor did it provide a specific 
legal basis for the Community civil protection. This absence was maintained until the Treaty 
amendment brought by the Lisbon Treaty.253 It can be argued that, as happened in regard to 
other Union policies which were intentionally defined in broad and abstract wording,254 the 
absence of legal basis and definition of the civil protection policy was a conscious choice of 
the Member States that wanted to preserve their freedom of developing the civil protection 
according to their own interests.255 
                                                 
250 Council Decision of 8 November 2007 establishing a Community Civil Protection Mechanism (recast) 
(2007/779/EC, Euratom). The Decision was adopted on the former Art. 308 EC Treaty, since civil protection 
was not expressly provided as a Community competence in the pre-Lisbon Treaty period. 
251 See the Crisis and Risk Network Report, ‘Risk Analysis, Cooperation in Civil Protection: EU, Spain and the 
UK’ (2010). 
252 See Art. 2 of the EC Treaty. 
253 The Lisbon Treaty introduced a specific legal basis for the Union’s policy of civil protection (Art. 196 
TFEU), it has also included it in the list of the categories of Union policies provided at the beginning of the 
TFEU (Art. 6(f) TFEU). More details on the innovations brought by the Lisbon Treaty is provided in the next 
sub-section. 
254 See the Title V of the EU Treaty on CFSP. 
255 On the logic that a broad definition or absence of definition of Union policies is not a coincidence, but a result 
pursued by the Member States, especially in the politically sensitive field of the foreign and security policy, see 
M. Koskenniemi, ‘International Law Aspects of Common Foreign and Security Policy’, in M. Koskenniemi (ed), 
International Law Aspects of the European Union, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (1998), 27-35. 
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A second stage of development was the adoption of a Council Decision,256 in 1999, 
which implemented the aforementioned EC Treaty internal objective and provided for the 
civil protection cooperation among the Member States, in view of preparing and carrying out 
the rescue and relief of people, property and the environment in the event of a crisis affecting 
one of the Member States. Thus, the second stage of development of the civil protection 
policy concentrated on establishing a purely intra-Community application of the policy.  
The defining stage in the development of the Community civil protection policy was 
the adoption of a second Council Decision, in 2001,257 which established the Civil Protection 
Mechanism and made it applicable also outside of the Union’s borders. According to the 2001 
Decision, third countries in distress had the possibility of requesting that the MIC trigger the 
Mechanism. In case the Union Presidency approved the application of the Mechanism in third 
countries, the Member States’ capabilities were put at the disposal of the affected third 
country and its population. 
This development was an expected consequence of the fact that the Member States 
were already providing disaster relief to countries outside of the EU by using the same 
capabilities that they would normally use in situations of disasters within the Union.258 The 
2001 Council Decision has thus formally extended the geographical scope of application of 
the civil protection policy to third countries, making the Civil Protection Mechanism both an 
internal and external Community instrument.259 Continuing the trend of expanding the scope 
of application of the civil protection policy, the 2000 Feira Council agreed to allow the use of 
the Civil Protection Mechanism by the ESDP for the purpose of securing rescue and relief of 
EU citizens. A Joint Declaration260 was adopted three years later formalising the agreement, 
and made the Community mechanism of Civil Protection Mechanism available to the CFSP 
crisis management missions. The Mechanism became a cross-pillar instrument,261 used to 
                                                 
256 Council Decision 1999/847/EC of 9 December 1999 establishing a Community action programme in the field 
of civil protection published in [1999] OJ L 327/53 of 21. 12. 1999. 
257 See Council Decision 2001/792/EC, Euratom of 23 October 2001 establishing a Community Mechanism to 
facilitate reinforced cooperation in civil protection assistance OJ L 297, p.7. 
258 See EU Crisis Management – A Humanitarian Perspective, VOICE Briefing Paper, Brussels, January 2004, 
available at http://60gp.ovh.net/~ngovoice/documents/VOICE_EU_CrisisMgmt_2001_04.pdf 
259 The 2001 Community Decision provided also a first more elaborate definition of the civil protection policy: 
‘the provision of assistance to humanitarian actors in covering the immediate survival and protection needs of 
affected populations’, See Presidency Report to the Göteborg European Council on European Security and 
Defence Policy, Annex III, Göteborg European Council (15-16 June 2001) Presidency Conclusions. 
260 M. Ekengren, N. Matzen, M. Rhinard, M. Svantesson, ‘Solidarity or Sovereignty? EU Cooperation in Civil 
Protection’, op.cit.. The Joint Declaration of the Commission and the Council has not been publicised. 
261 The Mechanism was established by a first pillar measure (Council Decision – Arts. 249 and 308 EC Treaty) 
but was later used as a tool within the Community and CFSP/ESDP pillars: Community – while it applied for 
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address both internal and external Community crisis situations. The use of the ESDP civilian 
and military capacities was authorised for the purpose of complementing the civil protection 
capabilities, notably in large-scale natural disasters.262 The use of military assets to provide 
assistance in third countries was only a last resort option, i.e. when there was no other 
available civilian alternative to support the urgent provision of humanitarian help.263 
In light of the practice of successfully using the Civil Protection Mechanism in several 
consular crises264, the extension of the personal scope of application of the Civil Protection 
Mechanism to EU citizens brought by the 2007 Council Decision was, in fact, a codification 
of an already established practice. The 2007 Council Decision provides that the protection of 
the EU civilian population outside of the Union will be ensured under the ambit of the broader 
consular assistance265 that is given to the Union citizens in international crisis. 
In practice, it has to be observed that the Civil Protection Mechanism works as a form 
of ad-hoc cooperation between the executives of the Member States (the different 
departments of the Government but also between the consular and diplomatic authorities) 
which are informed, by the Monitoring and Information centre (‘MIC’) established within the 
Council, of the exact forms of technical help that is needed in the affected third country so as 
to ensure the evacuation of the Union citizens. Through its 24/7 network linking the Member 
States’ administrations, the Mechanism could have provided useful operational assistance, in 
particular by exchanging information on victim identification teams, repatriation and 
(medical) evacuation needs266 of all Member States. It results that the civil protection policy, 
in its consular assistance ambit, required close cooperation between the Member States and 
between the Member States and the Union Institutions, without requiring the establishment of 
pre-determined core assets. It could be argued that the effectiveness of the civil protection 
policy depended entirely on how these ad-hoc and voluntary forms of cooperation worked in 
                                                                                                                                                        
disasters occurring intra-Community, CFSP/ESDP as it was designed to be used also by civilian and military 
ESDP missions in third countries affected by crisis. See the Table in Annex 2. 
262 Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in International Disaster Relief — ‘Oslo 
Guidelines’ (re-launched by UN OCHA in November 2006); European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, para. 
61 http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/consensus/consensus_en.pdf  
263 Military assets can fill in critical capacity gaps in areas such as transportation, logistics support, engineering, 
or medical support, such as during the earthquake and tsunamis in the Indian Ocean in December 2004 and the 
2010 Pakistan floods. See more in Commission Communication ‘Towards a stronger European disaster 
response: the role of civil protection and humanitarian assistance’, COM/2010/0 600 final. 
264 See the European Commission, ‘Towards a stronger European disaster response: The role of civil protection 
and humanitarian assistance’ (Brussels, 26 October 2010). 
265 See Council Decision 2007/779/EC of 8 November 2007. The civil protection is only part of the consular 
assistance that is conferred to the Union citizens in international crises, which encompasses also help with travel 
documents, visa issues, etc. 
266 As happened in the case of the 2004 South East Asia tsunami. 
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practice. The results of the evacuation procedures in the 2004 South East Asia Tsunami and 
the 2006 Lebanese conflict are a perfect illustration that the success of the civil protection 
policy depends primarily on the willingness and rapid reaction of the Member States, thus 
making the success of the use of the Civil Protection Mechanism something of a lottery.  
It has to be observed that the 2007 Community Decision did not place substantial 
obligations on the Member States compared to the post-Lisbon amended Decision on the civil 
protection mechanism.267 It only extended the scope of application of the Civil Protection 
Mechanism to include consular assistance of the Union citizens in international crises 
situations. Under the former EC and EU Treaties the Member States had two EU primary law 
obligations268: a Community obligation to ensure equal treatment of EU nationals in cases of 
requests for consular assistance269 and a Union obligation of cooperation with the Community 
delegations for the purpose of ensuring the aforementioned equal treatment obligation.270 The 
Civil Protection Mechanism seems to address both of the vertical and horizontal cooperation 
which the Treaties required for the purpose of ensuring protection of unrepresented Union 
citizens abroad.  
Interestingly, all of the three civil protection Community Decisions as well as the 
subsequent Decisions adopted for the implementation of the Mechanism271 were based on 
former Article 308 EC Treaty.272 The situation will change after the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty when Article 196 TFEU will be used as the legal basis for the adoption of a 
new Union Decision ensuring the continuance of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism to 
address the consequences of disasters from both within and outside the Union, and to protect 
both the population of affected third countries and the Union citizens.273 
                                                 
267 See Decision Council Decision 1313/2013 of the European Parliament and Council on a Union Civil 
Protection Mechanism, [2013] OJ L 347/924 of 17.12.2013. 
268 After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the member States still have the two obligations, still located 
in two different Treaties, only the Treaties have different names and there is a new numbering of the relevant 
articles. 
269 Art. 20 EC Treaty. 
270 Art. 20 EU Treaty. 
271 See the state of play of civil protection legal texts as presented by the European Commission Humanitarian 
Aid & Civil Protection site, available at http://ec.europa.eu/echo/civil_protection/civil/prote/legal_texts.htm (last 
checked at 04.04.2011). In this section only the Decisions on civil protection adopted pre-Lisbon are assessed, as 
post-Lisbon, the Union has specific power to adopt civil protection measures, see Art. 196 TFEU. 
272 In addition to the Art. 308 EC Treaty, these Decisions had also Art. 203 Euratom Treaty as a legal basis, 
which is the Euratom correspondent of Art. 308 EC Treaty.  
273 See Decision Council Decision 1313/2013 of the European Parliament and Council on a Union Civil 
Protection Mechanism, [2013] OJ L 347/924 of 17.12.2013. 
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b. The nexus between the Humanitarian Aid policy and the EU citizenship 
right to equal protection abroad 
 
During the Union’s pillar structure, the Community274 developed three different but 
complementary policies tackling problems resulting from international (humanitarian) crises 
affecting third countries: civil protection, humanitarian aid and development cooperation. Of 
these, civil protection and humanitarian aid policies, which address short-term relief, have 
also been used for the purpose of securing consular protection to the EU citizens located in 
third countries. 
Similarly to the civil protection policy, humanitarian aid did not have an explicit legal 
basis in the pre-Lisbon Treaty period.275 Humanitarian aid slowly made its appearance as an 
external Community competence during the Yaoundé Convention, whose Article 20 
mentioned the possibility of exceptional economic difficulties or natural disasters.276 The 
notion was later replaced with emergency aid and addressed both man-made and natural 
disasters. Its scope has enlarged throughout the years to cover all developing countries and 
types of disasters. The increasing humanitarian aid related activities of the Community in the 
1990s led to the creation of a separate directorate within the Commission, given the specific 
task of ensuring the effective implementation of the humanitarian aid policy (ECHO).277  
Reading the objectives of the Community humanitarian aid policy as provided by the 
Community Regulation278 governing the conferral of humanitarian aid, one sees that they are 
strikingly similar to those laid down in the 2001 Council Decision establishing the Civil 
                                                 
274 In addition to the Community pillar based policies, the CFSP and military and civilian ESDP mission have 
also served to secure consular protection to the EU citizens in third countries. Interestingly, the first Decision 
adopted on the basis of former Article 17 TEU concerned the evacuation of EU nationals whenever they are in 
danger in third countries. It was adopted as a sui generis Decision that was not published in the Official Journal. 
See Doc. 8386/96, Decision de Conseil du 27 juin 1996, relative aux operations d’evacuations de ressortisants 
des Etats membres lorsque leur sécurite est en danger dans un pays tiers – see more in Ramses A. Wessel, The 
European Union's foreign and security policy: a legal institutional perspective, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers (1999), 133. 
275 Unlike development cooperation, which was mentioned in the founding Treaties as early as the Treaty of 
Rome, see Part IV entitled Association of the Overseas Countries and Territories. 
276 Peter Van Elsuwege and J. Orbie, ‘The EU’s Humanitarian Aid Policy after Lisbon: Implications of a New 
Treaty Basis’, in I. Govaere and S. Poli, EU Management of Global Emergencies Legal Framework for 
Combating Threats and Crises, Brill Nijhoff (2014), 21-47. 
277 Originally ECHO was defined as the ‘European Office for Emergency Humanitarian Aid’, it later became the 
‘European Community Humanitarian Office’, and is currently the ‘European Commission office for 
Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection’. 
278 Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/96 of 20 June 1996 published in [1996] OJ L 163/1 of 2.7.1996.  
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Protection Mechanism.279 Despite the similar vocation280 of the civil protection and the 
humanitarian aid for prevention and relieving human suffering in third countries, the 
operation and resources used for their deployment differ considerably.281 While the EU Civil 
Protection Mechanism engages primarily the Member States’ national capabilities,282 the 
Community humanitarian aid policy involves the Community’s own financial resources. The 
operation of the civil protection is also different from the operation of the Community 
humanitarian aid, while the latter is implemented through partner organisations: European 
NGOs, the UN, and the Red Cross. The Community civil protection relies primarily on the 
Member States’ teams of experts, transport, and other necessary capabilities, with the 
Community usually contributing in the form of coordinating the action of the Member 
States.283 Depending on the gravity and urgency of the international crises, the Community 
could have exceptionally dispatched additional teams of experts or confer financial support 
for the transport of the Member States’ utilities.  
One of the salient differences concerning the operation of the two policies is that the 
use of the Mechanism outside the Union, similarly to within the Union, needs the previous 
request of the affected third country, while the Community humanitarian aid is directly 
provided to the people in distress, regardless of any request from the affected country, and, 
sometimes even against its wishes.284 Therefore, despite the common objective pursued by 
civil protection and humanitarian aid, the above-mentioned differing principles that define the 
operation of the two policies clarify that they are two distinct, but complementary Community 
                                                 
279 See in particular the principal objectives of the EC humanitarian aid operations as stipulated by the EC 
Regulation: ‘to save and preserve life during emergencies, natural disasters and their immediate aftermath; to 
provide the necessary assistance and relief to people affected by long-lasting crises arising, in particular, from 
outbreaks of fighting or wars; to help finance the transport of aid and efforts to ensure that it is accessible to 
those for whom it is intended for; to carry out short-term rehabilitation and reconstruction work, especially on 
infrastructure and equipment, with a view to facilitating the arrival of relief; to cope with the consequences of 
population movements (refugees, displaced people and returnees) caused by natural and man-made disasters; to 
ensure preparedness for risks of natural disasters or comparable exceptional circumstances and use a suitable 
rapid early warning and intervention system; to support civil operations to protect the victims of fighting or 
comparable emergencies, in accordance with current international agreements.’ Council Regulation (EC) No 
1257/96. 
280 See Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Region on Reinforcing EU Disaster and Crisis Response in 
third countries, COM (2005) 153 final of 20.04.2005.  
281 See the assessment of the instruments the Union has at its disposal to respond to crisis situations in third 
countries, VOICE Briefing Paper, ‘EU Crisis Management – A Humanitarian Perspective’, January 2004, 
especially, p. 5. 
282 Council Decision 2007/162/EC, Euratom of 5 March 2007 establishing a Civil Protection Financial 
Instrument OJ L 71, 10.3.2007, p. 9–17. See inter alia Art. 2(b), which clarifies that financial support by the 
Community is subsidiary to the help given by the Member States, and, if given, has to be reimbursed. 
283 See J. Orbie, Europe’s Global Role: External Policies of the European Union, Ashgate (2009), 103. 
284 See Council Regulation 1257/96 of 20 June 1996. 
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policies.285 It is precisely due to this complementarity, but also to the partial overlapping 
objectives of the civil protection and humanitarian aid policies, that the Commission has 
embarked since 2008286 on a more integrated approach to managing disaster response. In 
particular, within the response phase of the disaster, the Union committed to achieve an 
effective coordination of the relevant Union instruments and Member States capabilities for 
the purpose of, inter alia, ensure an effective protection of the Union citizens abroad.287 
Humanitarian aid has come to be delivered in situations where also other instruments 
related to crisis management are employed, such as civil protection and consular assistance. 
Practice seems to indicate that synergies between these policies are developing, following the 
Union’s recent objective of ensuring coordination of its different policies and secure a unified 
an efficient response to external crises.288 The example of the 2010 Arab spring revolution is 
reflective of this289 The Civil Protection Mechanism was triggered, and its application 
coordinated with the humanitarian aid capabilities for the purpose of securing, inter alia, the 
relief and safe evacuation of the EU citizens in situ. The European Union seems to have 
developed an integrated crisis management toolkit including several different policies of an 
external relations nature, such as: humanitarian aid, civil protection and development 
cooperation, with those of an internal nature, such as the EU citizenship right to equal 
protection abroad, which although exercised exclusively outside the Union, it is enshrined 
within the Union internal EU citizenship policy. 
                                                 
285 The relation between civil protection and humanitarian aid is similar to the situation that arose in the 
Bangladesh case between Community action under humanitarian aid (development cooperation legal basis) and 
action by the Member States serving the same objective as the development cooperation, i.e. urgent financial 
help, see Joined Cases C-181/91 and C-248/91 Parliament v Council and Commission (‘Bangladesh’) [1993] 
ECR I 3685. 
286 The European Commission realised the partial overlapping of the civil protection and humanitarian aid 
policies in terms of their potential for securing consular protection to EU citizens in third countries affected by 
disasters and merged the two policies within the same Directorate General of the European Commission. Civil 
Protection was moved from DG Environment to DG Humanitarian Aid (ECHO), which was renamed DG 
Humanitarian Aid & Civil Protection. This has been interpreted as an indication of the EU’s efforts to build a 
more coherent approach to disaster response by bringing the two main instruments (humanitarian assistance for 
emergencies outside the EU) and civil protection (cooperation within the EU, but often activated to assist 
countries outside the EU) together (see the Crisis and Risk Network Report, ‘Risk Analysis, Cooperation in Civil 
Protection: EU, Spain and the UK’ (2010). 
287 See the European Commission and the High Representative, ‘The EU’s comprehensive approach to external 
conflicts and crises’, JOIN (2013) 30 final Brussels, 11 December 2013; A. De Guttry, M. Gestri and G. Venturi 
(eds), International Disaster Response, Springer (2012). 
288 A communication from the European Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, ‘Towards a 
stronger European disaster response: The role of civil protection and humanitarian assistance’, COM(2010) 600 
final, Brussels, 26 October 2010. 
289 In particular, two grants (with a value of 112,000 Euro) were awarded to two Member States that had 
evacuated about 150 EU citizens. See Commission Staff Working Paper, Impact Assessment, accompanying the 
document, Proposal for a Directive of the Council on co-ordination and co-operation measures regarding 
consular protection for unrepresented EU citizens, SEC (2011) 1556 final, Brussels, 14.12.2011, p. 18. 
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c. Conclusion  
Co-operation among the external representations of the Member States for the purposes of 
securing the protection of EU citizens abroad has, for the most part, been a success story. 
However, several problems have been reported by national surveys.290 For example, during the 
2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, it was reported that certain Member State representations 
rescued only their own citizens while refusing to assist EU citizens of other nationalities.291 
Problems have also been encountered by EU citizens when trying to obtain European Travel 
Documents in non-crisis situations.292 But perhaps the most serious problem was the lack of 
EU citizens’ awareness of the existence of the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad, 
let alone what this right actually conferred to them.293 
The lack of awareness among EU citizens of their right to equal protection abroad and 
its content was probably due to the great variety of domestic legal frameworks and practices 
implementing this right before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. The EU 
citizenship right only introduced a prohibition of discriminatory conduct and not a right to 
consular and diplomatic protection as such. Therefore the different domestic consular and 
diplomatic legal frameworks remained which meant that an EU citizen could receive, in 
practice, different responses from the Member States, depending on whether the Member 
State endorsed a right- or policy-based approach to the provision of consular and diplomatic 
protection,294 and on the particular substantive and personal scope of consular and diplomatic 
                                                 
290 See the National Reports in the CARE Report, and Chapter III, Section 7-Summary. 
291 See the Article entitled ‘MEP attacks EU consular reaction in Mumbai’ in EU Observer, available at: 
<http://euobserver.com/justice/27253> (accessed on March 2013). See also F. Forni, brief comment on the 
situation in ‘The Consular Protection of EU Citizens during Emergencies in Third Countries’, in A. de Guttry, 
M. Gestri and G. Venturini (eds.), International Disaster Response Law, Springer T.M.C Asser Press (2012), 155 
– 177.  
292 See the CARE Report, Chapter Three, Section Five. 
293 For instance, in 2006 only 23% of those interviewed had heard of the EU citizenship right to equal protection 
abroad, see Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – 
Effective consular protection in third countries: the contribution of the European Union – Action Plan 2007-
2009, COM (2007) 767 final, 5 December 2007. On the persistent unawareness of the EU citizens of their EU 
citizenship right to equal protection abroad see, inter alia, European Parliament, Resolution of 2 April 2009 on 
problems and prospects concerning European Citizenship P6_TA(2009)0204; European Commission, 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Consular protection for EU 
citizens in third countries: State of play and way forward, COM (2011) 149 final, 23 March 2011. 
294 Certain Member States recognise a fundamental right to their nationals, others only a right, while others have 
an approach whereby consular and diplomatic protection is a matter of policy under the executive’s control. See 
details in Chapter 4, section VII - Mapping the Member States’ national systems of ensuring protection of 
citizens abroad and the top-down impact of the EU model of protecting Union citizens abroad ’ and Chapter III 
of Comparative analysis of legislation and practice of EU countries in the CARE Report. 
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protection recognised by the Member States in relation to their own citizens.295 The publicity 
of the EU citizenship right and its content was also different depending on the forms of the 
domestic transposition of the relevant EU primary legal provision conferring the EU 
citizenship right to equal protection abroad and of the sui generis consular protection 
Decisions.296 In addition, there were several other differences among the domestic legal 
frameworks implementing the EU citizenship right and the national based legal provisions, 
inter alia, regarding legal remedies297 and the definition of ‘honorary consuls’. In practice, 
there were very few common features of the provision of consular protection among the 
Member States. There was a high commitment in terms of pooling resources among the 
Member States to ensure prompt evacuation and relief to the EU citizens in distress abroad, 
especially in cases of consular crisis, which somehow compensated for the discrepant national 
frameworks implementing the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad. 
The solution, so far, in cases of Member States facing difficulties in ensuring prompt 
consular assistance for all their nationals abroad, has generally come from horizontal consular 
cooperation, whether initiated solely through intergovernmental cooperation mechanisms298 or 
through EU instruments.299 However with the financial crises diminishing the Member States’ 
budgets, horizontal cooperation had already proved to be insufficient and will become 
increasingly insufficient in light of the growing number of unrepresented Union citizens, 
especially in third countries where no Member States are represented.300 
                                                 
295 See more details in Chapter 4, section VII - Mapping the Member States’ national systems of ensuring 
protection of citizens abroad and the top-down impact of the EU model of protecting Union citizens abroad. 
296 Moreover, Member States have transposed the Decision 95/553/EC into their national legislation at different 
times and in different ways (e.g., through laws, circulars, and constitutions) or in some cases they have failed to 
transpose both this Decision and Decision 96/409/CFSP entirely. For a detailed analysis, see the CARE Report, 
Chapter Three, Section 2.3.1. 
297 In addition to the unclear ratione personae and ratione materiae scope of the right to equal protection of the 
EU citizen abroad, the concrete implementation of this right by the Member States and the EU was also not well 
established. For instance, the functioning of the co-ordination and co-operation among the Member States’ 
external representations, and the precise role of EU delegations on the ground is unclear; additionally the 
procedure for the reimbursement of consular assistance services was cumbersome and not uniform across 
domestic jurisdictions. For more on this see the CARE Report, Chapter Three, and S. Faro and M. Moraru, 
‘Comparative analysis of legislation and practice on consular protection and assistance of the 27 EU countries’, 
in S. Faro, M. P. Chiti and E. Schweighofer, (eds.) op. cit., 157-291. 
298 For example, under Decisions of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States 95/553/EC 
and 96/409/CFSP, or ad-hoc arrangements concluded between the Member States’ external representations 
existent in a third country, by way of Lead State arrangements. 
299 As for example, under the Civil Protection Mechanism, Council Decision 2007/779/EC Euratom establishing 
the EU Civil Protection Mechanism (Recast), [2007] OJ L 314/9. 
300 There are 27 countries outside the EU where no Member State is represented, while the EU has a delegation 




The solution to the on-going reduction of the external representation network of the 
Member States and their reduced budgets for consular and diplomatic assistance might thus 
come from outside single or collective national capabilities. The Treaty of Lisbon has 
revolutionised the conduct of EU foreign affairs both substantially and institutionally.301 
Among the most relevant amendments with regard to ensuring protection of EU citizens in the 
world, it is worth pointing out the establishment of a diplomatic service for the EU302 which 
includes around 140 Union delegations operating globally and making the EU better 
represented externally than most of the Member States.303 Indeed, in several third countries304 
only the EU has an ‘embassy’.305 In this context, the potential of the EU delegations in 
ensuring the protection of unrepresented EU citizens in situ by providing certain consular 








                                                 
301 Spatial constraints do not allow an in-depth analysis here of all substantive and institutional amendments 
brought about by the Treaty of Lisbon in the field of the EU’s external relations. For a complete assessment of 
the Treaty of Lisbon changes in EU external relations, please see M. Cremona, ‘Defining Competence In EU 
External Relations: Lessons from the Treaty Reform Process’, in A. Dashwood and M. Maresceau (eds.), Law 
and Practice of EU External Relations – Salient Features of a Changing Landscape, Cambridge University Press 
(2008), and by the same author, ‘The Union’s External Action: Constitutional Perspectives’, in G. Amato, H. 
Bribosia and B. de Witte (eds), Genèse et Destinée de la Constitution Européenne: Commentaire du traité 
établissant une Constitution pour l’Europe à la lumière des travaux préparatoires et perspectives d’ avenir, 
Bruxelles: Bruylant, (2007). 
302 The European External Action Service established by Article 27(3) TEU and Council Decision 2010/427/EU 
of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service, [2010] 
OJ L 201/30. 
303 See Annex 1. 
304 See Annex 1. 
305 Although the founding Treaties and the Council Decision establishing the EEAS refer formally to Union 
delegations, academics have also used the term Union ‘embassy’ when referring to Union delegations, unlike the 
Member States, notably, the UK, which have long fought for the Treaty of Lisbon to drop any reference to the 
terms ‘embassy’ or ‘Minister for Foreign Affairs’ used by the Constitutional Treaty. See J. Wouters and S. 
Duquet, ‘The EU and International Diplomatic Law: New Horizons?’, (2012) Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 31. 
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3. The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty - innovating the EU 
citizenship right to equal protection of (unrepresented) Union citizens 
abroad 
 
The Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force on 1 December 2009, brought important 
amendments to the area of EU citizens’ protection in third countries. 
A first legal addition is the provision of the protection of Union citizens outside the 
Union as an express Union objective,306 which is said to guide the Union ‘in its relations with 
the wider world’. A similar proposal was never put forward during the previous Treaty 
amendments, not even during the elaboration of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for 
Europe, which established several important Union symbols, such as an EU flag and passport.  
This new Union objective came at France’s proposal, and exactly what led France to 
put forward this proposal is unknown.307 However, one may speculate, on the basis of 
France’s experience with the implementation of the EU citizenship right to equal protection 
abroad, that a first reason might have been France’s concern of overburdening itself with the 
tasks of ensuring consular protection for an increasing number of unrepresented EU citizens. 
France might have been actually inclined to accept a shift of the consular and diplomatic 
protection burden from the Member States to the Union since, due to its extended consular 
network,308 France might have ended up having to assume the role of Lead State309 in many 
third countries, and the ensuing consequences – namely, considerably high human resources, 
and costs and legal responsibility for such operations – might have motivated France to put 
forward this new Union objective and accept a possible vertical sharing of burden depending 
                                                 
306 Art. 3(5) TEU: ‘In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall [...] contribute to the protection of its 
citizens.’ 
307 Especially in light of the fact that France has been one of the most fervent opponents of the transfer of powers 
from the Member States to the Union in the field of consular and diplomatic protection of EU citizens in third 
countries. See National Report on France in the CARE Report. 
308 Some of the EU Member States have more representations in third countries than other Member States 
(usually the smaller EU Member States). For instance, France, Germany, the UK, Italy and Spain (combined 
population of 314,815,000) have representations in more than 50% of all third countries, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Estonia, Latvia and Cyprus (combined population of 5,301,000) have representations in less than 10% of all 
third countries, see Madalina B. Moraru, ‘Practical and legal consequences of the absence of diplomatic and EU 
representation for EU citizens residing in foreign countries’, Chapter in European Parliament Report - Franchise 
and electoral participation of third country citizens residing in the European Union and of the European Union 
citizens residing in third country, 01/2013, edited by J. -Thomas Arrighi, R. Bauböck, M. Collyer, D. Hutcheson, 
M. Moraru, L. Khadar, J. Shaw, Study for an Impact Assessment on Coordination and Cooperation Measures to 
Facilitate the Right to Consular Assistance for Unrepresented EU Citizens. 
309 On the concept of consular Lead State see the Conclusions of the General Affairs and External Relations 
Council meeting on 18 June 2007 which aim to ‘strengthen consular cooperation between EU Member States 
through the implementation of the consular Lead State concept’ and the EU Guidelines on the implementation of 
the consular Lead State concept OJ C 317/6 of 12/12/2008. 
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on the evolution of circumstances. Another reason might have been France’s desire to ensure 
a back-up plan for the protection of Union citizens when the Member States cannot agree on 
the evacuation procedure310 or when a certain situation is to be considered as a ‘crisis’.311 
Regardless of the reasons behind the legally binding Union objective of ensuring protection of 
EU citizens in the world, Article 3(5) TEU is a welcome addition, capable of supporting the 
Union’s initiatives in the field of consular and diplomatic protection of Union citizens abroad. 
The insertion of a Union objective to protect the Union citizens in the Union’s 
relations with the wider world has some salient, symbolic ‘federalist’312 features. In addition to 
the already existent federalist elements of the European Union’s own territory and citizens313, 
the Reform Treaty added another federalist feature – the Union’s own objective to protect its 
citizens, thus showing to the entire world it now has both the will and the means to act for its 
citizens.  
Important changes were introduced in regard to the Union citizenship, making this 
legal status ‘additional’ instead of ‘complementary’ to the Member State’s citizenship. The 
dependent relationship of the Union citizenship on the State’s citizenship seems to have been 
diminished and has spurred a scholarly trend whereby the EU citizenship might became the 
fundamental, primary status of the EU citizenship in time.314 
The second salient change brought by the Lisbon Treaty is the new structure of Article 
20 TFEU (former Article 17 EC Treaty) in the format of a non-exhaustive list of rights for the 
Union citizens. Paragraph 2c stipulates the right of the unrepresented Union citizen to be 
protected by the consular and diplomatic authorities of any of the Member States represented 
in a third country which reiterates the first sentence of former Article 20 EC Treaty. This new 
                                                 
310 As pointed out in the minutes of the COCON meeting of 11th July 2008, the French EU Presidency already 
distributed a draft Decision on the implementation of the Lead State concept. Some Member States (Spain, 
Finland, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and UK) were against the use of a legally binding instrument and 
believed that Guidelines would be more appropriate. 
311 As happened, for instance during the 2008 military conflict in Georgia. According to the ‘Study on Member 
States’ Legislations and Practices in the field of Consular Protection’, which was entrusted to the Barcelona 
Instituto Europeo de Derecho (IED) by the European Commission, DG Justice, Liberty, Security, Fundamental 
Rights and Citizenship Directorate, 86: ‘in Georgia in 2008, according to Latvia, the Lead State concept did not 
work very well, as some Member States did not perceive the situation as a crisis.’ 
312 Referring to Armin van Bogdandy’s use of the term ‘federalism’. He asserted, based on the Amsterdam 
Treaty developments, that the then developments were sufficient to compare the Union to a federalist entity. See 
Armin van Bogdandy, ‘The European Union as a Supranational Federation: A Conceptual Attempt in the Light 
of the Amsterdam Treaty’, (2000) Columbia Journal of European Law, 27, 33. 
313 This aspect is underlined by the Commission in its recent Communication: Consular protection for EU 
citizens in third countries: State of play and way forward, doc. COM (2011) 149/2 of 23 March 2011. See also 
EU citizenship Report 2010 - Dismantling the obstacles to EU citizens’ rights - Report - 27.10.2010.  
314 See, inter alia, G. Martinico and R. Castaldi, ‘Rethinking (EU) citizenship’, (2011) Special issue of 
Perspectives on Federalism; A. Schrauwen, European Citizenship in the Treaty of Lisbon: Any Change at all 
(2008) Maastricht Journal or European and Comparative Law, 55, 59-60; J. Shaw (ed.), ‘Has the European Court 
of Justice Challenged Member State Sovereignty in Nationality Law?’ EUI RSCAS Working Paper 2011/62. 
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format makes clear that the TFEU establishes an individual right and not a mere policy of the 
Union.315 
Third, with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights becomes part of the Union primary law and legally binding on the Member States, 
with two exceptions, the UK and Poland. The innovation brought by the Charter to the field of 
international protection of the Union citizens, does not necessarily consist in the conferral of a 
fundamental status316 to the right embedded in Article 20(2)(c) TFEU, as argued by certain 
academics317, but in the title given to this right – consular and diplomatic protection, which 
has the potential to clarify the convoluted content of the Treaty based right.318 A second 
valuable change consists of the rights enshrined in Article 41 of the Charter. According to this 
Article, the Member States are required to respect the guarantees of ensuring good 
administration and effective judicial remedy319, in relation to the exercise of protection of EU 
citizens abroad. Moreover, it guarantees that the domestic executive will adequately answer 
the request of protection of the unrepresented Union citizens, and in case of violation, the EU 
citizen will have an appropriate judicial remedy against the executive’s conduct. The added 
value of Article 41 of the Charter to the consular and diplomatic protection is considerable 
due to the specificities of the national regulatory frameworks on consular and diplomatic 
protection of the nationals. Certain Member States did not confer, before the entry into force 
of the Charter, the rights enumerated in Article 41 in the form of domestic rights to their own 
nationals and consequently neither to non-national EU citizens under the implementation of 
the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad.320 Article 41 now ensures that the Union 
                                                 
315 As argued by the UK, see ‘Study on Member States’ Legislations and Practices in the field of Consular 
Protection’, which was entrusted to the Barcelona Instituto Europeo de Derecho (IED) by the European 
Commission, DG Justice, Liberty, Security, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship Directorate; certain legal 
authors contested also that the protection laid down in former Art. 20 EC Treaty is a right, since it looks more 
like a cooperation policy between the Member States: C. Closa, ‘Citizenship of the Union and nationality of 
Member States’, (1995) CMLRev, 487; S. Kadelbach, ‘European Integration: The New German Scholarship’, 
NYU Jean Monnet Working Paper 9/03. 
316 The fundamental status as such does not add guarantees other than those already existent for the Union 
citizen’s rights under the EU law. 
317 Alessandro I. Saliceti, ‘The Protection of EU Citizens Abroad: Accountability, Rule of Law, Role of Consular 
and Diplomatic Services’, (2011) European Public Law, 91. 
318 This aspect will be detailed in Chapter 4, Section IV - What’s in the EU citizen’s right to equal protection 
abroad? Challenges to establish the substantive content of the EU citizenship right. 
319 See Art. 47 EU Charter. 
320 For example, Italy (according to L. R. Perfetti, ‘Diritto ad una Buona Amministrazione, determinazione 
dell’interesse pubblico ed equita’, (2010) Rivista Italiana di Diritto Pubblico Communitarion, 802) and Romania. 
It has to be noted that the exercise of consular and diplomatic protection of citizens abroad is falling under 
administrative law. See S. Battini, ‘The Impact of EU Law and Globalisation on Consular Assistance and 
Diplomatic Protection’ in E. Chiti, Bernardo G. Mattarella (eds.), Global Administrative Law and EU 
administrative Law, Relationships, Legal Issues and Comparison, Springer (2011). 
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citizens have minimum safeguards in their relations with the consular and public authorities, 
as part of the national executive, when requesting consular protection. 
There are several other salient changes brought by the Lisbon Treaty, which have the 
effect of changing the area of ‘protection by the consular and diplomatic authorities of the 
Member States’ from a purely inter-governmental area to an area where strong signs of supra-
nationality appear. For instance, Article 23 TFEU transforms the EU regulatory framework 
from one dominated by collective measures to a field where the Council can also act by way 
of a Union Directive. According to Article 23(2) TFEU, the Council was given for the first 
time specific legislative power to adopt directives through quality majority voting at the 
Commission proposal and after consulting the European Parliament. The second change is a 
replacement of the former Article 20 EC Treaty phrase: ‘Member States shall adopt the 
necessary provisions [...]’ with: ‘Member States shall establish the necessary rules among 
themselves [...]’. It can be observed that the word which established the inter-governmental 
nature of the regulatory field, ‘themselves’, was erased, thus strengthening the new role of the 
Council alongside those of the Member States in the implementation of the EU citizenship 
right. 
Article 23 TFEU thus comes with an element of supra-nationality, the Member States 
stopped being the only actors competent to adopt rules governing the field, as the Council 
steps in with the competence to adopt legislative acts by way of qualified majority voting. A 
certain intergovernmental aspect is preserved since the European Parliament does not have an 
equal co-legislator role within the special procedure prescribed by Article 23(2) TFEU. 
Despite these inter-governmental elements mitigating the supranational effect of Article 23 
TFEU, there are numerous Union features infused into the implementing regime of the EU 
citizenship right to equal protection abroad, which bring this right closer to the other EU 
citizenship rights in terms of implementing regime. For instance, the fact that the Union 
Institutions have now legislative powers to adopt Union measures for the implementation of 
the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad,321 and that the EU principle of uniformity 
governs the implementation of the Council directive, will certainly limit the discretionary 
                                                 
321 The Commission can make proposals for Council Directives under Art. 17 TEU and Art. 23 (2) TFEU, the 
European Parliament has a consultative role, while the Council can adopt the Commission’s proposal after the 
reading of the proposal by the European Parliament and the reaction of the Commission, via the special 
legislative and QMV procedure. 
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powers of the Members to act solely according to their own interests and without due regard 
to time constrains and effectiveness of the EU citizenship right.322 
The umbilical link between former Article 20 EC Treaty (current Article 23 TFEU) 
and Article 20 of the former EU Treaty (current Article 35 TEU) has been maintained, 
obliging the Member States and the Union’s external representation to cooperate sincerely for 
the purpose of securing an effective implementation of the EU citizenship right to equal 
protection abroad. The wording of former Article 20 EU Treaty has mostly remained 
unchanged, except for the reference to the ‘Commission delegations’, which has been 
replaced with the ‘Union delegations’. Some of the legal323 as well as the political science324 
authors have argued that the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS), 
of which the Union delegations are a part, is the most innovative change brought by the 
Reform Treaty due to its consequences for the legal structure of the Union as a federalist 
entity and for the positive effects it will most likely have on the coherence of the Union 
external action.325 With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the external representation of 
the Union is primarily the task of the High Representatives for Foreign Affairs and the 
EEAS.326 The latter body has taken over the tasks of the previous Commission delegations, 
replacing also the Rotating Presidency representational responsibilities in third countries and 
                                                 
322 As regards the time constrains, notice that the Council is competent to adopt Directives, which the Member 
States are bound to implement in the time framework provided therein. The Member States have obligation 
during the period of implementation - Case C-129/96 Inter-Environnement Wallonie ASBL v Region Wallone 
[1997] ECR I-7411; Case C-1144/04 Mangold v Helm [2005] ECR I-9981, paras.76-78; and an obligation to 
implement in the time period provided by the Directive, with clear liability of the Member if non-implementing 
the said Directive based on Art. 4(3) TFEU: Joined Cases C-6 and C-9/90 Francovich v Italian Republic [1991] 
ECR I-5357; Joined Cases C-178, C-179, C-188 and C-190/94 Dillenkoffer v Germany [1996] ECR I-4845. See 
the numerous actions of infringement brought by the Commission against the Member States (Austria, Greece, 
Germany, Luxembourg, Portugal) for failure to transpose within the prescribed time limit the Directive 
2003/9/EC on minimum standards for reception of asylum seekers, which is a minimum standards Directive like 
the future Directive on consular and diplomatic protection. 
323 J. Wouters, D. Coppens and Bart de Meester, ‘The European Union’s External relations after the Lisbon 
Treaty’ in S griller and J. Ziller (eds.), The Lisbon Treaty: EU Constitutionalism without a Constitutional Treaty, 
Springer, (2008). 
324 S. Nuttall, ‘Coherence and Consistency’ in C. Hill and M. Smith (ed) International Relations and the 
European Union, Oxford University Press (2008). 
325 See   L. Rayner, ‘The EU Foreign Ministry and Union Embassies’, The Foreign Policy Centre, June 2005; R. 
Wessel and B. van Vooren, ‘The EEAS’ Diplomatic Dreams’, in P. Quinn (ed.), Making European Diplomacy 
Work: Can the EEAS Deliver?, EU Diplomacy Papers 8/2011. It is interesting to notice an assumption made by 
Magnette in 1999. According to her, the provision of European protection to EU nationals outside the Union 
would require a federal structure in which the EU itself would be vested with legal status and a diplomatic 
infrastructure. It seems that, ten years after, the conditions for the EU’s federalist structure, as envisaged by 
Magnette, have been achieved, following the amendments brought by the Lisbon Treaty, namely: the merger of 
the pillar structure into one international organisation being conferred expressed legal personality (Art. 47 TEU), 
separate from the Member States, and endowed with a diplomatic structure able to represent the interests of the 
Union and its citizens outside the Union borders – the EEAS. (Paul Magnette, La citoyenneté europeenne: 
droits, politiques, institutions, Imprint Bruxelles: Editions de l'Universite de Bruxelles (1999)). 
326 See Art. 27(3) TEU. 
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adding all the Union policies to its representation tasks327, unlike the Commission delegations 
whose functions were limited to the competences for which the Commission was competent 
to act. 
The EEAS is a sui generis body that does not fall under the Commission or Council,328 
and is said to be the first structure of a common European diplomacy,329 which may have the 
potential to replace the exercise of the consular functions of the Member States.330 Article 
35(3) TEU and Article 5(10) of Council Decision establishing the organisation and 
functioning of the EEAS331 already establish a supporting role for the EEAS in the area of 
consular and diplomatic protection of Union citizens. Following the Council’s new power of 
implementation of the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad, it seems that 
implementation of this right by way of Member States’ actions is now appropriate only in 
relation to the implementation of Article 35 TEU.332 Member States can continue to conclude 
agreements between themselves on burden sharing, co-location333, Common Visa Application 
Centers334 or Common Administrative Centers.335  
As to the role of the EEAS in the field of consular and diplomatic protection, the 
Council Decision establishing the EEAS provides in Article 5(10) that: 
 
‘The Union delegations shall, acting in accordance with the third paragraph of Article 
35 TEU, and upon request by Member States, support the Member States in their diplomatic 
relations and in their role of providing consular protection to citizens of the Union in third 
countries on a resource-neutral basis.’  
 
                                                 
327 See Art. 221 TFEU. 
328 Bart Van Vooren, ‘A Legal Institutional Perspective on the European External Action Service’, (2011), 
op.cit., 475. 
329 Here, by EEAS is meant not only the Brussels-based department but also the EU diplomatic delegations, the 
previous Commission’s diplomatic delegations – Art. 221 TFEU  
330 J. Wouters, ‘Can the EU Replace its member States in International Affairs?’ in I. Govaere (eds), Essays in 
Honour of Marc Maresceau, Brill (2014); R. Wessel and B. van Vooren, ‘The EEAS’ Diplomatic Dreams’, in P. 
Quinn (ed.), Making European Diplomacy Work: Can the EEAS Deliver?, EU Diplomacy Papers 8/2011; F. 
Austermann, The EU Delegations in EU Foreign Policy: A Diplomatic Service of Different Speeds, Palgrave 
Macmillan (2014); 
331 Council Decision No. 427 establishing the organisation and functioning of the EEAS of 26 July 2010, [2010] 
OJ L 201/30 of 3.8.2010. 
332 However the Member States would have to show respect to the CFSP norms, and the new post-Lisbon Treaty 
CFSP instruments which have been reduced to only one type – Decisions, see Art. 21 TEU. 
333 Co-location means the concentration of two or more diplomatic and/or consular missions in one building or 
facility. 
334 Common Visa Application Centres are mutual accreditation of an external service provider at a joint visa 
application centre. 
335 Common Administrative Centres are created for the issue of Schengen visas by several Member States in the 
same building or by one Schengen member in full representation of all Schengen partners in visa matters. 
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Despite the limited powers of the EEAS in the area of consular and diplomatic 
protection of Union citizens to support the Member States when the latter so request, the role 
of the EEAS is not insignificant and this is shown by Article 13(2) of the same Decision, 
which provides that: ‘The High Representative shall submit a report to the European 
Parliament, the Council and the Commission on the functioning of the EEAS by the end of 
2011. That report shall, in particular, cover the implementation of Article 5(3) and (10) and 
Article 9.’  
For the moment, the role of the EEAS in the area of ensuring protection of Union 
citizens in the world is now in an embryonic form and it will probably take several years until 
the competences of the EEAS increase to more than a supporting role. If, in the area of 
consular and diplomatic protection of Union citizens, the EEAS is only supporting the 
Member States, which are the principle actors to ensure the right to protection abroad of the 
Union citizens, the EEAS, through the activity of the Union delegations, has from its very 
establishment an independent competence to act by way of concluding co-location336, burden-
sharing agreements with the Member States and coordination of humanitarian assistance. This 
increased power of the EEAS in the field of consular activity was accepted by the Member 










                                                 
336 Germany, France, Italy and the UK share the location of their diplomatic missions with the Union delegation 
in Kazakhstan (in Astana and Almaty); Germany, Italy and the Netherlands share the location of their diplomatic 
mission with the Union delegation in Nigeria (Abuja); and, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK share the 
location of their diplomatic mission with the Union delegation in Tanzania (Dar Es Salaam). Information taken 
from 2009 ‘Study on Member States’ Legislations and Practices in the field of Consular Protection’, which was 
entrusted to the Barcelona Instituto Europeo de Derecho (IED) by the European Commission, DG Justice, 
Liberty, Security, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship Directorate. 
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            Conclusion of Chapter 1 
The formation of the EU legal framework on protection of EU citizens abroad has been a 
relatively slow process. It formally started in 1993 with the creation of the Union, Union 
citizenship, and the introduction of the right to equal protection abroad among the four EU 
citizenship rights. The introduction of the EU citizenship to equal protection abroad by the 
Maastricht Treaty came at a time when all the Member States were represented in only five 
third countries and the number of citizens travelling and residing abroad was increasing, 
making impossible the objective of efficiently responding to the citizens’ consular demand 
and expectations for the Member States. The then 15 Member States consented to extend the 
previous scattered regional agreements on sharing of consular and diplomatic protection 
functions to a partnership among all the Union’s Member States in an attempt to not only 
alleviate their consular and diplomatic tasks but also to advance the protection of the EU 
citizens abroad, and, in this way, to enlarge the territorial effectiveness of EU citizenship and 
strengthen the Union’s image also outside the EU.337  
The Maastricht Treaty introduced the new legal status of ‘EU citizenship’ that ‘is 
destined to become the fundamental status of the citizens of the Member States’338 and 
endowed it with several rights, of which includes the right of the EU citizen to receive 
protection while in a third country, where his Member State of nationality is not represented, 
from the diplomatic or consular authorities of any Member State that are represented, on the 
same conditions as the nationals of that State. The introduction of this EU citizenship right to 
equal protection abroad has been the result of compromises reached between the different 
interests and approaches that the Member States had towards the field of consular and 
diplomatic protection of individuals. Some Member States approached consular and 
diplomatic protection of individuals as a matter of policy reserved to the State, others had 
domestic legal provisions which recognised a limited individual right to protection abroad in 
certain circumstances,339 while one of the then Member States recognised a fundamental right 
to protection abroad to all its citizens.340 A compromise was reached and the Member States 
recognised an EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad for all unrepresented Union 
citizens.  
                                                 
337 The reasons for adopting the Union citizenship right to equal protection abroad of unrepresented Union 
citizens is to be found in the Adonnino Committee Report of 1984, which provided that the Committee was 
responsible for adopting Community measures ‘to strengthen and promote its identity and its image both for its 
citizens and for the rest of the world’. See Bull. EC 6-1984, 11: ‘A People’s Europe’. 





The EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad is a historically important 
innovation within both international relations and international law, since it then had no 
equivalent in other continents or international organisations. Traditionally, the protection of 
citizens abroad has been the sole responsibility of the individual’s Member State of 
citizenship. The Union, an international organisation, established a sort of supranational 
citizenship and it attached to it a right to equal protection to all those Union citizens 
unrepresented in the world. The holder of the obligation to protection is not the Member State 
of nationality, but any of the Member States that has a consular or diplomatic protection ‘in 
the place’ in the third country where the citizen is located. The term ‘in the place’ has to be 
differentiated from ‘in the third country’ since it confers the right to the Union citizen to ask 
for protection from any of the Member States that has a consular or diplomatic representation 
in a place nearer to where he is located instead of having to travel hundreds of kilometres to 
reach the consular or diplomatic representation of his own Member State within the same 
third country. The Member States have thus assumed responsibility to ensure not only their 
own peoples’ safety, but also that of other Member States’ citizens. 
The implementation of this right has not, on the other hand, been very novel, since the 
Member States decided to act only by way of a horizontal sui generis type of 
intergovernmental cooperation in the first 15 years. The right to consular and diplomatic 
protection of the Union citizens has so far remained quite underdeveloped in comparison with 
the other EU citizenship rights. Due to the Member States’ majoritarian view of consular and 
diplomatic protection of individuals as a field reserved to the State of nationality, the EU 
citizenship right, although part of the Community internal market policies, was implemented 
by way of sui generis international agreements and its supervision allocated to a Working 
Group within the Council composed of State consular and diplomatic officials. The different 
views and approaches of the Member States on the consular and diplomatic protection of 
individuals, ranging from a matter entirely reserved to the State of nationality’s executive, 
recognising a limited individual right, to a constitutional citizenship right to protection abroad 
has slowed down the development of EU policies and the building of a coherent and fully 
efficient Union mechanism guaranteeing security and protection of Union citizens in third 
countries.  
In the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami affecting South East Asia, it became evident that 
not even the Member States benefiting of the widest external representation network can cope 
individually or collectively with natural and man-made disasters, which seem to be of an 
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increasing frequency and magnitude. Increased coordination of the Member States under the 
guidance of the Union institutions and bodies and complementing the horizontal cooperation 
with the Union crisis management capabilities were necessary to fill the gaps in securing 
protection of EU citizens abroad, especially in large-scale disasters. A second stage was thus 
prompted in the development of the EU legal framework on protection of EU citizens abroad, 
namely the recognition of consular protection competence to a supranational organisation, the 
European Union. It can be observed that following the positive example of the vertical 
cooperation in the 2004 South East Asia consular crisis, the EU activities in securing 
protection of EU citizens abroad intensified, in spite of certain Member States’ resistance to 
the delegation of competence over a traditionally State reserved area, such as consular 
protection of citizens abroad, to the European Union.341 
In 2007, the Community Civil Protection Mechanism,342 commonly used to address the 
management of disasters occurring primarily within the Union, was formally extended to 
include also consular protection of EU citizens in third countries affected by all types of 
disasters. Complementary to the Civil Protection Mechanism, the protection of unrepresented 
Union citizens in third countries could also have been secured through the military and 
civilian capabilities of ESDP missions,343 but only in cases of emergencies, and only for the 
purpose of evacuating European citizens.344 However, military assets can only be used for 
humanitarian purposes as a last resort and where there is no other available civilian 
alternative.345  
Consequently, the protection of Union citizens abroad became a hybrid area where 
Community internal policies (EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad) intertwined 
with Community external policies (civil protection and humanitarian aid) and Union policies 
(the obligation of cooperation between the Member States consular and diplomatic missions 
                                                 
341 The persistent objector is the UK. 
342 Council Decision 2007/779/EC Euratom establishing the EU Civil Protection Mechanism (Recast), OJ, 2007, 
L 314/9. The Civil Protection Mechanism has been triggered for the purpose of consular assistance of Union 
citizens only in crisis situations affecting third countries.  
343 According to Article 43(1) TEU, according to which CSDP missions have, inter alia, rescue and assistance 
tasks. 
344 Interestingly, the first Decision adopted on the basis of former Article 17 TEU concerned the evacuation of 
EU nationals whenever they are in danger in third countries. It was adopted as a sui generis Decision that was 
not published in the Official Journal. See Doc. 8386/96, Decision de Conseil du 27 juin 1996, relative aux 
operations d’evacuations de ressortisants des Etats membres lorsque leur sécurite est en danger dans un pays 
tiers – see more in R. A. Wessel, The European Union's foreign and security policy: a legal institutional 
perspective, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (1999), 133. 
345 Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in International Disaster Relief — ‘Oslo 




with the Commission missions) and implementation measures in the form of sui generis inter-
States acts (Decisions of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States 
meeting within the Council). The consular and diplomatic protection of unrepresented Union 
citizens in the world, as an external dimension of Union citizenship, is thus only one aspect of 
the protection of EU citizens abroad. Consular protection and assistance of the Union citizens 
in third countries affected by crises could have been conferred also under other external 
relations policies and instruments of the Union and the Community: the Community civil 
protection policy and Civil Protection Mechanism, humanitarian assistance, crisis response 
under the Instrument for Stability346 by the Community delegations, and ESDP civilian and 
military capabilities. However the primary responsibility fell on the Member State of 
nationality, then on the horizontal cooperation among the Member States, and only in large-
scale consular crises would the Member States also have recourse to the Community or Union 
capabilities. In concrete terms, the protection of unrepresented EU citizens abroad during the 
pre-Treaty of Lisbon period could have been secured through different EU instruments and 
under different pillars (Community347 and CFSP348).  
The Member States did not chose to implement the EU citizenship right to equal 
protection abroad by way of a Community act, Directive or Decision, or CFSP measures, 
instead, they preferred to keep the exercise of protection of EU citizens abroad under their 
exclusive control, as a sui generis inter-governmental area of action. The Member States 
adopted three simplified international agreements entitled Decisions of the Representatives of 
the Member States, and soft law documents providing for ad-hoc horizontal cooperation 
among the consulates and embassies of the Member States for implementing an essential EU 
citizenship right. Decisions 95/553/EC, 11107/95 and 96/409/CSFP limited the material and 
personal scope of application of the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad to six 
mandatory consular situations,349 and the EU citizen’s choice of the Member State to resort to 
                                                 
346 EC Regulation No 1717/2006 Regulation Establishing an Instrument for Stability, [2006] OJ L 327/1 of 
24.11. 2006. 
347 Former Art. 20 EC Treaty, former Articles 308 and 3(u) EC Treaty. 
348 Former Articles 20(1) and 12 EU Treaty. Consular protection of EU citizens abroad could have been secured 
also by the civilian and military ESDP missions. 
349 Namely: (1) Death; (2) Serious accident or serious illness; (3) Arrest or detention; (4) Victims of violent 
crime; (5) Relief and repatriation of distressed citizens. In addition, Member States agreed to offer assistance 
also in cases of (6) loss of travel documents by issuing a European Travel Document that will allow the EU 
citizen to return to his or her EU country of residence. Incidentally, all Member States offered some kind of 
assistance in cases in which a national finds himself or herself in financial need, although this assistance tends to 
be very restrictive. This kind of financial aid is provided mainly for the purpose of helping citizens to return to 
their home country (repatriation) and on condition that a reimbursement commitment is undertaken by the EU 
citizen; more on the comparative analysis of the practices of the Member States can be found in the CARE 
Report, section 4.5.6. 
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for help in third countries. It was demonstrated that the content of the sui generis Decisions 
resembles that of Directives rather than Decisions of the Representatives of the Member 
States. These Acts, entitled Decisions or Conclusions350, have usually been political acts or, 
even if entailing legal effects, they affected only the Member States, and not directly the 
rights of individuals. Their character as international agreements and the consequent 
exclusion of certain EU legal remedies did not have the potential of prejudicing the Union 
citizens’ rights and freedoms. The sui generis EC and CFSP Decisions are exceptions to this 
practice, since due to their purpose, i.e. implementing the EU citizenship right to equal 
protection abroad, their impact on the EU derived individual rights is not an incidental effect, 
but constitutes the primary effect of the implementing measures. The fact that certain Member 
States considered the protection of citizens abroad as an exclusive right of the State of 
nationality and thus falling under the sole responsibility of the Member State of nationality 
has altered the understanding of the protection of EU citizens from an EU citizenship right, as 
established by the Maastricht Treaty, to an area of purely inter-governmental cooperation. 
Thus, it is no surprise that the Member States decided to act on the basis of Decisions of the 
Representatives of the Member States, when the nature of a ‘citizenship right’ of protection 
abroad of EU citizens was overshadowed by some of the Member States’ rationale of a 
‘discretionary right of the State of nationality’. 
The fact that the sui generis Decisions and the ad-hoc administrative arrangements for 
designating the responsible Member States to secure the protection of EU citizens in loco 
lacked transparency, precision and predictability have led to the stark unawareness of the 
Union citizens of the benefits they entail under the EU citizenship right, and consequently of 
its limited exercise, especially in day-to-day situations.  
It has to be pointed out that even if the Member States act by way of international 
agreements concluded outside of the Union framework, they are bound by the duty of sincere 
cooperation, in its negative ambit, to exercise their international powers in respect of the EU 
legal order with its constitutional precepts. This obligation requires the Member States first to 
act in such a way that the EU institutional balance is not jeopardised by their international 
actions, therefore the choice of a Community measure on the basis of the former Article 308 
jointly with Article 20 EC Treaty would have better ensured the respect of the constitutional 
principles of sincere cooperation and respect of the Union institutional balance, than the use 
of the international legal toolbox for the implementation of an EU citizenship right. Second, 
                                                 
350 Joined Cases C-181/91 and C-248/91 Bangladesh. 
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the implementation of the sui generis consular protection Decisions by circulars and un-
published administrative351 acts was clearly contrary to the principle of legal certainty in the 
implementation of the EU citizenship right and the principle of sincere cooperation. The 
measure adopted by the Member States for the transposition of the three sui generis Decisions 
vary considerably among the Member States in terms of their legal form, personal and 
material scope and legal remedies.  
Despite the intensification of Member States’ requests for the Union’s involvement in 
helping them to protect the Union citizens abroad post-2004, the pre-Lisbon Treaty 
framework on protection of Union citizens in third countries was characterised by a strong 
resistance among the Member States about the delegation of competence to the supranational 
level. This approach has led to the development of a sui generis legal framework restricting 
the scope of application of the EU citizenship right, ad-hoc horizontal cooperation of limited 
transparency coupled with an ad-hoc supranational intervention of the Union at the arbitrary 
requests of the Member States. The equal treatment based content of the EU citizenship right 
coupled with the great variety existing among the Member States’ systems of consular and 
diplomatic protection of citizens led to an incoherent EU framework of protection of EU 
citizens abroad. The combination of the specific conception of the EU citizenship right to 
protection abroad as an equal consular protection treatment, the differences among the 
national systems of consular and diplomatic protection of citizens, and the constant tension 
between delegation of authority to the Union and state sovereignty, characterising this 
politically sensitive field, have negatively impacted on building a coherent and efficient EU 
legal framework of protecting Union citizens abroad. 
It was shown that the innovations and amendments brought by the Lisbon Treaty have 
the potential for remedying these negative aspects, especially through the exercise of the 
Union’s new legislative competence to ensure the efficiency of the EU citizenship right. A 
proposal for a Directive establishing common standards on consular protection of Union 
citizens abroad was already put forward by the Commission in 2011.352 However, until the 
adoption of the Directive by the Council, the three Decisions adopted for the purpose of 
implementing former Art. 20 EC Treaty are still in force,353 in spite of the legal requirement to 
amend them in 2007. 
                                                 
351 See for more details the CARE Report, sections 2 and 4. 
352 See Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on Consular protection for citizens of the European Union 
abroad, Explanatory Memorandum, Brussels, COM(2011) 881 final 14.12.2011. 
353 Decision 95/553/EC, regarding protection for citizens of the European Union by diplomatic and consular 
representations, [1995] OJ L 314/73; Decision 96/409/CFSP, on the establishment of an emergency travel 
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To sum up, in spite of the identified deficiencies in securing protection of EU citizens 
abroad, it is clear that the European Union has developed its own specific legal regime on 
securing protection of EU citizens in the world, which has no exact equivalent at the 
international level, nor does it follow the classical international legal framework on consular 
and diplomatic protection of individuals. The traditional international legal framework defines 
consular and diplomatic protection of individuals as a discretionary right of the States of 
nationality, with limited exceptions codified by Article 8 Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations and Article 45 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, whereby Member 
States can consent to delegate consular and diplomatic functions to another State on the basis 
of strict conditions. The EU Member States have an obligation, and not a right to secure 
protection abroad of non-national EU citizens who are not represented in third countries. In an 
attempt to enhance the protection abroad of EU citizens, the Lisbon Treaty has also 
strengthened the role of the Union institutions, i.e. the Commission, the EEAS and EU 
delegations, in securing protection of EU citizens in the world at the request of the Member 
States. Therefore, in addition to non-national Member States, the organs of an international 
organisation were made competent to exercise State like functions for EU citizens. This 
particular consular protection function endowed to the institutions and bodies of a 
supranational organisation has no equivalent under the international legal framework, which 
has so far recognised only a ‘functional protection’ competence on international 
organisations.354 These particular distinctive features of the EU model of securing protection 
of Union citizens abroad have raised concerns regarding the compatibility of the Union 
specific legal regime with the traditional public international legal framework on consular and 
diplomatic protection of natural persons. In the following Chapter the evolution of the public 
international legal concepts of consular and diplomatic protection of natural persons will be 
assessed for the purposes of identifying the current appearance of the international regulatory 
                                                                                                                                                        
document, [1996] OJ L 168/11; Decision of the representatives of the Governments of the Member States, 
meeting within the Council, Measures implementing protection for EU citizens by diplomatic and consular 
representation (doc. 11107/95), 19 December 1995 (source: Council of the European Union, CFSP handbook – 
Compilation of selected texts applicable in CFSP, doc. 16074/06.) 
354 International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion of 11 April 1949, Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the 
Service of the United Nations, ICJ Reports (1949), 174–220. In this Opinion, the ICJ established the concept of 
‘functional protection’ defined as the right of an international organisation to bring an international claim against 
the responsible de jure or de facto Government, ‘with a view to obtaining reparation for the damage caused to 
the United Nations and to the individual victim to the victim or to persons entitled through him’, where the 
victim is an agent of the international organisation. L. Gramlich, ‘Diplomatic Protection Against Acts of 
Intergovernmental Organs’, (1984) German Yearbook of International Law, 386; J. Dugard, ‘Functional 
Protection’ in R. Wolfrum (ed), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2009); Myriam B. 
Carabot and Ubéda-Saillard Muriel, ‘Functional Protection’ in J. Crawford, A. Pellet, and S. Olleson (eds), The 
Law of International Responsibility, Oxford University Press (2010), 1073–1084.  
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framework and establishing whether the EU innovatory legal regime of ensuring protection of 
































Chapter 2: Reconsidering the Classical Public International Legal 
Institutions of Consular and Diplomatic Protection of Individuals 
I. Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed the evolution of the EU’s model of protecting the EU citizens 
abroad, in particular, the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad and its nexus with 
various other EU legal norms and instruments. It was pointed out that since 1993, the citizens 
of all the EU Member States have enjoyed a Union citizenship right which requires the 
Member States to confer to the unrepresented Union citizen the same consular protection 
treatment they would confer to their own citizens. The scope of the EU citizenship right has 
remained the same throughout the different Treaty amendments, including the last one 
brought by the Lisbon Treaty. It was shown that the classical international treaty nature of the 
implementing measures raised problems on their conformity with EU primary law and 
principles. The consular assistance Decisions limited the scope of application of the EU 
citizenship right to equal protection abroad, while conferring only limited legal remedies to 
individuals in cases of violation of their EU citizenship right. Furthermore, the measures 
chosen for the implementation of the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad raised 
problems for the respect of the institutional balance within the EU and the principle of sincere 
cooperation by the Member States.  
The EU architecture on protection of Union citizens abroad is unlike any other 
domestic, regional or global model. It departs from the traditional conception of securing 
protection of nationals abroad355 by way of advancing solidarity and cooperation among the 
European countries at both an inter-governmental and supranational level, which is unique 
within the general international legal framework. The EU model of protecting Union citizens 
abroad, although respecting the traditional conception of the State of nationality bearing the 
primary responsibility to protect its nationals abroad, adds new actors, with new 
responsibilities to protect the Union citizens abroad. The non-nationality Member States have 
been, since 1993, the bearers of an EU primary law obligation to ensure equal protection 
abroad to unrepresented Union citizens, incidentally, the institutions and bodies of a 
supranational organisation – the European Union – were recognised direct powers to secure 
                                                 
355 Based on the State of nationality model. 
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consular protection of Union citizens in cases of consular crisis.356 This specific bottom-up 
delegation of authority to exercise consular protection, and possibly also diplomatic 
protection of individuals in third countries to the EU,357 was argued to raise another series of 
problems, this time from the perspective of public international law.  
It seems that the Member States presumed the conformity of the EU-specific regime 
with public international law by introducing an obligation upon the Member States ‘to start 
the international negotiations required to secure this protection’.358 However, the legal 
novelties introduced by the Maastricht Treaty and especially by the Lisbon Treaty, and their 
potential for future development in EU secondary legislation,359 have no analogous example in 
other regions of the world and have considerably departed from the classical public 
international legal theories of consular and diplomatic protection as fictio juris and State of 
nationality prerogative.360 The traditional conception of consular and diplomatic protection 
depicts these mechanisms as exclusive rights of the State of nationality, in relation to which 
individuals are not recognised any rights or roles. Under this classical definition, the State of 
nationality decided when to exercise these mechanisms, in relation to whom, and to what 
extent; and, how much of the compensation received from the perpetrator State, as remedy for 
the wrongful act committed, to confer to the injured national, while the latter had no legal 
remedy against the State’s decisions under public international law.361 
                                                 
356 The EEAS and Union delegations according to current Art. 35 TEU (former Art. 20 TEU), the EEAS 
Decision and Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (Regulation No 230/2014 Establishing an instrument 
contributing to stability and peace, 11 March 2014, OJ L 77/1, succeeding the Instrument for Stability), bodies 
established within the Commission under the Union Civil Protection Mechanism and the CSDP civilian and 
military missions. 
357 See more details in Chapter 4. 
358 See Art. 23 (1)(2) TFEU, initial Art. 8(c) of the Maastricht Treaty. 
359 See the proposal for a Council Directive on Consular Protection for Citizens of the Union Abroad, Brussels, 
14.12.2011 COM(2011) 881 final 2011/0432 (CNS) approved with amendments by the European Parliament, 
see Report on the proposal for a Council directive on consular protection for citizens of the Union abroad 
(COM(2011)0881 – C7-0017/2012 – 2011/0432(CNS)), of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home 
Affairs Rapporteur: Edit Bauer (PE 492.575v03-00) of 10 October 2012. 
360 See Edwin M. Borchard, The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad, The Bank Law Publishing, New 
York (1916); Frederick S. Dunn, The Protection of Nationals: A Study in the Application of International Law, 
Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press (1932); R. Lillich, ‘Editorial Comment on Diplomatic Protection of 
Nationals Abroad’, (1975) AJIL, 359; Chittharanjan F. Amerasinghe, Diplomatic Protection, Oxford University 
Press (2008); Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. U.K.), Judgment 30 August 1924, PCIJ Reports 
(1924), Series A, No 2; Nottebohm case (second phase) (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), Judgment 6 April 1955, 
ICJ Reports (1955), 4; Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain), Merits, 
Judgment of 5 February 1970, ICJ Reports (1970), 3. 
361 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain), Merits, Judgment of 5 February 
1970, ICJ Reports (1970), 3, and paras. 77-79. 
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On the other hand, the EU specific regime of protecting EU citizens abroad confers a 
primary role to the EU citizen, and not the Member States, at least in theory.362 The expressly 
stated main objective of the EU consular and diplomatic protection mechanisms is the EU 
citizen.363 The (unrepresented) EU citizen enjoys a fundamental right to receive equal 
protection from the consular and diplomatic authorities of any of the Member States 
represented in situ.364 The EU citizen can complain of a violation of his fundamental right 
before domestic courts and the CJEU, and he is entitled to receive effective legal remedies for 
such violations by the State or Union’s institutions.365 In order to increase the effectiveness of 
such specific protection, the Union delegations, ‘embassies’ of an international 
organisation,366 were expressly authorised to complement the Member States in fulfilling their 
obligation to secure the fundamental right to equal consular and diplomatic protection.367 
These peculiar features were argued368 to place the EU and the international legal 
regimes in opposition. The international and EU mechanisms of ensuring protection of 
nationals abroad seem to be different legal mechanisms, with different premises369, legal 
natures370, conditions,371 and effects,372 although they serve, to a certain extent, similar 
objectives – the protection of nationals abroad.  
                                                 
362 See the discussion on the implementation of former Art. 20 EC Treaty by way of Decisions of the 
Representatives of the Governments of the Member States in Chapter 1, Section III.1 Implementing the EU 
citizenship right to equal protection abroad - securing effective protection of EU citizens abroad without 
diminishing on the Member States’ sovereign powers 
363 See the preamble of the Decision 95/553/EC, which started with the following recital: ‘Resolved to continue 
building an ever closer Union to its citizens.’ ‘Strengthen[ing] the identity of the Union as perceived in third 
countries’ is the other main objective of the EU provisions on protection of EU citizens abroad. 
364 See Art. 46 EU Charter. 
365 See Arts. 41 and 47 EU Charter and the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament 
and the Council - Consular protection for EU citizens in third countries: State of play and way forward, COM 
(2011) 149/2, 23.3.2011. 
366 The terms ‘embassies’ has been often used by the legal and political science literature in relation to the Union 
delegations. However it does not mean that the EU delegations are actual embassies in their national State like 
meaning. See, inter alia, M. Comelli and R. Matarazzo, ‘Rehashed Commission Delegations or Real Embassies? 
EU Delegations Post-Lisbon’, IAI Working Paper 11/23 July 2011; F. Austermann, ‘Towards Embassies for 
Europe? EU Delegations in The Union’s Diplomatic System’, Policy Paper 8/ January 2012. 
367 See Art. 35(3) TEU and Arts. 5(9) and (10) of the EEAS Council Decision 2010/427/EU of 26 July 2010 
Establishing the Organisation and Functioning of the European External Action Service, [2010] OJ L 201/30. 
368 See in particular the opinions of Professors A. Vermeer-Künzli and John Dugard. Inter alia, A. Vermeer-
Künzli, ‘Where the Law Becomes Irrelevant: Consular Assistance and the European Union’, (2011) ICLQ, 965; 
J. Dugard, Seventh Report on Diplomatic Protection, ILC 58 Session 2006 A/CN 4/567. 
369 ‘Nationality of claims’ v European citizenship. 
370 Exclusive right of the State v Obligation of the EU Member States. 
371 ‘Nationality of claims’, existence of an international wrongful act, and exhaustion of local remedies v 
‘European citizenship’, no accessible permanent representation of the Member States of nationality or another 
representing State or of a competent Honorary Consul in the third country where the EU citizens is located. 
372 No domestic right is recognised in favour of the individual under public international law compared to the EU 
legal order where the EU citizens can complain before domestic courts of a State liability for not fulfilling its EU 
primary law obligation. 
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Famous international legal specialists373, as well as some of the Member States,374 have 
pointed out that there is a growing legal tension between the traditional public international 
legal model of diplomatic and consular protection of individuals and the EU norms governing 
the protection of EU citizens abroad.  
The European Union legal order is undoubtedly part of the international legal order, 
but it has adapted the general framework to its own essential characteristics375, and thus at 
times, has to create exceptional, autonomous norms.376 The relationship between international 
law and EU law has often been said to be one of conflict,377 based on the not so scarce 
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the EU on the compatibility of EU primary378 and 
secondary norms379 with general international law, including customary international norms.380 
                                                 
373 A. Vermeer-Künzli, ‘Where the Law Becomes Irrelevant: Consular Assistance and the European Union’, 
op.cit. ; J. Dugard, Seventh Report on Diplomatic Protection, op.cit.. 
374 See the UK’s position from a recent report in relation to the Commission’s proposal for a Directive on 
consular protection of unrepresented Union citizens: ‘The Government's view — endorsed by both the 
Committee and its predecessor — has consistently been that: consular services are the responsibility of Member 
States; are, quite rightly, at the top of Ministers' and officials' agenda, at home and abroad; a good level of 
cooperation between Member States already exists, and work was underway to improve it further; missions 
staffed by EU officials could not provide a service of the same standard, with the level of immediate 
accountability that ensured that it remained thus; the Government would resist the expansionist elements in these 
proposals with vigour and determination’. (emphasis added). See the Thirty-third Report of Session 2012-13 of 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, available at: 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmeuleg/86-xxxiii/8615.htm> (accessed June 
2013). 
375 See CJEU Opinion 2/13, Accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Judgment of 18 December 2014. 
376 M. Ličkova, ‘European Exceptionalism in International Law’, (2008) Eur J Int Law, 463; J. Manuel Cortes 
Martin, ‘Exceptionalism in International Law? The European Union and the System of International 
Responsibility’ in The Responsibility of International Organizations: Essays in Memory of Sir Ian Brownlie, 
Maurizio Ragazzi ed., Brill (2013). 
377 G. de Burca, ‘The EU, the European Court of Justice and the International Legal Order after Kadi’, (2009) 
Harvard International Law Journal, 1; J. Odermatt, ‘The Court of Justice of the European Union: International or 
Domestic Court?’ (2014) Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law, 696; K. Ziegler, 
‘International Law and EU Law: Between Asymmetric Constitutionalisation and Fragmentation’, in A. 
Orakhelashvili, Research Handbook on Theory and History of International Law, Edward Elgar Publishing 
(2013), 269. 
378 See for instance, the Kadi legal saga (C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat 
International Foundation v. Council and Commission [2008] ECR I-6351). The Kadi case started from the 
incompatibility of the EU smart sanctions Regulation with the UNSC Resolutions listing certain individuals as 
terrorists and making them subject to international sanctions; this legal question, has later on turned into a more 
constitutional question on the compatibility of the EU general principle of protecting fundamental rights with 
Art. 103 of the UN Charter; Case C-364/10 Hungary v Slovakia, Judgment of 16 October 2012, nyr (the 
compatibility of Art. 21 TFEU with international diplomatic law). 
379 Case C-366/10 Air Transport Association of America and Others [2011] ECR I-13755 (the compatibility of 
the EU ETS Directive with a number of international treaties and principles of customary international law); C-
377/98 Netherlands v Parliament and Council [2001] ECR I-7079 (the Biotech Directive case). 
380 The international legal framework governing consular and diplomatic protection of individuals is made of 
both international treaties (VCCR and VCDR) and customary norms (as gathered by the ILC in the Articles on 
Diplomatic Protection). See ILC First Report on Diplomatic Protection, p. 10, para. 31 
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However, the EU has an obligation to respect international law in its actions381, and the CJEU 
has long recognised the precedence of international law over secondary EU law.382  
Before assessing the existence of a normative conflict between the EU and the 
international legal framework governing the mechanisms of consular and diplomatic 
protection of individuals, a principal question has to be answered: does current public 
international law still portray consular and diplomatic protection as an exclusive right of the 
State of nationality? From Antiquity, continuing with famous international legal writers such 
as Vattel383 and Borchard384, and until the mid-20th century, consular and diplomatic protection 
mechanisms of protecting individuals abroad were the only remedial means whereby the 
rights of aliens could be protected, due to the fact that international law recognised legal 
capacity only to States. Legal fiction types of procedural mechanisms, such as diplomatic 
protection, were constructed solely for the purpose of transferring the individual’s remedies 
rights to the State of nationality, which, unlike the individual, was a recognised subject of 
international law.  
Since then, international society and law has departed from the Westphalian model of 
international relations and law. The growing development of international human rights and 
the replacement of war and conflicts with negotiations and concern for security and the 
protection of human rights have impacted on the ways of conducting consular and diplomatic 
relations as well as on the peculiar function of consular and diplomatic authorities of securing 
the interests of their co-nationals abroad.385 Furthermore, the increasing number of 
international actors and increasing competence to act internationally has made room for new 
actors to exercise protective functions for individuals.386  
This chapter will re-consider the classical international legal conception of consular 
and diplomatic protection of individuals in light of the recent State practice, jurisprudence 
delivered by international, regional, and domestic courts and legal doctrine. In particular it 
will look at the international and national practice after 2006,387 to see whether there is any 
                                                 
381 See Art. 3(5) TEU. 
382 See, to that effect, C-162/96 Racke v Hauptzollamt Mainz [1998] ECR I-3633, paras. 45 and 46. 
383 Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations, (1758) Béla Kapossy & Richard Whatmore (eds) (2008). 
384 E. Borchard, The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad, New York, Banks Law Publishing Co. (1916). 
385 Riccardo P. Mazzeschi, ‘Impact on the Law of Diplomatic Protection’ in M. Scheinin and Menno T. 
Kammiga, The Impact of Human Rights Law on General International Law, Oxford University Press (2009). 
386 The express recognition of a functional protection competence to international organisations by the ICJ 
(International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion of 11 April 1949, Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the 
Service of the United Nations, ICJ Reports (1949), 174). 
387 The moment when the ILC approved the final version of the Articles on Diplomatic Protection, and when 




additional evidence that could indicate a change in the States’ practice on the perception of 
consular and diplomatic protection which coupled with the evidence previously gathered by 
Rapporteur Dugard388 might have built a more ‘extensive’, ‘uniform’ and ‘representative’ 
customary practice389 indicating a change in the legal nature, conditions and objectives of 
consular and diplomatic protection of individuals. It will also assess the current international 
legal norms on the capacity of international organisations to exercise consular and diplomatic 
protection of private individuals. 
 The chapter will conclude by providing a short summary of the changes brought by 
current international law to the international institutions of consular and diplomatic protection 
of individuals and establishing whether their influence over the international legal framework 
brings the latter closer to the Union legal regime. The specific question of the conformity of 
the EU’s model of protecting EU citizens abroad with the general international legal 
framework will be discussed at large in the next chapter, after first clarifying in this chapter 
the precise features of the current legal nature, content, conditions, and objectives of the 







                                                 
388 J. Dugard, Seventh Report on Diplomatic Protection, ILC 58 Session 2006 A/CN 4/567. 
389 The requirements of ‘extensive’, ‘uniform’ and ‘representative’ that a practice needs to fulfill in order to be 
considered an international custom are provided by the ILA, Final Report of the Committee on the Formation of 
Customary (General) International Law, Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General 
Customary International Law, Report of the Sixty-Ninth Conference, London, 2000, Principles 12 and 14, p. 
734. The principles are based on the ICJ jurisprudence: ICJ, North Sea Continental Shelf cases, Judgment, 20 
February 1969, ICJ Reports 1969, p. 43, para. 74; ICJ, Asylum case (Colombia v. Peru), Judgment, 20 November 
1950, ICJ Reports 1950, p. 277; ICJ, Fisheries case (United Kingdom v. Norway), Judgment, 18 December 1951, 
ICJ Reports 1951, p. 131; ICJ, Continental Shelf case (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment, 24 
February 1982, ICJ Reports 1982, p. 74, para. 100; ICJ, Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in 
and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States), Merits, Judgment, 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports 1986. 
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II. Reconsidering the Conditions for the Exercise of Consular and 
Diplomatic Protection of Individuals under the International Legal 
Framework  
The institutions of consular and diplomatic protection of individuals are among the oldest 
institutions of public international law. Although they were recognised as formal institutions 
of public international law relatively late,390 they existed as powers exercised by the State 
since the very early days of the international society. The precise temporal origin of the 
consular and diplomatic protection institutions is still a disputed topic. Some scholars suggest 
it was when they formally became institutions of international law,391 which was relatively 
late, in the 20th of century, while other scholars392 point out that incipient forms of these 
mechanisms had existed since the formation of the nation-State.393 The fact that consular and 
diplomatic protection are two different institutions of public international law is reflected, 
according to certain scholarly opinions, also by their different origins. Authoritative scholars 
argue that consular protection has an earlier origin than diplomatic protection, dating back to 
Antiquity,394 and with a more varied history. International treaty law is clearly placing the 
origins of both diplomatic and consular services in ancient times.395 Consular and diplomatic 
protection has evolved in line with the evolution of the international society, its needs, and the 
development of relations among the international actors. Therefore, the establishment of the 
nation-State and intensification of trade relations among nation States led to the increasing 
exercise of consular and diplomatic protection of citizens abroad.396 Since individuals did not 
                                                 
390 Chittharanjan F. Amerasinghe, op.cit. 
391 Chittharanjan F. Amerasinghe, op.cit. 
392 S. Peté and Max du Plessis, ‘South African Nationals Abroad and their Right to Diplomatic Protection- 
Lessons from the Mercenaries case’, (2006) South African Journal of Human Rights, 438. 
393 J. Dickie, The British Consul: Heir to a Great Tradition, London: Hurst & Company (2007), 5; Maaike 
Okano-Heijmans, ‘Consular Affairs’, in Andrew F. Cooper, J. Heine, and R. Thakur (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of Modern Diplomacy, Oxford University Press (2013); C. Tiburcio, The Human Rights of Aliens 
under International and Comparative Law, Kluwer International Law (2001). 
394 Luke T. Lee, Consular Law and Practice, 2011, 1; B. Sen, A Diplomat’s Handbook of International law and 
Practice, Springer (1979), 201; C. Economides, ‘Consuls’, in R. Bernhardt (ed), Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law Vol. 1 (1992), 770. It was argued that in ancient Greece, the city states looked after the 
interests of their citizens in others’ territory and that among the principles of law developed by the Greek cities, 
the institution of ‘proxenoi’ is considered a forerunner of modern consular protection. See more details in R. 
Jones-Bos & M. van Dalen, ‘Trends and Developments in Consular Services: The Dutch Experience’, (2008) 
The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 88; F. Przetacznik, ‘The Protection of Individual Persons in Traditional 
International Law (Diplomatic and Consular Protection), (1971) Österreichische Zeitschrift füröffentliches 
Recht, 69, 75. See also Alwyn V. Freeman, The International Responsibility of States for Denial of Justice, 
Longmans Green (1938), 76-79. 
395 Both the VCCR and the VCDR start by ‘recalling that peoples of all nations from ancient times have 
recognized the status of diplomatic agents’, respectively of ‘consular relations’. 
396 F. Przetacznik, ‘The Protection of Individual Persons in Traditional International Law (Diplomatic and 
Consular Protection)’ (1971) Österreichische Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, 69, 113; C. Tiburcio, op.cit. 
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have independent legal standing in international relations to claim remedy for the injuries 
committed by the receiving State, their only means of redress was through the espousal of 
their claims by their State of nationality. The conclusion of the Jay Treaty between Great 
Britain and the United States in 1794 was an important moment in the evolution of diplomatic 
protection. This Treaty established an arbitration commission to settle, inter alia, claims by 
US subjects regarding confiscated debts and reciprocal claims of illegal seizure of American 
ships by the British government.397 This Treaty established a framework for settling aliens’ 
claims through the exercise of diplomatic protection by the State of nationality of the injured 
aliens, a framework that would later come to be increasingly resorted to by States on behalf of 
their nationals.398  
The establishment of the Permanent Court of International Justice brought an 
additional judicial forum to the existent arbitral tribunals, where compensation for injuries 
could be claimed via the legal fiction of the diplomatic protection mechanism. In the often 
cited 1924 Mavrommatis case, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) noted that 
the institution of diplomatic protection was already an ‘elementary principle of international 
law’399 and, in the 1926 Case Concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, 
the Court recognised the existence of ‘a common or generally accepted international law 
respecting the treatment of aliens […] which is applicable to them despite municipal 
legislation.’400 In these cases, the PCIJ set out the first definition of diplomatic protection as 
an institution of customary international law, which would later on be re-stated in all its 
diplomatic protection related case law: ‘[b]y taking up the case of one of its subjects and by 
resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in 
reality asserting its own rights – its right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for 
the rules of international law’.401 This particular jurisprudential definition of diplomatic 
protection as an ius fictio, a complete transfer of the individual’s claim to the State of 
nationality, had its basis in the 18th century work of Vattel.402 Although Vattel’s Law of 
Nations does not deal with the institutions of consular and diplomatic protection as such, his 
                                                 
397 Chittharanjan F. Amerasinghe, op.cit. 
398 Chittharanjan F. Amerasinghe, op.cit., 13. 
399 Case Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. UK), Judgment 30 August 1924, PCIJ Reports (1924), 
Series A, No 2, 12. 
400 Case Concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, Judgment of 25 August 1925 
(Preliminary Objections), and Judgment of 25 May 1926 (Merits), see the publication online of the PCIJ, 
http://www.icj-cij.org/pcij/series-a.php?p1=9&p2=1 . 
401 Case Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, Permanent Court of International Justice, Series A. No. 2, 30 
August 1924. 
402 Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations, (1758) Béla Kapossy & Richard Whatmore, (eds)(2008). 
 97 
 
famous dictum on the treatment of individuals – ‘Whoever ill-treats a citizen injures the State’ 
– has been widely accepted by academia as one of the first doctrinal sources of the public 
international legal institution of diplomatic protection.403 He further explained that ‘the 
sovereign of the injured citizen must avenge the deed and, if possible, force the aggressor to 
full satisfaction or punish him, since otherwise the citizen will not obtain the chief end of civil 
society, which is protection.’404 Although Vattel did not use the notion of diplomatic 
protection, he did present his opinion on what the role of the State should be in cases when its 
nationals are injured by foreign States. Based on these famous statements, the 20th-century 
legal literature and international jurisprudence have deduced the definition of diplomatic 
protection as an jus fictio whereby the individual’s claim against a foreign State is entirely 
transferred to his State of nationality from the moment the latter decides to espouse the 
individual’s claim for remedy against the receiving State.405 The State of origin is recognised 
as having complete power over the exercise of this international procedural mechanism.406 
The classical Vattelian formulation of diplomatic protection reflected the dominant 
positivist view of international law of that time. According to that perspective, states were the 
only subjects of international law, and individuals did not possess any international rights and 
obligations, and could not take part directly on the international sphere.407 The only subjects of 
international law were the States, which had the legal capacity to claim remedies in case of 
violation of international obligations whether it affected the State directly, or indirectly 
through its nationals. Thus, if an individual sought to obtain remedy for injury he or she had 
suffered at the hands of a foreign State authority, they would need to seek the protection of 
their State of nationality, which would bring the international claim for remedy against the 
receiving State. As a consequence, the lack of capacity to possess international rights and 
obligations prohibited individuals from appearing as direct claimants before international 
judicial and quasi-judicial forums where they could seek recourse against violations of 
                                                 
403 A. Vermeer-Künzli, ‘Diplomatic Protection as a Source of Human Rights Law’, D. Shelton (ed), The Oxford 
Handbook of International Human Rights Law, Oxford University Press (2013). 
404 ILC Report on Diplomatic Protection of 1998, para 6, citing Vattel 1758, vol 1, p. 309, para. 71. 
405 E. Borchard, The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad (New York, Banks Law Publishing Co. (1916); 
Frederick S. Dunn, The Protection of Nationals: A Study in the Application of International Law, Baltimore, The 
Johns Hopkins Press (1932); Lillich, ‘Editorial Comment on Diplomatic Protection of Nationals Abroad’, (1975) 
AJIL, 359; Chittharanjan F. Amerasinghe, Diplomatic Protection, Oxford University Press (2008); 
Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. U.K.) case; Nottebohm case (second phase) (Liechtenstein v. 
Guatemala)4; Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain) case. 
406 See the Barcelona Traction judgment of the ICJ, para. 78. 
407 S. Gorski, ‘Individuals in International Law’, in Wolfrum (ed.), Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public 
International Law, Oxford University Press (2012); A. Clapham, ‘The Role of the Individual in International 
Law’, (2010) European Journal of International Law, 25; B. Stephens ‘Individuals Enforcing International Law: 
The Comparative and Historical Context’, (2002–3) DePaul Law Review, 433. 
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international law or secure their own protection against foreign receiving States. Until the 
mid-20th century, whenever the rights of an alien were violated and the individual did not find 
remedy before the domestic authorities of the receiving State, he could have found remedy 
only through the legal fiction of diplomatic protection whereby the individual injury was 
transformed into a direct injury to the State of his nationality. Tribunals were not determining 
individual’s rights, but only States’ rights. Whether international claims were submitted to 
arbitrary tribunals created specifically for that particular dispute or operating beyond the 
specific case, they were conceived as claims submitted by one state against another for injury 
suffered by the claimant state in the person of its national. Therefore, in a time when public 
international law was the law among States, and the latter held the monopoly over 
international relations, the procedural mechanism of ‘diplomatic protection’ was, for 
centuries, the only procedural mechanism whereby the aliens’ claims concerning their 
treatment in a foreign country could be brought to the international fora.  
In an exhaustive survey of the international claims practice from the late 18th until the 
20th century, Parlett reveals the characteristics of these dispute settlement mechanisms.408 The 
author found that the majority of these arbitration forums dealt with disputes submitted only 
through the diplomatic protection procedural mechanism,409 which involved only inter-state 
claims, while the awards were paid directly to the state of nationality rather than to the injured 
individuals. The state of nationality had exclusive control over the claim including its 
presentation and argument. These State-centric characteristics of the diplomatic protection 
institution were also present in the definition given by the PCIJ and later by its successor, the 
ICJ, to the mechanism of diplomatic protection of individuals. In one particular paragraph in 
the Barcelona Traction judgment410, the ICJ pointed out that international law recognised an 
                                                 
408 K. Parlett, The individual in the international legal system: state-centrism, history and change in 
international law, Cambridge University Press (2011). 
409 Parlett invoked the 1794 Jay Treaty as the first international claims commission (US–Great Britain, 19 
November 1794). In further arbitration claims commissions or tribunals, only states could submit claims, and 
there was no role for the individual during the taking of decisions for exercising diplomatic protection, during 
the international proceedings, or during the award of compensation: Spanish-US commission, 27 October 1795; 
France–Spain, 15 February 1851, 105 CTS 153, A. de Clerq (ed.), Recueil des Traite´s de la France (Paris, 
Arynot, 1864), vol. VI, p. 81; see also US–Peru, 23 December 1862, Moore, International Arbitrations, vol. II, p. 
1610; US–Brazil, 14 March 1870, ibid. vol. II, p. 1733; Spain–US, 16 June 1870, ibid. vol. II, p. 1007; Japan–
Peru, June 1873, ibid. vol. II, p. 5034; US–Colombia, 17 August 1874, ibid. vol. II, p. 1421; Netherlands–
Dominican Republic, 26 March 1881, ibid. vol. V, p. 5036; Haiti–US, 24 May 1884, ibid. vol. II, p. 1749 (the 
claim of Antonio Pelletier); US–Denmark, 6 December 1888, ibid. vol. II, p. 1185; Venezuela–US, 1 January 
1892, ibid. vol. II, p. 1693. For a detail list of all arbitration forums until the second World War, see Annex II 
and III of Parlett, op.cit.. 
410 ‘The Court here observe that, within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise 
diplomatic protection by the extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right that the State is asserting. Should the 
natural or legal persons on whose behalf it is acting consider that their rights are not adequately protected, they 
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absolute discretion to States in relation to the exercise of diplomatic protection of their 
nationals, from the decision of whether to submit an international claim to the awarding of 
reparations. 
For centuries, the institutions of diplomatic protection and consular protection have 
remained mostly immutable due to the persisting general characteristics of public 
international law and the international society as dominated by States. Following the 
revolutionary impact of international human rights law411 and multiplication of international 
actors on the international sphere412, the classical conception of consular and diplomatic 
protection as entirely State-centric mechanisms, rejecting the recognition of any role for the 
individual in their exercise, was challenged as being outdated, which risked turning these 
long-standing mechanisms into obsolete institutions under the contemporary international 
legal framework if their definition, requirements, and scope were not updated to 
contemporary realities.413 
Unlike diplomatic protection, consular assistance and protection is provided more 
often by the State to its nationals, since it does not involve such delicate political issues as 
                                                                                                                                                        
have no remedy in international law. All they can do is to resort to municipal law, if means are available, with a 
view to furthering their cause or obtaining redress. The municipal legislator may lay upon the State an 
obligation to protect its citizens abroad, and may also confer upon the national a right to demand the 
performance of that obligation, and clothe the right with corresponding sanctions. However, all these questions 
remain within the province of municipal law and do not affect the position internationally. 79. The State must be 
viewed as the sole judge to decide whether its protection will be granted, to what extent it is granted, and when it 
will cease. It retains in this respect a discretionary power the exercise of which may be determined by 
considerations of a political or other nature, unrelated to the particular case.’ Barcelona Traction, Light and 
Power Company, Limited, case, p. 44 paras. 78 and 79. 
411 A revolution also described by the academic literature as the ‘humanization’ of international law - the term 
was first employed by M. Bourquin in La technique et les principes du droit public: etudes en l’honneur de 
Georges Scelle, 1950, vol. I, 21 and was later on used by Judges Theodor Meron and A.C. Trindade, and shared 
by many other legal scholars, see in particular T. Kamminga, A. Petters, J. Klabbers, Constitutionalisation of 
International Law, Oxford University Press (2009), 174; See B. Simma, ‘Mainstreaming Human Rights: The 
Contribution of the International Court of Justice’, (2012) Journal of International Dispute Settlement, 7. There 
is an abundance of scholarly work on the impact of international human rights on international law which, 
despite their varying perspectives, all agree that human rights did have and still influences the evolution of 
international law: J. Crawford, ‘The ILC’s Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection’, (2006) S. Afr. Y.B. Int'l L, 
19; E. Milano, ‘Diplomatic protection and human rights before the International Court of Justice: re-fashioning 
tradition?’, (2004) Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, 85. For more details on how international law in 
general is changing, see A. C. Martineau, ‘The Rhetoric of Fragmentation: Fear and Faith in International law’, 
(2009) Leiden Journal of International Law, 1, 22. 
412 According to R. Ambast and V. Tyagi ‘if the preceding century was marked by a rise of nations, the present 
century is witness to the emergence of global actors who transcend national and regional divides’ (R. Ambast 
and V. Tyagi, ‘Ambassadors of Europe: An Insight into the Evolution of the European Union and International 
Diplomatic Law’, (2008) Studia Diplomatica, vol. LXI, 6; R. Lillich, ‘The Diplomatic Protection of Nationals 
Abroad: An Elementary Principle of International Law Under Attack’, (1975) AJIL, 362; A. Bremen and R.A. 
Wessel, ‘The International Legal Status of Informal International Lawmaking Bodies: Consequences for 
Accountability’ in J. Pauwelyn, R.A. Wessel and J. Wouters (eds.) Informal International Lawmaking, Oxford 
University Press (2012), 35-62.  
413 Stephen C. Neff, ‘A Short History of International law’ in Malcom D. Evans (ed.), International Law, fourth 
ed., Oxford University Press (2014), 1-27. 
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diplomatic protection does: namely, accusing a foreign State of breach of an international 
obligation and claiming remedy for its international wrongful act. Consular protection 
addresses the basic needs of the individuals, which do not commonly involve a violation of 
rights by the receiving State, but rather aim to help individuals in distressing situations or 
provide administrative services. Due to this specificity, the mechanism of consular protection 
has evolved under the influence of slightly different factors than the diplomatic protection 
mechanism. Namely, the growing demand for consular assistance as a reaction to the growing 
international migratory phenomenon and the novelty and growing gravity of challenges 
consuls have to face around the globe.414 The institution of consular protection has thus 
undergone changes mostly in relation to the modalities of exercise, while certain aspects 
regarding consular communication and notification have evolved under the impact of 
international human rights law.415 Although the mechanisms of consular and diplomatic 
protection are equally important in practice, diplomatic protection has attracted more attention 
than consular protection416 from both the ILC and the academic literature.417 
                                                 
414 See more in Maaike Okano-Heijmans, ‘Change in Consular Assistance and the Emergence of Consular 
Diplomacy’, The Hague, Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’ Clingendael Diplomacy 
Papers No. 26/2010 and by the same author, ‘Consular Affairs’, op.cit.; G. Haynal, M. Welsh, L. Century and S. 
Tyle, ‘The Consular Function in the 21st Century’, A Report for Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada, 
27 March 2013,1-3 – 1-5, available online at http://munkschool.utoronto.ca/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/The-
Consular-Function-in-the-21st-Century-.pdf . 
415 According to Maaike Okano-Heijmans, ‘while the essence of consular affairs as ‘assistance to individuals’—
often limited to “protection of citizens” — in foreign lands remains the same, fundamental changes occur in the 
character of the “individual” and of “assistance”, as well as in the environment in which consular services are 
delivered.’, see ‘Consular affairs’ in op.cit., 475. 
416 The literature on consular affairs has started to grow only recently. Textbooks on public international law 
focus principally on the institution of diplomatic protection, while consular protection is only briefly touched 
upon, see I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 8th edition, Oxford University Press (2008), 
349ff; Nguyen Q. Dinh, P. Daillier, Patrick, A. Pellet, Droit international public, 4e edition, LGDJ, Paris (1992), 
646ff. Of the books dedicated to consular affairs, see particularly, J. Melissen and Ana M. Fernandez (eds.), 
Consular Affairs and Diplomacy, Martinus Nijhoff (2011); C. Economidès, ‘Consular Relations, and Consuls’ in 
R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Volume I, North-Holland, Amsterdam (1992), 
765-768 and 770-776; Luke T. Lee and J. Quigley, Consular Law and Practice, Oxford University Press, 3rd 
edition (2008); J. Quigley, Willian J. Aceves, and A. Shank, The Law of Consular Access: A Documentary 
Guide, Routledge Research in International Law (2011) (however the latter deals in particular with the practice 
and jurisprudence on the application of Art. 36 VCCR); Maaike Okano-Heijmans, ‘Change in Consular 
Assistance and the Emergence of Consular Diplomacy’, The Hague, Netherlands Institute of International 
Relations ‘Clingendael’ Clingendael Diplomacy Papers No. 26/2010. 
417 Monographs on diplomatic protection, inter alia: Edwin M. Borchard, The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens 
Abroad, The Banks Publishing, New York, (1916); M. Bennouna, ‘La protection diplomatique, un droit de 
l’État?’, in J.-F. Flauss (ed.), Boutros Boutros-Ghali amicorum discipulorumque liber: paix, développement, 
démocratie, Bruxelles, Bruylant, (1998), vol. 1 and by the same author, La protection diplomatique. Mutations 
contemporaines et pratiques nationales, Bruxelles, Nemesis, Bruylant, (2003); A. Vermeer-Künzli, The 
Protection of Individuals by means of Diplomatic Protection, Ph.D. thesis, University of Leiden, (2007); 
Chittharanjan F. Amerasinghe, Diplomatic Protection, Oxford Monographs in International Law, Oxford 
University Press, (2008); E. Denza, Diplomatic law: commentary on the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations, 3rd ed., Oxford University Press, (2008); A. Bassu, La rilevanza dell'interesse individuale nell'istituto 
della protezione diplomatica, Giuffrè, (2008). 
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The classical conception of diplomatic protection has been subjected to more criticism 
than that of consular protection. Legal scholars have argued that it risked becoming ‘an 
ancient and often forgotten principle of international law’418, and indicated the necessity for 
updating the institution to the current day international society and law.419 Namely, consular 
and diplomatic protection should be accepted as outdated institutions of public international 
law or their definition and exercise should be updated in light of the contemporary parameters 
of the international society and law.420 Certain academics have even challenged the possibility 
of updating this institution to the current international reality, since they argued that 
international human rights systems, whether universal or regional, are more effectively 
fulfilling the remedial needs of aliens,421 thus allegedly rendering useless the classical 
institution of diplomatic protection. The added value of diplomatic protection, as a procedural 
mechanism of bringing international individual claims, was argued to have been considerably 
diminished by international human rights law, raising the question of what the role of 
diplomatic protection in the contemporary international society might actually be.422 
As rightly pointed out by Rapporteur Dugard in his First Report on Diplomatic 
Protection submitted to the ILC, ‘international human rights systems still lack effective access 
of individuals to judicial remedies and implementation mechanisms, in spite of their 
increasing proliferation.’ Gaps in the effective implementation of international human rights 
systems will continue to exist for as long as membership to these treaties remains voluntary in 
certain geographical regions, States challenge the international judgments pronounced within 
these legal systems,423 and there is a lack of uniform protection of human rights across the 
different geographical regions of the world. While Europe benefits from several partially 
                                                 
418 C. Forcese, ‘The Capacity to Protect: Diplomatic Protection of Dual Nationals in the ‘War on Terror’’, (2006) 
EJIL, 369. 
419 L. Condorelli, ‘L´évolution du champ d´application de la protection diplomatique’, in J-F. Flauss (ed.), La 
Protection Diplomatique: Mutations contemporaines et pratiques nationales, Brussels, Nemesis-Bruylant, (2003), 
3-28; Mariana S. Albornoz, ‘Legal nature and Legal Consequences of Diplomatic Protection. Contemporary 
Challenges’, (2006) Anuario Mexicano de Derecho Internacional, 377, 398. 
420 J. Briely, The Law of Nations, Clarendon Press (1963), 276; M. Bennouna, ‘La protection diplomatique, un 
droit de l’Etat?’, in Boutros Boutros-Ghali Amicorum Discipulorumque Liber. Paix, Développement, 
Démocratie, Bruxelles 1998, 245-250; J. Dugard, ‘Diplomatic Protection’ in R. Wolfrum (ed), Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Amsterdam: North-Holland (2003), 116;  
421 F.V. Garcia-Amador, ‘State Responsibility. Some New Problems’, (1958) Recueil des Cours, 435-6; J. 
Bederman, ‘State-to-State Espousal of Human Rights Claims’, (2011) Virginia Journal of International Law 
Online, 8. 
422 See E. Milano, op.cit.; Mariana S. Albornoz, ’Legal nature and Legal Consequences of Diplomatic 
Protection. Contemporary Challenges’, (2006) Anuario Mexicano de Derecho Internacional, 377; K. Nobuyuki, 
‘The Role of Diplomatic Protection in the Implementation Process of Public Interests’, in T. Komori and K. 
Wellens (eds.), Public Interest Rules of International Law Towards Effective Implementation, Ashgate (2009), 
193ff. 
423 See J. Dugard, First Report on Diplomatic Protection, 2000, Doc. A/CN.4/506. 
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overlapping legal systems conferring direct action to individuals in relation to human rights 
protection and a cross-fertilization of regional courts with human rights protection that are, to 
a certain extent, filling the gaps in each other’s legal systems,424 other geographical regions do 
not benefit of the same level of human rights protection.425 As rightly pointed out by 
Rapporteur Dugard:  
 
To suggest that universal human rights conventions, particularly the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, provide individuals with effective remedies for the 
protection of their human rights is to engage in a fantasy which, unlike fiction, has no place in 
legal reasoning. The sad truth is that only a handful of individuals, in the limited number of 
States that accept the right of individual petition to the monitoring bodies of these 
conventions, have obtained or will obtain satisfactory remedies from these conventions.426 
 
Despite the fact that a variety of specialised treaty-based dispute settlement procedures 
have proliferated and individuals have gained an unprecedented standing in international law, 
the allegedly outdated institution of diplomatic protection is still of relevance today, as proved 
by the recent international practice and jurisprudence, and it undoubtedly represents an 
                                                 
424 In the M.S.S. v Greece and Belgium (Appl. No. 30696/09, Judgment of 21 January 2011), the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR) highlighted the deficiencies of the EU secondary rules on asylum, in particular the 
implementation of the Dublin II Regulation (Council Regulation No. 343/2003/EC of 18 February 2003 
establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member States responsible for examining an 
asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national, [2003] OJ L 50/1, 25 Feb. 
2003). It found that the implementation of the EU Dublin II Regulation by the Belgium courts violated the 
human rights to prohibition of ill-treatments (Art. 3 ECHR) and to an effective remedy (Art. 13 ECHR). See 
more on this judgment and the relation with EU law in P. Mallia, ‘Case of M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece: A 
Catalyst in the Re-thinking of the Dublin II Regulation’, (2011) Refugee Survey Quarterly, 107. Another 
example of a ‘race to the top’ between the two Courts (ECtHR and CJEU) happened in the field of the 
implementation of the principle of non-discrimination, see the judgments of the ECtHR, Andrle v the Czech 
Republic, Appl. No. 6268/08, judgment of 17 February 2011, and CJEU in C-366/99 Griesmar, Judgment of 29 
November 2000. For more details on this topic, see M. Moraru and K. Podstawa, Handbook on Judicial 
Interaction Techniques – Their potential and use in the field of the European Fundamental Rights, 33, available 
at http://www.eui.eu/Projects/CentreForJudicialCooperation/Documents/2FinalHandbook.pdf 
425 In particular by conferring to individuals direct access to effective judicial remedies, and an effective 
implementation of regional judgments. If a person who is subject to the jurisdiction of the Council of Europe 
countries has several different legal paths to present direct claims against the European States, the situation is 
different if the same individual is located, for example, in an Asian or Arabic country. The case of Van Nguyen, 
an Australian national facing the mandatory death sentence in Singapore, who did not have access to any of the 
numerous international human rights instruments and courts, is revealing about the fact that consular and 
diplomatic protection are and will remain in the near future necessary mechanisms for the protection of human 
rights. See Li-Ann Thio, ‘The Death Penalty as Cruel and Inhuman Punishment before the Singapore high 
Court? Human Rights Norms, Constitutional Formalism and Supremacy of Domestic Law in Public Prosecutor v 
Nguyen Tuong Van’, (2004) Oxford University Commonwealth Journal, 213; N. Klein and L. Knapman, 
‘Australians Sentenced to Death Overseas: Promoting bilateral dialogues to avoid international law disputes’, 
(2011) Monash University Law Review, 89.  
426 J. Dugard, First Report on Diplomatic Protection, 2000, para. 25 (ILC Report A/56/10/2001). 
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important tool in human rights protection.427 For instance, the cases of the suspects of 
terrorism detained in Guantánamo Bay and other camps in Arab countries428, the cases of the 
aliens on death row in the US429, or individuals subject to smart sanctions430, show that the 
procedural mechanism of diplomatic protection still serves the needs of a part of the current 
society that does not find effective remedies before international human rights systems. The 
customary legal nature of the international norms establishing diplomatic protection and the 
impact a State claim has on other States, compared to the claims submitted by individuals, are 
aspects which can contribute to the longevity of the diplomatic protection remedial system, in 
spite of the concurrent existence of international human rights systems. 
Today, the international human rights systems and the diplomatic protection regime 
are increasingly intertwined. States support the claims of their nationals against other states by 
way of third parties intervention before human rights courts,431 but they also claim remedies 
on behalf of their nationals by exercising diplomatic protection either by way of international 
claims before judicial or quasi-judicial forums432 or through direct negotiations with the 
receiving State. This cross-fertilization between partially overlapping legal systems is to be 
supported since it can fill gaps in human rights protection and contribute to enhancing the 
level of protection, especially in those parts of the world where human rights protection is not 
effective.433 
                                                 
427 A. Shapovalov, ‘Should a Requirement of ‘Clean Hands’ Be a Prerequisite to the Exercise of Diplomatic 
Protection? Human Rights Implications of the International Law Commission's Debate’, (2005) American 
University International Law Review, 4; David J. Bederman, ‘State-to-State Espousal of Human Rights Claims’, 
(2011) Virginia Journal of International Law Online. 
428 See more details in the sub-section Jurisprudence from countries with common law systems in Section V – 
The Legal nature of Diplomatic Protection: State’s right, Individual Right or Human Right? 
429 See more details in A. Rilwan, ‘Medellin v Dretke’, (2006) New England International and Comparative Law 
Annual, 48; S. Babcock, ‘The Role of International Law in United States Death Penalty Cases’, (2002) Leiden 
Journal of International Law, 367; A. Bishop, ‘The Death Penalty in the United States: An International Human 
Rights Perspective’, (2001) South Texas Law Review, 1115; J. Quigley, Willian J. Aceves and S. Adele Shank, 
The Law of Consular Access: A documentary guide, Routledge Research in International Law (2013). 
430 Joined cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat v. Council [2008] ECR, I- 0000, para. 335; 
Case T-228/02 Organisation des Modjahedines du Peuple d’Iran (OMPI 1) [2006] ECR II-4665. See more 
details in the sub-section The jurisprudence of the EU Courts – diplomatic protection as a remedial mechanism 
for filling the gaps in European and international human rights law  within Section V – The Legal nature of 
Diplomatic Protection: State’s right, Individual Right or Human Right? 
431 See, for instance, the possibility provided by Art. 36 ECHR. 
432 See, for instances, the LaGrand, Avena, and Diallo cases before the ICJ. 
433 On the advantages of overlapping remedial systems, i.e. human rights systems and diplomatic protection see 
A. Vermeer-Künzli, ‘Unfinished Business: Concurrence of Claims Presented before a Human Rights Court or 
Treaty Body and through Diplomatic Protection’, (2010) Human Rights Law Review, 269; A. Vermeer-Künzli, 
‘Diplomatic Protection as a Source of Human Rights Law’, D. Shelton (ed), The Oxford Handbook of 
International Human Rights Law, Oxford University Press (2013), 11; on diplomatic protection as 
complementary to human rights systems, see E. Wyler, ‘La protection diplomatique: La concurrence des 
réclamations’ in Societe Française pour le Droit International (ed), Les compétences de l’Etat en droit 
international: Actes du Colloque de Rennes, 2–4 juin 2005, Paris: Pedone (2006), 239. 
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In light of the so-called humanization phenomenon of international law,434 and the 
empowering of the individual in international affairs, numerous legal scholars435 have called 
for the reform of the international legal conception of diplomatic protection for the purpose of 
making it correspond to the contemporary status of international law. An updated definition of 
diplomatic protection would thus need to reflect the balancing of the public interests of the 
State with the recognition of the private interests of the individual, instead of being a purely 
State-centred definition.  
The process of updating the classical public international legal conception of 
diplomatic protection began in 1996, when this topic was included on the ILC’s list of 
subjects for the codification and progressive development of international law.436 Under the 
work of Rapporteur Bennouna437, and particularly Rapporteur Dugard, the definition, legal 
nature and norms governing the conditions necessary for the exercise of diplomatic protection 
were updated to correspond to the contemporary reality. The ILC, under the guidance of 
Rapporteur Dugard, re-fashioned the classical conception of diplomatic protection by 
ensuring a balance between preserving the old State-centric conception and introducing the 
progressive development of international law. To a large extent, the ILC Articles on 
Diplomatic Protection incorporate international human rights conceptions, as reflected by the 
numerous exceptions introduced to the requirements for the exercise of diplomatic 
                                                 
434 The ‘humanization’ of international law - the term was first employed by M. Bourquin in La technique et les 
principes du droit public: etudes en l’honneur de Georges Scelle, 1950, vol. I, 21 and later on used by Judges 
Theodor Meron ‘The Humanization of Humanitarian Law’ (2000) AJIL, 239; and by the same author The 
Humanization of International Law, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (2006) and Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade 
(International Law for Humankind Towards a New Jus Gentium, second revised edition, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers (2013)). A. Petters, J. Klabbers, G. Ulfstein, Constitutionalisation of International Law, Oxford 
University Press (2009), 174; V. Pergantis, ‘Towards a ‘Humanization’ of Diplomatic Protection?’ (2006) 
ZaöRV, 351; Arnold N. Pronto, ‘‘Human-Rightism’ and the Development of General International Law’ (2007) 
Leiden Journal of International Law, 753; Nicholas T. Hooge, ‘Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as Duty to 
Protect?–Reassessing the Traditional Doctrine of Diplomatic Protection’ in Light of Modern Developments in 
International Law, 2010 Master of Laws thesis. 
435 See Special Rapporteur, Mohammed Bennouna International Law Commission: Preliminary Report on 
Diplomatic Protection, A/CN. 4/484, 4 February 1998. 
436 See Yearbook of the International Law Commission of 1996, vol. II (Part Two), p. 97, para. 248, and p. 137, 
annex II, addendum 1. 
437 Special Rapporteur Mohammed Bennouna was appointed in 1997 and issued his first and only report in 1998: 
Preliminary report on diplomatic protection, presented by M. Bennouna to the International Law Commission 
during its 50th session, UN Doc. A/CN.4/484 and A/CN.4/484/Corr. 1, February 4th, 1998. In 1999, Special 
Rapporteur John Dugard was appointed and delivered seven reports: First report, (UN Doc. A/CN.4/506 (7 
March 2000) and Corr. 1 (7 June 2000) and Add. 1 (20 April 2000)); Second report (UN Doc. A/CN.4/514 (28 
February 2001) and Corr. 1 (27 July 2001)); Third report (UN Doc. A/CN.4/523 (7 March 2002) and Add. 1 (16 
April 2002)); Fourth report (UN Doc. A/CN.4/530 (13 March 2003) and Add. 1 (6 June 2003)); Fifth report (UN 
Doc. A/CN.4/538 (4 March 2004)); Sixth report (UN Doc. A/CN.4/546 (11 August 2004)); Seventh Report (ILC 
Report A/60/10, 2005, Ch. IV). 
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protection.438 This normative approach has thus created a bridge between the classical 
institution of diplomatic protection and the modern international human rights law, two 
institutions of public international law that ultimately share the same objective: ensuring the 
protection of individuals whose rights have been breached by States.439 Whilst some of the 
most radical human rights driven proposals put forward by Rapporteur Dugard were not 
approved by the ILC – prescribing a State duty to exercise diplomatic protection, the 
prohibition of the use of military force as a diplomatic protection measure, and defining 
diplomatic protection as an entirely individual-centered mechanism – the 2006 Articles reflect 
a balance between the interests of the States and those of the individual, and between the 
‘traditionalist’ and ‘progressive’ opinions on diplomatic protection. The ILC Articles seem to 
have succeeded in updating the institution of diplomatic protection so that it remains a current 
and useful institution of public international law.440 
The absolute fictio juris definition of diplomatic protection, as well as the specific 
premise and conditions of the exercise of diplomatic protection of natural persons were 
amended441 to reflect the empowered position of the individual within international relations442 
and the ‘humanization’ of international law.443  
In its Articles on Diplomatic Protection, the ILC codified norms that reflect the 
contemporary customary international practice up until 2005. Thus starting from 2006,444 the 
definition of diplomatic protection was no longer the traditional one established in the 
Mavrommatis Concessions case, but a more nuanced definition in which the individual 
interests were recognised alongside those of the State. Article 1 shifts the focus from the 
classical legal fiction definition of diplomatic protection to its essential characteristics as a 
procedural mechanism. Thus diplomatic protection is defined as the invocation by a State of 
‘the responsibility of another State for an injury caused by an internationally wrongful act of 
                                                 
438 J. Dugard, First Report on Diplomatic Protection, UN Doc. A/CN.4/506 (7 March 2000), at 7 (§ 21) 
439 One of the main differences between the remedial legal frameworks of ‘diplomatic protection’ and 
‘international human rights law’ is that the former is directed primarily against non-nationality States, while the 
later against primarily the State of nationality. 
440 Ames L. Kateka, ‘John Dugard's Contribution to the Topic of Diplomatic Protection’, (2007) Leiden Journal 
of International Law, 921. 
441 For a brief overview of these amendments, see the Introductory Note to the 2006 ILC Articles on Diplomatic 
Protection, written by Prof. J. Dugard, available online at http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/adp/adp.html 
442 See R. McCorquodale ‘The Individual and the International Legal System’ in A Bianchi (ed) Non-State 
Actors and International Law, Ashgate Farnham (2009), 121–46; G. Gaja ‘The Position of Individuals in 
International Law: An ILC Perspective’ (2010) EJIL, 11. 
443 See James L. Kateka, ‘John Dugard's Contribution to the Topic of Diplomatic Protection’, (2007) Leiden 
Journal of International Law, 921; P. Escarameia, ‘Professor Dugard as an Innovator in the Work of the 
International Law Commission’ (2007) Leiden Journal of International Law, 931. 
444 The year when the final version of the ILC Articles on Diplomatic Protection was adopted. 
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that State to a natural or legal person that is a national of the former State’.445 Article 1 
makes clear that the international responsibility is owed for the injury caused to an individual, 
and it is no longer about the direct injury of the State.446 In the Diallo judgment, the ILC 
definition was confirmed by the ICJ, which added that customary international law reflects 
this change of definition of diplomatic protection, thus signalling that diplomatic protection 
has followed the evolution experienced by the general international law under the ambit of 
international human rights.447  
In the following paragraphs, this section will concentrate on bringing into light the 
modernisation of the international rules governing the conditions for the exercise of 
diplomatic protection. It will focus mostly on the transformation experienced by the pillars of 
the institution: the nationality of claims, existence of an international wrongful act and 
exhaustion of local remedies, which seem to have been re-drafted from a human rights 
perspective. It will be revealed that the contemporary international norms governing the 
exercise of diplomatic protection had to reflect the changes that had occurred in the States’ 
practice. Consequently, the first section will demonstrate that nationality is no longer the sole 
link legitimating the exercise of diplomatic protection. The second sub-section will show how 
the public international legal norms governing the requirement of exhaustion of legal 
remedies have changed under the impact of international human rights law, particularly in 
regard to the exemptions provided in cases of ineffective local remedies. The last sub-section 
will assess how the scope of the international wrongful act in light of the growing body of 
international human rights law conferring rights directly to individuals. Due to the limited 
space, the focus will be on those particular amendments that have the potential for bringing 
the international conception of diplomatic protection closer to the EU conception of 
protection of Union citizens abroad, rather than attempting an exhaustive overview of all the 
amendments brought by the ILC to the institution of diplomatic protection. 
                                                 
445 UN Doc A/61/10, at 25, para.4. [emphasis added] 
446 See commentary of Art. 1, para. 9, 2006 ILC Articles on Diplomatic Protection. 
447 Case Concerning Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v Democratic Republic of Congo) Case, 
Judgment of 30 November 2010, para. 39: ‘diplomatic protection consists of the invocation by a State, through 
diplomatic action or other means of peaceful settlement, of the responsibility of another State for an injury 
caused by an internationally wrongful act of that State to a natural or legal person that is a national of the 
former State with a view to the implementation of such responsibility (Article 1 of the draft Articles on 
Diplomatic Protection adopted by the ILC at its Fifty-eighth Session (2006), ILC Report, doc. A/61/10, p. 24).’ 
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1. The changing role of nationality448 in the field of consular and 
diplomatic protection of individuals 
The concept of ‘nationality’ is a complex political-legal-sociological term449 that emerged 
during a time when the nation-States were the sole actors on the international plane and there 
was limited migration of natural persons. Individuals commonly lived within one single State, 
namely the one whose nationality they possessed. In this specific international society, the 
specific legal-political and sociological conceptions of nationality coexisted more easily. 
People owed allegiance and in return received rights and protection from one single nation-
State, for which they also felt a strong and unique feeling of belonging.450 The fragmentation 
of international law and intensifying migratory trend made it increasingly difficult for the 
concept of nationality to serve one single function in public international law451 and to reflect 
both legal-political and sociological dimensions into one single individual nationality. Within 
the public international legal order, the development of conventional instruments recognising 
to the individual the possibility to directly submit claims regarding their rights eroded the 
relevance of the citizenship link for the public international law institutions.452 
Within the particular field of consular and diplomatic protection, nationality has 
developed a particular and strictly defined function, which can be briefly summarised as a 
                                                 
448 In this section the terms ‘nationality’ and ‘citizenship’ are used interchangeably. ‘Citizenship’ is however 
conceived as a matter of domestic law, and is associated with eligibility for a range of social and political rights 
and entitlements that a State confers, including the right to vote, marry, work, and carry a passport. The term 
‘nationality’ is more commonly used in international law and indicates the connection that an individual has to a 
particular state which affords certain benefits and entitlements while travelling outside the borders of the State of 
nationality (See J. Kunz, The Nottebohm Judgment (Second Phase) (1960) AJIL, 536, 546; L. Barry and N. 
Klein, ‘A human rights perspective on diplomatic protection: David Hicks and His Dual Nationality’, (2007) 
AJHR, 1, 25). In international law, nationality has been described as the: ‘[…] juridical expression of the fact 
that the individual upon whom it is conferred either directly by the law or as the result of an act of the 
authorities is in fact more closely connected with the population of the State conferring nationality than that of 
any other State.’ [Nottebohm, 1955, at 24.] 
449 The political-legal definition of ‘nationality’ commonly describes this status of a natural person as a tie of 
allegiance, which materialises in duties owed to the nation-State in return for which it benefits from rights, and 
thus presupposes the prior existence of a nation-State. The sociological definition defines nationality as the 
individual’s feeling of belonging to a group that has several attributes in common, such as language, territory, 
tradition. Hence, the sociological understanding of nationality is a state of mind that can exist even before the 
creation of the State. Therefore the definitions are corresponding, they can co-exist but they are also independent 
of each other. For more details see C. Tiburcio, op.cit., 3-5; Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts (eds) 
Oppenheim’s International Law, 9th ed., Oxford University Press (1992), 849, 857–59; K. Kruma, EU 
Citizenship, Nationality and Migrant Status: An Ongoing Challenge, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (2014). 
450 T. Hobbes, Leviathan, 1651, edition by M. Oakeshott, Oxford University Press, 1960, 467ff. 
451 See the established international legal theory of functional approach of nationality, I. Brownlie, International 
Public Law, Oxford University Press (2008), 406, ‘there seems to be general acquiescence in this splitting up of 
the legal content of nationality for particular purposes.’ 
452 See, Francisco O. Vicuna, ‘Interim Report on The Changing Law of Nationality of Claims’, International 
Law Association, Committee on Diplomatic Protection 2000, p. 638; M.I. Papa, ‘Protezione diplomatica, diritti 
umani e obblighi erga omnes’, (2008) RDI, 711. 
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legitimating factor for a State willing to exercise consular and diplomatic protection on behalf 
of natural persons.453 Due to this particular salient role of justification for the limitation of the 
principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of another State, and its strict 
application,454 the bond of nationality has been commonly perceived as hierarchically superior 
to the other two prerequisites for the exercise of diplomatic protection455, being described as 
the foundation of the State’s right to exercise diplomatic protection.456  
Within the public international legal institution of diplomatic protection, the 
requirement of nationality of claims has been more strictly imposed than within the consular 
protection institution457, since the former raised the international responsibility of a foreign 
State and thus led to more serious legal implications on the international arena, consequently 
making nationality an almost absolute458 requirement for the exercise of diplomatic 
protection.459 Changes in the international society and international law, in particular the 
aforementioned decoupling of the political-legal perception of nationality from the 
sociological perception, the growing role of the individual on the international arena, and the 
development of international human rights systems, have also impacted on the traditional 
public international norms defining the bond of nationality within the institutions of consular 
and, particularly, diplomatic protection. A short overview of the classical international 
standards governing ‘nationality’ will first be presented, and then this section will continue 
with an analysis of the changes recently introduced to these international norms. 
 
                                                 
453 Since the institution of diplomatic protection developed in a time when the principle of non-interference in 
the domestic affairs of the state and equal sovereignty were almost absolute principles of international law, the 
nationality of the alien within a State was found to be the triggering factor of the jurisdiction of another State. 
See Art. 5(a) VCCR, and Art. 3 (a) VCDR and Art. 1 ILC Articles on Diplomatic Protection. 
454 According to the traditional approach, ‘[c]itizenship is usually an essential condition of diplomatic protection. 
In the matter of the presentation and enforcement of international claims, no rule is more strictly observed’; see 
Edwin M. Borchard, The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad, or The Law of International Claims, Banks 
Law Publishing Co. (1915), 462. Additionally, no replacements were commonly permitted under the classical 
conception. See A. Vermeer-Künzli, ‘Nationality and diplomatic protection - A reappraisal’, in A. Annoni and S. 
Forlati (eds.), The Changing Role of Nationality in International Law, Routledge (2013), 76-96. 
455 Namely, the existence of an international wrongful act and exhaustion of legal remedies. 
456 See, in particular, Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway (Est. v. Lith.), 1939 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 76, at 16 (Feb. 
28): ‘This right [to resort to ‘diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings’] is necessarily limited to 
intervention on behalf [of the state’s] own nationals because, in the absence of a special agreement, it is the 
bond of nationality between the State and the individual which alone confers upon the State the right of 
diplomatic protection.’ See also, J. Dugard, First and Seventh Reports, op.cit. 
457 See J. Dugard, Seventh Report on Diplomatic Protection, op.cit., 19. 
458 I.e., allowing no derogations. 
459 J. Dugard, Seventh Report on Diplomatic Protection, op.cit. 
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a. Traditional international standards on the ‘nationality of claims’ 
requirement for the exercise of diplomatic protection 
The first definition of the bond of nationality, or the ‘nationality of claims’ requirement for 
the exercise of diplomatic protection, was set out by the Permanent Court of International 
Justice in the Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway case460:  
 
This right [to exercise diplomatic protection] is necessarily limited to intervention on 
behalf of its own nationals because, in the absence of a special agreement, it is the bond of 
nationality between the state and the individual which alone confers upon the State the right of 
diplomatic protection, and it is as a part of the function of diplomatic protection that the right to 
take up a claim and to ensure respect for the rules of international law must be envisaged. 
 
The PCIJ did not define ‘nationality’ as such, but rather it established the function it 
plays within the public international law institution of diplomatic protection. 
In its 1955 Nottebohm judgment,461 the ICJ added precise criteria that the bond of 
nationality had to fulfil in order to legitimise the exercise of diplomatic protection. The 
defendant State, Guatemala, had confiscated the property of Mr Nottebohm based on his 
German nationality, although, at that time, he no longer possessed that nationality, but that of 
a war neutral State, Liechtenstein. Guatemala sought to obtain the rejection of Liechtenstein’s 
claims, brought by means of diplomatic protection, by contending that Mr Nottebohm had 
fraudulently acquired nationality of Liechtenstein, in violation of the domestic law and 
consequently also of customary international law. Before this judgment, the main condition 
which nationality had to fulfil, under international law, for the purpose of legitimising an 
exercise of diplomatic protection, was to be acquired in conformity with the national 
legislation, while States were recognised discretionary power to establish the criteria for the 
acquisition of nationality.462 Guatemala’s main defence argument was that Mr Nottebohm’s 
acquisition of nationality by way of naturalisation was not in conformity with the national 
legislation of Liechtenstein. The Law on nationality of Liechtenstein was argued to have been 
breached in two aspects: the order of the procedure for naturalisation was argued to have been 
                                                 
460 Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), International Court of Justice, Judgment of 18 November 
1953, ICJ Reports (1953), 111–125. 
461 Nottebohm case (second phase), Liechtenstein v Guatemala, ICJ Reports 1955. 
462 Art. 1 of Hague Convention governing Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationalities - ‘It is for 
each State to determine under its law who are its nationals.’ Art. 2 reads as follows: ‘Any question as to whether 




inversed; and certain essential requirements laid down in the Law were said to have not been 
fulfilled, such as the requirement of three years residence in Liechtenstein. Consequently, the 
grant of nationality by way of naturalisation was argued to have been acquired fraudulently 
for the sole purpose of obtaining a change in Mr Nottebohm’s legal status from a national of 
“a belligerent country to one of a neutral country”. The link existing between Nottebohm and 
Liechtenstein was argued to be a sham, which could not be legally opposed to the 
defendant.463 
The Nottebohm case was a controversial and ground-breaking judgment in the field of 
diplomatic protection and, more generally, in international law, since the Court limited the 
exclusive competence of States in matters of nationality by establishing an additional criterion 
to be fulfilled by nationality, namely: to be ‘genuine’ and ‘effective’.464 The Court established 
that nationality, as the premise of the exercise of diplomatic protection, should be the legal 
expression of ‘a social fact of attachment’ and reflect ‘a genuine connection of existence, 
interests and sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties.’465 The 
ICJ’s Nottebohm judgment became the reference case for the ‘genuineness’ requirement that 
the ‘nationality of claims’ as prerequisite for the exercise of diplomatic protection had to 
fulfil. Based on the minimum presence of Nottebohm in Liechtenstein (limited to transitory 
visits), the fact there were no concrete indications of his intention to transfer his economic 
interests, and his few family ties in the country, the Court concluded that he had minimal 
genuine connections with the country and thus proved he had no intention of settling in 
Liechtenstein. These facts were found to essentially prove the ‘absence of genuineness 
required of an act of such importance as naturalization.’ The fact that Nottebohm had 
renounced his previous German citizenship in favour of that of Liechtenstein, which was, at 
that time, a neutral country, was considered a sort of forum shopping making the individual’s 
choice of State nationality fraudulent, and thus diminishing the ‘genuineness’ of his 
naturalisation. 
The underlying rationale of the ICJ judgment ruling in the Nottebohm case was the 
prohibition of fraudulent acquisition of nationality by individuals, and abuse of State’s 
prerogatives in the field of nationality matters aimed at avoiding the laws on war. However, 
the Court did not base its judgment on these general principles, which were already 
                                                 
463 The issue of fraudulently using ‘nationality’ to obtain benefits occurred also in the CJEU jurisprudence, see, 
for instance, Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen [2004] ECR I-9925. 
464 Nottebohm case (second phase), Liechtenstein v Guatemala, ICJ Reports 1955, 4, 24 and 26. 
465 Nottebohm judgment, ICJ Reports of Judgments, 1955, 24. 
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recognised by the customary international norms of the time,466 instead, the Court, in a 
questionable exercise of innovative thinking, created the ‘genuine’ and ‘effective’ nationality 
standard, on which it based its judgment. The Nottebohm judgment has been equally criticized 
by academics467 and practitioners468, receiving also a considerable number of dissenting 
opinions from the judges sitting at the ICJ.469 The main criticisms centred on the lack of 
empirical international evidence for creating this international standard, and the unfair 
consequence it creates for individuals, who, due to this new criterion, are ultimately treated by 
public international law as stateless individuals.470 For a long period of time, the scope of 
application of the Nottebohm principle has been over-emphasised, mainly by legal 
academics471, by treating it as a general principle applicable to the nationality of claims 
requirement for the exercises of diplomatic protection.  
The principle of continuous nationality of the individual on behalf of which diplomatic 
protection is exercised is a second general international standard that the bond of nationality 
had to fulfil to legitimise the international exercise of diplomatic protection. According to this 
classical international principle, a State could exercise its right to diplomatic protection only if 
the injured individual had possessed his nationality continuously from the time of the injury 
until the time of presentation of the international claim.472 The legal definition of diplomatic 
protection as a legal fiction whereby the injury of the individual was transferred to the State of 
nationality upon the latter’s espousal of the claim, and the States’ fears of nationality 
shopping contributed to the development of this difficult to prove international standard.473  
In addition to these two requirements, a few others applied in cases of dual or multiple 
nationalities of the injured individual aiming at either singling out one nationality as the 
dominant one, or prohibiting all together claims being brought to the international fora by 
                                                 
466 C. Tiburcio, op.cit., 37ff. 
467 Glazer, ‘Affaire Nottebohm’ (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala) - A Critique, (1956) Geo. L.J. 313, 325; J. Kunz, 
‘The Nottebohm Judgment’, (1960) AJIL, 536, 543; A. Randelzhofer, ‘Nationality’, in R. Bernhardt (ed.), 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Elsevier (1997). 
468 R. Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It, Oxford University Press (1994), 
52; Advocate General Tesauro Opinion in Case C-369/90 Micheletti [1992] ECR I-4239, para. 5, where the AG 
held that the principle of genuine nationality resulted from the ‘romantic’ period of international relations, and 
the judgment itself is ‘extremely controversial’. 
469 Three dissenting opinions were formulated, by Judge Read, Judge Klaestad and Guggenheim. 
470 J. Kunz, op.cit., 536, 543. 
471 Brownlie, op.cit. and A. Vermeer-Künzli, ‘Diplomatic Protection as a Source of Human Rights Law’, op.cit. 
472 Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway case, PCIJ, 28 February 1939, series A/B F. Orrego Vicuna, ‘Interim Report 
on the Changing law of Nationality’, op.cit., para. 168; Commentary to the Art. 5 of the 2006 ILC Articles on 
Diplomatic Protection; J. Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, Oxford University Press 
(2012), 434ff and chapter 31. 
473 Edwin M. Borchard, ‘The protection of citizens abroad and change of original nationality’, (1934) Yale LJ, 
379; F. Battaglia and F. Perrini, ‘La Regola della continuita della cittadinanza’ in L. Panella (eds.), La Protezione 
Diplomatica Sviluppi e Prospettive, Giappichelli (2009), 57, 59. 
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way of diplomatic protection. It has to be noted that for a long period of time474 dual and 
multiple nationalities were addressed by public international law as problems to be tackled.475 
For this purpose the principle of effective nationality was jurisprudentially established in an 
attempt to choose one single nationality, the effective, dominant one476, that itself alone could 
act as the legitimating factor for the exercise of diplomatic protection on behalf of a natural 
person.477 In case the injury was committed by one of the States of nationality, international 
law prohibited for a long period of time478 the invocation of its international responsibility by 
way of diplomatic protection, based on the traditional public international legal principle of 
equal sovereignty, whereby States cannot be held internationally responsible for the treatment 
of their nationals. Therefore, classical public international law established the absolute rule of 
non-responsibility for international wrongful acts committed against an individual, in the 
specific case that the individual possessed dual or multiple nationalities, of which one was the 
nationality of the State perpetrator of the international legal violation.479  
The imposition of the ‘genuine’, ‘effective’ and ‘continuous’ criteria to be fulfilled by 
the bond of nationality have been subject to strict application, making the bond of nationality 
an almost absolute condition for the exercise of diplomatic protection of natural persons. 
International jurisprudence has not admitted exceptions or if, in principle, admitting them, the 
practice showed little acceptance for them.480 The situation was different as regards the rules 
on acquisition, loss, withdrawal, and domestic rights and obligations associated with 
nationality. On these aspects, public international law has generally admitted the exclusive 
                                                 
474 It seems the issue has recently resurfaced, stirred by nationalist parties. For instance, see M. Fritsma, 
‘Amendment of the State Law on Dutch Nationality in relation to multiple nationality and other issues related to 
nationality’ Kamerstukken 31 813 (R1873), 19 January 2010. 
475 See the preamble of the 1930 Hague Convention. In 1954 the UN ILC put forward the following rule as 
regards nationality: ‘Every person has the right to a nationality – but to only one’ see Institut de Droit 
International, Tableau General des Resolutions 1873-1956, 1957, 41. 
476 Different terms were used by the tribunals with similar meaning, e.g. ‘dominant’, ‘effective, and 
‘predominant’. See A. Vermeer-Künzli , ‘Nationality and diplomatic protection - A reappraisal’, in A. Annoni 
and S. Forlati (eds.), The Changing Role of Nationality in International Law, Routledge (2013), 76-96, 83. 
477 See Case A/18 concerning the Question of Jurisdiction over Claims of Persons with Dual Nationality (Mergé) 
International Legal Material 1984, 489; see also Thomas A. Aleinikoff, D. Klusmeyer (ed), Part II-The issue of 
Plural Nationality’, in Citizenship Today: Global Perspectives and Practice, Carnegie Endowment for 
International Practice (2001). 
478 Namely until 2006, when the ILC introduced an exception within its Articles on Diplomatic Protection. 
479 Art. 4 of the 1930 Hague Convention, rule changed by the ILC Articles on Diplomatic Protection. See also 
the judgment of the PCIJ in Panevezys case, ‘Where the injury was done to the national of some other State, no 
claim to which such injury may give rise falls within the scope of the diplomatic protection which a State is 
entitled to afford nor can it give rise to a claim which that State is entitled to espouse.’ 
480 R. Donner, The Regulation of Nationality in International Law. 2d ed. Irvington-on-Hudson, NY: 
Transnational (1994); C. Forcese, ‘Shelter from the Storm: Rethinking Diplomatic Protection of Dual Nationals 
in Modern International Law’, (2005) George Washington International Law Review, 85; P. Klein, ‘La 
protection diplomatique des doubles nationaux: Reconsidération des fondements de la règle de non-
responsabilité’ (1988) Revue belge de droit international, 184. 
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States’ competence to establish domestic rules. The nationality of claims condition for the 
admissibility of a diplomatic protection claim required only that the State would prove that 
the individual, in relation to which the international wrongful act was committed, possessed 
its nationality, while the domestic rules on the basis of which the individual acquired 
nationality were almost automatically considered internationally legitimate.481  
Conferral of nationality and the rights associated with nationality are commonly held 
to be an exclusive matter of domestic law of the state concerned.482 The Permanent Court of 
International Justice articulated this position in the Nationality Decrees judgment, stating that: 
‘In the present state of international law, questions of nationality are, in principle, within the 
reserved domain of States.’483 This rule was then codified by Article 1 of the Hague 
Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality (the Hague 
Convention 1930) which confirmed that ‘[i]t is for each State to determine under its own law 
who are its nationals.’ The consequence of such wide discretion recognised to States led to a 
diversity of domestic norms governing the conferral, acquisition, loss, and withdrawal of 
nationality, as well as the rights conferred to the nationals. In time, the domestic norms 
governing these issues have more or less converged towards a short list of variables, which 
has now been codified, to a certain extent, by the ILC. There are a few elements that States 
recognise as criteria of the acquisition of nationality, and Article 4 of the ILC Articles on 
Diplomatic Protection mentions those most commonly used: birth (jus soli), descent (jus 
sanguinis), naturalisation and succession of States. However this list is not exhaustive as the 
ILC recognises there can be other legitimate connecting factors, as long as they are consistent 
with international law.484  
International law has established a few limitations to the States’ prerogative over 
nationality matters, which have been commonly enshrined in a few relevant treaties and 
customary international legal norms.485 There are few international treaties governing this 
area, and they focus on dealing with problems stemming from multiple nationalities, or 
                                                 
481 Art. 1 of Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws art. 1, Apr. 12, 1930, 
179 L.N.T.S. 89 [hereinafter 1930 Hague Convention] reads as follows: ‘It is for each State to determine under 
its own law who are its nationals. This law shall be recognised by other States in so far as it is consistent with 
international conventions, international custom, and the principles of law generally recognised with regard to 
nationality.’ See also the Panevezys judgment. 
482 Robert D. Sloane, ‘Breaking the Genuine Link: The Contemporary, International Legal Regulation of 
Nationality’, (2009) Harvard International Law Journal, 1. 
483 Nationality Decrees in Tunis and Morocco, Advisory Opinion of 7 February 1923 (Series B, No. 4); 
Acquisition of Polish Nationality, Advisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 7, at 16 (Sept. 15). 
484 See Art. 4 of the ILC Articles on Diplomatic Protection and the commentary of this Article. 
485 For a complete list of the international norms governing citizenship, see the EUDO-Citizenship database, 
available online at: http://eudo-citizenship.eu/databases/international-legal-norms/?stype=3  
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nationalities issues concerning vulnerable groups of peoples (e.g. women486 and children487). 
Many of their provisions are outdated, corresponding to a past international society.488 In 
addition to the written norms, there is a short list of customary international norms whose 
content is still difficult to define today.489 In short, these customary international norms490, 
placing limitations on the still recognised exclusive States’ competence over nationality 
matters, can be summarised as follows: prohibition of abuse of rights in relation to acquisition 
of nationality;491 recognition of the individual’s right to a nationality492, with its correspondent 
States’ obligation to eliminate statelessness;493 and prohibition of discrimination.494  
In case the domestic rules on nationality do not conform to international conventions, 
international custom, and the principles of law generally recognised with regard to 
nationality495, the sanction established by international law is international in-opposability of 
the said norms,496 and the consequential inadmissibility of the international claim brought by 
                                                 
486 Convention on the Nationality of Women, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 4, 38, entered into force Aug. 29, 1934. 
487 Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by 
General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990. 
488 For instance, Art. 4 of the 1930 Hague Convention, which prohibits diplomatic protection being exercised 
between States of nationality; Art. 5 allowing states to treat individuals with multiple nationalities as possessing 
only one, namely that of principle residence or closest connection. 
489 Robert D. Sloane, ‘Breaking the Genuine Link: The Contemporary International Legal Regulation of 
Nationality’ (2009) Harvard International Law Journal, 1. See also, A. Sironi, ‘Nationality of individuals in 
public international law A Functional approach’, in A. Annoni and S. Forlati (eds.), The Changing Role of 
Nationality in International Law, Routledge (2013), 54-76. 
490 These customary international norms have largely remained un-altered and are raised in few cases. For the 
application of the prohibition of discrimination, see ECtHR, Genovese v Malta (Appl. 53124/09, judgment of 11 
October 2011), and for changes of nationality done exclusively for the purpose of eluding the internal rules of an 
international organisation by one of its staff members, see, United National Administrative Tribunal, Case No. 
1383, judgment of 29 September 2006. 
491 An example of abuse of rights in the field of conferral of State nationality is provided in the commentary to 
Art. 1 of the 1930 Hague Convention: ‘If State A should attempt, for instance, to naturalize persons who have 
never had any connection with State A, who have never been within its territory, who have never acted in its 
territory, who have no relation whatever to any persons who have been its nationals, and who are nationals of 
other states, it would seem that State A would clearly have gone beyond the limits set by international law.’ 
492 Inter-American Court of Human Rights Advisory Opinions of 1984 (OC-4/84) held that nationality was an 
inherent right of all human beings. The Court held that domestic regulation of nationality is no longer deemed to 
be within the State’s sole jurisdiction, but it is circumscribed by their obligations to ensure the full protection of 
human rights. For the qualification of the right to nationality as one of the most fundamental of an individual’s 
human rights, see C. Tiburcio, op.cit.; J. M. M. Chan, ‘The Right to a Nationality as a Human Right’, (1991) 
HRLJ, 1. 
493 See the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (30 August 1961, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 
989, p. 175); Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (28 July 1951, United Nations, entered into force on 
22 April 1954); Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (28 September 1954, United Nations, 
Treaty Series, vol. 360, p.117, entered into force on 6 June 1960); Art. 5 of the European Convention on 
Nationality. 
494 Arts. 4 and 5 of the European Convention on Nationality, Convention on the Nationality of Women which 
prohibits all sex-based discrimination regarding nationality and Art. 1(3) of the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination. 
495 See Art. 1 of the 1930 Hague Convention. 




way of diplomatic protection. International law, as interpreted by the ICJ497, has thus made a 
distinction between nationality at the domestic level and nationality at the international level. 
If nationality can be legal within the territorial boundaries of the State, and no state can 
interfere in this regard, at the international level, domestic legislation establishing the 
conferral or withdrawal of nationality may be challenged, and if nationality is not 
internationally recognised, then neither will the diplomatic protection exercised by that state 
for its nationals.  
The bond of nationality has played a crucial role in relation to the public international 
law institution of diplomatic protection, being defined by specific rules of very strict 
application. The absolute conditionality of diplomatic protection on the bond of nationality, 
and the international requirements of ‘genuineness’, ‘effectiveness’ and ‘continuity’ 
significantly restricted the personal scope of application of diplomatic protection of 
individuals. Public international law has changed greatly since its ‘romantic’498 period under 
the impact of international human rights, the growing role of individuals and other non-state 
actors in international relations, and the increasing migration of populations. The following 
sub-sections will assess the extent to which these general trends have impacted also on the 
classical international standards imposed on the bond of nationality as admissibility 
requirement for the exercise of diplomatic protection. The main questions that will be 
addressed in the following sub-sections are the following: is the classical bond of nationality 
still required as a mandatory, exclusive link for the exercise of consular and diplomatic 
protection of individuals, or is the contemporary international practice signalling that factors 
other than ‘nationality’ are starting to be slowly accepted as alternative premises for the 
institution of diplomatic protection? Has the ‘humanization’ phenomenon extended the 
personal scope of diplomatic protection? 
 
                                                 
497 See the following judgments in: Mavrommatis, Panevezys, Nottebohm, Barcelona Traction, Tehran Hostages 
cases. 
498 The term was used by Advocate General Tesauro in relation to the public international law existent at the 
time the Nottebohm judgment was delivered, see his Opinion in the Micheletti case, (Case C-369/90 Micheletti v 
Delegacion del Gobierno en Cantabria, 1993 ECR I-4239), para. 5. 
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b. Restricting the principle of continuous nationality of diplomatic protection 
claims 
The classical principle of continuous nationality has been subject to vehement critiques in 
relation to both its content and its legal basis.499 The principle was criticised as unfounded 
from both the classical ius fictio conception of diplomatic protection and the current 
individual oriented conception of the institution. According to the Vattelian legal fiction 
definition of diplomatic protection, the injury of the individual is retroactively considered a 
direct injury to the State. Since the State is considered the sole holder of the right to claim 
remedy from the moment it decides to exercise diplomatic protection, there seems to be no 
logic behind the requirement of continuous possession of nationality, from the moment of 
lodging the international claim and until the resolution of the international claim. In light of 
the growing international role of the individual, the logic of the rigid principle of continuous 
nationality is questionable. 
The 2006 ILC Articles on Diplomatic Protection maintained this highly challenged and 
unfair500 international customary norm, perpetuating, to a certain extent, the existence of the 
classical norm.501 Rapporteur Dugard’s initial proposal was to eliminate the rule altogether 
since it no longer corresponds to the present day society. He argued that maintaining such a 
prerequisite would only lead to numerous individual claims submitted on the basis of 
diplomatic protection being rejected, when diplomatic protection should serve to ensure the 
protection of individual’s rights.502 This individual rights oriented approach was not shared by 
all States, some of whom raised concerns about potential nationality shopping by individuals 
– with the sole purpose of finding a State that would agree to espouse their claims. Such a 
significant amendment was argued to lead to complications in practice, in case there are 
concurrent States’ claims to espouse the same individual’s claim. Thus the Working Group 
did not approve Rapporteur Dugard’s radical proposal.  
                                                 
499 For more details on this issue, see J. Dugard, First Report on Diplomatic Protection, Chittharanjan F. 
Amerasinghe, Chapter ‘Nationality of Claims’ in Diplomatic Protection, Oxford University Press, 2008. 
500 See in particular the critique raised by Judge Fitzmaurice, who noted in his separate opinion in the Barcelona 
Traction case: ‘[T]oo rigid and sweeping an application of the continuity rule can lead to a situation in which 
important interests go unprotected, claimants unsupported and injuries un-redressed, not on account of anything 
relating to their merits, but because purely technical considerations bring it about that no State is entitled to act. 
This situation is the less defensible at the present date in that what was always regarded as the other main 
justification for the continuity rule, namely the need to prevent the abuses that would result if claims could be 
assigned for value to nationals of States whose Governments would compel acceptance of them by the defendant 
State, has largely lost its validity.’ in Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd (Belgium v. Spain) [1970] 
ICJ Rep. 4, 23 
501 Art. 5(1) ILC Articles on Diplomatic Protection. 
502 See J. Dugard, First and Seventh Reports on Diplomatic Protection. 
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The final version of the Article, as approved by the ILC and the UN, reflects a more 
flexible approach that attempts to balance two radically opposed approaches, namely, the 
progressive individuals-centric approach of Rapporteur Dugard503 and the classical States-
centric approach, which aimed at preventing abuses of diplomatic protection.504  
In a second attempt, Rapporteur Dugard convinced the Working Group to loosen the 
very strict and limitative norm by establishing exceptions to the rule. First of all, a rebuttable 
presumption of continuous possession of nationality was recognised based on the possession 
of nationality at the moment of the injury and at the moment when the State of nationality 
espouses the individual’s claim. Secondly, paragraph 2 of the Article 5 of the ILC Articles on 
Diplomatic Protection introduces a second exception, whereby a State may exercise 
diplomatic protection in respect of a person who was a national at the time of the official 




c. Discarding the Nottebohm principle of ‘genuine’ and ‘effective’ nationality 
under current public international customary law 
The ICJ judgment in the Nottebohm case has been criticised both by practitioners506 and by 
international and EU legal academics507 for two main reasons. First, for assessing the facts of 
the case in light of erroneous legal assumptions. It was argued that there were no relevant 
international custom, treaty provisions, principles or international jurisprudence that could 
sustain the Court’s conclusion that State nationality had to fulfil the condition of 
‘genuineness’ in cases of diplomatic protection for the benefit of single nationals. If such a 
condition can have an explanation in cases of dual nationalities, where both States of 
                                                 
503 Whereby the individual is ‘the ultimate beneficiary of diplomatic protection’, see the ILC First Report of 
2001, para.169. 
504 This approach focused on the States’ fears that in the absence of the continuous nationality rule, the 
mechanism of diplomatic protection would be abused by individuals shopping for the nationality of States that 
would more willingly espouse their claims, or for the nationality of more powerful States; or diplomatic 
protection would be abused by States by way of conferring nationality only for the purpose of gaining economic 
or political benefits by espousing individual’s claims in strategic disputes. 
505 Art. 5(2) reads as follows: ‘A State is entitled to exercise diplomatic protection in respect of a person who 
was a national of that State continuously from the date of injury to the date of the official presentation of the 
claim.’ 
506 See the dissenting opinion of Judges Klaestad, Read and Guggenheim in the Nottebohm case. 
507 D. Kochenov, 'Two Sovereign States vs. a Human Being: ECJ as a Guardian of Arbitrariness in Citizenship 
Matters', in J. Shaw (ed.), Has the European Court of Justice Challenged the Member State Sovereignty in 
Nationality Law?, EUI Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Working Paper 2011/62, 11-16; D. Ruzié, 
‘Nationalité, effectivité et droit communautaire’, (1993) Revue générale de droits international public 107,113. 
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nationality are equals from the point of view of international law, the situation is radically 
different in a case where the diplomatic protection is exercised against a non-nationality State. 
Secondly, the Court’s judgment given in a single nationality case is creating a gap in the legal 
protection of individuals by placing them in a situation equivalent with statelessness. Many 
scholars508 do not accept the genuine link requirement as a rule of customary international law, 
except for dual citizenship cases. They argue that should the Nottebohm doctrine be extended 
to other cases than those between the States of nationalities of the injured individual, the rule 
would considerably deprive millions of people of the benefit of diplomatic protection, which, 
in certain circumstances, might be the only legal remedy available to individuals.509 Other 
scholars510 contend that the pre-Nottebohm literature and national judicial decisions support 
the ‘genuine link’ doctrine as a general principle with applications also outside the context of 
dual nationality. Overall, scholars seem to agree on the need to apply the principle with 
flexibility and adapt it to the changing needs of the international community.511 Rapporteur 
Dugard, in his first Report prepared for the ILC on Diplomatic Protection, clearly stated that 
the Nottebohm principle of effective and genuine nationality cannot be considered as a rule of 
customary international law in cases other than dual nationality.512 His conclusion seems to be 
supported by the post-Nottebohm international jurisprudence of the ICJ513 and arbitral 
tribunals. Contemporary practice shows that the Nottebohm ‘genuine’ and ‘effective’ 
nationality link is no longer a general principle of international law limiting the international 
opposability of diplomatic protection claims.514  
In light of the numerous critiques brought against the general application of the 
principle of genuine and effective nationality, without differentiating between cases of single, 
dual or multiple nationalities, the ILC Project revisited the classical conception of this 
principle. During the elaboration of the 2006 ILC Articles on Diplomatic Protection, 
                                                 
508 A. Randelzhofer, ‘Nationality’, in R. Bernhardt (ed), Encyclopedia of Public International Law, vol. 3. 
Amsterdam, Elsevier, 1997, 507; C. Parry, ‘Some considerations upon the protection of individuals in 
international law’, Recueil des cours de l’Académie de droit international de La Haye, 1956–II. Leiden, Sijthoff, 
1957, 707; Josef L. Kunz, ‘The Nottebohm judgment (second phase)’, op.cit., 536. 
509 J. Dugard, First Report on Diplomatic Protection, op.cit., 41. For instance, in the case of individuals subject 
to terrorist related sanctions, see the cases of the Guantánamo Bay detainees. 
510 See I. Brownlie, ‘The relations of nationality in public international law’, (1963) British Yearbook of 
International Law, 349. 
511 Francisco O. Vicuna, ‘Interim Report on The Changing Law of Nationality of Claims’, op.cit.,27 
512 J. Dugard, First Report on Diplomatic Protection, op.cit. 
513 Cases decided post-Nottebohm judgment rejected the application of the Nottebohm doctrine, as proved by the 
LaGrand and Avena judgments, where the exercise of diplomatic protection by Germany and Mexico were not 
rejected by the ICJ as ineffective and not genuine, although it seemed there was a stronger link between the 
injured individual and the defendant State rather than with the applicant State. 
514 For instance, the Flegenheimer case of the Italian-United States Conciliation Commission, decision No. 182 
of 20 September 1958 (UNRIAA, vol. XIV (Sales No. 65.V.4), p. 327) 
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divergent views were expressed within the specific Working Group in relation to the 
codification or not of the Nottebohm doctrine as a requirement to be generally applied to the 
nationality link. The final commentary approved by the ILC Working Group excludes the 
general application of the Nottebohm criteria to other cases than those with circumstances 
similar to the Nottebohm case.515 Therefore, the Nottebohm ‘genuine’ nationality link doctrine 
can be considered as no longer reflecting the current international practice.516 The only 
circumstance where a sort of ‘genuineness’ is still applied to the nationality of diplomatic 
protection claims is in cases of multiple nationalities, where a claim is lodged by one of the 
States of nationality against another State of nationality.  
It can thus be noticed that the Nottebohm ‘genuine’ link has been abandoned by the 
current international law. The current test imposed to the ‘nationality of claims’ no longer 
requires the ‘genuineness’ of the nationality. As rightly pointed out by Rapporteur Dugard, 
maintaining the classical general principle of ‘genuine’ nationality, in the current day 
international society, would have led to eliminating millions of persons who are moving into a 
different country than their country of nationality, without acquiring the former country’s 
nationality, while also losing the real connection with their country of nationality.517 To a 
certain extent, the underlying rationale of the ‘genuine link’ doctrine still persists today, 
reformulated under the general international principle of prohibition of abuses of rights. 
Today, the very fact that a state is willing to grant an individual its nationality or recognise an 
individual as a national, while respecting the general international legal principles of 
prohibition of discrimination and abuse of rights, should be a sufficient proof of a link 
existing between the state and that national.518 
d. Eliminating the non-responsibility rule in dual and multiple nationalities 
cases 
The development of international human rights law and of a scholarly trend approaching 
diplomatic protection as an alternative mechanism, filling the gaps of human rights legal 
systems, contributed to the elimination of the traditional international rule of non-
responsibility of States in cases of dual nationality. The absolute non-responsibility rule in 
                                                 
515 Namely that of a State of nationality with ‘extremely tenuous’ links with the injured individual, which brings 
an international complaint by way of diplomatic protection against another State where the individual, although 
not possessing its nationality, has had a solid and close link for a long period, based on residence and economic 
interests. 
516 See Art. 7 of the ILC Articles on Diplomatic Protection (2006). 
517 See ILC Diplomatic Protection Articles 2006a, Art. 4, Commentary, para. 5. 
518 See L. Kunz. op.cit., 553. 
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cases submitted between States of nationalities corresponds to a time when individuals spent 
most of their lives within the territory of a single State, acquiring its nationality by way of 
birth or descent. In 2006, the ILC amended this rule by changing its character from absolute 
to relative, and introducing an exception based on the ‘predominant’ nationality criterion. 
Thus, the current international customary law, as codified by Article 7 of the ILC Articles on 
Diplomatic Protection, recognises the opportunity to exercise diplomatic protection also 
between States of nationalities, as long as the State lodging the claim is the ‘predominant’ 
State, ‘both at the date of injury and at the date of the official presentation of the claim’. The 
factors that can be taken into consideration when deciding which nationality is the 
predominant one are not expressly provided in the Articles, but they are mentioned in the 
commentaries of the Rapporteur added to the Articles.519 The adjective of ‘predominant’ was 
chosen from a varied list of suggestions, including the ‘effective’ and ‘dominant’ criteria, 
which were also previously used by the international jurisprudence. Rapporteur Dugard 
preferred the relativity implied by the word ‘predominant’ compared with the other 
adjectives, especially in light of the elimination of the Nottebohm ‘effective’ nationality 
requirement. The issue in this situation is not to establish the effectiveness in general of one 
of the nationalities of the individual, but, to establish which of the two nationalities, of the 
claimant or of the defendant States, is the predominant one at the moment of exercising 
diplomatic protection.  
Although, in principle, the non-responsibility rule still exists, satisfying the concerns of 
the prudent States, the newly codified exception is a step forward for the advancement of the 
individual’s rights protection via the diplomatic protection mechanism. Using the 
‘predominant nationality’ limitation, instead of the ‘dominant’ or ‘effective’ nationality, 
creates an opportunity for individuals to more easily fulfil the prerequisites necessary to 
benefit from diplomatic protection. The ‘effectiveness’ of the nationality is assessed only at 
the precise time of the injury and lodging of the international claim, and in relation only to the 
States involved in the international claim. This particular amendment and its phrasing signal 
                                                 
519 ‘The authorities indicate that such factors include habitual residence, the amount of time spent in each 
country of nationality, date of naturalization (i.e., the length of the period spent as a national of the protecting 
State before the claim arose); place, curricula and language of education; employment and financial interests; 
place of family life; family ties in each country; participation in social and public life; use of language; taxation, 
bank account, social security insurance; visits to the other State of nationality; possession and use of passport of 
the other State; and military service. None of these factors is decisive and the weight attributed to each factor 
will vary according to the circumstances of each case.’ (Commentary to Art. 7 of the ILC Articles on Diplomatic 
Protection, para. 5, p. 46) 
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that the bond of nationality is no longer required to be unique and corresponding to one single 
State, but that different nationalities can be equally important. 
 
e. Increasing exceptions to the exclusive ‘nationality link’ requirement 
The bond of nationality has been for centuries the fundamental premise for the exercise of 
diplomatic protection. It fulfilled two important functions within the institution of diplomatic 
protection: a national function determining the State entitled to exercise diplomatic protection 
and an international law function legitimising the State’s use of diplomatic protection on the 
international plane. At the domestic level, nationality reflects a bond between an individual 
and a State which acts as a triggering factor of a State’s interest, capable of outweighing the 
disadvantage of jeopardising its foreign affairs with another State. At the international level, 
nationality triggers the personal scope of the state sovereignty, even outside the territorial 
border, and it can thus justify the limitation of the general international legal principle of non-
intervention in the domestic affairs of a State.520 These two functions that nationality has 
exclusively fulfilled for a long period of time within the field of diplomatic protection have 
started to be gradually fulfilled by other criteria, such as ‘residence’. A long-term residence 
can reflect a political-legal-sociological situation of a natural person similar to that reflected 
by nationality. Rights are being accrued as well as obligations, while a feeling of belonging 
may be even stronger than in the case of nationality.521 As from the perspective of 
international law, international human rights law has attributed to ‘residence’ the role of 
triggering international responsibility and thus legitimising external State intervention.522 
The parameters of the international society and relations have changed drastically since 
the time the institution of diplomatic protection was formed. We can no longer think of 
nationality as the exclusive foundation for diplomatic protection in the same way it used to be 
100 years ago. The institution of diplomatic protection needs to reflect the current day society 
where individuals commonly have multiple nationalities, and/or take residence and live in 
another country than the one of their nationality. In international practice, residence starts to 
slowly gain an important place as a factor reflecting a link between an individual and a State, 
                                                 
520 See the ICJ in the Barcelona Traction judgment held that: ‘Diplomatic protection deals with a very sensitive 
area of international relations, since the interest of a foreign State in the protection of its nationals confronts the 
rights of the territorial sovereign, a fact of which the general law on the subject has had to take cognizance in 
order to prevent abuses and friction.’, para. 37. 
521 As for instance in the case of refugees or persons benefiting of subsidiary protection. 
522 According to Loizidou v Turkey (Appl. No. 15318/89, Judgment of 18 December 1996, paras. 62 and 77), the 
essential element is the effective jurisdiction over the individual. 
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and in certain situations it can reflect a stronger, or more genuine link than nationality.523 
Stateless people, refugees, and individuals benefiting of subsidiary protection are the perfect 
example of such a situation. This category of people has also increased in the last decades, 
and their status in society cannot simply be ignored. In their situation it is not nationality, but 
residence, which reflects a genuine connection between the individual and a country. 
While nationality undoubtedly still commonly reflects the bond between an individual 
and a state, which legitimises the State of nationality intervention into the domestic affairs of 
a foreign State, other ties are gradually recognised as being as strong and sufficiently effective 
as nationality, and could thus constitute the international legitimising factor for the exercise of 
diplomatic protection. Long-term or permanent residence is one such tie that has been held by 
the ILC as a sufficiently strong bond that can justify the exercise of diplomatic protection by a 
State in certain situations. As early as 1939, the ICJ recognised that, in exceptional 
circumstances, bonds other than nationality can legitimise an exercise of diplomatic 
protection, if based on consent of the State parties to the litigation.524 The current debate is 
focused on identifying these other internationally recognised bonds. 
The 2006 ILC Articles on Diplomatic Protection introduced a ground-breaking step for 
the advancement of customary international legal norms governing the institution of 
diplomatic protection of individuals. Article 8 departs from the traditional rule that only 
nationals may benefit from the exercise of diplomatic protection and allows the State of legal 
and habitual residence of the refugee, the individual benefiting of subsidiary protection and 
the stateless person to exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of these individuals. The 
condition necessary for the exercise of diplomatic protection is that the residence in the 
applicant State is ‘lawful’ and ‘habitual’ both at the time of the injury and at the date of the 
official presentation of the claim.525 However, this particular legal innovation is not generally 
endorsed as a customary legal norm binding on States. The UK Court of Appeal challenged 
Article 8 on the grounds that it was not reflective of generally accepted customary 
international law.526 Article 8 of the ILC Articles on Diplomatic Protection was found to be 
‘something of a distraction’.527 Regardless of the opposition from certain States, Article 8 is an 
                                                 
523 See J. Dugard, First Report on Diplomatic Protection, op.cit. 
524 ‘In the absence of a special agreement, it is the bond of nationality between the State and the individual 
which alone confers upon the state the right of diplomatic protection.’ Panevezys case, (ser A/B no 76, at 1). 
525 For a detailed analysis of diplomatic protection of refugees, see V. Silvestri, ‘La Protezione Diplomatica dei 
Rifugiati’ in L. Panella (ed), La Protezione Diplomatica: Sviluppi e Prospettive, Giappichelli (2009), 289-313. 
526 Al Rawi and Others v Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Another [2006] EWHC 458, para. 115 
(Admin) available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2006/1279.html 
527 Ibid., para. 120. 
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important step towards the recognition of alternative legal premises to the classical absolute 
application of the ‘nationality link’. ‘Residence’ is thus gaining relevance on the international 
sphere as a legitimate founding premise of diplomatic protection in circumstances where the 
application of the nationality prerequisite would pre-empt the individual from enjoying access 
to a mechanism that can ensure protection of his rights and interests. 
It has to be noticed that ‘lawful and habitual’ residence is not the only exception 
recognised so far by international practice. Further exceptions have developed in the field of 
international organisations, such as employment relations. In the Reparation for Injuries case, 
the ICJ recognised a right of international organisations to exercise functional protection for 
its agents. This functional protection involves the lodging of international claims asking for 
damages from States for the international wrongs committed on the officials of an 
international organisation.528  
2. Extending the material scope of the international wrongful act 
prerequisite for the exercise of diplomatic protection of individuals 
The second requirement commonly imposed by general international law to the exercise of 
diplomatic protection is the existence of an international wrongful act committed by the 
receiving State, which directly injured an individual alien while on its territory.529 This 
requirement involves an assessment of the international wrongful act according to the rules of 
international responsibility of States.530 Therefore, the injury must have been committed by 
the State, be it an organ pertaining to the executive, legislative or judiciary branches of the 
State’s power, or exceptionally by private individuals, but only if it can be established that the 
State had a positive obligation to prevent the injury or punish it.531 As diplomatic protection is 
merely a procedure whereby the international responsibility of States is invoked, the 
circumstances provided by the ILC Articles on International Responsibility of States as 
                                                 
528 However, functional protection has to be differentiated from the classical diplomatic protection, although they 
serve similar objectives, namely of protecting an individual. While diplomatic protection is designed for the 
protection of private individuals, the functional protection covers only individuals who have suffered an injury 
while exercising their official duties. The national state may intervene when the agent is acting for his/her 
personal aims. See more in Chittharanjan F. Amerasinghe, op.cit., p. 53. See also the 1949 Advisory Opinion of 
the ICJ in the case Reparation for Injuries suffered in the service of the UN; Myriam B. Carabot and Ubéda-
Saillard Muriel, ‘Functional Protection’ in J. Crawford, A. Pellet, and S. Olleson (eds), The Law of International 
Responsibility, Oxford University Press (2010), 1073–1084; J. Dugard, ‘Diplomatic Protection’ in R. Wolfrum 
(ed), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Oxford University Press (2009). 
529 J. Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, Oxford University Press (2014), Chapters 25 
and 26. 
530 See ILC Articles on International Responsibility of States for International Wrongful Acts, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 
(2001). 
531 See C. Tiburcio, op.cit., 48. 
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exonerating of international responsibility will equally apply to the diplomatic protection 
institution, inter alia: consent, countermeasures, force majeure and fortuitous event, distress, 
and self-defence.532  
In terms of the substantive international norms whose violation could lead to the 
establishment of an international wrongful act and thus legitimise the exercise of diplomatic 
protection, the classical definition of diplomatic protection included norms providing for a 
core of individual rights whose scope and legal understanding corresponded to the European 
and United States’ conceptions, and were qualified as falling under the ‘international 
minimum standard’ doctrine.533 The principle of ‘international minimum standard’ was 
defined as early as 1910 by the famous American international lawyer, Elihu Root, as a 
general international legal standard to which every national law related to the treatment of 
aliens had to conform.534 The basis for this opinion was a decision of the Claims Commission 
under the Convention between the United States of America and the United Mexican States 
rendered in 1926, which is the first official legal account recognising the principle of the 
International Minimum Standard on the protection of aliens: ‘[...] the propriety of 
governmental acts should be put to the test of international standards [...] the treatment of an 
alien, in order to constitute an international delinquency should amount to an outrage, to bad 
faith, to wilful neglect of duty, or to an insufficiency of governmental action so far short of 
international.’535 
Following the European States’ abuses of the diplomatic protection mechanism for the 
purpose of intervening in the domestic affairs of developing States536, the latter developed an 
                                                 
532 See Arts. 21-25 of ILC Articles on International Responsibility of States for International Wrongful Acts, 
U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001). 
533 See more details in Chittharanjan F. Amerasinghe, Chapter ‘The International Law Violated’, op.cit.; C. 
Tiburcio, Chapter ‘Historical Development of the Treatment of Aliens’, op.cit.; A. Roth, The Minimum Standard 
of International Law Applied to Aliens, A. W. Sijthoff (1949). 
534 E. Root, ‘The basis of protection to citizens residing abroad’, (1910) AJIL   ., 517, 521: ‘Each country is 
bound to give to the nationals of another country in its territory the benefit of the same laws, the same 
administration, the same protection, and the same redress for injury which it gives to its own citizens, and 
neither more nor less: provided the protection which the country gives to its own citizens conforms to the 
established standard of civilization. […]. If any country's system of law and administration does not conform to 
that standard, although the people of the country may be content or compelled to live under it, no other country 
can be compelled to accept it as furnishing a satisfactory measure of treatment to its citizens.’ 
535 See case L. Fay, H. Neer and Pauline Neer (USA) V. United Mexican States, Reports of International Arbitral 
Awards, 15 October 1926, Vol. IV, 60-66. 
536 Specifically during the 19th and early 20th century, when powerful imperialist States abused the diplomatic 
protection that was initially aimed to protect their nationals carrying out commercial activities in developing 
States. For example, the Anglo-Boer war (1899-1902) was justified by Britain as an intervention to protect its 
nationals who owned the gold mines of Witwatersrand, and the United States´ military interventions in 
Dominican Republic in 1965, in Grenada in 1983 and in Panama in 1989 were justified in the same way. The US 
force interventions were carried out on the pretext of defending US nationals in those countries. For more details 
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alternative to the ‘international minimum standards’ doctrine, namely ‘national standards 
doctrine’ whereby aliens were recognised the same treatment as the one applied to the local 
citizens.537 The so-called Calvo doctrine was supported in particular by Latin American 
countries based on the general principle of public international law of equal respect of State 
sovereignty and prohibition of intervention into the domestic affairs of a State.538 The doctrine 
has never been endorsed outside the Latin American region, being criticised as a construction 
aimed at releasing the State from its responsibilities towards other States.539 The international 
minimum standard received wider endorsement and became the applicable international norm 
delimitating the material scope of diplomatic protection. This theory established a list of 
minimum rights from which every individual should benefit regardless of his nationality and 
regardless of the country in which he was located. In time, and under the influence of the 
growing role of international human rights, the content of the international minimum standard 
has grown, including the prohibition of slavery, torture, ill-treatment, and discrimination, as 
well as relative international human rights, such as the right to a fair trial.540  
Numerous legal scholars541 have suggested that the international minimum standards 
should include also the entire body of international human rights law. According to 
Rapporteur Dugard:  
 
‘[i]n considering the question of whether an alien has been mistreated, international 
tribunals may accordingly turn to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and 
similar human rights tribunals for guidance. In this way the international minimum standard for 
the treatment of aliens and the human rights standards of a state's own nationals are likely to 
merge.’542  
However, Rapporteur Dugard has not codified his approach in the 2006 Articles on 
Diplomatic Protection, leaving the material scope of diplomatic protection outside its 
                                                                                                                                                        
see, First Report on diplomatic protection, presented by J. Dugard to the International Law Commission during 
its 52nd session, UN Doc. A/CN.4/506, 7 March 2000, 5-6, para. 14. 
537 Drago developed the doctrine in response to action taken by Italy, Germany and Great Britain against 
Venezuela in 1902 following its failure to pay contractual debts owed to the nationals of those States. The results 
of his actions materialised in the 1907 Porter Convention Respecting the Limitation of the Employment of Force 
for the recovery of Contract Debts (Convention II of the 1907 Hague Peace Conference). The national treatment 
doctrine was later on elaborated by Calvo. For an analysis of the Calvo doctrine see C. Tiburcio, The Human 
Rights of Aliens under International and Comparative Law, op.cit., 43-53. 
538 C. Tiburcio, op.cit., 46ff. 
539 Freeman, Recent Aspects of the Calvo Doctrine and the Challenger to International Law, (1946) AJIL 121. 
540 M Shaw International Law 5ed (2003); J Dugard International Law - A South African Perspective 2ed (2000) 
541 C. Warbrick and D. McGoldrick, ‘Diplomatic Representation and Diplomatic Protection’, (2002) ICLQ, 723; 
R. Lillich, ‘The Human Rights of Aliens in Contemporary International Law’, Manchester University Press 
(1984); C. Tiburcio, op.cit. 
542 2006 ILC Articles on Diplomatic Protection with commentaries. 
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codification object, due to the primary nature of these rules, which were considered as best 
kept separate from the secondary, procedural rules of diplomatic protection. 
The issue of whether international human rights are part of the material scope of 
diplomatic protection has, however, been recently clarified by the ICJ in its judgment 
delivered in the Diallo case. The ICJ expressly recognised that the material scope of the 
international minimum standards has now come to include also the growing body of 
international human rights law: ‘Owing to the substantive development of international law 
over recent decades in respect of the rights it accords to individuals, […] diplomatic 
protection, originally limited to alleged violations of the minimum standard of treatment of 




3. The ‘humanization’ of the requirement of exhaustion of local remedies 
The principle of prior exhaustion of local remedies is one of the oldest principles of 
international law.544 Accordingly, an alien in a foreign State has to comply with the local legal 
system and thus give the opportunity to the receiving State authorities to remedy the violation 
of an international obligation that affected him or her, before the international wrongful act is 
raised at the international level. Until local remedies are exhausted, the injury can still be 
considered a national issue.545 The traditional norm on the exhaustion of local remedies as a 
prerequisite for the exercise of diplomatic protection by a state on behalf of an individual is 
now codified in Article 14 ILC Articles on Diplomatic Protection.546 The Article endorses the 
classical definition of this principle as established by the ICJ’s traditional international 
jurisprudence, whereby the ‘exhaustion of local remedies’ was already qualified as ‘a well-
                                                 
543 Case concerning Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea Case concerning Ahmadou Sadio Diallo 
(Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 24 May 2007, 
para. 39. 
544 Chittharanjan F. Amerasinghe, Local Remedies in International Law, Cambridge University Press (2004); 
A.A. Cancado Trindade,’ Origin and Historical Developments of Exhaustion of Local Remedies in International 
Law’, (1976) RBDI, 449. 
545 C. Tiburcio, op.cit., 39. 
546 Art. 14 reads as follows: ‘A State may not present an international claim in respect of an injury to a national 
or other person referred to in draft article 8 before the injured person has, subject to draft article 15, exhausted all 
local remedies. 2. ‘Local remedies’ means legal remedies which are open to the injured person before the judicial 
or administrative courts or bodies, whether ordinary or special, of the State alleged to be responsible for causing 
the injury. Local remedies shall be exhausted where an international claim, or request for a declaratory judgment 
related to the claim, is brought preponderantly on the basis of an injury to a national or other person referred to 
in draft article 8.’ 
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established rule of customary international law’.547 However, the ILC has also introduced 
significant legal innovations to the classical principle, which are modelled on the definitions 
and standards distilled in international human rights law, and the more recent judgments of 
the ICJ delivered in diplomatic protection cases. For instance, the notion of ‘legal remedies’ is 
defined following the standards developed in the jurisprudence of the European Commission 
for Human Rights. Accordingly, Article 14 clarifies that only legal remedies that give ‘the 
possibility of an effective and sufficient means of redress’548 need to be exhausted. Within the 
field of mixed claims, an exception from the prior exhaustion of legal remedies is accepted 
when the State’s and the individual’s rights, and thus also their injuries, are inter-dependent.549  
The most evident changes to the traditional conception of the exhaustion of local 
remedies requirement were brought via Article 15 of the ILC Articles on Diplomatic 
Protection,550 which codifies a list of five situations where the requirement does not need to be 
fulfilled prior to the lodging of the international claim. These five derogations are clearly 
modelled upon the rules developed in international human rights law, instead of the States-
centred general international law.551 The first two exceptions refer to shortcomings in the legal 
and/or judicial systems of the receiving states, while the last three exceptions refer primarily 
to objective circumstances attributable to the individual. The criteria chosen by the ILC to 
define the type of local remedy that exonerates the individual from exhausting the domestic 
legal remedies are not the stringent ones applied by general international law552 – ‘obvious 
futility’ – but the more flexible criterion applied by international human rights law – ‘no 
                                                 
547 The Interhandel case (Switzerland v. United States of America) Preliminary objections, I.C.J. Reports 1959, 
p. 6 at p. 27; in the Elettronica Sicula (ELSI) case ‘the exhaustion of local remedies’ was referred to as ‘an 
important principle of international law’, 1989 ICJ Reports 42, para. 50. 
548 See fn 179 mentioned in para. 4 of the commentary to Art. 14, 2006 ILC Articles on Diplomatic Protection. 
549 The ICJ judgment in the Avena case was cited. See Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United 
States of America), at paras. 135-143. According to the commentary of Art. 14, ‘in cases of ‘mixed claims’ 
containing elements of both injury to the State itself and injury to the nationals of that State, a ‘preponderance’ 
test is applied to ascertain which claim is to prevail.’ See the Introductory Note written by Prof Dugard to the 
2006 ILC Articles on Diplomatic Protection. 
550 Art. 15 reads as follows: ‘Local remedies do not need to be exhausted where: (a) There are no reasonably 
available local remedies to provide effective redress, or the local remedies provide no reasonable possibility of 
such redress; (b) There is undue delay in the remedial process which is attributable to the State alleged to be 
responsible; (c) There was no relevant connection between the injured person and the State alleged to be 
responsible at the date of injury; (d) The injured person is manifestly precluded from pursuing local remedies; or 
(e) The State alleged to be responsible has waived the requirement that local remedies be exhausted.’ 
551 See V. Zambrano, ‘La regola del previo esaurimento dei ricorsi interni: il Progetto della Commissione di 
Diritto Internazionale dulla protezione diplomatic’ in L. Panella (ed.), La Protezione Diplomatica: Sviluppi e 
Prospettive, Giappichelli (2008), 191, 207. 
552 See the commentary to Art. 15 ILC Articles on Diplomatic Protection, paras. 1 and 2. 
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reasonable possibility of effective redress.’553 The ineffectiveness of local remedies is to be 
decided by the competent international tribunal. 
A recent case where the ICJ follows the ILC’s more flexible application of the 
exhaustion of local remedies requirement is the Diallo case. Guinea alleged that several 
individual and human rights of Guinea citizen Mr Diallo were violated by the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, while Mr Diallo was doing business there. In relation to one particular 
international wrongful act, it was alleged that the requirement of exhaustion of local remedies 
was not fulfilled by the applicant, namely in relation to his alleged illegal expulsion. The 
Court noted that expulsion was characterised by the Democratic Republic of Congo as a 
‘refusal of entry’ when it was carried out, therefore the fulfilment of the exhaustion of local 
remedies should have been assessed in relation to the act qualified as ‘refusal of entry’. Based 
on estoppel, the Court considered that the Democratic Republic of Congo was prevented from 
re-labelling the ‘refusal of entry’ as ‘expulsion’ and found that a ‘refusal of entry’ was not 
‘appealable under Congolese law’, and an application for grace was the only permitted 
domestic ‘remedy’.554 This particular remedy was not characterised by the ICJ as a legal 
remedy that must be exhausted for the diplomatic protection claim to be considered 
admissible. It then rejected the Democratic Republic of Congo’s objection based on non-
exhaustion of local remedies. 
It can thus be observed that the ILC updated the prerequisites of the diplomatic 
protection following to a certain extent the ‘humanization’ trend that has also generally 
influenced public international law. The infused innovation is not just an exercise of 
progressive development, since the ICJ recently confirmed in the Diallo judgment the ILC 
amendments of the legal definition and conditions for the exercise of diplomatic protection. 
 
4. Conclusion 
For centuries the institution of diplomatic protection has been perceived as a purely inter-
States mechanism primarily for the protection of States’ interests.555 The changing 
international framework and rules have impacted on this classical State-centric conception of 
                                                 
553 Ibid., para.3 and 4. 
554 See Diallo, Preliminary Objections, ICJ judgment of 2007, para. 47 ‘[…] of submitting a request for 
reconsideration of the expulsion decision to the administrative authority having taken it, that is to say the Prime 
Minister, in the hope that he would retract his decision as a matter of grace cannot be deemed a local remedy to 
be exhausted.’ 
555 J. Dugard, Seventh Report, op.cit., para.3; N. Kato, ‘The Role of diplomatic protection in the implementation 
process of public interest’, in T. Komori and K. Wellens, Public Interest Rules of International Law: Towards 
Effective Implementation, Asghate (2009), 189-206. 
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diplomatic protection, mainly by recognising within the definition of diplomatic protection 
the individual’s interests alongside those of the State, and considerably extending the personal 
scope of diplomatic protection to permit wider categories of natural persons to benefit from 
this institution, in case it is their last resort for remedying injuries suffered abroad. Several 
academics have now confirmed the impact of international human rights law on the 
development of general international norms regarding diplomatic protection and the consular 
protection/assistance rights.556 
The conditions for the exercise of diplomatic protection: nationality of claims, 
existence of an international wrongful act and exhaustion of local remedies were revisited by 
the 2006 ILC Articles on Diplomatic Protection. Furthermore, the progressive development 
infused by Rapporteur Dugard in the codification process have to a certain extent been 
confirmed as binding international law by the ICJ.557 
The link of nationality is no longer essential for the capacity to bring international 
claims. The development of international human rights law and general international law have 
introduced more and more exceptions to the tie of nationality, which was traditionally 
required whenever an international claim was brought by means of diplomatic protection.  
Several paramount innovations were brought by the ILC in relation to the nationality 
of claims premise of diplomatic protection: discarding the unfair Nottebohm requirements of 
the ‘genuine’ and ‘effective’ character of the nationality; introducing a presumption of 
continuous nationality, and other exemptions from this general requirement; the absolute 
effective character of the nationality required in multiple nationalities cases has been replaced 
by the relative ‘predominant’ requirement; and recognising the possibility of an exercise of 
diplomatic protection between States of nationality insofar as the claimant State is the one of 
predominant nationality of the individual.. These ILC Articles dealing with the issue of 
nationality of claims requirement lead to extending the personal scope of diplomatic 
protection, permitting a wider category of individuals558 to have access to this procedural 
mechanism in order to protect their rights and interests. 
                                                 
556 See S. Sheeran, R. Rodley (eds), Routlege Handbook of Human Rights Law, Routledge (2013); C. Cerna, 
‘Impact on the Right to Consular Notification’ in M. Scheinin and T. Kamminga (eds) The Impact   of 
International Human Rights Law on General International Law, Oxford University Press (2009); The Right to 
Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law, IACtHR, 
Advisory Opinion OC-16/99 of 1 October 1999, (1999) Series. A No.16, Dissenting opinion of Judge Cançado 
Trindade, para. 35. Available 
on the IACtHR website: <http://www.corteidh.or.cr>. 
557 See, for instance, the ICJ judgment in the Diallo case, op.cit. 
558 It enlarged the category of nationals resident abroad by eliminating the ‘genuine’ link; the category of dual 
nationals; added refugees, people benefiting of subsidiary protection and stateless persons. 
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The development of international human rights law has impacted on both the 
substantive and procedural aspect of diplomatic protection. Individual’s human rights have 
slowly become part of the ‘diplomatically protectable’ rules, and in 2010 the ICJ formally 
recognised this incorporation.559  
The role of the individual in the institution of diplomatic protection is currently 
straightforwardly accepted. The ILC has recognised the individual’s role in all of the phases 
of the exercise of diplomatic protection: from the definition of the institution (Art. 1), and the 
conditions for the exercise of the mechanism by making them more flexible (Arts. 1-9, 14, 
15), to the last phase of diplomatic protection, namely the transfer of the award to the 
individual (Art. 19).560 It used to be the case that the individual had no role to play in any of 
the stages of the exercise of diplomatic protection, including the award of remedies, even 
though it was clearly done for the benefit of the individual victims, which was probably one 
of the most illogical aspects of the institution. The ILC has recognised that satisfaction in 
inter-States diplomatic protection cases should always be done for the benefit of individual 
victims (Art. 19). Alongside the new balanced definition of diplomatic protection, the ICJ has 
also endorsed the ILC amendment of the award of remedy in the Diallo case, where it noted 
that Article 19 recommends ‘[t]ransfer[ring] to the injured person any compensation 
obtained for the injury from the responsible State subject to any reasonable deductions’.561  
Consular and diplomatic protection definitely have a new face today when compared 
with the romantic period of public international law. In spite of scholarly critiques, the 
‘humanization’ trend and the work of Rapporteur Dugard, who is a great supporter of 
advancing diplomatic protection as an instrument of enhancing the effectiveness of 
international human rights, have definitely changed the classical definition, requirements, and 
exercise of diplomatic protection. The flexibility infused into the conditions for the exercise 
of diplomatic protection has revived this mechanism so as to serve more easily the remedial 
needs of the individuals.562 
                                                 
559 See the Diallo judgment. 
560 This article seems to codify the prevailing academic opinion and practice, see G. Gaja, ‘Droits des Etats’, 
op.cit., 69: ‘[c]’est en tout cas l’individu seul qui devrait etre le benéficiaire de la ré paration. La pratique est 
déja` nettement orientée dans ce sens, ce qui encore s’harmonise mieux avec la conception de l’existence des 
droits individuels plutot qu’avec la conception traditionnelle.’ 
561 Moreover, the ICJ has expressly indicated that ‘the sum awarded to [the applicant State] in the exercise of 
diplomatic protection of Mr. Diallo is intended to provide reparation for the latter’s injury’ (see Diallo (Guinea 
v. Democratic Republic of the Congo) (Compensation), ICJ Rep. 2012, para. 57). 
562 Mariana S. Albornoz, ‘Legal nature and Legal Consequences of Diplomatic Protection. Contemporary 
Challenges’, (2006) Anuario Mexicano de Derecho Internacional, 377, 380. 
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III. Differentiating consular assistance from diplomatic protection as 
State’s mechanisms for protecting citizens abroad 
 
International law recognises two types of mechanisms that States may exercise to ensure 
protection of their nationals abroad: consular assistance or protection563 and diplomatic 
protection, which are two different legal mechanisms governed by different legal regimes and 
requiring different conditions for their exercise under general international law. Practice, 
law564, and sometimes even academia, have, however, made it very difficult, so far, to clearly 
differentiate these two institutions.565 For example, in the 1997 Rudolph Bernhardt’s edition of 
the Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, diplomatic protection is described as 
including also the consular protection type of action in addition to the remedial type of 
protection which diplomatic protection commonly offers to nationals:  
                                                 
563 The terms ‘consular assistance’ and ‘consular protection’ are generally used interchangeably in the doctrine 
and practice (see J. Núñez Hernández and X. Martí, La Función Consular en el Derecho Español, Ministerio de 
Asuntos Exteriores, Madrid, third ed. (2009), 313-314); there is only a small distinction between the two notions: 
consular protection is commonly used in relation to consular services provided to nationals in cases of natural or 
man-made disasters, while assistance usually refers to the rest of services that consular officials can provide to 
citizens abroad. For a different distinction between ‘consular assistance’ and ‘consular protection’, see National 
Report on Spain in the CARE Report, 465. Certain States have a clear policy of differentiating between the two 
terms (see the German Consular Act commented in the National Report on Germany in the CARE Report). 
564 One of the critiques brought against the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad is that it confuses 
between consular and diplomatic protection, since it refers to the broad concept of protection by the consular and 
diplomatic authorities of the Member States, without ensuring that the international legal conditions for the 
exercise of diplomatic protection of individuals are respected. See, A. Vermeer-Künzli, ‘Where the Law 
becomes Irrelevant: Consular Assistance and the European Union’, (2011) International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly, 965-995; See J. Dugard, Seventh Report on diplomatic protection, United Nations General Assembly, 
A/CN.4/567, United Nations, New York, 7 March 2006, p. 10; A. Vermeer-Künzli, ‘Exercising Diplomatic 
Protection, the fine line between litigation, demarches and consular assistance’, (2008) ZaöRV, 339-340; P. 
Vigni, ‘The Protection of EU Citizens: The Perspective of International law’ in J. Larik and M. Moraru (eds.), 
Ever-Closer in Brussels – Ever-Closer in the World? EU External Action after the Lisbon Treaty, EUI Working 
Paper 2011/10, 91-107; F. Forni, ‘Diplomatic Protection in EU Law: What’s New under the Sun?’ (2014) The 
Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 150. 
565 G. Perrin, ‘Réflexions sur la protection diplomatique’, in Mélanges Marcel Bridel: Recueil de travaux publiés 
par la Faculté de Droit, Lausanne 1968, 379, 379-380; J. Peake, ‘Diplomatic Protection for Dual Nationals: 
Effective Nationality or non-responsibility?’ (2007) Trinity C.L.Rev, 98. L. Klein argued that ‘among the actions 
associated with diplomatic protection are ‘consular action, negotiation, mediation, judicial and arbitral 
proceedings, reprisals, retorsion, severance of diplomatic relations, economic pressure and, the final resort, the 
use of force’ (see C. Forcese, op.cit., 473); Luke T. Lee confuses consular protection with diplomatic protection 
when commenting on the Abbasi and Khadr cases. The author notes that the Applicant challenged the 
government decision to provide consular protection while an exercise of diplomatic protection was at issue, see 
Luke T. Lee, Consular law and practice, 2008 edition, 134-136; G. Distefano writing on the position of the 
individual in relation to the diplomatic protection mechanism extensively cites and comments on the ICJ 
judgments on violation of Art. 36(1)(b) VCCR, as evidence for the development of individual rights within the 
diplomatic protection field (see G. Distefano, ‘The position of individuals in public international law through the 
lens of diplomatic protection: the principle and its transfiguration’, R. Kolb and G. Gaggioli (eds), Research 
Handbook on Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Edwar Elgar Publishing (2013), 70). See generally on this 
subject, A. Vermeer-Künzli, ‘Exercising diplomatic protection: the fine line between litigation, démarches and 
consular assistance’, op.cit. Several domestic legislations confuse consular protection with diplomatic protection. 




‘A State's right of diplomatic protection comprises two aspects: firstly, the helping and 
protecting of nationals abroad in the pursuance of their rights and other lawful activities by 
consular or diplomatic organs [...]; secondly, the claiming of compensation from a State which 
has treated the nationals of the protecting State in a manner incompatible with international 
law’.566  
 
Other scholars have made a similar error by referring to diplomatic protection as 
including both mechanisms of protection, even though they have different legal basis in 
international law (see the two different multilateral international treaties: the VCCR and the 
VCDR).567 Even domestic legislation on consular functions and their interpretation by 
practitioners confuses the two mechanisms, including diplomatic protection action within the 
mechanism of consular protection.568 
The international legal norms governing these mechanisms follow such a similar 
codification pattern that it seems almost impossible to distinguish between them based on a 
literary interpretation of these norms.569 After centuries of having performed consular and 
diplomatic functions based on customary international law, in 1963, the Convention on 
Consular Relations (VCCR) entered into force, and one year later the Convention on 
Diplomatic Protection (VCDR) followed. The two Conventions were drafted following a 
similar codification pattern, and sometimes even identical wording, which can be identified in 
terms of the objectives stated in the preamble, the rules governing the establishment of 
consular and diplomatic relations and posts, the functions consular and diplomatic posts can 
exercise570 and also other consular and diplomatic relations matters.571 The similar codification 
                                                 
566 A. Randelzhofer, ‘Nationality’, in Rudolph Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public International Law 
Amsterdam: North-Holland (1997), 506. 
567 See C. Forcese, ‘The Obligation to Protect: The Legal Context for Diplomatic Protection of Canadians 
Abroad’, (2007) U.N.B.L.J., 102. 
568 See the domestic legislation of Romania, Portugal, Spain and the UK in CARE Report, 606-7. Rapporteur 
Dugard also criticised the EU Treaty provisions establishing the EU citizenship right to consular and diplomatic 
protection as a grave confusion of the two mechanisms, i.e. diplomatic protection and consular assistance, when 
the EU provisions should have made clear that the only protection mechanism secured to unrepresented EU 
citizens abroad is consular assistance (see J. Dugard, Seventh Report, op.cit., para.19) 
569 See E. Denza, Diplomatic Law, a Commentary on the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 
Diplomatic Law (2nd edition), Oxford University Press (1998), 40. 
570 The two most important functions of consular and diplomatic officials are almost identically phrased in the 
two Conventions, namely: furthering the development of commercial, economic, cultural and scientific relations 
between the sending State and the receiving State and otherwise promoting friendly relations (Art. 5(b) VCCR, 
Art. 3 (e) VCDR); and protecting in the receiving State the interests of the sending State and of its nationals (Art. 
5(a) VCCR, Art. 3(b) VCDR).  
571 See more details in E. Denza, op.cit.; Luke T. Lee, The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations with Text 
and commentaries, A.W. Sijthoff Leyden/Rule of Law Press – Durham N.C. (1966). 
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style and substance of norms as well as the interchangeability between the consular and 
diplomatic functions572 permitted by the two Conventions greatly narrows down the 
differences between diplomatic and consular functions. The VCCR provides a definition of 
the specific function of consular assistance of nationals abroad drafted in broad language and 
identical to the definition of diplomatic protection of nationals abroad enshrined in the 
VCDR. The first consular function mentioned in Art. 5 VCCR is the function of the consular 
officials ‘protecting’ the interests of their State’s nationals as well as helping and assisting 
them abroad. The same identical function of protecting the interests of the nationals of the 
sending State in the receiving State is mentioned also by the VCDR among the functions 
which a diplomatic mission can exercise (Art. 3(b) VCDR). The broad wording used to 
describe the consular and diplomatic protection functions was necessary in order to achieve 
consensus among the numerous Contracting States which had ‘diverse national, regional, and 
ideological interests, [and thus] the fact that a convention was concluded at all was in itself a 
remarkable feature.’573 
To confuse the demarcation even more, Article 3 of the VCCR574 provides that 
consular functions can be exercised also by diplomatic missions in accordance with the 
provisions of the VCCR. While Article 17 of the VCCR provides a corresponding function 
for the consular officials, namely that consuls in a country without a diplomatic mission may 
also perform diplomatic functions.575 In light of this permitted interchangeability between 
consular and diplomatic functions576, the difference between consular and diplomatic 
                                                 
572 Art. 3(2) VCDR and Art. 3 VCCR provide that consular functions can be exercised by diplomatic officials 
without the need to obtain previous state approval; while consuls in a country without a diplomatic mission may 
also perform diplomatic functions (Art. 17 VCCR). While interpreting the VCDR, E Denza confirms that ‘[i]n 
determining the legal rules applicable to members of a diplomatic mission exercising consular functions, it must 
be borne in mind that there is no clear dividing line between diplomatic and consular functions’, see E. Denza, 
op.cit. 
573 Luke T. Lee, ‘Vienna Convention on Consular Relations’, (1969) International Conciliation, 41, 48 and by 
the same author, Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Text and Commentaries, A.W. Sijthoff (1966), see 
Commentary of Article 5. 
574 An equivalent provision is enshrined in Art. 3(2) VCDR. 
575 Art 17 VCCR distinguishes three conditions that have to be met for a consular officer to be authorised to 
execute diplomatic functions: (1) the sending state does not have a diplomatic mission of its own in the state 
concerned nor is represented by a diplomatic mission of a third state, (2) the consular officer has the consent of 
the receiving state, (3) and this performance of diplomatic functions cannot affect its consular status. See more 
details in J. Wouters, S. Duquet, and K. Meuwissen, ‘The Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular 
Relations’ in Andrew F. Cooper, J. Heine, and R. Thakur (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy, 
Oxford University Press (2013). 
576 Recent studies on the management of consular affairs have pointed out that very often, and especially in 
managing crises, ‘consulates increasingly undertake “diplomacy-like” tasks and other non-traditional functions, 
breaking down the traditional divide between consular services and diplomacy.’ See Report on the consular 
functions today prepared by the University of Toronto for the Foreign Affairs and International Trade of Canada, 
G. Haynal, M. Welsh, L. Century & S. Tyler, Consular Function in the 21st Century, 27 March 2013 at 5; see 
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protection does not reside in the nature or level of the public official exercising the protection, 
namely consular or diplomatic officials. It can thus be concluded that the international treaties 
governing the specific topics of consular and diplomatic relations do not establish clear 
demarcation lines between the two public international legal institutions. 
In practice, the level of confusion is similarly high due to the complex situations which 
often require a high level of interchangeability and increased connectivity between the 
functions exercised by consular and diplomatic officials, to which a list of many other 
complex factors adds up.577 Today’s world is characterised by millions of individuals 
travelling abroad, moving away from their State of nationality, and taking up short- or long-
term residence in States whose nationality they never acquire, or in the best case scenario 
where they acquire a second nationality. There is an increasing number of individuals 
possessing the citizenships of multiple States578 that have different approaches to conferring 
consular and diplomatic protection to their citizens, thus increasing the complexity of 
establishing which type of protection the individual requires in a particular situation.579 The 
mounting number of natural and man-made disasters580 places a growing number of foreigners 
in difficult situations while abroad, requiring them to face more often an extraneous legal 
system, culture, procedure, and language. For example, when a foreigner is arrested, 
regardless of whether or not it is a legitimate arrest, the individual is extraneous to the 
specificities of the local legal systems and legal customs.581 Unaware of the peculiar legal 
features and very often unable to speak the local language, his fate is determined by the 
presence of consular and diplomatic officials of the sending State who can help him 
understand his rights and obligations, his options to ensure a fair process and prompt release, 
                                                                                                                                                        
Maaike Okano-Heijmans, ‘Change in Consular Assistance and the Emergence of Consular Diplomacy,’ in J. 
Melissen and Ana M. Fernandez, eds., Consular Affairs and Diplomacy (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2011). 
577 See, for instance, complications that have arisen with modern globalization and its new complexities, such as 
dual citizenship, multiple passports, and the responsibilities expected from a state, as noted by Maaike Okano-
Heijmans in Consular Affairs Chapter in The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy, Andrew F. Cooper, J. 
Heine, and R. Thakur (eds.), Oxford University Press, 2013. 
578 T. Faist and J. Gerdes, ‘Dual Citizenship in an Age of Mobility’, TransAtlantic Council on Migration, 
Migration Policy Institute, 2008. 
579 See the case of the Mr Khadr, with dual nationality, that of Canada and the UK, the case is discussed in the 
Section on National jurisprudence under the Diplomatic Protection. 
580 Recent statistics point out that the recorded annual number of disasters has increased fivefold – from 78 in 
1975 to nearly 400 currently, and disasters are likely to continue increasing, see the European Commission’s 
Proposal for a Council Directive on consular protection for citizens of the Union abroad, Brussels, 14.12.2011, 
COM(2011) 881 final 2011/0432 (CNS) p.10. 
581 The difficulties of understanding a foreign legal culture, systems and procedures apply to all situations when 
an alien has to deal with legal/judicial proceedings, regardless of whether it is due to distress caused by other 
persons or due to distress caused to a citizen of the receiving State. 
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contact with his family, and prevent ill-treatment or other human rights violations, or if such 
instances have already occurred, they can help the individual to find redress.582  
There are plenty of harmful events, or difficult situations to which an individual can be 
exposed while in a foreign country, and different services, or measures, which a consular 
and/or diplomatic official can provide. There is no doubt that consular access and protection 
have become matters of great practical importance in recent years583, but at the same time,584 
also of great legal complexity.585 For instance taking the aforementioned example of the 
arrested foreigner, in a first scenario, it falls to the local consul of the sending State to visit 
him in prison, advise him how best to protect his interests, notify his relatives if he requests 
this, put him in touch with a local lawyer and an interpreter, attend any criminal proceedings, 
and perhaps repatriate him if he finds himself released without any funds. But if he 
complains, for example, that he has been held for several months without any charge being 
brought, or that he has been brutally treated by the police, or that there is no form of legal 
redress open to him, then the specific circumstances of the case will require a different sort of 
protection, namely diplomatic protection. In the latter scenario, it will usually be the embassy, 
on the basis of its specific competence to exercise diplomatic protection, which will make 
representations on behalf of the individual to the ministry of foreign affairs, proposing the 
latter to intervene and ensure that the violation of the individual’s human rights is remedied. 
While consular assistance is the form of State protection exercised in the first scenario and by 
consular officials. Once the individual complains of violation of his international human 
rights, and he has not found a remedy to this violation based on local remedies, then a 
different mechanism applies, namely, diplomatic protection. 
Scholars, rather than international treaties, have clarified what the function of consular 
assistance comprises. Consular assistance is now widely accepted as including both ‘day-to-
day consular assistance in cases of individuals who have found themselves in distress while 
abroad and the more demanding, and complex consular assistance tasks required in ‘large-
                                                 
582 See more details and cases in the 2012 REDRESS Report, ‘Tortured Abroad: The UK’s Obligations to British 
Nationals and Residents’, available online 
http://www.redress.org/downloads/publications/121001tortured_abroad.pdf  
583 According to Maaike Okano-Heijmans, consular assistance is the main function of consular officials, see 
‘Consular affairs’, op.cit. 
584 I. Roberts, Satow’s Diplomatic Protection, Oxford University Press (2011), 263. 
585 The Breard, LaGrand and Avena cases reviewed by the ICJ are examples of the legal complexity involved 
when delimitating, in practice, between consular and diplomatic protection. While the merits of the cases 
involved in addition to the violation of these States’ rights, also the violation of consular assistance of the 
individuals, the cases were brought before the Court through the procedural mechanism of diplomatic protection, 
at least for the consular assistance part of the merits. 
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scale consular emergency management’’, as well as documentary services.586 Unless the 
individual requests a simple notary or public register service, all the other consular functions 
that can be exercised in the above-mentioned situations – such as facilitating administrative 
procedures pertaining to repatriation in the cases of death or serious illness, evacuation, etc. – 
can also be performed by diplomatic officials.587 
The criteria differentiating between the two legal institutions have been clearly noted 
only recently, by the ILC in its 2006 commentaries to the Articles on Diplomatic Protection588 
and further discussed during the debate stirred by the (2007) European Commission Green 
Paper on diplomatic and consular protection of Union citizens in third countries.589 The 
definition given by the ILC to diplomatic protection590 covers a wide variety of acts of State, 
ranging from diplomatic demarches (direct communication and negotiations at the ministerial 
level) to judicial and arbitral proceedings, which can be differentiated as falling under the 
scope of consular or diplomatic protection based on criteria such as the moment in time when 
the act is adopted or provided, and specific conditions which have to be previously fulfilled 
before the exercise of protection.591 The point in time of exercising protection can help to 
                                                 
586 K. Tindall, ‘Governments' Ability to Assist Nationals in Disasters Abroad: What Do We Know about 
Consular Emergency Management?’ (2012) Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 103; Luke T. Lee 
and John Quigley, Consular Law and Practice, 3rd ed, Oxford University Press (2008); Maaike Okano-
Heijmans, ‘Consular Affairs’, op.cit. 
587 Ana M. Fernández, ‘Consular Affairs in the EU: Visa Policy as a Catalyst for Integration?’, (2008) The 
Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 21. 
588 See paras. 9-11 of Commentary to Art.1 of ILC Articles on Diplomatic Protection (2006), available on the 
UN website, http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_8_2006.pdf  
589 Former CJEU judge Jean-Pierre Puissochet provided legal clarification by adding that there are fundamental 
differences between these two types of protection ‘Diplomatic protection is always discretionary as the State is 
not obliged to endorse the citizens’ request while consular protection is a citizens’ right meaning that such 
assistance should always be provided’ (see Summary report of Public hearing of 29 May 2007 on the Green 
Paper on diplomatic and consular protection of Union citizens in third countries). In the same vein see also the 
European Parliament Working document on diplomatic and consular protection for citizens of the Union in third 
countries: ‘There are, of course, differences between diplomatic and consular protection as regards their nature, 
structure and the triggering of their procedures: while consular protection may, at least in some cases, be an 
obligation, in the case of diplomatic protection one is always in the area of a discretionary power, and in any 
case in the area of a relationship between one State and another.’ 
590 Art. 1 of the ILC Articles on Diplomatic Protection reads as follows: ‘diplomatic protection consists of the 
invocation by a State, through diplomatic action or other means of peaceful settlement, of the responsibility of 
another State for an injury caused by an internationally wrongful act of that State to a natural or legal person that 
is a national of the former State with a view to the implementation of such responsibility.’ ILC Articles on 
Diplomatic Protection of 2006 approved in 2011. 
591 Rapporteur Dugard, Seventh Report of Diplomatic Protection of 7 March 2006, Agenda Item 2, A/CN.4/567: 
‘Any intervention, including negotiation, at inter-State level on behalf of a national vis-à-vis a foreign State 
should be classified as diplomatic protection (and not as consular assistance), provided that the general 
requirements of diplomatic protection have been met—i.e. that there has been a violation of international law for 
which the respondent State can be held responsible, that local remedies have been exhausted and that the 
individual concerned has the nationality of the acting State. That such a broad view of “action” in the context of 
diplomatic protection is warranted is supported by doctrine and both international and national judicial 
decisions.’ (para. 16) 
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establish which type of protection is needed in the particular case, and it is intrinsically 
connected with the conditions necessary for the exercise of diplomatic protection. For 
instance, if the harm inflicted on the individual does not involve a violation of an international 
obligation incumbent upon the State, then the harm or distress to which the national has been 
subjected is simply a domestic/national event and consular protection is usually the form of 
protection that the State provides. When the harm inflicted on the national constitutes an 
international wrongful act, and none of the available local remedies have provided redress to 
the inflicted injury, then the protection commonly considered is diplomatic protection.  
The UK, in its response to the (2007) EU Commission Green Paper on Diplomatic and 
consular protection of Union citizens in third countries, has eloquently highlighted the main 
characteristics differentiating the two mechanisms:  
“[D]iplomatic protection [...] is formally a state-to-state process by which a state may 
bring a claim against another state in the name of a national who has suffered an internationally 
wrongful act at the hands of that other state. Conversely, consular assistance is the provision of 
support and assistance by a state to its nationals [...] who are in distress overseas”592 
The point in time also dictates the difference in objectives pursued by the two 
institutions. Consular assistance is mainly preventive, i.e. preventing harm or helping to put a 
stop to the ongoing harmful situation in which an individual finds himself. On the other hand, 
diplomatic protection is mainly remedial, thus coming at a later stage than the need for 
consular assistance, i.e. once harm has been done and the individual seeks to obtain remedy 
for the harm inflicted at the hands of a foreign state, and usually diplomatic protection is the 
last resort remedy for him. 
The essential differences between consular and diplomatic protection are: the point in 
time at which they intervene, thus consular protection usually comes before diplomatic 
protection, and the latter usually intervening after an exercise of consular assistance, when, in 
practice, the latter failed to prevent or remedy the violation of the individual’s international 
right(s);593 the qualification of the harm inflicted upon the individual as an international 
wrongful act.  
                                                 
592 See UK response to the (European) Commission’s Green Paper on Diplomatic and consular protection of 
Union citizens in third countries, March 2007, para. 1.5, available at 
http://www.careproject.eu/database/upload/UKresponseGP/UKresponseGPText.pdf.  
593 The two international mechanisms are thus in an inter-dependent relation. According to the latest edition of 
Satow’s Diplomatic Practice, consular and diplomatic protection can be exercised successfully or even 
simultaneously in respect of the same events, see I. Roberts, Satow’s Diplomatic Protection, Oxford University 
Press (2011), 275. For instance, in cases of torture or ill-treatment of nationals, consular assistance and 
diplomatic representations are inter-dependent. Consular assistance types of measures will be provided to the 
individual to either prevent the occurrence of such harm, especially in countries having a record of ill-treatments, 
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Legal scholars594 and practitioners595 have pointed out two other salient differences 
between consular and diplomatic protection, which stem from their specific features, i.e. the 
representational nature of the diplomatic protection function and the different interests that 
these two legal institutions serve.596 Consular functions are said to lack representative or 
political character and are instead of a more commercial, practical, and administrative 
nature.597 The absence of the representational function is argued to consequently impede a 
consular agent to bring or defend legal proceedings on behalf of his State in the receiving 
country, except when expressly mandated to do so. As to the interests these two mechanisms 
serve, the current conception of diplomatic protection as serving both the State’s and the 
individual’s interests, instead of solely the State’s interests as specific to the classical 
conception of diplomatic protection, has brought diplomatic protection closer to the institution 
of consular protection, which is argued to serve primarily the interests of the injured 
individual. Thus the different interests based argument commonly raised by international legal 
scholars has slightly lost its relevance.  
In spite of the existence of several criteria that can be applied to identify which type of 
protection to provide to a national abroad, Lee and Quigley note that, because of the growing 
interconnectedness of politics, and economic and commercial affairs of sending States abroad, 
in many instances, a complete distinction between diplomatic and consular functions is 
considered unfeasible.598 Certain legal scholars seem to reject a too strict delimitation between 
the two institutions. They are usually those who approach consular and diplomatic protection 
as mechanisms working for a common objective, superior to the traditional conceptions 
                                                                                                                                                        
or to identify the local remedies available to the individual, or a lawyer to help the individual to identify them in 
case the ill-treatment has occurred. This record of consular protection measures will help to build the case of the 
individual, in case the local remedies have not provided any remedy and the State decides to act on behalf of the 
individual via diplomatic protection measures. It has thus been emphasised by reports of States’ foreign affairs 
departments and NGOs involved in the protection of nationals abroad, that although consular assistance is 
primarily preventative and protective in individual cases, ‘it is also more than that, as it can and should also lay 
the ground for reparation.’ See the 2012 REDRESS Report, at 22. 
594 See, in particular, J. Zourek, ‘Quelques Problèmes Théoriques du Droit Consulaire’, (1963) Journal de Droit 
International, 54-5; A. Vermeer-Künzli, ‘Exercising Diplomatic Protection: The Fine Line between Litigation, 
Demarches and Consular Assistance’, (2006) ZaöRV, 321; E. Milano, op.cit. 
595 See F. Przetacznik, ‘The Protection of Individual Persons in Traditional International Law (Diplomatic and 
Consular Protection)’, (1971) Österreichische Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, 69. 
596 Rapporteur Dugard, Seventh Report of Diplomatic Protection, Agenda Item 2, A/CN.4/567: ‘This means that 
consuls are permitted to represent the interests of the national but not the interests of the State in the protection 
of the national. This is a matter for the diplomatic branch.’ (para. 17.) 
597 J. Wouters, S. Duquet, and K. Meuwissen, ‘The Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations’ 
in Andrew F. Cooper, Jorge Heine, and Ramesh Thakur (ed), The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy, 
Oxford University Press (2013). 
598 Lee and Quigley, Consular Law and Practice, op.cit., 541. 
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underpinning public international law (securing/protecting State’s interests), namely, 
protection of individual’s (human) rights.599 
Other scholars have harshly criticised the confusion or the conscious option of treating 
the two legal mechanisms as interchangeable or a singular mechanism, in spite of sharing the 
former scholars’ human rights approach of consular and diplomatic protection.600 
Having exposed the difficulties in differentiating between the two legal institutions, 
one may question why is it important in the first place to differentiate between the two? Is it 
simply a matter of legal formalism whether we use the adjective ‘consular’ or ‘diplomatic’?601 
From a legal point of view, the two institutions actually possess important differences 
regarding salient aspects such as: the legal requirements for their exercise; their substantial 
scopes; and the rights and remedies they can offer to the injured individuals, which, in case 
they are not respected, may lead in practice to opposition from the receiving State, 
inopposability of the type of protective measure on the international plane, and ultimately 
negatively impact on the situation of the individual. 
 
IV. The current status of Consular Protection of Individuals: 
Discretionary State Prerogative, International Individual or Human Right? 
1. The current face of consular protection of individuals in public 
international law 
 
The consular protection institution is one of the oldest in international relations.602 The 
protection of nationals, whether natural or legal persons, in foreign countries is arguably one 
of the most important functions of consular representatives603 and one that has a great impact 
                                                 
599 N. Klein, op.cit.; C. Forcese, op.cit. 
600 See mainly A. Vermeer-Künzli, ‘Exercising Diplomatic Protection: The Fine Line between Litigation, 
Demarches and Consular Assistance’, op.cit., who provides examples of erred classification of States actions as 
diplomatic protection when they should have been considered as instances of consular protection, or the vice-
versa, made by legal scholars, including renowned ones, practitioners and domestic courts. 
601 The legal consequences of using the two adjectives ‘consular’ and ‘diplomatic’ are important to identify also 
from the perspective of the EU law, which refers to the concept of ‘protection by the consular and diplomatic 
authorities’ instead of ‘consular protection’ and ‘diplomatic protection’. See Arts. 20(2)(c) and 23 TFEU. 
602 See B. Sen, A Diplomat’s Handbook of International Law and Practice, 3rd ed, 1988, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 201; C. Economides, ‘Consuls’, in R. Bernhardt (ed), Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Vol. 
1 Oxford University Press (1992), 770; Luke T. Lee, Consular Law and Practice, second ed., Oxford: Clarendon 
Press (1991), 124; I. Roberts, Satow's Diplomatic Practice, 7th edition, Oxford University Press (2013), 259. 
603 See I. Roberts, op.cit., 260; Manual of Consular Instructions of Canada (2007), para. 2.4.9, quoted in Luke T. 
Lee and John Quigley, Consular Law and Practice, op.cit., 138. 
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on the life of the national abroad. For instance, the protection a consul can provide to 
nationals, who subject to criminal proceedings in a foreign country that applies the death 
sentence, has the potential of saving that national from a fatal sentence, and can help him 
conduct his case in a way that will multiply the chances of ensuring the respect of his human 
rights or obtaining remedies.604 In addition to being one of the most basic consular functions, 
its role within the realm of consular functions has gained importance over the years,605 due to 
the growing number of travelling citizens and the decline of the consul's other functions.606 
Furthermore, the need for consular assistance of nationals abroad is expected to increase in 
the following years.607 
As to the nature of consular assistance, the traditional conception of public 
international law describes consular assistance as a State prerogative.608 Under the impact of 
the changing position of the individual in international relations, growing importance of 
international human rights, increasing number of travels and of nationals taking up of 
residence outside the country of nationality, the traditional conception is gradually giving way 
to a new conception, whereby some States believe their consular officials have a sort of duty 
to provide the necessary protection to co-nationals in distress abroad.609  
This section plans to assess international treaties, States’ practice and decisions of 
international and national courts on the exercise of consular assistance of nationals abroad for 
the purpose of identifying whether there has been a change in the exercise of the classical 
international institution of consular protection of individuals, and whether this change brings 
the international conception of consular protection closer to the unique EU conception of 
consular protection of EU nationals.610  
The current section is divided in three sub-sections separately assessing each type of 
the aforementioned evidence for the purpose of identifying the current legal nature of consular 
protection of individuals.611 Thus, the first sub-section will address the question of whether 
                                                 
604 In this sense, see the arguments of the applicant State, Mexico, in the Avena case reviewed by the ICJ. 
605 I. Roberts characterises consular protection as the most important function of a State’s consular official, see 
Satow’s Diplomatic Protection, op.cit., 262 and 267. 
606 Luke T. Lee and J. Quigley, op.cit., 116. 
607 See European Commission, Green Paper: Diplomatic and consular protection of Union citizens in third 
countries, 28 November 2006, para. 1.5., EU Doc. COM/2006/0712; Canada Consular Affairs Bureau, 
Kidnapping, Hostage Taking and Hijacking: Consular Policy, Procedures and Practices (July 2000). 
608 I. Roberts, op.cit., 276. 
609 See sub-section 3 dedicated to State practice. 
610 See Art. 46 EU Charter which provides for a fundamental right to diplomatic and consular protection 
recognised to all unrepresented Union citizens outside the Union. 
611 On the methodology of customary international law norm formation, see London Statement of Principles 
Applicable to the Formation of General Customary International Law (with commentary); N. Johanna Arajarvi, 
‘Genesis of Customary International Law and International Criminal Law’ in The Changing Nature of 
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there is evidence in recent international treaties of an individual right to receive consular 
protection from the State of nationality or other States. The following sub-section will assess 
whether States, through their executive branches, have expressly or tacitly endorsed an 
obligation to exercise consular protection of their nationals or other individuals abroad. And, 
finally, the recent jurisprudence of international, regional, and domestic courts on this topic 
will be analysed to search for judgments that might have recognised an individual right to 
consular protection. The opinion of scholars on the topic will be integrated within each of 
these sub-sections. 
 
2. International treaty law 
 
The topic of consular protection is regulated under public international law by the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR). In 1955 the ILC received the task of drafting a 
treaty that would codify the existing customary international legal rules. The adoption of the 
text of the VCCR in 1963 by the UN has been considered as ‘undoubtedly the single most 
important event in the history of the consular institution.’612 The Convention is now ratified by 
176 States613, which represent nearly all States existent in the international community, and 
regulates the management of inter-states consular relations, namely the functions, powers, and 
immunities of the consular personnel and premises of the States parties.614 Article 5 (a) of the 
VCCR provides as one of the functions of the consular officials, the protection of interests of 
the sending State’s nationals. This particular function has been widely characterised by 
courts615 and practitioners616 as one of the paramount functions of the consular officials. 
However, the Treaty does not specify what is meant by ‘protection of nationals’ interests’ and 
what kinds of actions fall under this function. Based on States’ practice, academics have 
                                                                                                                                                        
Customary International law: Methods of Interpreting the Concept of Custom in International Criminal 
Tribunals, 2011 EUI PhD Thesis, 11-52. 
612 Luke T. Lee and John Quigley, Consular Law and Practice, op.cit., 25; J. Quigley, J. Aceves, A. Shank, 
(eds.), The Law of Consular Access: A documentary guide, Routledge Research in International Law (2013), 10. 
613 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, United Nations Treaty Collection, http:// 
treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=III-6&chapter=3&lang=en (last checked on 
January 2015). 
614 H. S. Schiffman, ‘Breard and Beyond: The Status of Consular Notification and Access under the Vienna 
Convention’, (2000) Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law, 1132. 
615 Inter-American Court of Human Rights  
(IACtHR), Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of 
the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law, October 1, 1999, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser A) No. 16 (1999), para.80. 
616 See, inter alia, Luke T. Lee, op.cit., I. Roberts, op.cit., J. Quigley, William J. Aceves and A. Shank, op.cit. 
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elaborated non-exhaustive lists including various actions falling under the ambit of consular 
protection,617 while a definition of consular protection as an institution of public international 
law is to be found only in scholarly works. Based on the wording of Articles 5(a), (e) and 8 of 
the VCCR, legal scholars have elaborated a definition phrased along the following lines:  
 
‘[C]onsular protection or assistance is the provision of immediate help and assistance 
by a State to its nationals, natural and legal persons, or to nationals of another State when in 
distress abroad. The consular protection function is provided by career or honorary consuls to 
co-nationals or non-nationals, by assisting them in asserting their rights under the legal system 
of a foreign State, provided that the individual concerned has given his consent.’618 
 
Salient rights in relation to securing consular assistance of nationals abroad are 
established by the VCCR, especially in Article 36 VCCR.619 Consuls have the right to 
communicate with and assist their co-nationals. While aliens have rights inter-linked620 to the 
consul’s rights, namely individual rights to have access and communication with consular 
officials of his sending State, the right to be immediately informed by the local authorities of 
the receiving State of the alien’s right to notification and communication with the consular 
officials of his sending State by the local authorities of the receiving State, when the alien is 
                                                 
617 See, for instance, I. Roberts, op.cit., 263, 275. 
618 The definition is merging different scholarly definitions given to consular protection, see, in particular, Luke 
T. Lee and J. Quigley, op.cit.; I. Roberts, op.cit., 270ff; and B. Nascimbene, who makes a summary of the 
different definitions given to the public international legal institution of consular protection of individuals, in 
Briefing Paper, Consular Assistance and Demarches to Support EU nationals in third countries, 2009, 1, 
available online at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2009/407001/EXPO-
DROI_NT%282009%29407001_EN.pdf . 
619 See Art. 36 VCCR, entitled -Communication and contact with nationals of the sending State – reads as 
follows: ‘1. With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions relating to nationals of the sending 
State: (a) consular officers shall be free to communicate with nationals of the sending State and to have access 
to them. Nationals of the sending State shall have the same freedom with respect to communication with and 
access to consular officers of the sending State; (b) if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving 
State shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if, within its consular district, a national 
of that State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any other manner. 
Any communication addressed to the consular post by the person arrested, in prison, custody or detention shall 
be forwarded by the said authorities without delay. The said authorities shall inform the person concerned 
without delay of his rights under this subparagraph; (c) consular officers shall have the right to visit a national 
of the sending State who is in prison, custody or detention, to converse and correspond with him and to arrange 
for his legal representation. They shall also have the right to visit any national of the sending State who is in 
prison, custody or detention in their district in pursuance of a judgement. Nevertheless, consular officers shall 
refrain from taking action on behalf of a national who is in prison, custody or detention if he expressly opposes 
such action. 2. The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall be exercised in conformity with the laws 
and regulations of the receiving State, subject to the proviso, however, that the said laws and regulations must 
enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this article are intended.’ 
620 The ICJ described Article 36 of the VCCR as ‘an interrelated regime designed to facilitate the implementation 
of the system of consular protection.’ Avena and Other Mexican Nationals judgment of the ICJ, para. 46. 
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detained abroad. These provisions are regarded as foundational for good consular relations.621 
Furthermore, they also apply to those nations that have not yet ratified the VCCR, since due 
to the wide and long established acceptance of the VCCR, its norms are now considered part 
of customary international law.622  
Article 36 of the VCCR has been a much disputed article in the international 
jurisprudence and literature in relation to the type of rights and obligations it confers.623 Being 
part of an inter-states multilateral agreement it was presumed that the rights conferred by 
Article 36 would be rights recognised only to the sending and receiving States. However, the 
ICJ clarified the individual nature of some of the rights prescribed by Article 36.624 Article 
36(1)(a) provides for mutual rights, pertaining to the sending State and its nationals abroad, of 
access and communication. The second paragraph of Article 36(1) recognises the similar 
rights in the specific circumstances of arrest, custody, or other forms of deprivation of liberty 
of the sending State’s national. Due to the specific circumstances of the alien’s deprivation of 
liberty, Article 36(1)(b) of the VCCR recognises additional guarantees regarding access and 
communication, namely the right of the detained alien to be immediately informed about his 
                                                 
621 See J. Quigley, Willian J. Aceves, A. Shank, ‘Introduction’ in op.cit. 
622 Luke T. Lee, The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations with Text and commentaries, A.W. Sijthoff 
Leyden/Rule of Law Press – Durham N.C. (1966), 15ff; and by the same author, Consular Law and Practice, 
op.cit., 26. Similarly to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, see E. Denza, Introductory Note on The 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961 http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/vcdr/vcdr.html  
623 William J. Aceves, ‘International Decisions: Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States) 
Provisional Measures Order’, (2003) AJIL, 923; William J. Aceves, ‘International Decisions: LaGrand 
(Germany v. United States)’, (2002) AJIL   ., 210; William J. Aceves, ‘International Decisions: Case Concerning 
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Federal Republic of Germany v. United States)’, (1999) AJIL, 
924; William J. Aceves, ‘International Decisions: Application of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 
(Paraguay v. United States)’, (1998) AJIL., 517; William J. Aceves, ‘The Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations: A Study of Rights, Wrongs, and Remedies’, (1998) Vand. J. Transnat'l L., 257; Linda E. Carter, 
‘Lessons from Avena: The Inadequacy of Clemency and Judicial Proceedings for Violations of the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations’, (2005) Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L., 259; Linda E. Carter, ‘Compliance with 
ICJ Provisional Measures and the Meaning of Review and Reconsideration Under the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations: Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex v. U.S.)’, (2003) Mich. J. Int'l L., 117; M. 
Halberstam, ‘Lagrand and Avena Establish a Right, but Is There a Remedy? Brief Comments on the Legal Effect 
of Lagrand and Avena in the U.S.’, (2005) ILSA J. Int'l & Comp. L., 415; Mark J. Kadish, ‘Article 36 of the 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: A Search for the Right to Consul’, (1997) Mich. J. Int'l L., 565; M. 
Mennecke & Christian J. Tams, ‘LaGrand Case (Germany v. United States of America)’, (2002) ICLQ, 449; 
Sean D. Murphy, ’Implementation of Avena Decision by Oklahoma Court’, (2004) AJIL   ., 581; Sean D. 
Murphy, ‘U.S. Position before International Court of Justice in Mexican Death Penalty Case’, (2003) AJIL   ., 
434; Jordan J. Paust, ‘Breard and Treaty-Based Rights under the Consular Convention’, (1998) AJIL   ., 691; 
Howard S. Schiffman, ‘Breard and Beyond: The Status of Consular Notification and Access Under the Vienna 
Convention’, (2000) Cardozo J. Int'l & Comp. L., 27; D. Shelton, ‘Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican 
Nationals (Mex v. U.S.)’, (2004) AJIL   ., 559. 
624 The ICJ majority judgment in the LaGrand case was criticised by some of the other judges who dissented 
from the majority decision. Judge Shi criticised the judgment for reaching the decision on the individual 
character of the Art. 36(1)(b) VCCR right solely based on literary interpretation, when purposive and contextual 
methods should have also been used and, in this case, a different decision would have been reached in light of 
the alleged purely inter-states nature and objectives of the VCCR (see Judge Shi Separate Opinion, para. 4, 
LaGrand Case (Germany v. United States of America), judgment of 27 June 2001, ICJ Reports (2001)). 
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rights to access and communication with a consular official of his sending State. The fact that 
Article 36(1)(b) VCCR provides also for international rights for the individuals is no longer 
debatable, since it has been confirmed on several occasions by the ICJ.625 In spite of being 
located within an inter-states treaty, Article 36 VCCR provides for a considerable number of 
consular related individual rights: 1) to be informed without delay by the detaining authority 
of the right to consular notification and communication; 2) to choose whether or not to have 
the consulate of his sending State contacted; 3) to have the consulate contacted without delay 
by the detaining authority; 4) to communicate freely with the consulate; 5) to accept or 
decline any offered consular assistance. It can be noticed that, so far, these rights possessed by 
the individuals do not have a corresponding obligation incumbent upon the State of 
nationality to provide consular protection to the national abroad, not even in cases of 
detention. The possessor of the obligation corresponding to the aforementioned individual 
rights is the receiving State.626 The third sub-paragraph of Article 36(1) VCCR does provide 
for the type of consular services that the consuls of the sending State can provide once 
informed of the arrest of their nationals.627 The type of consular assistance that can be 
provided under Article 36 VCCR encompasses the recommendation of legal representation, 
explanation of the judicial system and proceedings of the country concerned, and facilitation 
of the location of evidence or witnesses.628  
Therefore the consular assistance services provided under Article 36(1) VCCR are 
exercised as rights of the sending State, with obligations on this aspect incumbent only on the 
receiving State. Therefore the related individual rights to consular access and communication 
do not prescribe some sort of corresponding obligation on the part of the consular officials 
vis-à-vis their co-nationals.629 The last paragraph of Article 36 creates an obligation 
                                                 
625 See the ICJ judgments in the Breard, op.cit., LaGrand, op.cit., Avena, op.cit., and Diallo cases.  
626 See Luke T. Lee, Consular Law and Practice, op.cit., section 10 – Consular Access as a Right of the detained 
National in Chapter – National Charged with Criminal Offences. 
627 Art. 36(1)(c) VCCR reads as follows: ‘(c) consular officers shall have the right to visit a national of the 
sending State who is in prison, custody or detention, to converse and correspond with him and to arrange for his 
legal representation. They shall also have the right to visit any national of the sending State who is in prison, 
custody or detention in their district in pursuance of a judgement. Nevertheless, consular officers shall refrain 
from taking action on behalf of a national who is in prison, custody or detention if he expressly opposes such 
action.’ 
628 J. Quigley, ‘LaGrand: A Challenge to the U.S. Judiciary’, (2002) Yale J. Int’l L., 435, 435. 
629 If Art. 36 VCCR based jurisprudence of the ICJ (Breard, LaGrand, and Avena) did not address the question 
whether this Article establishes certain obligations on the part of the sending State to exercise consular 
protection to its nationals, certain domestic courts have rejected the deduction of such an obligation from the 
wording of Art. 36 VCCR. See the case of Kuijt v Minister of Immigration and Integration, Administrative 
appeal, No. KG 03/137, 18 March 2003, ILDC 149 (NL 2003), where the Dutch Court interpreted Art. 36 VCCR 
and held that this article does not impose an obligation upon Dutch consulates to fulfil the request of detained 
Dutch nationals to consular protection. 
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incumbent, similarly to the previous paragraph, on the receiving Sate, whereby its laws and 
regulations should ‘enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded 
under this Article are intended.’ 
The travaux préparatoires of the VCCR reveal that some of the members of the ILC 
were of the opinion that the purpose of Article 36(1)(b) VCCR should be to safeguard human 
rights.630 Germany pointed out that the US representatives agreed during the ILC discussion 
leading up to the conclusion of the VCCR that the right of a foreigner to communicate with 
the consulate of his or her home state is ‘a very fundamental human right’.631 This discussion 
has not materialised into a concrete provision expressly providing a human right of the 
individual to consular assistance related services. 
Therefore the purpose of Article 36 VCCR is to ensure that consular officials are able 
to exercise their Article 5 VCCR administrative functions and, in particular, that they have 
access to the national, especially when the latter is detained abroad. In this circumstance, it 
has been argued that the rationale of Article 36(1)(b) VCCR is to ensure the basic human 
rights of the nationals, in particular, to ensure that the local police and judicial systems treat 
the foreign detainee fairly.632  
While the VCCR represents the point of analytical departure for the legal assessment 
of consular protection, there are other specialised treaties containing consular related 
provisions. For instance, the Convention against Torture,633 the Migrants Workers 
Convention634 and the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from 
Enforced Disappearance635 have provisions recognising consular communication rights to 
individuals, similar to those provided in Article 36(1) VCCR.636 However they do not depart 
                                                 
630 See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1980, p. 25, para. 48. 
631 Memorial of the Federal Republic of Germany, submitted for the ICJ in the LaGrand case, para. 4.98. 
632 Victor M. Uribe, ‘Consuls at Work: Universal Instruments of Human Rights and Consular Protection in the 
Context of Criminal Justice’, (1996-1997) Hous. J. Int'l L., 390; Lee and Quigley, Consular Law and Practice, 
140. The Canadian Alberta Court of Appeal in R. v. Van Bergen, (2000) A.J. No., 882, reported 225 W.A.C. 386, 
agreed with the Canadian Minister of Justice that the purpose of Article 36 VCCR was ‘to ensure that foreign 
detainees receive equal treatment under the local criminal justice system and are not disadvantaged because 
they are not familiar with and do not understand the proceedings against them.’ 
633 The Convention against Torture provides in Art. 6(3) that any persons in custody for a torture-related offense 
‘shall be assisted in communicating immediately with the nearest appropriate representative of the State of 
which he is a national, or, if he is a stateless person, with the representative of the State where he usually 
resides.’ 
634 Art. 23 of the Migrants Workers Convention provides that migrants have a right of recourse to consular 
notification as well as to consular protection and assistance. Art. 7(a) confers to migrants a right equivalent to 
Art. 36(1)(b) VCCR. 
635 See Art. 17, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/177 (Dec. 20, 2006). 
636 For a detailed analysis of treaty norms similar to Art. 36 VCCR, see M. Warren, ‘Rendered Meaningless? 
Security Detentions and the Erosion of Consular Access Rights’, (2013) Southern Illinois University Law 
Journal, 27, 37-42. 
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from the Article 36 VCCR template of relations between States, and the State of nationality 
and the individual. It seems, therefore, that the multilateral international treaty regulating 
consular relations (VCCR) and specialised international treaties with incidental provisions on 
consular access and communication do not establish a State duty to provide consular 
protection services to its nationals or other individuals abroad.  
If general consular related international treaties are not yet a source of individual rights 
to receive consular protection from State(s), then international human rights, placing the 
individual at the centre of their objectives, might be such a source of consular protection 
related individual rights. There is a growing amount of scholarly work637 arguing that a State 
obligation to provide consular (and diplomatic) protection to its nationals abroad may be 
deduced from international human rights law. Although international human rights norms do 
not recognise an express human right of the individual to ask for and/or receive consular 
protection from the State of nationality or another State, the general provision of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights638, as well as States’ membership to 
regional human rights treaties, have been interpreted as requiring the State of nationality to 
exercise some sort of consular protection so as to ensure respect of its nationals’ human rights 
in third countries.639 Additionally, specific international human rights provisions have been 
interpreted as establishing a State obligation to precise consular services, such as an 
obligation upon the consular officials of the sending State to not arbitrarily refuse the issuance 
of a passport to citizens as derived from Article 12(4) ICCPR.640  
The IACtHR Advisory Opinion No. 16 has been referred to as evidence supporting the 
recognition of a (human) right to consular access based on pre-existing human rights.641 The 
                                                 
637 Victor M. Uribe, ‘Consuls at Work: Universal Instruments of Human Rights and Consular Protection in the 
Context of Criminal Justice’, (1996-1997) Hous. J. Int'l L., 397ff; N. Klein and L. Barry, ‘A Human Rights 
Perspective on Diplomatic Protection: David Hicks and His Dual Nationality’, (2007) Australian Journal of 
Human Rights, 1; N. Karazivan, ‘Diplomatic Protection: Taking Human Rights Extraterritorially’, (2006) 
Canadian Yearbook of International Law, 299; Francisco O. Vicuna, International Dispute Settlement in an 
Evolving Global Society, Cambridge University Press (2004); A. A. C. Trindade, ‘The Humanization of 
Consular Law: The Impact of Advisory Opinion No. 16 (1999) of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on 
International Case-law and Practice’, (2007) Chinese Journal of International Law, 1; Luke T. Lee, Consular 
Law and Practice, op.cit., 136; Christina M. Cerna, ‘Impact on the Right to Consular Notification’, Menno T. 
Kamminga and M. Scheinin (eds), The Impact of Human Rights Law on General International Law, Oxford 
University Press (2009). 
638 Art. 2(3) ICCPR: ‘any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognised are violated shall have an 
effective remedy’. 
639 Klein, op.cit.; Karazivan, op.cit. 
640 Luke T. Lee, op.cit., 136. 
641 The IACtHR pointed out that the evolutive interpretation and application of international human rights law 
have had ‘a positive impact on International Law in affirming and developing the aptitude of this latter to 
regulate the relations between States and human beings under their respective jurisdictions’. The Court thus 
accepted the inter-connected and dependent relation between an international individual right to consular 
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justification of a State obligation to exercise consular protection to their nationals abroad 
based on international human rights law642 has been criticised for being contrary to the 
doctrine of territorial jurisdiction643 required by international human rights law as a condition 
for holding the international responsibility of a State for violation of international human 
rights law.644 According to the doctrine of territorial jurisdiction, the violation of an 
international human right has to be committed within the territory of the State whose 
international responsibility is claimed645 – a condition which is evidently not fulfilled in the 
case of consular protection of nationals whose rights are violated within the territory of 
another State than the sending State. Recent jurisprudence has recognised in certain limited 
circumstances the international responsibility of a State other than the territorial State, namely 
the State of the agent exercising authority,646 or the State exercising effective control over the 
territory,647 or when acts within the territory of the State of nationality cause an individual to 
suffer violations of his human rights outside the territory.648 Certain scholars649 argue that the 
                                                                                                                                                        
notification and access and several human rights such as the right to a fair trial and life within the framework of 
‘the evolution of the fundamental rights of the human person in contemporary International Law’ (Advisory 
Opinion No. 16 of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights [IACtHR] on the Right to Information on 
Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Due Process of Law of 01.10.1999, paras. 114–115). For a 
commentary of the Advisory Opinion No 16/1999 in light of the impact of international human rights law on 
public international law, see A. A. C. Trindade, The access of individuals to justice, op.cit., 145-147; and by the 
same author, ‘The Humanization of Consular Law: The Impact of Advisory Opinion No. 16 (1999) of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights on International Case-law and Practice’ (2007) Chinese Journal of 
International Law, 1. 
642 A State duty to exercise diplomatic protection has been argued on the basis of the same interpretation of 
international human rights law, see Karazivan, op.cit. 
643 State sovereignty remains a general and foundational principle in international law, and within its territory the 
exercise of judicial, legislative, and executive jurisdiction by a state constitutes an essential corollary of that 
sovereignty. State jurisdiction extends over the whole territory and whoever is present there, including non-state 
subjects. A. Aust, Handbook of International Law, 2nd edition, Cambridge University Press (2010), 43; I. 
Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 7th edition, Oxford University Press (2008), 299. 
644 A.Vermeer-Künzli, ‘As If …’ op.cit.; and by the same author, ‘Diplomatic Protection as Human Rights Law’, 
op.cit.; and The protection of individuals by means of diplomatic protection: diplomatic protection as a human 
rights instrument, 2007, Doctoral Thesis. 
645 F. Berman, ‘Jurisdiction: The State’, in P. Capps, M. Evans, K. Konstandinides (eds), Asserting Jurisdiction: 
International and European Legal Perspectives, Hart Publishing (2003). 
646 Ocalan (Appl. No. 46221/99, Judgment of the Grand Chamber of 12 May 2005), Al-Saadoom v UK (Appl. 
No. 61498/08, Judgment of 2 March 2010). 
647 Ilascu v Moldova and Russia (Appl. No. 48787/99, Judgment of 8 July 2004); Bankovic, Stojanovic, 
Stoimedovski, Joksimovic and Sukovic v. Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, and the 
United Kingdom, (Appl. No. 52207/99, Judgment of 12 December 2001), Al-Skeini and others v The United 
Kingdom (Appl. No. 55721/07, Judgment of 7 July 2011). 
648 See Soering (Appl. No. 14038/88, Judgment 7 July 1989); for a description of this specific condition, see 
Abbasi & Anor., R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs & Secretary 
of State for the Home Department [2002] EWCA Civ 1598 (06 November 2002), para. 71. 
649 See M. Scheinin, ‘Extraterritorial Effect of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’, in 
Coosmans and Kamminga, (eds), Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties, Antwerp-Oxford: 
Intersentia (2004), 73-76.  
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territorial standard of control over the territory has to be replaced in certain circumstances650 
with the standard of control over the person, facts or events giving rise to the violation of 
human rights. 
The permeation of international human rights into general international consular law is 
a phenomenon widely accepted by legal scholars.651 The general recognition of the individual 
nature of the rights to consular notification and access provided by Art. 36(1)(b) VCCR has 
been widely accepted as an effect of the impact of international human rights. Reading into 
multilateral and regional human rights treaties a State duty to exercise consular protection of 
their nationals when their human rights are in danger is, however, not generally accepted by 
the legal academia. 
Therefore bilateral and international treaties do not establish rights and obligations 
within the relationship between a sending State and it’s national. The only State duties related 
to consular assistance expressly recognised by international treaties are the following: a duty 
of the receiving State towards the sending State to notify its consular officials of the 
detention/arrest of their co-national, and to ensure access and communication with the 
detained individual; and another duty of the receiving State towards the detained foreigner to 
inform him of his right to ask for the notification of the consular officials of his State and 
ensuring communication with them.652 Treaty law thus provides for a classical public 
international State duty owed towards another State, and another duty towards the residing 
alien. According to public international law, a sending State has a right to assist, but no 
obligation to do so towards its national or another individual. Such an obligation may 






                                                 
650 In cases of denial of a passport to citizens residing abroad, assassinations, and abductions. 
651 C. Cerna, ‘The Rights to Consular Notification as a Human Right’, (2008) Suffolk Transnational Law 
Review; and by the same author, ‘Impact on the Right to Consular Notification in The Impact of Human Rights 
Law’, in Menno T. Kamminga and M. Scheinin (eds), op.cit.. 
652 On the basis of Art. 36 VCCR. 
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3. State practice 
Although there is no international legal norm recognising an individual right to consular 
protection in general, there is a considerably high number of States that attach to their 
citizenship a right to receive protection abroad from the government. Through constitutional 
or ordinary legal provisions653 or executive acts, these States include among the citizenship 
rights the right of their nationals to be protected by the State while they are located in foreign 
countries.654 The domestic legal norms do not recognise an express right to consular 
protection, however the right has been interpreted as including a right to consular 
protection.655 What exactly this individual right to consular protection includes is not precisely 
defined or delimitated. The substantive content is to a certain extent provided by domestic 
consular acts implementing and detailing the provisions of the VCCR or summarised in 
consular guidelines. Fernandez and Mellissen argue that ‘in most of the countries consular 
assistance includes documentary services, individual assistance to citizens in distress and 
assistance at times of crisis.’656 However precisely what this ‘assistance’ entails depends on 
the local culture, diplomacy, and legal system. 
                                                 
653 States with constitutional legal provisions recognising a right to their nationals to be protected abroad: 
Bulgaria, China as interpreted by the Constitutional Court, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Russia; countries having a legislative provision that is interpreted by legal experts as 
providing a right to consular protection: Brazil, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Denmark, Finland, Mexico, 
Norway, Slovakia and Slovenia; countries having no specific legislative provision, however, according to 
national legal experts consular protection is granted as a right based on the interpretation of the specific national 
legislation, as a whole, and the relevant national case-law: Italy, Sweden. Data collected during the research 
work carried out within the Project Citizens Consular Assistance Regulation in Europe, Final Report, Chapter 
three: Comparative analysis, section 4.1., Right to consular protection, 608-614, available online at 
http://www.careproject.eu/images/stories/ConsularAndDiplomaticProtection.pdf and available also in S. Faro 
and M. Moraru, ‘Comparative analysis of legislation and practice on consular protection and assistance of the 27 
EU countries’, in S. Faro, Mario P. Chiti, E. Schweighofer (eds.), European Citizenship and Consular Protection 
New Trends in European Law and National Law, , Editoriale Scientifica (2012), 143-150; and J. Quigley, 
William J. Aceves, S. Adele Shank, ‘The Statutory right to sending state protection’, in The Law of Consular 
Access A documentary guide, Routledge Research in International Law (2013), 97-101. 
654 The inclusion of domestic law within the methodology on formation of customary international law has been 
criticised by certain legal scholars, see P. Weis (Nationality and statelessness in international law, in Brownlie, I. 
Principles of International Law, Oxford University Press (1998), 98) who argued that ‘concordance of municipal 
law does not yet create customary international law; a universal consensus of opinion of states is equally 
necessary. It is erroneous to attempt to establish rules of international law by methods of comparative law, or 
even to declare that rules of municipal law of different states which show a certain degree of uniformity are 
rules of international law.’ However, legislation has been considered as evidence of a State’s position on a 
certain topic and recognised as among the evidentiary material for the formation of customary international law, 
see J. Dugard, First Report on Diplomatic Protection, op.cit. 
655 See the national Reports on those countries that recognise an individual right to protection abroad in the 
CARE Report, Chapter two, available online. On the interpretation of the non-EU countries legal provision, see 
Luke T. Lee, Consular Law and Practice, op.cit., 131-137. 
656 See Maaike Okano-Heijmans, ‘Change in Consular Assistance and the Emergence of Consular Diplomacy,’ 
in J. Melissen and Ana M. Fernandez (eds.), Consular Affairs and Diplomacy, Martinus Nijhoff (2011), 22, 




Other States have a different approach to consular protection, which is not provided as 
a legal right of the individual, but approached as a matter of State’s discretion.657 For instance, 
the Commonwealth countries treat consular protection as a matter of State discretion, thus 
citizens are consequently not entitled to claim such services as a legal right from these 
countries. The cases and times when consular protection can be exercised is left to the 
Secretary of State’s discretionary decision-making power.658 There is however more and more 
State practice whereby even these States, that have applied the traditional conception of 
consular protection of individuals, are gradually embracing a modern conception of the 
institution by way of recognising an obligation of the consular officials to exercise consular 
protection of nationals, particularly in cases of violation of their citizens’ human rights, or 
when nationals are detained in foreign countries. States from different geographical regions of 
the world (some of the Latin American, European, and Commonwealth States) have 
developed a practice of approaching consular protection of citizens in situations of extreme 
distress as a State obligation.659  
For instance, with the exodus of citizens from Latin American States to the US, and 
many of them becoming subject to legal proceedings in the receiving country,660 their States of 
nationality started to adopt a conduct both internally and externally that reveals their 
commitment to ensuring consular protection to nationals.  
On the external plane, a string of executive agreements were concluded between 
certain Latin American countries and other foreign countries that host large communities of 
their nationals, for the purpose of ensuring the consular access and communication rights of 
Latin American countries’ nationals in the receiving States. For instance, Mexico concluded a 
string of Memoranda of Understanding with the US regarding the consular protection of their 
respective nationals.661 Starting at the turn of the century, Latin American countries concluded 
between themselves agreements delegating the power to exercise consular assistance of their 
nationals to other contracting Latin American countries that were represented in situ,662 in an 
attempt to ensure that their nationals would not be left unprotected in case of need. The topic 
                                                 
657 For instance, Commonwealth countries, many of the Latin American countries, and France.  
658 See Canada Manual on Consular Instruction of 2007 and Luke T. Lee, op.cit. 
659 See Luke T. Lee, op.cit., 130-150. 
660 See more on this in Luke T. Lee, op.cit. 
661 See the 1996 Memorandum of Understanding between Mexico and the US regarding consular protection of 
their nationals; the string of Memoranda of Understanding between the Consular General of Mexico in several 
different counties in the US State of California and the public authorities of those counties regarding consular 
assistance in custody proceedings involving Mexican minors. 
662 These agreements are similar to the type of bi-lateral and multilateral agreements concluded between the 
European States on, inter alia, delegation of consular assistance functions. 
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of ensuring the nationals’ right of access to consular officials also became prominent during 
international conferences, signalling the importance given to the topic in this region of the 
world.663 When diplomatic negotiations, the adoption of treaties and local remedies proved to 
be ineffective for ensuring respect of the rights to consular access and communication of the 
Latin American countries’ nationals, particularly in the US, these countries passed to the next 
stage, namely that of bringing the US’s violations of these international individual’s rights 
before the IACtHR and ICJ.664 The Breard, LaGrand and Avena cases, as well as the request 
for an Advisory Opinion from the IACtHR665 by Mexico revealed the strong commitment of 
the respective applicant States, Paraguay, Germany, and Mexico, and the intervening Latin 
American States,666 towards ensuring consular assistance for their nationals. Following the US 
denial of these States’ right to be notified of the detention of their nationals, to promptly 
contact them and, ultimately, to provide consular assistance to their co-nationals, these States 
made recourse to diplomatic protection and lodged international judicial proceedings against 
the receiving State. The cases of detained nationals abroad, especially in countries where 
capital punishment is still in force, have revealed the seriousness, commitment and sense of 
duty with which consular officials approach the exercise of their consular function to protect 
their co-nationals abroad in such extreme circumstances. ‘Mexicans on Death Row’, the book 
written by the consul general of Mexico in Houston, Texas, US, during the famous trials of 
Ricardo Aldape and the Mexican nationals in the Avena case highlights the enormous 
consular efforts made by the Mexican government to protect its citizens abroad, often at the 
initiative of the government itself.667 
                                                 
663 See the Iberian Meeting of the Community of Brazilians abroad, 2002; for more details, see Trindade, 
International Law for Humankind: Towards a New Ius Gentium, second revised edition, 2013, 494- 497. The 
trend was mainly due to the increased number of Latin American nationals being detained, tried and sentenced to 
death without having had access to consular officials of their State of nationality during these legal proceedings. 
664 Inter-American Court of Human Rights  
(IACtHR), Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of 
the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law, October 1, 1999, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser A) No. 16 (1999). 
665 Ibid..  
666 Seven other Latin American countries intervened in support of Mexico’s request for an Advisory Opinion 
from the IACtHR, thus proving wide support of Mexico’s claim. It seemed these States shared the opinion of the 
important role consular assistance plays for the protection of human rights, as well as for proving a similar 
conduct towards the exercise of consular assistance to prevent violations of the human rights of their nationals 
abroad. 
667 R. Ampudia, Mexicans on Death Row, Arte Publica (2010). 
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These international initiatives668 show a clear commitment of the Latin American 
countries to ensure consular protection of their citizens abroad as a form of preventing 
violations of the human rights of their nationals.669 
On the internal plane, several soft law documents were adopted by certain Latin 
American countries whereby consular assistance programmes were developed.670 Mexico’s 
consular assistance programme’s main goal was to ensure financial support to Mexican 
citizens subject to legal proceedings abroad for the purpose of ensuring that their nationals 
will benefit from adequate legal representation and thus avoid capital punishment or at least 
achieve commutation to a prison sentence.671 When learning of cases where their nationals 
were tried for criminal offences without having first being informed of their right to have the 
consular posts contacted by the receiving State authorities, Latin American countries have 
challenged the respective detention measures and criminal sentences before the domestic 
courts.672 Three main objectives have motivated these States in starting suits before courts: 
first, a desire to suspend or prevent the violations of the consular rights of their nationals, 
second, to ensure remedy for the injuries suffered by their nationals and their families, and 
third, to ensure that other nationals will not be subject to similar international wrongful acts in 
the future. 
Some European States have had a similar approach to the exercise of consular and 
diplomatic protection of citizens abroad. Certain countries confer a constitutional right to 
                                                 
668 In addition to the initiatives herein mentioned, Judge Augusto Cançado Trindade mentiones several other 
intiatives of Latin American countries supported also by European States, before the US courts based on the 
IACtHR AO No. 16/99, aimed at obtaining a reconsideration of the death penalty of their nationals due to the US 
violations of their Article 36 VCCR consular rights. See Augusto Cançado Trindade, ‘The Humanization of 
Consular Law: The Impact of Advisory Opinion No. 16 (1999) of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on 
International Case-law and Practice’ (2007) Chinese Journal of International Law, 1. 
669 Similar actions were adopted also by other States. For instance, Spain adopted a legal act whereby Spanish 
citizens facing the death penalty abroad would benefit of free legal assistance (see Circula Order 
AEC/2292/2009 on Spaniards arrested and imprisoned abroad). The Spanish Report in the CARE Report refers 
to five cases in which the individuals benefited of financial help to cover the costs of their legal representation 
before courts.  
670 R. Ampudia, op.cit.; T. Lee, Chapter three Protection of Nationals in Consular Law and Practice,, op.cit. 
671 See R. Ampudia,op.cit.. 
672 See the case started by Paraguay before the Supreme Court of the US in Paraguay v Gilmore, Governor of 
Virginia, 523 U.S. 371 (1998); the case started by Germany against the US before the Supreme Court of the US, 
Federal Republic of Germany v US, 526 U.S. 111 (1999); see Mexico’s Application for Reprieve and 
Application for Commutation of Death Sentence to Lesser Penalty and Memorandum in Support Thereof at 7, In 
re Irineo Tristan Montoya, Before the Governor for the State of Texas and the Board of Pardons and Parole 
(1996): ‘By custom and practice the Mexican Consulate actively intervenes as soon as it is notified of a Mexican 
National's detention and/or arrest. The Consulate meets with the National, informing them of his rights […] The 
Consulate also provides a list of Spanish-speaking attorneys. Once a lawyer is appointed or obtained, the 
Consulate meets with the lawyer and offers to assist in any way possible. Further, the Consulate may attend trial 
on a daily basis to ensure the National's rights are protected. This assistance is not to be minimized-in fact-it is 
recognized as imperative and instrumental in avoiding the death penalty.’ (p.19) 
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protection abroad to their citizens and access to courts to seek remedy for violation of this 
right673, others confer a legal right to protection abroad,674 while other European countries, 
although not expressly prescribing such an individual right,675 have, in practice, showed a 
strong endorsement of a State duty to exercise some sort of consular and diplomatic 
protection for their nationals facing grave violations of their individual human rights 
abroad676.677 
Significant changes have occurred also in the practice of the Commonwealth countries, 
known for treating consular protection as a full discretionary power of the State, where 
citizens are not entitled to claim such services as a legal right.678 Post-2000, changes in the 
US, Canada, the UK and Australia’s conduct of consular assistance services could be 
observed whereby the protection of citizens in distress abroad, especially those arrested or 
detained, was approached as an obligation to exercise some sort of consular assistance 
services. The cases of the terrorist suspects detained in the Guantánamo Bay camp or in the 
Arab countries have showed increased efforts and willingness of the States of nationality to 
exercise consular assistance of their nationals. Consular assistance in the form of visits paid 
by consular officials to detained co-nationals, and keeping close contact with them were 
common practice of the Commonwealth countries’ consular officials in relation to their 
detained nationals in the ‘war on terror’.679 In these specific circumstances consular access and 
assistance was perceived as contributing to the respect of these individuals’ human rights.680 
The above-mentioned domestic legal provisions of a considerable number of States, 
the practice of governments towards their nationals detained in foreign countries for terrorism 
related events, the States’ practice of using the diplomatic assurances institution681 are all case 
                                                 
673 See Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal and Romania. 
674 European countries having a legislative provision that is interpreted by the national scholars as providing a 
right to consular protection: Denmark, Finland, Greece, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
675 European countries having no legislative provision, which according to the national scholars, is interpreted as 
including a similar right: Italy, Sweden. 
676 See the case of Germany, and its efforts for the LaGrand brothers, see the LaGrand case. 
677 For more details on the legal nature of consular and diplomatic protection of individuals within the national 
systems of the Member States of the European Union, see Chapter 4, Section VII - Mapping national systems of 
ensuring protection of citizens abroad and the top-down impact of the EU model of protecting Union citizens 
abroad.  
678 The definition of consular protection in the Canadian Manual is representative for all Commonwealth 
countries’ approach on consular protection of their citizens. See Canada Manual of Consular Instructions of 
2007, para. 20.1. 
679 These cases will be analysed in more detailed under the Section Diplomatic Protection as a Duty to Protect: 
Examining the Formation of a Customary Rule of International Law. 
680 M. Warren, ‘Rendered Meaningless? Security Detentions and the Erosion of Consular Access Rights’ (2013) 
Southern Illinois University Law Journal, 27. 




studies indicating the recognition of some sort of consular protection duty by several States, at 
least in cases where the human rights of their nationals were at stake.  
In a nutshell, it can be observed that there is a growing practice among States of 
recognising some sort of consular assistance and/or protection duty in regard to their nationals 
abroad, especially when they are subjected to grave violations of their most fundamental 
rights, such as prohibition of torture and other ill-treatments, right to life and deprivation of 
liberty. Even States that do not have enshrined in their national constitutions or legislation an 
express individual right to protection abroad have, in the last decade, made more balanced 
choices between preserving their foreign relations interests and ensuring the security and 
safety of their nationals abroad. Cases such as Breard, LaGrand, Diallo and Avena are just 
some of the famous examples, however they are part of a growing trend following the more 
general ‘humanization’ phenomenon of consular affairs. 
Securing consular protection to nationals abroad is increasingly important for 
worldwide States, which explains the growing State practice of concluding consular 
cooperation agreements with other States from the same geographical region or similar 
culture or legal systems, which commonly include a provision on sharing the function of 
consular assistance of each other’s citizens in third countries. Latin American, the 
Commonwealth and various European States have agreed to delegate the function of consular 
assistance and protection of their citizens to non-nationality Contracting States in third 
countries, where they are not represented, for the purpose of ensuring that their citizens are 
not left unprotected in third countries.682 The provisions of these bilateral or multilateral 
consular treaties offer an important but often overlooked source of authority on the 
contemporary understanding of consular assistance and protection. Although States have no 
express treaty duty to provide consular protection to their citizens abroad and are reluctant to 
                                                 
682 See, for instance, the Accord entre la Bolivie, la Colombie, l’Equateur, le Pérou et le Venezuela relative aux 
attributions des consuls respectifs dans chacune des Républiques contractantes of July 1911. Nordic countries 
have long-standing consular cooperation going back to 1954, see the CARE Report. Consular services for 
Libyans were provided by different States in different parts of the world, for instance: Jordan in Spain, by 
Lebanon in France and Ghana, by Iraq in Iran and Pakistan, and by the UK in other countries. The UK may 
provide consular services for citizens of some Commonwealth countries: Ghanaians, Canadians and Sri Lankans 
in the absence of consulates of those States in third countries. Australia began issuing visas for New Zealanders 
in Argentina in 1984, and providing services for Papua New Guineans in 1975. For more recent examples of 
consular sharing agreements, see Art. 20(2)(c) TFEU for European Union countries, and similar agreements, 
although not benefiting of the specific EU legal guarantees, procedure and institutional arhitecture, were 
concluded among the ASEAN and Andean countries. See more details in Lee & Quigley, Consular Law and 
Practice, op.cit. 62ff; G. Haynal, M. Welsh, L. Century and S. Tyle, ‘The Consular Function in the 21st Century’, 
A Report for Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada, 27 March 2013, 1-12ff, available online at 
http://munkschool.utoronto.ca/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/The-Consular-Function-in-the-21st-Century-.pdf ; 




include such an express duty in international treaty law, they have, in practice, changed their 
conduct towards consular access and protection under the impact of international human 
rights law, the media and national society pressures. The increasing acceptance by States of 
an obligation to provide consular assistance and protection of non-nationals in exchange of 
the guarantee that another Contracting State will secure a similar consular service to their own 
nationals indicate the increasing implicit recognition by States of a duty to provide consular 
assistance to citizens in distress abroad, and the changing classical international conception of 
consular protection as prerogative of the State of nationality. Other actors than the State of 
nationality are exercising consular assistance and protection functions for individuals abroad. 
Non-nationality States seem to be a common presence on the international scene. The 
enlargement of the circle of actors exercising consular protection functions signals that 
traditional international norms on consular assistance and protection of individuals are 
relative norms, from which States are increasingly derogating in favour of safeguarding the 
human rights of their nationals abroad, without strong opposition from third countries. 
4. The position of international, regional and national courts on the 
individual’s right to consular protection  
Having explored the conduct of the legislature and the executive of States from around the 
globe on the consular protection of their national abroad, this section explores the position 
taken by courts – international, regional and domestic – on the legal nature of consular 
protection of nationals in foreign countries. Have courts admitted complaints from nationals 
regarding the executive’s refusal, inadequate or ineffective exercise of consular assistance? 
Have courts recognised some sort of consular assistance or protection rights to the citizen 
against his State of nationality or to other individuals against a non-nationality State? These 
are some of the questions that this section seeks to answer. 
Under the classical international conception of consular protection, the State’s 
decisions on the exercise of consular protection was considered a sovereign State prerogative 
that is non-justiciable.683 This conception corresponds to a time where travelling, or living 
abroad were not so common as today, and when international human rights laws were not yet 
developed. 
The increase in travelling and living abroad of nationals has led to an increase of 
individual claims being lodged before courts from different jurisdictions and legal orders 
                                                 
683 Lee, op.cit., 125; Victor M. Uribe, op.cit., 375. 
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complaining about the sending States’ refusal of, or inadequate or ineffective provision of 
consular protection. The development of international human rights law and its permeation 
throughout the different fields of public international law and domestic law has also impacted 
on the courts’ approach towards reviewing the executive’s conduct in both consular and 
diplomatic protection claims.684 International, regional and domestic courts have widely 
agreed that this aspect of the executive’s competence can no longer be left completely outside 
the jurisdiction of courts.685 International and domestic jurisprudence has thus developed on 
the legal nature of consular assistance and protection and the consular rights and duties of 
States towards nationals and other individuals. Two main string of cases can be identified 
based on the actors in dispute and the claims they have against each other. The first string of 
cases addressed the international individual consular rights of aliens sentenced to the death 
penalty or facing a death sentence in the US, who were persistently denied their Art. 36 
VCCR based consular rights by the US public authorities. A second string of cases addressed 
the international, but mostly domestic consular assistance rights of aliens detained in the ‘war 
on terror’, who felt their State of nationality or of residence did not do enough in terms of 
consular assistance and protection for the purpose of securing their human rights allegedly 
violated abroad.686 Both strings of cases have attracted vast scholarly attention,687 due to their 
potential of establishing a ground-breaking shift in the legal definition of the international 
institutions of consular protection and assistance of individuals. The main questions addressed 
                                                 
684 See, for instance, the Abbasi judgment of the UK Court of Appeal, which signals a significant shift in the UK 
courts deference towards the executive conduct of foreign affairs, and consular and diplomatic protection actions 
as part of the executive’s prerogative over the conduct of foreign affairs. 
685 See M. Attanasio, C. Malara, S.F. Nicolosi, ‘Il ‘judicial review’ del rifiuto statale di agire in protezione 
diplomatica’, in L. Panella (ed.), La Protezione Diplomatic: Sviluppi e Prospettive, Giappichelli (2008). 
686 Additionally, the European Commission of Human Rights and the ECtHR have assessed the topic of a State 
duty to exercise consular protection in few cases, and recently domestic courts have had to review the policy of 
their Government regarding consular financial assistance to their citizens facing the death penalty abroad. These 
cases will be assessed towards the end of this sub-section. 
687 William J. Aceves, ‘Individual rights under Vienna Convention on Consular Relations-duty to inform 
detained foreign nationals of right to seek consular assistance-protections against arbitrary deprivation of life 
advisory jurisdiction of Inter-American Court of Human Rights’, (2000) American Journal of International law, 
560; Christina M. Cerna, ‘Impact on the Right to Consular Notification’, in Kamminga and Scheinin (eds), The 
Impact on the Law of Diplomatic Protection, Oxford University Press (2009); Riccardo P. Mazzeschi, ‘Impact 
on the Law of Diplomatic Protection’, in Kamminga and Scheinin (eds), The Impact on the Law of Diplomatic 
Protection, Oxford University Press (2009); M. Mennecke, ‘Towards the Humanization of the Vienna 
Convention of Consular Rights — The LaGrand Case before the International Court of Justice’, (2001) German 
Yearbook of International Law; N. Klein, ‘David Hicks, Stern Hu, Scott Rush, Jock Palfreeman and the Legal 
Parameters of Australia's Protection of Its Citizens Abroad’, (2011) Melbourne University Law Review; for a 
more detailed analysis of the Beard case, see Michael K. Addo and Malcolm D. Evans, ‘Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations (Paraguay v. United States of America) (‘Breard’) and Lagrand (Germany v. United States of 
America), Applications for Provisional Measures’, (1999) ICLQ, 673ff; Monica F. Tinta, ‘Due Process and the 
Right to Life in the Context of the VCCR: Arguing the LaGrand case’, (2001) EJIL, 363; M. Warren, ‘Rendered 
Meaningless? Security Detentions and the Erosion of Consular Access Rights’ (2013) Southern Illinois 
University Law Journal, 27. 
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by this international and domestic jurisprudence sought to establish whether individuals enjoy 
first, under international law, and if negative, than under domestic law, individual consular 
rights enforceable against the receiving and sending States. The VCCR based cases dealt with 
the duty of the receiving State to inform the alien of his right to consular notification and 
access, while the ‘war on terror’ second string of cases688 assessed the State duty to exercise 
consular protection related services to its citizens, long-term residents and refugees detained 
abroad. 
The widespread denial of timely consular access and communication to foreigners 
detained in the US and facing a death penalty, in plain violation of the VCCR, has led to a 
wealth of cases submitted by the States of nationality of these individuals against the 
receiving State – US.689 The international, regional and domestic courts, as well as academic 
literature have mainly focused on the rights conferred by Article 36 VCCR to foreign 
nationals subject to capital punishment in the United States.690 It is settled case law that rights 
of the national to consular access and communication with the consular officials of their 
sending State are individual rights guaranteed by Article 36 (1)(b) VCCR, which oblige the 
authorities of a receiving State to inform a foreign national detainee about his rights to notify 
without delay the consular post of his state of nationality about the arrest.691 This duty has in 
practice often been ignored and as a consequence many arrested individuals in various States 
around the globe have not been able to receive support from their consular posts. This has led 
to a string of cases before national and international courts raising the question of the legal 
consequences of such omissions, and of the appropriate remedy for the detained or sentenced 
individuals.  
The literature692 and jurisprudence, both national693 and international694, have so far 
widely agreed on the individual character of the right to consular notification and access 
conferred by Article 36(1)(b) VCCR.  
                                                 
688 These cases are dealt in more detail in the following section. 
689 All these cases arouse, mainly, out of the same factual and legal background, namely the detention, trial and 
sentencing to the capital punishment of foreigners in the US, without the US public authorities having complied 
with their international obligation to inform them of their right to have the consulate notified of their detention 
without delay, and freely communicate with them as required under Art. 36(1) VCCR. 
690 See, for example, M. Warren, ‘Timeframes for Consular Notification and Access: Determining Contemporary 
State Practice’, (2009) Human Rights Research; J. Quigley, William J. Aceves and S. Adele Shank, op.cit.; and 
Barbara H. Bean, ‘Guide to Research on Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Notification Requirements’, 
NYU, 2007, available online at 
http://travel.state.gov/content/dam/travel/CNAtrainingresources/CNAManual_Feb2014.pdf  
691 See the LaGrand and Avena judgments of the ICJ. 
692 M. J. Kadish, ‘Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: A search for the right to consul’, 
(1996–1997) Mich. J. Int’l. L., 565; M. Mennecke, ‘Towards the Humanization of the Vienna Convention of 
Consular Rights – The LaGrand Case before the International Court of Justice’, (2001) GYIL, 430; M. 
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Certain regional courts695 went even further by recognising a human right character to 
the international individual right to consular notification and access. The difference between 
the natures of an ‘individual’ versus ‘human’ right is not simply an issue of semantics. The 
label of ‘human right’ comes with the benefit of a self-standing right of the injured individual 
                                                                                                                                                        
Mennecke and C. Tams, ‘LaGrand Case (Germany v. United States of America)’, (2002) ICLQ, 449; C. Tams, 
‘Consular Assistance: Rights, Remedies and Responsibility: Comments on the ICJ’s Judgement in the LaGrand 
Case’, (2002) EJIL, 257; T. Stephens, ‘The LaGrand Case (Federal Republic of Germany v. United States of 
America). The Right to Information on Consular Assistance under the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations: A Right for What Purpose?’, (2002) Melbourne Journal of International Law, 143; S. Baker, 
‘Germany v. United States in the International Court of Justice: An International Battle Over the Interpretation of 
Article Thirty-six of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Provisional Measures Orders’, (2001-
2002) Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L., 277; J. Fitzpatrick, ‘Symposium on the LaGrand Case: The Unreality of 
International Law in the United States and the LaGrand Case’, (2002) Yale J. Int’l L., 427; M.J. Kadish, ‘Article 
36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: The International Court of Justice in Mexico v. United 
States (Avena) speaks emphatically to the Supreme Court of the United States about fundamental nature of the 
right to consul’, (2004–2005) Geo. J. Int’l L., 1; N. Klein, ‘Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. 
United States of America): Case notes’, (2004) Austl. Int’l L.J., 143. 
693 Certain national courts considered the non-notification of rights under Article 36 VCCR a violation of an 
individual right: the German Constitutional Court ruled that non-compliance with Article 36 VCCR, as 
established in international case law (see the ICJ LaGrand and Avena case, discussed infra) constituted a 
violation of the complainants’ constitutional right to a fair trial. German Consular Notification Case, Joint 
constitutional complaint, Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2 BvR 2115/01, 19 September 2006, ILDC 668 (DE 2006). 
See also: Bundesgerichtshof, 5th Zivilsenat, Beschluss, 12 May 2011, Aktenzeichen: V ZB 23/11; 
Bundesgerichtshof, 5th Zivilsenat, Beschluss, 18 November 2010, Aktenzeichen: V ZB 165/10, and 
Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2nd Senat, 2nd Kammer, Stattgebender Kammerbeschluss, 8 July 2010, 
Aktenzeichen: 2 BvR 2485/07, 2 BvR 2513/07, 2 BvR 2548/07 available at <www.juris.de>. In the Netherlands, 
courts upheld a similar reasoning in e.g. Court of First Instance's-Gravenhage, AWB 08/34834, 9 June 2006. The 
Dutch Courts however did not always recognise an individual right based on Art. 36 VCCR; see Court of First 
Instance Amsterdam, AWB 06/918, 2 June 2006 and Court of First Instance Amsterdam, AWB 06/742, 7 
October 2008, all available at <www.rechtspraak.nl>. In certain cases, the national courts did not find any 
violation of the rights of defence because of an Art. 36 VCCR violation; see Court of Cassation (2nd Chamber.), 
No. P.00.0788.N, 13 juin 2000 (D.), available at <www.cass.be> (Belgium). In Canada, the statements given by 
a detainee were considered admissible, even though there was a clear violation of Art. 36 VCCR, Ontario 
Supreme Court, R. v. Partak, 2001 CanLII 28411 (ON SC), 31 October 2001, available at 
<http://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2001/2001canlii28411/2001canlii28411.html>. Courts in the United 
States have proven to be even more reluctant to reverse convictions based on Art. 36 violations. District Court 
for the Western District of North Carolina (USA), Garcia v. United States, Decision on motion to vacate, 16 
October 2008, ILDC 1216 (US 2008), para. 3; Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (USA), Cornejo v County 
of San Diego and others, Appeal Judgment, 504 F3d 853 (9th Cir 2007), 24 September 2007, ILDC 1080 (US 
2007). In Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon (2006), it was assumed, without deciding, that the VCCR created rights that 
were judicially enforceable by individuals (para. 18). The US Supreme Court nevertheless decided that evidence 
did not have to be excluded solely based on the fact it was obtained in violation of Article 36 of the VCCR: 
United States Supreme Court, Sánchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006), 28 June 2006 (United States of 
America), ILDC 697.  
694 IACtHR; the ICJ on the other hand, although asked to pronounce on the arguably human rights character of 
the individual right provided by Art. 36(1)(b) VCCR, it avoided to answer the question, see the LaGrand and 
Avena cases. 
695 IACtHR Advisory Opinion No. 16/1999; Germany and Mexico have asked the ICJ to pronounce on the 
human right nature of the right to consular notification and access, but the ICJ, unlike the IACtHR, refused to 
address the question on the basis of the lack of impact of the answer to the solution of the case (LaGrand 
(Germany v. United States of America), Judgment of 27 June 2001, I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 466; Avena and Other 




to his/her own reparation.696 However modern these rights are, compared to the traditional 
conception of consular protection, they establish a right which the national does not possess 
vis-à-vis the State of his nationality, but towards the receiving State. The Vienna Convention 
on Consular Relations does not establish an obligation on the part of the State of nationality to 
provide consular assistance starting from the moment it has been notified by the receiving 
State of the detention to one of its nationals. The fact that part of the international 
jurisprudence has approached the individual rights to consular notification and access 
provided by Art. 36(1)(b) VCCR as closely interlinked with the human rights to due process 
(Art. 14 IACHR), prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of liberty (Art. 6 ICCPR), private life 
(Art. 8 ECHR)697 and life, does not lead to the establishment of an individual right to consular 
protection enforceable against the State of nationality. The bold Advisory Opinion No. 16/99 
of the IACtHR and the Breard, LaGrand, and Avena judgments of the ICJ assessing the 
nature of rights enshrined in Article 36 VCCR do not address the sending State of nationality 
or of residence duties towards their nationals or residents abroad, but only the consular rights 
and duties between the alien and the receiving State and between the sending and receiving 
States. Therefore the judgments of the ICJ and IACtHR are of relevance for this chapter and 
section only to the extent they can reveal a change in the States of nationality practice to 
exercise consular protection of their nationals. The position of most Latin American and EU 
countries, made evident during the memorials and oral hearings before international courts, 
can indicate a change in the opinio juris of these States towards the legal nature of consular 
protection of individuals abroad. Before the IACtHR and the ICJ, Mexico, Paraguay, 
Germany and the intervening States, emphasised the important role of providing consular 
assistance to their nationals, which arguably could have prevented the fatal end of their 
judicial trial. It was argued by the Applicant States that, had they been able to provide prompt 
consular assistance to their nationals, for instance to explain to them (in a language they 
understand) the differences in legal systems, the specificities of the judicial trial and the 
severe sentence that they face, and had their nationals enjoyed the legal representation of a 
lawyer with experience in similar cases, which could have been secured with the help of the 
consulate’s logistic and financial support, the sentence of the nationals would perhaps have 
                                                 
696 See C. Tomuschat, Human Rights: Between Idealism and Realism, Oxford University Press, 3rd ed. (2014), 
284-5. 
697 See Silver and Others v UK, Appl. Nos. 5947/72, 6205/73, 7052/75, 7061/75, 7113/75, 7136/75, Judgment of 
the ECtHR of 25 March 1983, para.104. In this case Austrian prison authorities delayed three weeks the 
forwarding of an US national letter to a US consulate and the VCCR individual right was analysed as a situation 
of a possible violation of the right to privacy as guaranteed under Art. 8 ECHR. 
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been less severe. The case law of the IACtHR698 and of the ICJ related to the interpretation 
and application of Art. 36(1) VCCR eloquently shows that consular assistance is an important 
guarantee for several human rights, both procedural and substantive ones, and that States 
would go to great lengths to secure consular assistance to their nationals facing the death 
penalty abroad. Consular assistance provides a means for the accused to defend himself, and 
this has an effect on the defendant’s other procedural rights, especially the rights connected 
with due process management, and ultimately, as shown by the Avena case, also a decisive 
impact on the outcome of the case,699 which is probably the reason why the conduct of the 
applicant States resemble an exercise of a State duty.  
It is important to emphasise that neither the IACtHR, nor the ICJ changed the State 
right legal nature of the consular assistance of the individuals by the State of nationality. 
Instead, they referred to it as the right of the State of nationality to assist their nationals by 
way of an official consular intervention. These Courts recognised only an individual right to 
have access to consular officials for the purpose of seeking consular assistance.700  
Another field that might provide additional jurisprudential evidence concerning the 
State obligation to provide consular protection to nationals and non-national residents abroad 
is the institution of diplomatic assurances. The development of international human rights has 
led to the establishment of the institution of diplomatic assurances, particularly in the context 
of extradition, expulsion or other forms of removals of individuals from the territory of the 
receiving State to the requesting State, as a form of safeguarding the right of the individual 
not to be subjected to torture and other ill-treatments.701 Obtaining diplomatic assurances ‘is 
common in death penalty cases, but assurances are also sought if the requested State has 
concerns about the fairness of judicial proceedings in the requesting State, or if there are 
fears that extradition may expose the wanted person to a risk of being subjected to torture or 
other forms of ill-treatment’.702 Diplomatic assurances are commonly sought when a sending 
                                                 
698 Application to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the Case of Jesús Tranquilino Vélez Loor (Case 
12.581) against the Republic of Panama; Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Peru, Judgment of May 30, 1999; See 
more details on the case in H. Bicudo, The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Process of 
Democratization in Peru, (2002) Human Rights Brief, 18. 
699 Especially in cases of foreigners convicted to the death penalty. 
700 See the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, ‘The Right to Information on 
Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law’, para. 80. 
701 According to the UNHCR, diplomatic assurances can be defines as: ‘The term “diplomatic assurances”, as 
used in the context of the transfer of a person from one State to another, refers to an undertaking by the 
receiving State to the effect that the person concerned will be treated in accordance with conditions set by the 
sending State or, more generally, in keeping with its human rights obligations under international law.’ See the 
UNHCR Note on Diplomatic Assurances and International Refugee Law, available online at 
http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/44dc81164.pdf  
702 2006 UNHCR Note, available at http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/44dc81164.pdf  
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State seeks to obtain guarantees with regard to the proper treatment of a person by the State 
from which he will be expelled. 
The institution of diplomatic assurances has thus a preventive nature, meant to 
safeguard the individual from any injury to his/her absolute fundamental right of not being 
subject to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment by the State of residence of the 
individual. It is a sort of compromise institution, meant to strike a balance between two 
competing community values: protection of human rights, on the one hand, and protection of 
the national/international security and the elementary principle of international law of equal 
state sovereignty. 
It is precisely this preventive nature, and the fact that diplomatic assurances involves 
the diplomatic channels of two States, of which, very often, one is the State of nationality of 
the individual, which determines the nature of diplomatic assurances as an institution falling 
under the consular protection functions of the State. The fact that an actual international 
wrongful act has not yet occurred pre-empts the qualification of the diplomatic assurances 
institution as a diplomatic protection form of action of the State. 
Although the institution of diplomatic assurances is not yet generally perceived as a 
legally binding international obligation on States, there is wide State practice, stemming from 
jurisprudential evidence, reflecting the approach of States towards this institution as fulfilling 
a sort of obligation to uphold the prohibition of torture or other mistreatments.703 The 
requesting States, in an attempt to ensure respect of their commitments under international 
human rights law, commonly ask for diplomatic assurances from the State of transfer of the 
individual that the latter will not be subjected to violation of fundamental human rights. It is 
thus often perceived as a first step in assessing the risk the individual might face if transferred 
to the requesting State. It seems to be perceived as forming an integral part of the positive 
obligations incumbent upon States under international human rights obligations. 
During its existence, the European Commission of Human Rights had to review 
several claims concerning the duties of consular and diplomatic authorities to intervene on 
behalf of their co-nationals in diverse situations.704 One such case, is the famous case X v 
                                                 
703 Chahal v United Kingdom (Appl. No. 22414/93, Judgment of 15 November 1996); Saadi v Italy (Appl. No. 
37201/06), Judgment 28 February 2008); Abu Qatada v UK (Appl. No. 8139/09 Judgment of 17 January 2012); 
Manickavasagam Suresh v Minister of Citizenship and Immigration and the Attorney General of Canada (Suresh 
v Canada), 2002, SCC 1, File No. 27790, January 11, 2002. 
704 For more details of these cases, please see K. da Costa, The Extraterritorial Application of Several Human 
Rights Treaties, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (2013), 96-99. 
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UK705, where a British mother complained that the British consul in Amman, Jordan, helped 
the father to legitimise his custody over the child, in spite of the mother’s legal custody 
having been granted by the UK courts and the claims submitted in Jordan against the father. 
Upon examination of the facts, the Commission found that the British consul complied with 
its functions, namely to insert the name of the child on the passport of the mother, and 
consequently rejected the claim as inadmissible, without considering the aspect of the help the 
consul should have given to the British mother in retrieving the child and securing his return 
to her. In this particular case, and other similar ones, the Commission, although recognising 
that ‘diplomatic and consular representatives [...] perform certain duties with regard to 
[nationals of a contracting state abroad] which may, in certain circumstances, make that 
country liable in respect of the Convention’, has never found a violation of one of these duties 
vis-à-vis the nationals. 
Domestic jurisprudence also signals a shift in the approach of the exercise of consular 
protection of individuals. Based on the consular guides and practice of the States, more and 
more domestic court recognise a State’s duty to provide consular protection to their nationals 
abroad. For instance, in a 2004 judgment, the Federal Court of Canada held that the Canadian 
Consular Guide as well as previous actions of the Canadian Government have created ‘a 
legitimate and reasonable expectation that a Canadian citizen detained abroad will receive 
many of the services’ which a citizen has requested. ‘Indeed, Canadians abroad would be 
surprised, if not shocked, to learn that the provision of consular services in an individual case 
is left to the complete and unreviewable discretion of the Minister.’706 The US Supreme Court 
held that the issuance of a passport by the US authorities is establishing upon the Government 
an obligation to protect.707  
A ground-breaking judgment for the consular assistance rights of the individual was 
delivered by the UK Supreme Court on 16 July 2014.708 The main issue of debate was the 
legality of the UK general consular assistance policy of refusing to grant financial help to 
nationals for legal representation purposes. Ms Sandiford is a British national sentenced to 
capital punishment by the Indonesian courts for the offence of drug trafficking. Following her 
                                                 
705 X v UK, European Commission of Human Rights, Appl. No. 7547/76, UK, decision of 15 December 1977, 12 
DR (1977) 73. 
706 See Federal Court of Canada, Khadr v Canada (Minister of Foreign Affairs) 2004, F.C. 1145, 18 August 
2004. 
707 See US v Laub, 385 U.S. 475, 481 (1966): ‘an US passport recognises the right of the bearer to protection 
and good office of American diplomat and consular officers.’ 
708 R (on the application of Sandiford) (Appellant) v The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs (Respondent) [2014] UKSC 44, Judgment of 16 July 2014 [hereinafter Sandiford case] 
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arrest, she cooperated with the police, enabling them to arrest and convict four Indonesian 
nationals involved in a drug cartel, which determined the prosecutor to change his request, in 
appeal, from the death sentence to a custodial one. As Ms Sandiford did not speak the local 
language and did not possess the financial means to hire a specialised lawyer who would 
defend her case before the appeal court, she thus sought financial support from the UK 
Government to pay the costs for her legal representation, but was refused this consular 
assistance service. The Government provided an alternative consular service, namely it 
facilitated the meeting between Ms Sandiford and an experienced lawyer working on a pro 
bono basis. Unfortunately, as the legal proceedings went on, her lawyer was no longer able to 
represent her at a certain point in time. Throughout the legal proceedings, the Government’s 
representatives submitted memorials and supportive amicus curiae briefings before the 
Indonesian courts. It refused, however, to financially contribute to the costs of the accused’s 
legal representation by a new lawyer based on the ‘Support for British Nationals Abroad: A 
Guide’ policy.709 Before resorting to the UK Courts, the appellant's last resort to have her 
sentence commuted was to apply to the Supreme Court of Indonesia to ask for the reopening 
of her case or to apply to the President for clemency. Both of these actions required money, 
which, again, she did not possess.  
The specific circumstances of her case, namely that she could not afford to pay for 
legal representation, and no such assistance was available to her in Indonesia, the irreversible 
sentence she was facing, and the expedient nature of the Indonesian legal proceedings and 
judgments which did not take into account the mitigating circumstances of her case, were 
invoked by Ms Sandiford as reasons that might have justified a change of the UK alleged 
general policy of refusing consular assistance in the form of financial support for legal 
representation.710  
Ms Sandiford based her claim before the Supreme Court of the UK on Art. 6(3) ECHR 
and domestic law. The UK Supreme Court rejected the application in relation to both grounds. 
The application of the ECHR was rejected on the ground of not fulfilling the conditions for 
the exceptional application of extra-territorial jurisdiction in cases of ‘acts of diplomatic or 
                                                 
709 Other EU countries have a policy of providing financial assistance, or ensuring free legal assistance to their 
citizens facing a death penaly abroad, e.g. Spain. See the National Report on Spain in the CARE Report. 
710 It has to be noted that other countries organised financial programmes meant to cover legal representation of 
their citizens detained abroad, giving priority to those risking the death sentence. Mexico is one of the most 
famous examples of such countries, explained by the high number of Mexican citizens detained in the US and 
sentenced to the death penalty. 
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consular agents’ when they ‘exert authority and control over others’.711) As to the Government 
requirements imposed by domestic law, the Court first established whether it has jurisdiction 
to review a prerogative power of the State, which would, in principle, confer absolute 
discretionary decision-making to the government. Invoking the Abbasi judgment, the Court 
held that it has jurisdiction to review the exercise of the State’s prerogatives on the basis of 
the limitations the State itself placed by the published policy and practice.712 
Having assessed the policy of the Government and the facts of the case, the Supreme 
Court rejected the appeal based on considerations that the Government had provided 
reasonable assistance to the applicant.713 The fact that the money was in the end provided by 
the family of the applicant also played a role in the Court reasoning, pointing out that the 
financial help of the Government was not that urgent and indispensable.  
The ground-breaking part is only now to come. Even if the Court rejected the appeal, it 
continued by making a recommended suggestion to the Secretary of State to urgently review 
the application of its general policy in light of the precarious situation of Ms Sandiford and 
the negative record of human rights of the Indonesian courts.714 This is the first judgment 
where a UK court has made a recommendation for a precise consular assistance measure to be 
considered by the Secretary of State. So far, although accepting jurisdiction over 
consular/diplomatic protection claims of the individuals against the Government, the UK 
court has limited the judicial review to assessing whether the executive decisions were 
arbitrary or irrational, expressly excluding the possibility of indicating any precise measures 
to the Government, as this would imply a substitution of the executive with the judiciary in 
foreign affairs matters, and lead to a breach of the separation of powers principle.715 However, 
in this case, the court limited itself to the review of the challenged consular service, namely 
the financial help, without indicating other alternative or additional consular services to the 
                                                 
711 Sandiford case, para. 24. 
712 ‘In so far as reliance is placed on legitimate expectation derived from established published policy or 
established practice, it is to the policy or practice that one must look for the limits, rigid or flexible, of the 
commitment so made, and of any enforceable rights derived from.’ (para. 62 of the Abbasi Judgment) 
713 The Government was held to have responded ‘with appropriate urgency to the wholly unexpected death 
sentence. They were able to put the appellant in contact with an experienced local lawyer who was willing to 
conduct the appeal on an expenses only basis.’ (para. 64) 
714 ‘[…] the Secretary of State ought now to revisit the question whether the policy should be broadened or an 
exception made in order to accommodate the particular case of Mrs Sandiford in the light of the fresh 
information about the course of the proceedings in Indonesia. But that is not because the Secretary of State has a 
duty to broaden his policy to make an exception. It is because he has already undertaken a review of that policy 
on the information available to him at the time, and because consistency and rationality require him not to treat 
that review as closed at a time when relevant further information is still becoming available which might alter 
his assessment.’ (para. 85) 
715 See the Abbasi judgment of the UK Court of Appeal. 
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executive. Furthermore, the Court was very careful in its wording not to establish a legal 
binding obligation on the part of the Government to confer financial help, but suggested the 
Government to re-consider its general policy in light of the exceptional case of Ms Sandiford, 
who was subject to an irreversible sentence after a grave violation of her human rights had 
been committed abroad.  
5. Conclusion 
A particular State practice can become a customary international law if it is repeated over a 
long period of time and is ‘uniform, extensive and representative’.716 The precise number of 
States that have to endorse a certain practice in order to form an international customary rule 
is not precisely established under public international law. Article 38(1)(b) of the ICJ Statute 
refers simply to a general practice. It is well established that unlike international treaties, 
customary rules do not require universal consent for acquiring legally binding effect, however 
the traditional norm on formation of international customary rules still imposes a high number 
of States’ recognition, not universally, but at least ‘an overwhelming majority of States’.717 In 
the North Sea Continental Shelf case, Judge Lachs argued that the ‘overwhelming majority’ 
standard has been replaced by a lower threshold, namely ‘a great number of States’,718 as long 
as those States that have participated in the establishment of a particular conduct as an 
international customary rule represent different political, economic and legal systems and 
their participation was determined by States’ interests. Judge Lachs and later also Judge 
Higgins719 have persuasively argued that the different social and scientific characteristics of 
the present society militate in favour of recognising the replacement of the traditional norm of 
public international law that an ‘overwhelming if not almost universal consent of States’ is 
needed for the formation of an international customary rule with a more updated and refined 
norm, accepting a smaller number of necessary States as long as they have explicitly or 
implicitly recognised the conduct to be proclaimed as customary norm. In spite of Judge 
Lachs’ proposal, the ICJ maintains its traditional approach based on the interpretation of 
                                                 
716 ILA, Final Report of the Committee on the Formation of Customary (General) International Law, Statement 
of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General Customary International Law, Report of the Sixty-Ninth 
Conference, London, 2000, Principle 4, 734. 
717 ICJ, Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Merits), judgment of 
27 June 1986; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, I.C.J. Reports 
1996, p. 226; J. Tasioulas, ‘Customary international law and the Quest for Global Justice’ in Perreau-Saussine, 
Amanda and Murphy, James B (eds), The Nature of Customary Law: Philosophical, Historical and Legal 
Perspectives, Cambridge University Press (2007). 
718 At 229. 
719 R. Higgins, Theories and Themes of Public International Law, op.cit., 112-3. 
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international law as an inter-States consensual relation, whereby an ‘overwhelming majority’, 
if not all members of the international community, need to consent to a certain conduct in 
order to ascertain the establishment of an international customary rule.720  
The opinion put forward in this thesis is that State practice on consular protection of 
nationals has not yet reached the required public international ‘overwhelming majority’ 
threshold. However, there is a widespread State practice, whereby consular assistance to 
citizens located in areas affected by disasters, or facing a death sentence, are treated as cases 
wherein the State needs to secure a certain consular assistance or protection to the citizen. 
Additionally, a practice of providing consular protection to nationals whose most basic human 
rights are in danger abroad is gradually developing. Nonetheless, it would be overly 
optimistic at this point to argue that such practice reflects a universal consensus of opinions 
among the States that creates an international customary individual right to consular 
protection abroad. 
The situation is a bit more nuanced at the regional level. European countries have 
concluded between them numerous bilateral, or multilateral consular and diplomatic 
cooperation arrangements for the purpose of ensuring the widest possible representation of 
their foreign interests and protection of their citizens in the world, long before the creation of 
the EU, or their accession to the EU.721 European countries with long-standing cultural and 
diplomatic ties, such as the Benelux countries, some of the Central and Eastern European 
countries, and the Baltic States,722 have concluded regional agreements recognising among 
them a State duty to ensure consular assistance of the nationals of the other Contracting States 
that were not represented in a particular foreign country. Starting from 1992, the Maastricht 
Treaty has united this fragmented consular and diplomatic cooperation framework under the 
                                                 
720 See Continental Shelf Tunisia v Libya, at 38, and Continental Shelf Libya v Malta. 
721 See, inter alia, the Helsinki Treaty, concluded on 23 March 1962 between the Scandinavian countries 
(Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Iceland and Norway). For more detailed information on this type of regional 
agreements between the EU countries, see Chapter three, section 2.1.2 of the CARE Report.  
722 The Baltic cooperation is dedicated entirely to issues of consular assistance. For example, Article 3 of the 
Baltic Agreement reiterates the cases set out in Article 5(1) of Decision 95/553/EC and adds a new consular 
function in Article 3(g) – [the consular and diplomatic officials of the Contracting Parties] acting as notary in 
capacities and performing certain functions of an administrative nature, in conformity with the laws and 
regulations of the receiving State. See also See, inter alia, the Helsinki Convention on Nordic Co-operation 
(hereinafter the Helsinki Treaty), concluded on 23rd of March 1962 between the Scandinavian countries 
(Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Iceland and Norway), or the Agreement on Consular Assistance and Cooperation 
signed between the three Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, before they acceded to the EU on 5 
February 1999. For the entire list of bilateral and regional agreements between the European countries on 
consular cooperation, see Chapter Three, Section 2.1.2 of the CARE Report, available at: 
http://www.careproject.eu (accessed February 2013). 
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ambit of the EU, and imposed on all Member States the obligation to provide equal consular 
protection of all Union citizens who are unrepresented in third countries. 
It could be argued that the time and space requirements necessary for the formation of 
a regional customary international rule recognising to nationals an individual right to equal 
consular protection abroad have been fulfilled within the current EU’s territory. Such a 
regional customary international norm could represent a stepping-stone for the formation of a 
general international customary norm on ensuring a certain consular protection of citizens 
abroad. 
There is a growing pressure exerted by citizens, NGOs, media, and scholars on 
national governments to assume a duty to provide consular protection to nationals abroad in 
certain critical circumstances, such as disasters or grave violations of human rights.723 It seems 
that it is only a matter of time until a general customary international norm recognising a 
limited State duty to provide consular protection to its nationals abroad, at least when facing 
grave violations of human rights, will be recognised. Until then, although international law 
reserves consular protection to the State of nationality decision-making, current practice 
admits new actors with consular protection functions, such as the non-nationality States which 
can increasingly perform this function on the basis of the growing number of consular 
cooperation international treaties.  
 
V. The legal nature of Diplomatic Protection: State’s right, individual or 
human right? 
1. Introduction - Diplomatic Protection as a Duty to Protect: Examining 
the Formation of a Customary Rule of International Law 
The public international legal institution of diplomatic protection has traditionally been 
defined as an exclusive State right, over which States can discretionarily decide whether to 
exercise it, for the benefit of which natural person, when, and how.724 Therefore all the aspects 
related to the exercise of diplomatic protection of individuals have been traditionally 
                                                 
723 Maaike Okano-Heijmans, ‘Change in Consular Assistance and the Emergence of Consular Diplomacy’, in J. 
Melissen and Ana M. Fernandez (eds.), Consular Affairs and Diplomacy, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff (2011). 
724 Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway Case, (1939) PCIJ Series A/B, No. 76 16, 17; Mavrommatis Palestine 
Concessions Case (1924), PCIJ Series A No. 2; the Nottebohm Case, 1955 ICJ Reports, 24; Barcelona Traction, 
Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain), ICJ 1970; Borchard, The Diplomatic Protection of 
Citizens Abroad, op.cit.; Joseph, Nationality and Diplomatic Protection—The Commonwealth of Nations 
Leyden: A. W. Sijthoff (1969), 1. 
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conceived as falling entirely under the exclusive and discretionary power of the State, more 
precisely, the State of nationality. This has become the classical conception of diplomatic 
protection portrayed as a State-centric mechanism of international law.725 However, at the 
basis of this State’s right to exercise diplomatic protection are individual rights, namely those 
of its nationals, who were breached by a foreign state. However, they have not acquired a 
place within the classical general international customary norm which defines diplomatic 
protection.726 This definition emerged in a time when individuals did not exist on the 
international plane, and their protection had to be ensured via a legal fictional transfer of the 
individual’s pleas against a foreign State to an international actor that was recognised as 
having a place in international relations, namely the State of nationality of the individual. The 
legal fiction of diplomatic protection was thus created as no more than ‘a means to an end’.727 
As clearly stated by the ICJ in the Barcelona Traction case, the protection of the individual 
rights lost a place also in the ‘end’, i.e. the objective driving diplomatic protection, being 
replaced with the State’s own public interests. For a particularly long time, diplomatic 
protection was thus an entirely State dominated international mechanism, which, although 
initially legitimised by a violation of an individual right, was made entirely dependent on 
State’s discretionary decision-making and the interests driving diplomatic protection were not 
primarily related to the safety and protection of the nationals abroad. 
A revolutionary shift, produced in the aftermath of the Second World War, when 
individuals were gradually recognised a place in international relations, concretised in the 
development of international human rights systems. The international legal system, although 
still principally controlled by States, now also encompasses a broad range of other actors: 
international organisations, non-governmental organisations, including with increasing 
regularity, individuals.728 The ICJ has already expressly admitted in the Jurisdiction of the 
Courts of Danzing case that the individual can acquire international rights directly under 
international treaties, thus offering the possibility of considering the individuals as possible 
subjects of international law. The thesis of the individual as a full subject of international law 
                                                 
725 See Chittharanjan F. Amerasinghe, op.cit., 23ff. 
726 ‘[…] by taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international 
judicial proceedings on his behalf, a state is in reality asserting its own right, the right to ensure, in the person 
of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law.’ See Mavrommatis, 12. The Mavrommatis formula has 
been latter reaffirmed in several other leading cases of the ICJ and to a certain extent still acknowledged by the 
ILC. 
727 See A. Vermeer-Künzli, op.cit., PhD Thesis, 2007, 35. 
728 See K. Parllet, The Individual in the International Legal System. Continuity and Change in International Law, 
Cambridge University Press (2010); R. McCorquodale, ‘The Individual and the International Legal System’, in 
Evans (ed.), International Law, 3rd ed., Oxford (2010). 
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with capacity to acquire and exercise international rights and obligations is not yet generally 
accepted in the international practice and academia, on the other hand, the title of participant 
in international relations is widely accepted in relation to the individual.729 This position 
reflects already a significant change in public international law compared to several decades 
ago, and has also fuelled the debate on whether the role of the individual should be formally 
recognised within the institution of diplomatic protection. This particular development within 
the public international legal framework led certain academics to challenge the classical, 
State-centric definition of diplomatic protection as old-fashioned.730  
Under the previous section, dedicated to consular protection, it was concluded that the 
current face of consular protection is different from the classical public international legal 
conception of this institution. The development of international human rights, the increased 
migratory flow of natural persons, the pressures exerted by citizens and domestic 
communities on the Governments’ conduct of consular protection have instilled new 
characteristics on the public international legal conception of consular protection. In short 
these changes can be summarised as a sort of ‘humanization’ updating of consular protection.  
The present section aims to assess the impact of these trends on the classical 
conception of diplomatic protection as a discretionary State right. Some remarks have already 
been advanced in the second section of this chapter, dedicated to the conditions for the 
exercise of consular and diplomatic protection. It was argued that, as regards the requirements 
and scope of diplomatic protection, the current international legal framework has departed 
from the State-centric conception and evolved into an institution that is more effectively 
serving the protection of individuals and their rights. The present section aims to assess 
whether a similar evolution can be identified as regards the legal nature of diplomatic 
protection: is it still defined as a purely discretionary State right, or has the individual been 
given a place, and if so, how has this re-definition impacted on the legal nature of diplomatic 
protection. The 2006 ILC Articles on Diplomatic Protection, the opinions of renowned legal 
academics, State practice and international, regional and domestic jurisprudence will be 
assessed with the purpose of answering a question that was raised by the legal literature as 
                                                 
729 R. Higgins, Problems and Process. International Law and How We Use It, Oxford: Clarendon Press, Oxford 
(1994), 49; see also Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig case, PCIJ Reports Series B No. 15 (1928). 
730 G. Amador, ‘State Responsibility. Some New Problems’, (1958) Hague Recueil, 437–9, 472; G. Amador, 
Second Report to the ILC, (1957) YBILC, 112–16; M. Bennouna, Preliminary Report on Diplomatic Protection, 
UN Doc. A/CN.4/484, paras. 34–7; Chittharanjan F. Amerasinghe, op.cit., 23. 
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early as the 1970s,731 but has not yet find a final asnwer: is there an international customary 
norm establishing a State duty to exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of individuals? 
2. Diplomatic Protection as a Duty to Protect: Examining the Formation 
of a Customary Rule of International Law 
a. Opinions of scholars 
 
This sub-section will assess the contribution of academics to the development of the 
institution of diplomatic protection of individuals, starting with the classical Vattelian legal 
fiction conception of diplomatic protection, continuing with the opinions establishing the 
‘humanization’ trend and until the current day growing academic trend of recognising a 
limited State duty to provide some sort of diplomatic protection measures to the nationals 
abroad who have been subjected to grave violations of human rights. The objective of this 
overview of legal thought is to understand whether there has been a paradigm shift in the 
scholarly conception of diplomatic protection from a State-monopolised mechanism to one 
where the individual and the State are sharing positions, and whether this paradigm shift has 
currently reached the level of a majoritarian academic view recognising a limited (human) 
individual right to diplomatic protection and finally the impact of the academics’ view on the 
international normative framework. 
Vattel732, the legal scholar to which the first definition of diplomatic protection has 
been generally ascribed, is argued to have been the first to refer to the legal nature of 
diplomatic protection as a right of the State based on a transfer of the injured individual’s 
right to the State of his nationality.733 It has to be noted that although there is a unanimous 
academic consensus that the origins of diplomatic protection are to be found in Vattel’s Law 
of Nations, the author has not treated the topic of diplomatic protection as such. Diplomatic 
protection would be formally recognised as an institution of public international law only 
                                                 
731 Richard B. Lillich, ‘Commentary, The Diplomatic Protection of Nationals Abroad: An Elementary Principle 
of International Law Under Attack’, (1975) American Journal of International Law, 359, 359; P. Weis, 
‘Diplomatic Protection and International Protection of Human Rights’, (1971) HRJ, 675. They are among the 
first legal scholars arguing in favour of re-fashioning diplomatic protection based on a ‘humanist’ based vision, 
which gained strong support once the individual acquired rights under the international scene. Accordingly, the 
State acts as an agent on behalf of the injured individual and enforces the right of the individual rather than that 
of the State. 
732 E. de Vattel, The Law of Nations (1758), (reprint of the translation by J. Chitty of 1854), New Jersey 2005. 




centuries later.734 In his treaties on international law as a law between and for States, Vattel 
addressed the particular situation of citizens ill-treated by foreign States. On closer inspection, 
his famous passage associated with diplomatic protection seems to indicate the opinion that 
States have a duty to protect their nationals injured abroad: ‘Whoever ill-treats a citizen 
indirectly injures the State, which must protect that citizen. The sovereign of the injured 
citizen must avenge the deed and, if possible, force the aggressor to give full satisfaction or 
punish him, since otherwise the citizen will not obtain the chief end of civil society, which is 
protection’.735 
A textual interpretation would indicate that he speaks not of a State’s right but of a 
State’s obligation to protect its citizens. Words such as ‘must protect’, ‘must avenge the 
dead’, and ‘force the aggressor to give full satisfaction or punish him’ indicate that Vattel 
frames the relationship between the State and the individual as one where the State bears a 
duty of protection towards its national that has been injured by a foreign State. Vattel thus 
seems to be the first international legal scholar referring to a State duty to protect its citizens 
abroad.  
At the beginning of the 20th of century, Borchard would indicate that Vattel’s referral 
to a State obligation to ensure protection of its citizens abroad is simply a moral and not a 
legal obligation incumbent upon the State, which the latter is free to manage as it pleases.736 
During this time, diplomatic protection was formally recognised as part and parcel of public 
international law,737 and its legal nature was undisputedly established as a discretionary right 
of the State. According to Borchard, the protecting State is the sole holder of rights in relation 
to diplomatic protection, rejecting the agent or trustee doctrine.738 There was unanimous 
scholarly agreement that after the individual submitted his claim for protection before the 
Government, he lost all power over the fate of the proceedings. The approval of the 
individual’s claim, the choice of means for diplomatic protection, the sequence of the 
proceedings and the remedy awarded by the accused state were all considered issues falling 
                                                 
734 See Chittharanjan F. Amerasinghe, op.cit., 23ff. 
735 Vattel, E. de, Le droit de gens ou les principes de la loi naturelle (London, 1758), in The Classics of 
International Law, Washington, D.C., Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1916, vol. I, book II, p. 309, para. 71. 
736 ‘[…] it is clear that at international law there is no legal duty incumbent upon the State to extend diplomatic 
protection. Whether such a duty exits towards the citizen is a matter of municipal law of his own country, the 
general law being that even under municipal law the State is under no legal duty to extend diplomatic 
protection.’ (Borchard, The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad (1916)) 29. The writers cited by Borchard 
include Grotius and Vattel) 
737 See ICJ in the Panevezys case and arbitration tribunals Administrative Decision No. V (UNRIAA, 7, 153). 




under the arbitrary power of the State.739 Until relatively recently, the prevailing school of 
thought has thus described diplomatic protection as a right of the State, in which only the 
State can decide in which circumstances to exercise this right and over which the judiciary 
had no judicial control.  
The progressive development of international human rights law and the general 
changing public international legal framework, in the aftermath of the Second World War, 
have influenced legal scholars to change their classical approach of the institution of 
diplomatic protection. In the 1970s, American legal scholars such as Lillich, Root and Paul 
Weis740 started to approach diplomatic protection as a sort of moral and legal obligation of the 
State to help citizens in distress while abroad. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, and especially post-2000, more and more international lawyers 
and scholars741 started to call for a reform of the international law governing diplomatic 
protection for the purpose of making it correspond to the contemporary status of international 
law, which in the recent decades focused increasingly on empowering and protecting the 
individuals.742 The increased recognition of the role of the individual in international relations 
and law, and the changing definition of the State sovereignty have determined certain 
academics to argue that individuals are gaining certain diplomatic protection rights vis-à-vis 
their sending State.743 The development of States’ obligations in the field of international 
human rights and the acquisition of individual’s rights on the international scene have fuelled 
an academic trend recognising the role of the individual and individual rights within the 
traditional diplomatic protection institution. At the start of the 21st century, a growing number 
of legal scholars started to argue that the influence of international human rights law on the 
traditional institution of diplomatic protection should be accepted and explored. A State duty 
                                                 
739 Vattel, op.cit.; D. Anzilotti, ‘La responsabilité internationale des Etats à raison des dommages soufferts par 
des étrangers’, (1906) RGDIP, 5; Borchard, op.cit.; J. Dugard, First Report, op.cit., para. 62. 
740 E. Root, ‘The Basis of Protection to Citizens Residing Abroad’, (1979) AJIL, 517; Richard B. Lillich, 
‘Commentary, The Diplomatic Protection of Nationals Abroad: An Elementary Principle of International Law 
Under Attack’, (1975) AJIL, 359, 359; P. Weis, ‘Diplomatic Protection and International Protection of Human 
Rights’, (1971) HRJ, 675. 
741 G. Gaja, op.cit.; M. Benouna, op.cit.; Dugard, op.cit.; Trindade, op.cit.; Karazivan, op.cit. 
742 A. Peters and J. Klabbers argue that the current international law is evolving towards empowering the 
individual, see Constitutionalisation of International Law, see op.cit., 174. 
743 Robert B. Lillich, International Law of State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens, Charlottesville (University 
Press of Virginia), 1983; The Human Rights of Aliens in Contemporary International Law, Manchester 
(Manchester University Press), 1984; R. Higgins, Problems and Process, International law and how we use it, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press (1994); M. Benouna, ‘La protection diplomatique, un droit de l’Etat?’ in Balletbo and 
others (ed), Boutros Ghali Amicorum discipulorumque Liber, Vol. I Bruxelles: Bruylant (1998), 245; C. 
Dominice, ‘L’emergence de l’individu en droit international public’, (1987-1988) Annales d’etudes 
internationals. Latter on G. Gaja would follow this trend, see ‘Droits des etats et droits des individus dans le 
cadre de la protection diplomatique’ in J. F. Flauss, (dir.), La Protection Diplomatique: Mutations 
contemporaines et pratiques nationales, Brussels, Nemesis-Bruylant, 2003. 
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to exercise diplomatic protection was subsequently based on the international human rights 
law and practice.744 Strong academic support is developing on framing diplomatic protection 
as an obligation of the State when the international wrongful act at issue consists of a breach 
of basic human rights of the individual as they are defined in international human rights law, 
especially those provided by jus cogens norms.745 A State duty to protect nationals abroad 
seems to be accepted also in cases when individuals do not have access to international 
jurisdictions.746 Therefore this scholarly theory seems to bridge the traditional understanding 
of diplomatic protection as a discretionary right of the State with the contemporary strong 
doctrine of human rights vested in individuals.747  
The classical State-centred theory of diplomatic protection has now been replaced by 
theories which try to balance the aforementioned human rights based theory of diplomatic 
protection with the political considerations inherent in the institution of diplomatic protection. 
This theory argues that attention should be paid to practice and reality, and admit the role 
political considerations are playing and will continue to play in the State’s decision-making 
procedure on the exercise of diplomatic protection.748 Currently, the majority of legal scholars 
agree that the individual plays a more considerable role within the institution of diplomatic 
protection, even if not on an equal par with that of the State.749 Among them, there is a 
growing number of scholars who argue that the State either has a duty based on State practice 
and jurisprudence750 or that it ought to have a duty de lege ferenda.751 
                                                 
744 Karazivan, op.cit.; Dugard, op.cit.; G. Ress/T. Stein (eds.), Dser Diplomatische Shutz im Volker-und 
Europarecht, aktuelle probleme und entwicklungstendenzen, 1996 ; Pieter H. Kooijmans, ‘Is the Right to 
Diplomatic Protection a Human Right?’, in Studi di Diritto Internazionale in Onore di Gaetano Arangio Ruiz, 
Napoli (2004), 1980-1981; L. Condorelli, ‘L´évolution du champ d´application de la protection diplomatique’, 
en J. F. Flauss, (dir.), La Protection Diplomatique: Mutations contemporaines et pratiques nationales, Brussels, 
Nemesis-Bruylant, 2003, 3-28; M. Pinto, ‘De la protection diplomatique à la protection des droits de l’homme’ 
(2002) RGDIP, 513; C. Tiburcio, op.cit.; T. Hooge, Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as Duty to Protect? – 
Reassessing the Traditional Doctrine of Diplomatic Protection in light of Modern Developments in International 
Law, LLM Thesis, 2010, available at: 
<https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/bitstream/1807/25618/1/Hooge_Nicholas_T_201011_LLM_thesis.pdf> 
745 Karazivan, op.cit.; Trindade, op.cit.; Dugard, op.cit.; Tiburcio, op.cit; N. Kato, The Role of Diplomatic 
Protection in the Implementation Process of Public International Law, op.cit. 
746 See Hooge, op.cit. 
747 E. Prochaska, ‘Testing the Limits of Diplomatic Protection: Khadr v The Prime Minister of Canada’, EJIL 
Analysis, available at http://www.ejiltalk.org/testing-the-limits-of-diplomatic-protection-khadr-v-the-prime-
minister-of-canada/  
748 See Pergantis, op.cit.; Albornoz, op.cit.; A. Vermeer-Künzli, op.cit.; Koopmans, op.cit. 
749 Pergantis, op.cit.; Hooge, op.cit.; A. Vermeer-Künzli, op.cit.; S. Touzé, La Protection Des Droits Des 
Nationaux À L'étranger - Recherches Sur La Protection Diplomatique, Paris, Pedone, 2007; Chittharanjan F. 
Amerasinghe, op.cit. 
750 C. Focarelli, International Law as Social Construct: The Struggle for Global Justice, Oxford University Press 
(2012),185-188; N. Kato, ‘The Role of Diplomatic Protection in the Implementation Process of Public 
International Law’, op.cit.; Karazivan, op.cit.; Trindade, op.cit. 
751 Dugard, op.cit.; Klein, op.cit.; Condorelli, op.cit. 
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The most significant contribution brought by legal scholars to updating the institution 
of diplomatic protection is found in the work of Professor John Dugard, and Judge Bennouna, 
who have acted as Rapporteurs appointed by the ILC for the codification and progressive 
development of the international rules on diplomatic protection. In 1996 the International Law 
Commission identified the topic of diplomatic protection as being ripe for codification and 
progressive development752 and appointed Judge Bennouna753 for fulfilling the task of 
articulating the relevant rules.754 In its First Report, Rapporteur Bennouna stressed the need to 
update the classical institution of diplomatic protection to the current reality of international 
relations, which would no longer support the Mavrommatis legal fiction definition. 
Rapporteur Bennouna was replaced in 2000755 by Professor Dugard who completed the draft 
Articles on Diplomatic Protection in 2006.756 
Professor Dugard’s innovative way of satisfying both States’ interests, namely of 
preserving their discretionary right of exercising diplomatic protection, and the current needs 
of international society, where individuals are active participants in international relations, 
when defining diplomatic protection materialised in three proposals, some more revolutionary 
than others. Article 1 of the 2006 ILC Articles on Diplomatic Protection enshrines the current 
generally accepted definition of diplomatic protection. It describes the institution as a 
procedural means with the help of which a State can invoke the international responsibility of 
a State ‘for an injury caused by an internationally wrongful act of that State to a natural or 
legal person that is a national of the former State’. Therefore the role of the individual is 
expressly recognised as a foundation of diplomatic protection. Neither Article 1, nor other 
subsequent Articles clarify whether the State asserts its own rights or those of the national. 
This codification solution keeps open both the traditionalist and the modern interpretations of 
                                                 
752 See Report on the Work of the International Law Commission during its 48th session (1996), UN Doc. 
A/51/10 (General Assembly, Official Records, Supplement No. 10), para. 249 and Annex II, addendum 1. In the 
same year, the International Law Association established a Committee on the Diplomatic Protection of Persons 
and Property, which would closely follow the work of the ILC. 
753 Judge Bennouna was appointed as Special Rapporteur in 1997, (1997) II Part 2 International Law 
Commission Yearbook para. 190. 
754 The topic of diplomatic protection was first considered to be included in the agenda of the ILC during the 
study of the State responsibility. Garcia Amador argued that diplomatic protection norms are secondary, 
procedural rules which should be kept separate from the substantial rules of international law on responsibility of 
States for international wrongful acts. First Report of Garcia Amador (1956) 11 ILC Yearbook 173 192ff (A/CN 
4/96). 
755 In 1999, Rapporteur Bennouna was elected to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 
which led to his replacement with the renowned South African Professor John R. Dugard. 
756 Seventh Report on Diplomatic Protection, ILC 58 Session 2006 A/CN 4/567. See also Dugard, ‘Diplomatic 
protection and human rights: The Draft Articles of the International Law Commission’ (2005) 24 Australian YIL 
75. The final Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection with commentaries are at ILC Report of the Fifty-eighth 
Session (2006) A/CN 4/L 684. 
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diplomatic protection, without rejecting any of them. This compromise can be considered a 
more positive step for the recognition of the individual’s place in international relations than 
the previous norm expressly excluding the right of the individual from the diplomatic 
protection mechanism. 
The other two proposals put forward by Rapporteur Dugard with relevance for the 
legal nature of diplomatic protection refer to the express recognition of a State duty to 
exercise, in limited circumstances, diplomatic protection on behalf of its nationals. A first 
proposal was put forward in Article 4757 of Dugard’s First Report submitted to the ILC in 
2000. It was an exercise of progressive development of the practice, providing a State legal 
duty to exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of the injured nationals in the particular 
circumstances of a ‘grave breach of jus cogens norms’. Rapporteur Dugard also added the 
obligation of States to provide in their municipal law the right of the individual to an effective 
judicial remedy in case the State of nationality violates its international legal obligation. The 
practice on the basis of which the Rapporteur ascertained a State duty to exercise diplomatic 
protection included the domestic legal provisions of several States recognising a right of the 
national to receive protection from the State when abroad, and the domestic jurisprudence 
assessing individual claims to receive diplomatic protection. Dugard’s proposal for a State 
duty to exercise diplomatic protection in cases of violations of jus cogens norms was not well 
received by either the States’ representatives or scholars. Most of the criticisms referred to the 
lack of clarity of the normative proposal as to whom the State duty was owed – the national or 
the entire community, and the limited owner of the duty – the State of nationality, when the 
norms violated were of a jus cogens nature, and should thus be considered binding on the 
entire international community.758 Second, the absence of a clear understanding of the scope 
                                                 
757 Art. 4 reads as follows: ‘1. Unless the injured person is able to bring a claim for such injury before a 
competent international court or tribunal, the State of his/her nationality has a legal duty to exercise diplomatic 
protection on behalf of the injured person upon request, if the injury results from a grave breach of a jus cogens 
norm attributable to another State. 2. The State of nationality is relieved of this obligation if: (a) The exercise of 
diplomatic protection would seriously endanger the overriding interests of the State and/or its people; (b) 
Another State exercises diplomatic protection on behalf of the injured person; (c) The injured person does not 
have the effective and dominant nationality of the State. 3. States are obliged to provide in their municipal law 
for the enforcement of this right before a competent domestic court or other independent national authority.’ 
758 See, inter alia, J.F. Flauss, ‘Vers un aggiornamento des conditions d’exercice de la protection diplomatique?’, 
in J.F. Flauss (dir.), La protection diplomatique: mutations contemporaines et pratiques nationals, Bruxelles, 
(2003), 31; V. Pergantis, ‘Towards a ‘Humanization’ of Diplomatic Protection?’, (2006) ZaöRV, 351, 377-379; 
Kooijmans argued whether the same objective pursued by Dugard’ revolutionary proposal, namely of filling the 
gap in the present system of human rights protection, could be achieved by less dramatic transformations, see, 
Pieter H. Kooijmans, ‘Is the Right to Diplomatic Protection a Human Right?’, op.cit., 1980-1981; G. Gaja, ‘Is a 
State Specially Affected When Its Nationals’ Human Rights Are Infringed?’, in L.C. Vohrah et al. (eds.), Man’s 
Inhumanity to Man: Essays in Honour of Judge Antonio Cassese, The Hague : Kluwer Law International (2003), 
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of jus cogens norms was argued to create confusion rather than providing clear limits to the 
discretionary nature of the State’s right to exercise diplomatic protection. It has to be recalled 
that at the moment when draft Article 4 was discussed, the notion of jus cogens had not been 
formally endorsed by the ICJ; it was only in 2006 that the ICJ recognised the notion in the 
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo case.759  
Finally, the 6th ILC Committee refused Rapporteur Dugard’s revolutionary proposal to 
recognise a limited State duty to exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of nationals on the 
basis of the alleged insufficient evidence of an opinio juris recognising diplomatic protection 
as a State duty in situations of violations of jus cogens norms by a foreign State. The several 
domestic legal provisions recognising a State duty to exercise protection of nationals abroad760 
were held to be insufficient evidence of the necessary opinio juris that would support an 
international obligation upon the State.761 In addition, it was argued that, firstly, ‘there were 
not very many contemporary writers who thought that diplomatic protection was a duty of the 
State’ and, secondly, that the conclusion reached by Rapporteur Dugard ‘that there were 
‘signs’ in recent State practice of support for that viewpoint’ was held to be an optimistic 
assessment of the actual materials available.762 Whether these reasons were well-founded is 
arguable, since there were several established scholars that supported the theory of a State’s 
legal duty to exercise diplomatic protection to its nationals in cases of human rights 
violations. For example, during the same year that Rapporteur Dugard proposed to include a 
State’s duty to exercise diplomatic protection, Francisco Orrego Vicuna, Rapporteur of the 
ILA within the Committee on Diplomatic Protection of Persons and Property, put forward 
before the ILA an article with a similar content as Dugard’s draft Article 4 which passed the 
approval of the ILA.763 
Important developments have occurred since 2000, in both State practice, and 
international and domestic jurisprudence, which bring significant evidence in support of a 
                                                                                                                                                        
373-382; ibid., ‘Droits des États et droits des individus dans le cadre de la protection diplomatique’, op.cit., 63-
69. 
759 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction 
and Admissibility, Judgment of 3 February 2oo6, General List No. 126 
760 See more details in the subsequent sub-section. 
761 It has to be noted that the States’ representative opinions were supported also by academics, see in particular, 
V. Pergantis, ‘Towards a ‘Humanization’ of Diplomatic Protection?’, op.cit., 351, 378;  
762 See Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its Fifty-eighth Session, U.N. Doc. A/61/10 
(2006), 78. 
763 Francisco O. Vicuna, Interim Report on The Changing Law of Nationality of Claims’ submitted to the ILA 
Committee on Diplomatic Protection of Persons and Property in the 2000 Conference, 28-44; For a common 
examination of the ILC and ILA codification projects, see Pieter H. Kooijmans, ‘Is the Right to Diplomatic 
Protection a Human Right?’, op.cit., 1975-1984. 
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developing individual’s right to diplomatic protection in certain specific circumstances. 
Additionally, many more scholars have shown their support for the imposition of duty upon 
States to exercise diplomatic protection for their nationals in cases of grave violation of 
fundamental human rights.764 The proposed Article 4 was ultimately removed from the Draft 
Articles and Professor Dugard proposed instead a significantly toned down Article. Not 
willing to completely give up the proposal, which was a step towards furthering diplomatic 
protection for the protection of international human rights, the Rapporteur replaced the legal 
duty with a recommendation for the state to consider exercising diplomatic protection in the 
same circumstances as those enshrined in the previous Article 4. Current Article 19(a) 
provides that a State ‘should [...] [g]ive due consideration to the possibility of exercising 
diplomatic protection, especially when a significant injury has occurred’. In the commentary 
of Art. 19, the Rapporteur noted that ‘[…] there is growing support for the view that there is 
some obligation, however imperfect, on States [...] to protect their nationals abroad when 
they are subjected to significant human rights violations’.765 The Constitutions of many States 
recognising an individual right to receive diplomatic protection for injuries suffered abroad 
and the decisions of a number of domestic courts were invoked as evidentiary support for the 
recommended practice.766 
The State practice and jurisprudence until 2006 was thus held by Rapporteur Dugard 
and approved by the ILC to suggest ‘that international law already recognizes the existence 
of some obligation on the part of a State to consider the possibility of exercising diplomatic 
protection on behalf of a national who has suffered a significant injury abroad’.767  
The 2006 ILC Articles768 have brought salient changes to the institution of diplomatic 
protection, reflecting a more balanced conception between the traditional view of diplomatic 
protection as State-centric, and the modern conception of international law, where the 
individual is recognised a place in the international fora. This normative updating has been 
                                                 
764 E. Milano, ‘Diplomatic Protection and Human Rights before the International Court of Justice: Re-fashioning 
Tradition?’, (2004) NYIL, 85, 94-97; Mariana S. Albornoz, ‘Legal Nature and Legal Consequences of 
Diplomatic Protection. Contemporary Challenges’, (2006) Anuario Mexicano de Derecho Internacional, 377-
417; and Kooijmans, op.cit.; A. Bassu, La rilevanza dell'interesse individuale nell'istituto della protezione 
diplomática, Giuffrè, 2008; Karazivan, op.cit.; Crawford, J. Crawford, ‘The ILC’s Draft Articles on Diplomatic 
Protection’, (2006) S. Afr. Y.B. Int'l L, 19. 
765 Report of the International Law Commission, Fifty-eighth Session, U.N. Doc. A/61/10 (2006), 96. 
766 Report of the International Law Commission, Fifty-eighth Session, U.N. Doc. A/61/10 (2006), 96. 
767 Report of the International Law Commission, Fifty-eighth Session, U.N. Doc. A/61/10 (2006), 96-97. 
768 In 2008 the United Nations decided to accept the ILC proposal to consider the adoption of a Convention on 
Diplomatic Protection, see 62nd session, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly, 8 January 2008, 62/67. 
In 2013 the UN decided to establish a Working Group in order to fulfill the mandate conferred by the General 
Assembly, see Resolution 65/27 of 7 October 2013. 
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the result of Rapporteur Dugard’s view of approaching the task of codifying the international 
norms governing diplomatic protection from the perspective that human rights and diplomatic 
protection serve a common remedial objective, namely protection of individual (human) 
rights, and, consequently, the rules governing diplomatic protection should contribute to 
making diplomatic protection a tool for increasing the effectiveness of international human 
rights. His proposals as regards the definition of diplomatic protection and recognition of an 
international norm in formation establishing a State duty to exercise diplomatic protection 
have revolutionised the classical conception of diplomatic protection of individuals, and 
recognised the individual and his human rights among the driving forces of the institution. 
In conclusion, it can be observed that, regarding the legal nature of diplomatic 
protection, international legal scholars are now divided in two main categories. On the one 
hand, the supporters of a human rights based conceptualisation of diplomatic protection, who 
argue that a State duty to protect citizens abroad exists, or is in the process of creation, based 
on domestic legislation and jurisprudence, and on the States’ duties resulting from 
international human rights law.769 The second category includes scholars who argue that in 
spite of the increasing role of the individual in international relations, a State duty to protect 
nationals abroad cannot be established based on the existent practice that is insufficient and 
establishes very loose, moral rather legal, obligations on the part of the State.770 These 
international legal scholars also argue that such a State duty should not be established since 
the reality is that diplomatic protection is a highly political institution that better serves the 
individual if it remains political and exceptional instead of formalising it as a right of the 
individual, which will lead diplomatic protection to lose its international impact. 
 
b. State practice 
In spite of the fervent critiques brought to the institution of diplomatic protection as being an 
obsolete institution of public international law771, practice proves that diplomatic protection 
undoubtedly continues to be valuable and current.772 
                                                 
769 Main supporters: J. Dugard, op.cit., Karazivan, op.cit.; P> Klein, op.cit.; and Trindade, op.cit. 
770 Pergantis, op.cit.; A. Vermeer-Künzli, op.cit.; G. Gaja, op.cit.; O de Schutter, International Human Rights 
Law: Cases and Materials, Commentary, Cambridge University Press (2014), 5, 15. 
771 International Law Commission, International Responsibility. Second Report by F.V. Garcia Amador, Special 
Rapporteur, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/106 (1957) at 112-116; see also, F. V. García Amador, ‘State Responsibility. 
Some New Problems’ (1958), 94 Recueil des Cours 421; L. Condorelli, ‘La protection diplomatique et 
l’évolution de son domaine d’application’, 86 RDI (2003), 5-26; Preliminary Report on Diplomatic Protection by 
Mohamed Bennouna, UN Doc. A/CN.4/484 (4 February 1998), at 2-3, points out that the legal fiction based 
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The fact that in public international law the legal nature of diplomatic protection has 
for a long period been predominantly considered as only a discretionary right of the State did 
not pre-empt the development of domestic legislation stipulating a right of the individual, 
usually the citizen, to receive diplomatic protection from the Government of the State of 
nationality or other sending States. The ICJ had confirmed this possibility in 1970, 
highlighting that, although international law does not recognise an individual right to 
diplomatic protection, municipal law may choose differently, and prescribe a duty of the State 
to protect its citizens abroad.773 
As has already been pointed in the previous section on the legal nature of consular 
protection of individuals, over the years, a wealth of States have decided to adopt some type 
of legal act ranging from constitutional, statutory, ordinary legislation, to executive acts or 
soft law documents recognising some sort of State obligation to ensure protection of nationals 
abroad. The legislative provisions have been, for the most part, drafted in broad wording, 
using the general term of ‘protection of citizens/nationals abroad’ and not consular and/or 
diplomatic protection as such. There are several States with constitutional provisions 
prescribing a duty of the State to ensure protection of their citizens abroad. These States 
spread over the entire globe, covering various geographical regions.774 These constitutional 
provisions are all formulated in similarly vague language, whether formulated from the 
perspective of the State, namely as a State obligation/duty, or from the perspective of the 
individual, namely as a fundamental right, they all are phrased along the following line: 
citizens abroad benefit from the protection of the State.775 As to the EU countries, it has to be 
noted that most of the EU countries conferring a constitutional right to the citizen to 
protection abroad are the Eastern European countries, which adopted these constitutional 
provisions after the fall of the communist regime. The constitutional provisions follow the 
                                                                                                                                                        
diplomatic protection is obsolete and it requires a new definition correspondent to the contemporary reality of 
the international relations. 
772 See for a similar point of view, J. Crawford, ‘The ILC’s Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection’, (2006) S. 
Afr. Y.B. Int'l L., 19. 
773 Barcelona Traction Company Case (1970) ICJ Rep, para. 78: ‘[…] and may also confer upon the national a 
right to demand the performance of that obligation, and clothe the right with corresponding sanctions.’ 
774 For instance, some of the EU countries, Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, China, 
Georgia, Guyana, Kazakhstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, the 
Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, Vietnam, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
775 The constitution of the Republic of Macedonia is bit vaguer, stating that the State ‘cares for’ the well-being of 
its nationals abroad, see ILC First Report on Diplomatic Protection, 83. 
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same pattern, however most of them construct the protection of citizens abroad as a 
fundamental right of the citizens, rather than a duty of the State.776  
In addition to the fundamental provisions, there are several other States with ordinary 
legislative provisions which either expressly refer to a sort of State duty to protect its citizens 
abroad, or have been so interpreted by academics or practitioners. Denmark, Finland, 
Slovakia and Slovenia have a legislative provision that is interpreted as providing a right to 
consular protection included in their laws regulating the functions of the Foreign Affairs 
Ministries.777 Italy and Sweden do not have a specific legislative provision providing an 
individual right or State duty to provide diplomatic protection. However, according to the 
literature, consular protection is granted as a right based on the interpretation of the specific 
national legislation, as a whole, and the relevant national case-law.778 In other EU countries, 
although having internal legislative provisions recognising an obligation of the State to 
protect the rights and interests of their citizens abroad, the wide discretion recognised by the 
national judiciary to the State in relation to the exercise of diplomatic protection negatively 
impacts on the individual right.779 Another sub-group of EU countries, although not 
                                                 
776 Article 25(5) of the Bulgarian Constitution: ‘Any Bulgarian citizen abroad shall be accorded the protection of 
the Republic of Bulgaria.’; § 13 of the Estonian Constitution: ‘Everyone has the right to the protection of the 
State and of the law. The Estonian State shall also protect its citizens abroad.’; Article 69(3) of the Hungarian 
Constitution: ‘All Hungarian citizens are entitled to enjoy the protection of the Republic of Hungary while 
legally residing or staying abroad.’; Article 98 of the Latvian Constitution: ‘Everyone having a Latvian passport 
shall be protected by the State when abroad and has the right to freely return to Latvia.’ Article 13 of the 
Lithuanian Constitution: ‘The State of Lithuania shall protect its citizens abroad.’; Article 36 of the Polish 
Constitution: ‘A Polish citizen shall, during a stay abroad, have the right to protection by the Polish State.’ 
Article 14 of the Portuguese Constitution: ‘Les citoyens portugais qui séjournent ou résident à l’étranger 
jouissent de la protection de l’Etat pour l’exercice de leurs droits et sont obligés aux devoirs qui ne sont pas 
incompatibles avec leur absence du pays.’; Article 17 of the Romanian Constitution: ‘Romanian citizens while 
abroad shall enjoy the protection of the Romanian State and shall be bound to fulfil their duties, with the 
exception of those incompatible with their absence from the country.’ 
777 Section 1(3) of Act No. 150 of 13 April 1983 on the Danish Foreign Service Act: ‘The Foreign Service 
provides assistance to Danish citizens as well as assistance to Danish businesses in their commercial relations 
with foreign countries.’ Section 2(1) of the Consular Services Act of 1999: ‘Unless a consular service is subject 
to other provisions, consular services referred to in Chapters 3 to 10 of this Act may be provided for a Finnish 
legal person or a Finnish citizen or for a foreign citizen residing permanently in Finland, who is in possession of 
or has been granted a permit to reside or work in Finland either permanently or in a comparable manner.’ 
According to the national Rapporteur, on the basis of Art. 14 of the Law No. 151/2010 on Foreign State Service, 
‘The Ministry of Foreign Affairs ensures protection of rights and interests of the Slovak Republic and its citizens 
abroad.’ Art. 24(1) of the Slovenian Foreign Affairs Act: ‘A consulate shall perform the following functions: 1 
protect the interests of the Republic of Slovenia and its citizens and legal entities, and conduct consular-legal 
affairs […].’ In the same vein as Art. 14 of the Slovak Foreign Services Act, Art. 24(2) of the Slovenian Foreign 
Affairs Act has been interpreted by the national Rapporteur as establishing an obligation for the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs’ staff to ensure the protection of rights of the Slovenian citizens, which have, as a counter-part of 
the MFA’s obligation, a right to consular protection. For more details see the National Reports and section 4.1 in 
the CARE Report. 
778 See the CARE Report, Section 4.1. 
779 For instance, Germany, see the National Report on Germany in the CARE Report. 
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recognising a right to diplomatic protection to their citizens, have, on the other hand, a 
consular law780 establishing some sort of diplomatic protection duties on the State.781 
It seems thus that there are a considerable number of States, from around the globe, 
recognising a State duty to ensure protection abroad of their citizens.782 The question that 
follows is whether these domestic legal provisions are sufficient to prove the necessary opinio 
juris for the creation of an international customary norm providing a State duty to exercise 
diplomatic protection. Most of the aforementioned domestic legal provisions were already 
invoked by Rapporteur Dugard in support of his initial proposal for a State duty, which 
unfortunately was rejected by States based on lack of sufficient opinio juris. Additionally, 
certain scholars contested the contribution of these domestic legal provisions to the formation 
of an international customary norm783 due to the clear demarcation established by the ICJ 
between the domestic and international legal orders with no influence of the former over the 
latter legal order.784 The unclear nature of the obligation enshrined in these legal provisions, 
namely whether moral or legal, has been invoked as an additional barrier to their added value 
for the formation of international law. Thus, what the precise scope of the domestic right of 
the citizen to protection abroad actually is remains uncertain, namely: whether it goes beyond 
the right of access to consular officials abroad, simple consular assistance or minimal 
informal diplomatic intervention. On the other hand, they clearly establish a duty upon these 
States to consider diplomatic protection for their nationals abroad, and that some sort of 
diplomatic action is required from the Government for the benefit of their citizens abroad.  
In addition to the domestic legislation, States are developing other forms of practice 
that can act as evidence of the formation of a customary international rule of a State’s duty to 
provide diplomatic protection to their nationals. For instance, the South African Deputy 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, in an interview with the media regarding the Government’s 
position towards citizens in distress abroad, mentioned that: 
‘[A]s their government, we have to ensure that all South African citizens, 
whatever offence they have carried out or are charged with, must receive a fair trial, 
                                                 
780 The concept of ‘law’ is to be construed largely as encompassing every act adopted by vote of the nationals of 
EU countries or the State authorities, i.e., Constitution, Law, acts adopted by the Government and Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and other Ministries. 
781 The Czech Republic, France, Luxembourg, and Spain. See CARE Report, Section 4.1. 
782 The duty is phrased along the lines of three main types of language: duty to protect nationals abroad 
containing either an explicit and indeterminate form of a duty to protect, an individual right of the citizen 
travelling abroad, or as a sort of guarantee of government protection for the citizen travelling abroad. 
783 V. Pergantis, ‘Towards a ‘Humanization’ of Diplomatic Protection?’, op.cit., 351. 
784 ‘[…] all these questions [the existence of domestic remedies for controlling the State in the exercise of 
diplomatic protection] remain within the province of municipal law and not affect the position internationally.’ 
Barcelona Traction Case, op.cit. 44, para.78. 
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they must have access to their lawyers, they must be tried within the framework of the 
Geneva Convention, they must be held in prison within the framework of the Geneva 
Convention and International law and we will always, it is our constitutional duty[,] 
ensure that this is getting out within the framework of the Geneva Convention and that 
there is a fair trial.’785 
Several countries have openly supported an interpretation of their right to provide 
diplomatic protection as encompassing also some forms of obligations in precise 
circumstances. For instance, during the sessions of the ILC Working Group on diplomatic 
protection, Italy fervently supported Rapporteur Dugard’s proposal for a limited State duty to 
provide diplomatic protection in cases of violation of jus cogens types of norms. It also 
proposed amendments to Professor Dugard’s proposal for a recommendation of a State duty786 
meant to clarify the material scope of the jus cogens norms, and the legal effects of the 
violation that triggers the State duty to exercise diplomatic protection, that could help the 
proposal to find wider approval among the States’ representatives as a legal duty rather than a 
mere recommendation. 
Commonwealth countries have traditionally endorsed a sort of moral duty to exercise 
diplomatic protection on behalf of their nationals whose human rights had been violated in 
foreign countries.787 Since the early 20th of century they have departed from the definition of 
diplomatic protection as a purely discretionary royal prerogative, and started to incorporate 
instances of State’s legal duty to exercise diplomatic protection. It can be argued that the US 
had developed such an approach when it espoused the human rights claims of its nationals 
                                                 
785 The statement is mentioned in Kaunda and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa (CCT 23/04) 
[2004] ZACC 5, Judgment of the Constitutional Court of South Africa of 4 August 2004, para. 68. 
786 The amendments read as follows: ‘that [...] an exception to that rule would be appropriate in some particular 
and very limited circumstances, from the perspective of the progressive development of international law, when 
the protection of fundamental values pertaining to the dignity of the human being and recognized by the 
international community as a whole is at stake. The Special Rapporteur, Mr. John Dugard, following the above 
approach, provided for a similar exception in cases of breach of jus cogens norms. By contrast, Italy maintains 
that a more precise and more limited exception should be included in draft article 2 under the following 
conditions: (a) in the case of grave violations of fundamental human rights and, more precisely, with respect to 
the right to life, the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the prohibition of 
slavery and the prohibition of racial discrimination; and (b) if, in addition, following those violations it is 
impossible for the individual victim to resort to international judicial or quasi-judicial organs able to afford 
reparation. When the two cumulative conditions are present, the national State should have the duty to exercise 
diplomatic protection in favour of the injured individual and the subsidiary duty to provide, in favour of the 
individual, for an effective domestic remedy against its own refusal.’ See Comments and observations received 
from Governments, A/CN.4/561 and Add. 1–2, p.38 
787 See the famous statement of Lord Palmerstone: ‘[…] a British subject, in whatever land he may be, shall feel 
confident that the watchful eye and the strong arm of England, will protect him against injustice and wrong.’ 
Hansard, third series, cxii (25 June 1850) at 444. 
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following the 1987 Iraqi attack on the USS Stark788, the assassination of US citizens in 1976 
by Chilean individuals789, detention in the Nazi camps790, 2008 terrorist acts in Libya791.792 The 
Commonwealth countries’ reactions to their nationals’ detention in the Guantánamo Bay 
camp show a strong willingness of those governments to provide consular and diplomatic 
assistance and also to espouse their nationals’ human rights claims against the US via 
diplomatic actions. It is true that of all the Commonwealth countries with nationals detained 
in Guantánamo Bay, the UK has been the most persistent in extensively using its diplomatic 
channels for the purpose of ensuring the protection of its nationals’ human rights, and 
obtaining their repatriation. Canada and Australia have also deployed diplomatic actions in 
regard to their nationals detained in Guantánamo Bay, however they were less willing to 
request repatriation.793 
In parallel to the State practice signalling the creation of a State duty to exercise some 
sort of diplomatic protection action, there are countries in favour of maintaining the 
traditional conception of diplomatic protection as a discretionary right of the State. This 
stance has been defended by several State representatives during the ILC Working Group 
sessions on diplomatic protection. The Nordic countries, the UK, and Israel are some of the 
countries that have made it crystal clear that diplomatic protection should not be construed as 
a State duty, not even in the limited case of violation of jus cogens norms, based on the 
insufficient evidence for an international customary norm recognising such a duty.794 The 
representative of Israel pointed out that one of the possible reasons behind this position could 
be the persistent concerns of the States that they might be put in a difficult and delicate 
position on the international plane by their nationals’ requests for diplomatic protection 
interventions. Instances of such a difficult position were created by some of the Guantánamo 
                                                 
788 ‘State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens: Damages for Wrongful Death’, 2 Nash (Leach) DIGEST, at 
2337–40. Evidence of similar conduct of US authorities are noted in International Claims and State 
Responsibility, 1991–1999 DIGEST § 8, at 1125; See W. Michael Reisman & Robert D. Sloane, ‘Commentary, 
The Incident at Cavalese and Strategic Compensation’, (2000) AJIL, 505, 510–13. 
789 See International Claims and State Responsibility, op.cit., at 1072–73. 
790 See Immunities and Related Issues: Sovereign Immunity, 1991–1999 DIGEST § 10, at 1191–93. 
791 See Exec. Order No. 13,477, 73 Fed. Reg. 65,965 (Nov. 5, 2008); see also Foreign Claims Settlement 
Comm’n of the U.S., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 2009 Annual Report, 8–10 (2010). 
792 Generally on the US approach to espousing human rights claims, see David J. Bederman, ‘State-to-State 
Espousalof Human Rights Claims’, (2011) Virginia Journal of International Law Online, 1-11. 
793 For more details, see the sub-section Domestic Jurisprudence – Jurisprudence from the Commonwealth 
countries. 
794 Statements made during the debates in the 6th Committee of the ILC on the topic of Diplomatic Protection, 
see Document A/CN.4/561 and Add. 1–2 Comments and observations received from Governments. 
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Bay detainees asking for diplomatic protection from one of their States of nationality, where 
they have never lived or did not have close links with.795  
Some of the States who were opposed to the codification of a State duty to diplomatic 
protection, even if limited to the circumstances of grave violations of human rights, are giving 
mixed signals on the subject of the legal nature of diplomatic protection. There have been 
instances when States decided to espouse the claims of their nationals whether of their own 
motion, or at the request of the national.796 It is common international practice that, during the 
process of customary international law formation, there is often a mismatch between the state 
practice and the states’ opinio juris.797 In the case of diplomatic protection, the situation is 
similar, in the sense that often the State’s foreign ministry or Government representatives 
declare that they do not recognise a State duty to exercise diplomatic protection, but the 
consular programme, official statements, sometimes even concrete practice proves 
otherwise.798 Therefore, the mere declaration of a State, even if official and during an 
international reunion, might not be the one to engage the State, if there is a contrary and 
sustained (in time) practice of the State. 
The recent development of the notion of ‘Responsibility to Protect’799 as an obligation 
of States to intervene and cooperate by way of diplomatic measures for the purpose of 
reacting to mass atrocities inflicted on the local population or including also aliens, has been 
interpreted as a sign of the favourable opinio juris of the international community to 
                                                 
795 For instance the case of the dual national Hicks, who turned to ask for help from the UK to be repatriated 
from Guantánamo Bay although he has never lived in the UK (case commented in the following sub-section 
Domestic Jurisprudence – Jurisprudence from the Commonwealth countries); or of the non-British long term 
residents application in R (Al Rawi & Others) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs 
[2006] HRLR 42. 
796 See for instance the case of the UK government in the case of the Guantánamo Bay detainees. Cases are 
commented in detail in the sub-section Domestic Jurisprudence – Jurisprudence from the Commonwealth 
countries. 
797 A famous case is the Nicaragua case, where the ICJ found a discrepancy between the State saying they are 
regarding a certain rule as binding, and their actual opinio juris, Nicaragua Case, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14; Brian D. 
Lepard, ‘The Necessity of Opinion Juris in the Formation of Customary International Law’, Discussion Paper for 
Panel on ‘Does Customary International Law Need Opinio Juris?’ 
798 An interesting case reflecting this duality is the case of the UK government’s reaction to their nationals 
detained in Guantánamo Bay. Although initially rejecting these nationals’ requests for concrete diplomatic 
protection measures, most of which were in the form of requests of repatriation or legal intervention in the 
domestic cases opened by these nationals before US courts (see the Abbasi case commented in Domestic 
Jurisprudence – Jurisprudence from the Commonwealth countries), the UK government subsequently asked for 
and obtained repatriation of all of them. On the release of British nationals from Guantánamo Bay, see I. Cobain, 
‘Guantánamo Bay files: Profiles of the 10 released British prisoners’, article in The Guardian (2011), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/25/guantanamo-files-british-prisoners-profiles and Khadr v 
Canada, [2009] F.C.J. No. 462, para. 85. 
799 The Responsibility to Protect, Ottawa: International Development Research Centre (2001) (hereinafter ‘ICISS 
Report’); U.N.G.A., Resolution 60/1. 2005 World Summit Outcome. U.N. Doc. A/Res/60/1 (2005); U.N.S.C., 
Resolution 1674. U.N. Doc. S/Res/1674 (2006); U.N. Doc. A/63/677 (2009). 
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recognising a State’s obligation to exercise diplomatic measures which take also the form of 
the classical diplomatic protection when exercised in favour of its own nationals.800 Although 
the notion of ‘Responsibility to Protect’ is a different notion from diplomatic protection, this 
specific part of the exercise of diplomatic protection measures for the aliens, existent among 
the affected population, fulfils also the classical requirements of the diplomatic protection 
institution. It can be observed that with each international reunion discussing the legal nature 
and content of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ notion, its nature is evolving from a moral to a 
legal obligation of States to intervene, and having a more precise material scope.801 These 
developments have determined certain scholars to conclude that ‘R2P has, in some sense, 
confirmed the progressive development of the law of diplomatic protection that the ILC and 
Special Rapporteur Dugard began.’802 
It can be concluded that there is a growing State practice signalling a trend among 
States of assuming a duty to provide, in urgent circumstances, some sort of diplomatic 
protection measures. However, it cannot be ignored that, in deciding whether to exercise 
diplomatic protection and the precise type of action to be taken, States are always balancing 
their foreign policy interests vis-à-vis the receiving State or the welfare of the entire national 
population’s well-being with the interest of the injured individual(s). It could be that, in many 
cases, a particular State would decide to exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of its 
nationals abroad, simply because it serves its interests.803 The nature of those interests, 
whether of the State or of the injured individual, that determined the State to intervene by 
means of diplomatic protection, does not make the practice less important. It can anyhow 
contribute to the formation of a custom in relation to the State, which obliges the latter to 
provide, in the future, diplomatic protection to nationals in similar situations abroad, based on 
either the domestic doctrine of legitimate expectations or the international doctrine of 
estoppel. 
                                                 
800 See T. Hooge, Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as Duty to Protect? Reassessing the Traditional Doctrine of 
Diplomatic Protection in Light of Modern Developments in International Law, University of Toronto, 2010, 
Master Thesis. 
801 Nina H. B. Jorgensen, ‘The Responsibility to Protect and Obligations of States and Organisation under the 
Law of International Responsibility’, in J. Hoffmann & A. Nollkaemper (eds), Responsibility to Protect from 
Principle to Practice, Pallas Publication (2012); see more generally the book mentioned herein edited by 
Hoffmann and Nollkaemper. 
802 T. Hooge, op.cit., 57. 
803 This particular argument has been raised by academia as another argument against the formation of a 
customary international norm recognising a State duty to exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of nationals 




The decisions of international and domestic courts provide another relevant source of law, and 
can play an important role in the formation of an international custom. The significant 
normative role of international adjudication is today beyond dispute.804 Regional courts and 
the ICJ can identify customary international rules, and also ‘shed much light on the general 
approach to the formation and evidence of customary international law’.805 As to domestic 
courts, one of their main roles in relation to international law is that of ‘law creation’.806 
Domestic jurisprudence, as official decisions of the State’s public authorities, reflect the 
opinio juris of the State and thus contribute to the formation of international legal customs.807 
International courts and scholars have emphasised the important role played by national 
courts in the formation of international customs as they can indicate what the custom/norm 
is.808 However when domestic jurisprudence is contradicted by the practice of other branches 
of the State’s power, then it is likely that it will be contested by States, and thus be less 
determinative in the process of formation of a particular international legal custom.809 
Rapporteur Dugard has already assessed considerable international, regional and 
domestic jurisprudence in his research on the codification and progressive development of 
diplomatic protection undertaken for the ILC.810 The selected jurisprudence was analysed 
mainly for the purpose of identifying the international custom on the legal nature of 
diplomatic protection. The present section does not purport to reproduce the evidence already 
collected and examined by the Rapporteur, but rather to assess the new jurisprudential 
developments, and to establish its added value to the pre-2004 jurisprudence, which was 
already analysed by Rapporteur Dugard.811 
                                                 
804 Armin von Bogdandy and I. Venzke, ‘The Spell of Precedents: Lawmaking by International Courts and 
tribunals’, in Cesare P.R. Romano, Kare J. alter and C. Avgerou, The Oxford Handbook of International 
Adjudication, Oxford University Press (2013). 
805 First report on formation and evidence of customary international law by Michael Wood, Special Rapporteur, 
International Law Commission Sixty-fifth session Geneva, 6 May-7 June and 8 July-9 August 2013, para. 54. 
806 A. Roberts, ‘Comparative International Law? The Role of National Court in creating and enforcing 
international law’, (2011) ICLQ, 57, 59. 
807 Brownlie, op.cit., 6; M. Shaw, International Law, 6th ed., Cambridge University Press (2008), 82; 
Oppenheim, op.cit., 26, 41–42; Philip M. Moremen, ‘National Court Decisions as State Practice: A Transjudicial 
Dialogue?’ (2006) North Carolina J Intl L & Commercial Regulation, 259.  
808 Brownlie, op.cit., 19; A. Nollkaemper, ‘Decisions of National Courts as Sources of International Law: An 
Analysis of the Practice of the ICTY,’ in G. Boas and W. Schabas (eds), International Criminal Law 
Developments in the Case Law of the ICTY, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden (2003), 277. 
809 A. Roberts, op.cit., 57, 63. 
810 See the First (2000) and Second (2004) Reports on Diplomatic Protection, op.cit. 
811 Rapporteur Dugard submitted seven Reports to the ILC on codification of international norms on diplomatic 
protection, the last dating from 2006, however, in the last two Reports, no new national jurisprudence dealing 
with the particular topic of the legal nature of diplomatic protection was added. 
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The relevant jurisprudence of the ICJ, of several regional courts,812 and domestic 
jurisprudence delivered by national courts from different geographical regions, legal systems 
and cultures will be assessed, in the following sections. The main purpose is to identify 
whether the incipient judicial trend, identified by Rapporteur Dugard in 2001813 has, more than 
a decade later, geographically spread and consistently developed so much so that it could be 
argued that a common judicial view recognising an international individual right to some sort 
of diplomatic protection currently exists. 
 
Jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice 
The first definition of the diplomatic protection given by the ICJ dates from the time of its 
predecessor, namely the PCIJ, in 1924814 and was later restated in several judgments,815 with a 
famous judgment dating from 1970816 when the discretionary power of the State in relation to 
the exercise of diplomatic protection was confirmed to exist throughout all possible stages of 
the mechanism: whether to exercise it or not; in relation to whom; when; to which extent and 
when to put a stop to the exercise; the State’s decisions regarding the transfer of the awards 
established within the legal proceedings started by means of diplomatic protection. The State 
was not required to offer justification for its decisions, but if it did, they could have been 
either purely political considerations or individually related ones. No legal remedy was 
available to individuals, under public international law, against the sending State decisions on 
the exercise of diplomatic protection.817  
Despite the development of more effective remedial means provided by international 
human rights, the traditional inter-States remedial mechanism of diplomatic protection 
continued to be used, and the ICJ continued to receive States claims brought on behalf on 
                                                 
812 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, European Court of Human Rights and the European Union’s courts. 
813 See J. Dugard, 2000 First Report, op.cit., paras. 86-88. 
814 Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions Case (1924), P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 2: ‘by taking up the case of one of its 
subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in 
reality asserting its own right, the right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of 
international law.’ 
815 Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway Case (Estonia v. Lithuania), judgment of 28 February 1939, PCIJ Ser.A/B, 
No. 76; Nottebohm case (Lichtenstein v. Guatemala), [1955] I.C.J. Rep. 4 at 24 
816 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited Case (Belgium v. Spain), judgment of 5 February 
1970, ICJ Reports (1970), 3 et seq., at paras 45 and 75 (hereinafter Barcelona Traction Case). 
817 Ibid, paras. 45 and 75: ‘[W]ithin the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise diplomatic 
protection by whatever means and whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right that the State is asserting. 
Should the national or legal person on whose behalf it is acting consider that their rights are not adequately 
protected, they have no remedy in international law. All they can do is resort to international law, if means are 
available, with a view to furthering their cause or obtaining redress. ...The State must be viewed as the sole 
judge to decide whether its protection will be granted, and to what extent it is granted, and when it will cease. It 
retains in this respect a discretionary power the exercise of which may be determined by considerations of a 
political or other nature, unrelated to the particular case.’ 
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their nationals against another State that had violated their national’s rights. The question that 
this sub-section seeks to address is whether the ICJ’s conception of diplomatic protection has 
changed in the recent jurisprudence818 compared to the earlier traditionalist State-centric 
approach of diplomatic protection.  
Between 1998 and 2012, several States have decided to espouse the claims of their 
nationals for the purpose of securing a legal remedy to the violation of their international 
individual rights. The Breard819, LaGrand820, Avena821 and Diallo822 cases are amongst the most 
famous recent cases of diplomatic protection heard by the ICJ. The first three cases are mixed 
claims, of the applicant States in their own rights based on violation of the sending State 
rights under Art. 36(1)(b) and (2) VCCR and on behalf of their nationals,823 while the latter 
case is based entirely on a diplomatic protection claim brought on behalf of Mr Diallo, 
claiming violation of his human rights and his rights as a shareholder.  
In the first three cases the same individuals rights were argued to have been violated, 
namely Art. 36 VCCR based individual rights: to be informed without delay about the right of 
the individual to have the consular officials informed of his detention and the right to 
communicate with them. The corresponding international obligation was, in these cases, 
incumbent on the US, the receiving State, which did not inform these aliens of Paraguayan, 
German, and Mexican nationality, about their international consular rights, and thus 
committed an international wrongful act. Following an unsuccessful exhaustion of the 
available US legal remedies, the State of nationality of these individuals brought actions 
against the US before the ICJ, as a last resort remedial means for obtaining reparation of the 
                                                 
818 In particular, Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguay v USA) 1998 ICJ 
Rep 248,250; LaGrand Case (Germany v USA) 2001 ICJ Rep. In the Case Concerning Avena and Other 
Mexican Nationals (Mexico v USA), 2004 ICJ Rep; Case Concerning Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Preliminary 
Objections), (Republic of Guinea v Democratic Republic of the Congo), Judgment of 24 May 2007 and 
Judgment on the merits of 30 November 2010, Judgment Compensation owed by the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo to the Republic of Guinea of 19 June 2012. See also the contention raised in the Case Concerning the 
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 whereby the case was transformed into one of diplomatic protection after the 
Foreign Minister of the DRC left office. The DRC had brought the case by way of diplomatic protection and the 
court rejected the Belgian position: 2002 ICJ Rep. Fisheries Jurisdiction case (Spain v Canada) 1998 ICJ Rep 
1998. 
819 Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguay v. United States of America), 
Provisional Measures, order of 9 April 1998, ICJ Reports (1998), 248ff (hereinafter Breard case). 
820 LaGrand Case (Germany v. United States of America), Judgment of 27 June 2001, ICJ Reports (2001) 
(hereinafter LaGrand case). 
821 Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America), Judgement of 31 March 2004, 
ICJ Reports (2004), 12ff (hereinafter Avena case). 
822 Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), judgment on preliminary 
objections of 27 May 2007, judgment on the merits of 30 November 2010, judgment on compensation of 19 June 
2012 (hereinafter Diallo case). 
823 O. Spiermann, ‘The LaGrand case and the individual as a subject of international law’, (2003) Zeitschrift für 
öffentliches Recht, 197; J. Dugard, Seventh Report, op.cit., (para. 18). 
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US violation of the individual international rights to consular notification and access. These 
cases show thus a closely inter-linked connection between consular and diplomatic protection 
as mechanism for protecting individuals. Diplomatic protection was the procedural means 
whereby the applicant States brought their claims against the US for having violated both 
their State’s consular rights (to be informed by the US authorities of their national’s 
detention) and their nationals’ consular rights (to be informed about the consular notification 
rights as enshrined in Art. 36(1)(b) VCCR). 
Certain legal scholars have interpreted the ICJ’s recognition of an individual right to 
consular notification and access based on Art. 36(1)(b) VCCR as establishing a core 
obligation also on the part of the detainee’s own State.824 However this interpretation presents 
several flaws. Firstly, an ad literam interpretation of the ICJ judgment would not support such 
an interpretation. The ICJ recognised a State obligation only on the part of the receiving State. 
Secondly, the rights at issue in these judgments are consular assistance and protection rights, 
while diplomatic protection was only the procedural mechanism whereby the violation of the 
consular rights was brought before the ICJ. These legal scholars seem to presume that 
consular notification and access are part of the diplomatic protection which is an erroneous 
understanding of the mixed claims involving two international rights of a different nature, one 
substantial and the other procedural. 
These judgments do not recognise an international individual right to diplomatic 
protection, however, they show an evolution in both the States practice and the ICJ approach 
of the institution, reflective of the general international law trend of the growing role of the 
individual in the international community. Firstly, it has to be noticed that unlike previous 
diplomatic protection cases brought before the ICJ for violation of economic related rights of 
the individual, the core of these three cases was an international individual right to access 
consular officials connected with human rights guarantees.825 Secondly, the ICJ recognised the 
                                                 
824 C. Warbrick, ‘Diplomatic Representations and Diplomatic Protection’, (2002) ICLQ, 723, 731; M. Pinto, ‘De 
la protection diplomatique à la protection des droits de l’homme’, (2002) RGDIP, 513, 524. 
825 The starting premise in all these cases was the fact that the nationals of Paraguay, Germany and Mexico were 
convicted to death sentences, which might have been prevented had the consular officials of their States of 
nationality been immediately informed by the receiving State public authorities of their nationals’ detention. For 
instance, Paraguay made clear in its Request for provisional measures submitted in the Breard case that one of 
the main reasons for its application was the protection of the right to life of Mr Breard as protected by Article 6 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Germany, in its application submitted in the 
LaGrand case underlined several times that the case before the ICJ was an exercise of diplomatic protection 
meant to ensure protection of several human rights of the LaGrand brothers: right to life and due process. Thus 
the consular related rights were closely connected with the nationals’ human right to life and fair trial. The close 
connection had been previously confirmed by the IACtHR in its Advisory Opinion No.16/99, see the following 
sub-section and sub-section   4. The position of international, regional and national courts on the individual’s 
right to consular protection from his State of nationality. 
 190 
 
rights of the individual in the determination of the appropriate remedies,826 thus expanding the 
role of the individual within the institution of diplomatic protection and implicitly offering 
more criteria for the judicial assessment of the executive’s decisions related to the exercise of 
diplomatic protection. 
The Diallo case is a showcase of the great influence played by the international human 
rights doctrine and judicial dialogue over the traditional diplomatic protection doctrine. The 
case arose as a result of the mistreatment of a Guinean businessman by the DR Congo over 
several decades. The mistreatment was inflicted on Mr Diallo personally, but also on his two 
companies. The innovative part of the judgment is the one concerning the individual injuries, 
namely his illegal arrest and detention, and arbitrary expulsion from DR Congo. As to the 
injuries experienced personally by Mr Diallo, Guinea claimed that the DR Congo violated 
several of his human rights guaranteed by international treaties,827 to which both countries are 
parties to, and which, thus, legitimated its international complaint brought before the ICJ on 
the basis of an exercise of diplomatic protection on behalf of Mr Diallo. 
The Court first ruled in 2007 in relation only to the preliminary objections. It held that 
Guinea had the right to exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of Mr Diallo’s individual and 
direct rights, and his rights as a member of the private limited liability companies, rejecting 
thus the Congolese objections. In 2010 the ICJ delivered its judgment on the merits.828 We 
will not analyse the entire judgment, as the only relevant part for our purposes is the one 
concerning the exercise of diplomatic protection for the violation of Mr Diallo’s human 
rights. First of all, the judgment of the ICJ brings important changes to the classical institution 
of diplomatic protection of natural persons. It replaced its traditional Mavrommatis definition 
of diplomatic protection with the ILC’s more balanced definition, as provided in Article 1 of 
the 2006 ILC Articles on Diplomatic Protection.829 It thus officially recognised that the ILC 
                                                 
826 See the opinion of V. Pergantis, op.cit. 
827 Prohibition of arbitrary expulsion as guaranteed by Art. 13 International Covenant of Civil and Political 
Rights;, Art. 12(4) African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights; prohibition of arbitrary detention and arrest 
as guaranteed by violation of Article 9, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and Article 6 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and Article 6 of the African Charter; 
prohibition of mistreatments as guaranteed by Articles 7 and 10, paragraph 1, of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights; Article 5 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.  
828 Judgment of 30 November 2010. There is also a third judgment in the case, regarding the compensation owed 
by the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the Republic of Guinea, delivered on 19 June 2012. 
829 The Mavrommatis based definition reads as follows: ‘by taking up the case of one of its subjects and by 
resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting 
its own right, the right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law’, while in 
Diallo the ICJ completely endorsed the ILC Art. 1 on Diplomatic protection as it had been finally adopted by the 
ILC in 2006: ‘The Court will recall that under customary international law, as reflected in Article 1 of the draft 
Articles on Diplomatic Protection of the International Law Commission (hereinafter the ‘ILC’), ‘diplomatic 
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definition reflects the new understanding of the diplomatic protection notion.830 Second, it 
updated the material scope of the diplomatic protection to the current characteristics of the 
international reality, by recognising that international human rights are part of the substantive 
scope of the diplomatic protection institution: ‘[o]wing to substantive development in 
international law over recent decades in respect of the rights it accords to individuals, the 
scope ratione materiae of diplomatic protection [...] has subsequently widened to include, 
inter alia , internationally guaranteed human rights.’ (para. 39) 
It has to be noticed that the Republic of Guinea resorted to diplomatic protection in 
order to address, inter alia, the injuries inflicted upon Mr Diallo’s human rights. An initiative 
which clearly supports the idea that diplomatic protection can be used to address human rights 
violations. The case shows that states can use diplomatic protection as a last resort when their 
nationals have been unable to secure redress for violations of their human rights by way of 
domestic legal remedies.831 
The cases discussed under this section prove the growing connection between 
diplomatic protection and human rights and also the growing willingness of the States to use 
diplomatic protection of their own initiative for remedying human rights and international 
individual rights of their nationals, even when the latter have taken residence for a long period 
of time in a another State (e.g., as in the LaGrand case). 
 
Jurisprudence of regional international courts 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHRS) 
The IACtHR had the opportunity to review the legal nature of the rights enshrined in Article 
36 VCCR and their role in the protection of human rights of nationals abroad in a request for 
an Advisory Opinion submitted to it by Mexico, in 1997. At that time, Mexico’s application 
received great support from seven other Latin American States, indicating these countries’ 
                                                                                                                                                        
protection consists of the invocation by a State, through diplomatic action or other means of peaceful settlement, 
of the responsibility of another State for an injury caused by an internationally wrongful act of that State to a 
natural or legal person that is a national of the former State with a view to the implementation of such 
responsibility’ (Article 1 of the draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection adopted by the ILC at its Fifty-eighth 
Session (2006), ILC Report, doc. A/61/10, p. 24).’ ICJ Judgment on Preliminary Objections of 24 May 2007, 
para. 39. 
830 A. Vermeer-Künzli, ‘Diallo and the Draft Articles: The Application of the Draft Articles on Diplomatic 
Protection in the Ahmadou Sadio Diallo Case’, (2007) Leid. J. Int’l. L., 941. 
831 According to Judge Trindade Separate Opinion in Diallo, the Diallo judgment is the first judgment of the ICJ 
where it established violations of two human rights treaties: ICCPRs and the African Charter; see also A. 
Vermeer-Künzli, ‘Diallo and the Draft Articles: application of the Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection in the 
Ahmadou Sadio Diallo case’, (2007) Leiden Journal of International Law, 941. 
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common view of the high relevance of individual consular rights in ensuring the protection of 
human rights of nationals abroad. The factual and legal circumstances of Mexico’s request 
were almost identical to the background of the trio of cases that would later be reviewed by 
the ICJ (the Bread, LaGrand and Avena cases). Namely, the detention of several nationals 
(this time of Mexican nationality) by US authorities which failed to inform them of their right 
to have their consulate notified of their detention and of freely communicating with Mexico’s 
consular officials. These nationals were tried and ultimately sentenced to death without 
having received a remedy for the violation of their international individual rights to consular 
notification and communication. Due to the human rights character of the Court, Mexico’s 
claim was based on the role played by the individual rights to consular notification and 
communication for ensuring respect of several human rights of the Mexican nationals 
sentenced to the death penalty.832 We will not engage in a full analysis of the Advisory 
Opinion, but simply point out certain aspects of the decision that are relevant for the present 
section.  
In its memorial, Mexico pointed out, almost emphatically, that its worldwide network 
of consular and diplomatic missions are ready to intervene and provide consular assistance to 
their citizens that risk receiving a death sentence in foreign countries.833 Mexico’s efforts to 
pursue different remedial avenues (before the IACtHR and the ICJ) for the purpose of 
obtaining an international judgment that would sanction the persistent violation of their 
national’s consular rights by the US and the aforementioned clear formulation of a sort of 
obligation on the part of consular and diplomatic officials to intervene on behalf of nationals 
facing the death sentence abroad seem to indicate a State practice of willingly espousing the 
individual claims of their nationals. This practice seems to indicate the opinio juris of several 
Latin American States towards approaching diplomatic protection of its nationals abroad as a 





                                                 
832 Such as the rights to private life, due process and life. Art. 64 of the American Convention authorises the 
members of the Organization of American States (OAS) to request the Inter-American Court to provide an 
interpretation of the American Convention ‘or of other treaties concerning the protection of human rights in the 
American states.’ 
833 Advisory Opinion No. 16/99, The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the 
Guarantees of the Due Process of Law, October 1, 1999, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser A) No. 16 (1999), para. 27. In 
these cases, the foreign country was usually the US. 
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Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human rights (ECtHR) – use of Art. 33 ECHR 
inter-states mechanism as a form of diplomatic protection mechanism for the 
protection of human rights 
The European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) does not include an explicit individual 
right to diplomatic or consular protection from the State of nationality or another State. The 
rationale of the Convention, as with most of the human rights treaties, is the protection of the 
basic human rights of the individual irrespective of their nationality, giving a locus standi 
against both the State of nationality and resident State, or the State exercising effective 
control over his person or the territory where the individual suffered the injury.834 Although 
the Convention covers, in principle, also injuries inflicted on aliens, its rationale is to confer a 
direct claim to the individual, instead of transferring the injury to the State of nationality that 
would later espouse its claim against the defendant State, as is characteristic for the 
diplomatic protection institution. The Convention, as interpreted by the Commission and the 
ECtHR, has been held to establish, firstly, that a certain duty exists upon consular and 
diplomatic officials to exercise protective measures on behalf of their nationals against a 
foreign State, and secondly that, in cases of grave or spread violations of human rights, States 
will resort to the inter-states and third party intervention mechanisms to protect their nationals 
and non-nationals whose fundamental human rights were violated by another State party to 
the ECHR. 
Although the European Commission and the Court itself have repeatedly stated that the 
Convention does not contain an individual right requiring the signatory States to exercise 
diplomatic protection, or espouse an applicant’s complaint under international law or 
otherwise to intervene with the authorities of another State on his or her behalf,835 the 
                                                 
834 Assanidze v Georgia, Appl. No. 71503/01, Judgment of 8 April 2004; Al-Skeini and others v United 
Kingdom, Appl. No. 55721/07, Judgment of 7 July 2011. Similarly for other regional human rights legal orders, 
see the IACtHR, Advisory Opinion, OC-2/82, The Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the 
American Convention on Human Rights, 24 September 1982, see also O. de Schutter, ‘Diplomatic Protection, 
Section 5 –Introduction’ International Human Rights Law: Cases, Materials, Commentary, 2nd ed., Cambridge 
University Press (2014). 
835 See for example, Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation Limited v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 7597/76, Dec. 
2.5.78, D.R. 14 p. 117 at 123, 124; Kapas v the United Kingdom, Appl. No. 12822/87, Commission Decision of 
9 December 1987, Decision and Reports (DR) 54, L. v Sweden, Applic. No. 12920/87, Commission decision of 
13 December 1988, and Dobberstein v Germany, Appl. No. 25045/94, Commission Decision of 12 April 1996; 
M and others v Italy and Bulgaria, Appl. No. 40020/03, Judgment of 31 July 2012. When individuals lodged 
claims before the ECtHR founded on a violation of the State’s duty to exercise diplomatic intervention on their 
behalf against other Member States, these applications have consistently been declared incompatible ratione 
materiae with the Convention and thus rejected as inadmissible. 
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Commission retained in X v Federal Republic of Germany836 that ‘diplomatic and consular 
representatives [...] perform certain duties with regard to [nationals of a contracting state 
abroad] which may, in certain circumstances, make that country liable in respect of the 
Convention.’837 In the above-mentioned case, one of the applicant’s claims against Germany 
was that the consular officials did not help him to obtain redress in a property case against the 
Moroccan officials, nor did they oppose his deportation. Mr X’s claim was rejected as 
inadmissible on the basis that ‘the consular authorities had done all that could be reasonably 
expected of them.’838 Therefore the Commission did recognise that consular and diplomatic 
officials have certain duties in relation to their co-nationals, however, it refused to find a 
violation of such a duty under one of the Convention articles. 
Even though the ECHR legal system is primarily an individual-centred remedial 
system, the ECHR also recognises an inter-states mechanism under Art. 33 ECHR. This 
mechanism offers thus the context for the Contracting States to exercise diplomatic protection 
on behalf of individuals under its personal jurisdiction or within the actio popularis judicial 
proceedings. As the ECtHR has rightly noted, this is a ‘category of inter-State complaint 
where the Applicant State denounces violations by another Contracting Party of the basic 
human rights of its nationals (or other victims).’839 In fact such claims are substantially similar 
not only to those made in an individual application under Article 34 of the Convention, but 
also to claims filed in the context of diplomatic protection, that is, ‘invocation by a State, 
through diplomatic action or other means of peaceful settlement, of the responsibility of 
another State for an injury caused by an internationally wrongful act of that State to a natural 
or legal person that is a national of the former State with a view to the implementation of such 
responsibility’.840  
Over the years, the inter-States mechanism has only rarely appeared in the ECtHR 
jurisprudence.841 States’ practices of illegal or arbitrary detention and torture, or inhuman or 
degrading treatment have most commonly triggered the use of this procedural mechanism by 
                                                 
836 European Commission of Human Rights, X v Federal Republic of Germany, Decision of 25 September 1965, 
Appl. No. 1611/62, 8 (1965) Yearbook of the ECHR, 158. For a similar case, see M v Denmark, Appl. No. 
17392/90, Decision of the European Commission of Human Rights of 14 October 1992. 
837 European Commission of Human Rights, X v Federal Republic of Germany, Decision of 25 September 1965, 
Appl. No. 1611/62, para. 168. 
838 European Commission of Human Rights, X v Federal Republic of Germany, Decision of 25 September 1965, 
Appl. No. 1611/62, para. 168. 
839 Cyprus v Turkey, Appl. No. 25781/94, Judgment 12 May 2014, para. 45. 
840 Cyprus v Turkey, Appl. No. 25781/94, Judgment 12 May 2014, para. 45. 
841 For an almost complete list of Art. 33 inter-States complaints, see the ECtHR list, available online at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/InterStates_applications_ENG.pdf this lists does not include the latest of the 
application filled by Ukraine against Russia, namely, Appl. No. 43800/14. 
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the State of nationality of the victims or by non-nationality States acting as defenders of the 
European public order.842 Based on Art. 33 ECHR inter-states mechanism, Contracting States 
can submit an application, acting as guardians of the European public order, or on behalf of 
specific victims.843 While the former category is a form of actio popularis844, the latter 
category is a form of subrogation of the State into the individual victims’ claims, which 
resembles diplomatic protection claims.845 These are cases in which a Contracting State 
expressly seeks redress for violations of identified victims, who can be both its nationals and 
nationals of another Contracting State. This category is illustrated by the cases brought by 
Denmark against Turkey846, concerning treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR inflicted upon a 
Danish citizen by Turkish police officers. This Art. 33 ECHR application included both 
elements of diplomatic protection – infringements by a State of the rights of aliens, and 
elements more characteristic of human rights regimes – such as violations of the Convention 
by a State in regard to its own nationals. Denmark thus requested the ECtHR to examine both 
the treatment of its citizen and whether the interrogation techniques used on him were 
commonly used in Turkey. According to the ECtHR this was ‘the only case in which the 
doctrine of “diplomatic protection” as recognised in international law has been applied in 
the context of an individual who was identifiable from the time of lodging of the 
application.’847  
The third category of cases submitted under Art. 33 ECHR refers to those where a 
Contracting State seeks to assert interests ‘in so far as it represents or is closely linked to 
                                                 
842 See the first two cases of this type introduced by Greece v UK for measures adopted by the colonial 
government of Cyprus such as collective punishments, arrests, detentions and deportations, Appl. Nos. 176/56 
and 299/57; the 1960s series of inter-States cases brought by Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands 
against Greece for violations of human rights committed by the military regime of Greece against their own 
nationals but also other non-national victims, Appl. Nos. 3321/67 to 3323/67 and 3344/67, 4448/70; two cases 
brought by Ireland against UK for acts committed in the Northern Ireland at the beginning of 1970, Appl. Nos. 
5310/71 and 5451/72; four cases brought by Cyprus v Turkey post-1970 invasion; a string of cases brought by 
Nordic States against Turkey, and the cases brought by Georgia against the Russian Federation, of which two 
have been settled, the last judgment of the Grand Chamber deciding in favour of the applicant, Georgia; and two 
cases lodged in 2014 by Ukraine against the Russian Federation for events in Crimea, Appl. Nos. 20958/14 and 
43800/14.  
843 Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands v. Greece (‘the Greek case’ – Appl. Nos. 3321/67, 3322/67, 
3323/67 and 3344/67, Committee of Ministers Resolution of 15 April 1970). One might also cite the case of 
France, Norway, Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands v. Turkey (Appl. Nos. 9940-9944/82, Commission 
decision of 6 December 1983); Cyprus v Turkey, Appl. No. 25781/94. 
844 Cyprus v Turkey, Appl. No. 25781/94, ECtHR, Judgment of 12 may 2014: ‘vindicating the public order of 
Europe within the framework of collective responsibility under the Convention.’ See in particular the speech of 
Dean Spielmann, President of the ECtHR to Gray’s Inn ‘The European Court of Human Rights as guarantor of a 
peaceful public order in Europe’ of 7 November 2014, available online at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Speech_20141107_Spielmann_GraysInn.pdf  
845 D. Spielmann, presentation before the Gray’s Inn, op.cit. 
846 Denmark v Turkey, Appl. No. 34382/97, Judgment of 5 April 2000. 
847 As stated in a subsequent case, see Case Cyprus v Turkey, Appl. No. 25781/94, ECtHR, para.3. 
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individuals alleged to be victims of acts occurring in the context of a political dispute between 
two countries’,848 such as the cases brought by Cyprus against Turkey, 849 Ireland v. the United 
Kingdom850 and by Georgia and Ukraine against the Russian Federation.851 While the in some 
of the cases introduced by Cyprus and Georgia, victims were identified, in the case of Ireland 
v. the United Kingdom852 the victims were not identified, which means that this latter exercise 
of Art. 33 ECHR by Ireland cannot be qualified as a classical diplomatic protection claim.  
The role of these inter-states cases is that of reflecting the position of certain States 
towards violations of human rights. Although the claim of the individual is sufficient for the 
ECtHR to find a violation of a Convention human right and establish direct injury and 
remedy, these States of nationality chose, of their own initiatives, to officially support their 
nationals’ claims, by way of exercising a sort of diplomatic protection mechanism. It can thus 
be interpreted as another string of evidence supporting the idea of a growing opinio juris of 
States that persistent, widespread, or grave violations of absolute or fundamental human rights 
trigger a certain duty on the State of nationality, and more widely on the community of States, 
to exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of (non)-nationals on whom such treatments are 
inflicted.  
In addition to the Article 33 ECHR type of mechanism, the ECHR offers another 
modern remedial route that can be interpreted as falling under the category of diplomatic 
protection claims. Article 36 (1) of the Convention, taken together with Rule 44 (1) (a) and 
(b) of the Rules of Court, allows a State to intervene in support of a case lodged before the 
Court by one of its nationals against another State party.853 This specific third party 
intervention procedure has been held to reflect a disguised classical form of diplomatic 
                                                 
848 Cyprus v Turkey, para.3. 
849 Cases Cyprus v Turkey, Appl. Nos. 6780/74, 6950/75, 8007/77. 
850 Two cases submitted by Ireland v UK, Applic. Nos. 5310/71 and 5451/72, Judgment of 18 January 1978. 
851 Georgia v Russian Federation, Appl. Nos. 13255/07, 38263/08, 61186/09; Ukraine v Russian Federation, 
Appl. Nos. 20958/14 and 43800/14. 
852 Two cases submitted by Ireland v UK, Appl. Nos. 5310/71 and 5451/72, Judgment of 18 January 1978. 
853 The ECtHR qualifies the provision as reflecting ‘the right of diplomatic protection which gives a State an 
opportunity to protect its nationals in a situation where they suffer an injury as a result of a breach of public 
international law by another Member State’ case of I v Sweden (Appl. No. 61204/09, Judgment of 5 September 
2013) para. 42. See the following cases, as examples of State practice of Art. 36(1) ECHR: Sisojeva and Others 
v. Latvia (striking out) [GC], Appl. No. 60654/00, Judgment of 15 January 2007 (Russia); Slivenko v. Latvia 
[GC], Appl. No. 48321/99, para. 6, Judgment of 9 October 2003 (Russia); Somogyi v. Italy, Appl. No. 67972/01, 
Judgment of 2004 (Hungary); Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy [GC], Appl. Nos. 39221/98 and 41963/98, Judgment 
of 13 July 2000 (Belgium); and Demades v. Turkey, Appl. No. 16219/90, 31 July 2003 (Cyprus)). 
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protection which gives States the right to intervene in cases taken by one of their nationals 
against another State party to the ECHR.854  
The use of Articles 33 and 36 ECHR mechanisms by the Contracting States can offer 
evidence of States’ position towards the institution of diplomatic protection, and the extent to 
which they change their traditional position of diplomatic protection as serving primarily 
States interests.855 The jurisprudence discussed above seems to show that when the human 
rights, in particular absolute human rights, of their nationals are stake, States feel obliged to 
act on behalf of their injured (non)-nationals abroad and help them obtain remedies for these 
human rights violations.  
Furthermore, the Court has never rejected the idea of consular and diplomatic officials’ 
duty to intervene on behalf of their nationals, on the contrary, the Commission had clearly 
pointed out that ‘diplomatic and consular representatives [...] perform certain duties with 
regard to [nationals of a contracting state abroad] which may, in certain circumstances, 
make that country liable in respect of the Convention (X v Germany).’ Additionally, the Court 
has limited the discretionary power of the State over diplomatic protection matters, when in 
the Beaumartin v France case,856 the ECtHR held that a citizen has a right to receive 
compensation paid by a foreign state to his state of nationality obtained in legal proceedings 
started by means of a diplomatic protection claim. Therefore, it could be argued that the 
ECtHR recognised an individual right to obtain the remedy attributed to his State of 
nationality in legal proceedings opened by way of exercising diplomatic protection. 
Another case that is of interest for this particular section is the complex case of Ilascu 
v Moldova and Russia.857 In 1999, four Moldavian citizens brought an application before the 
ECtHR against Moldova and Russia for violation of Arts. 3 and 5 of the ECHR. The 
applicants were charged with the murder of two Transnistrian officials and fighting by illegal 
means against the State of Transnistria. They were detained and one of the men was later 
sentenced to death (Mr Ilascu), while the other Moldavian citizens were sentenced to long-
term imprisonment and confiscation of property. The case is complex and involves several 
different issues such as the conformity of the applicants’ detention pending judicial 
proceedings with Art. 5 ECHR and of the detention conditions with Art. 3 ECHR. Before 
                                                 
854 Dean Spielmann, President of the ECtHR to Gray’s Inn ‘The European Court of Human Rights as guarantor 
of a peaceful public order in Europe’ of 7 November 2014, available online at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Speech_20141107_Spielmann_GraysInn.pdf  
855 Namely of an absolute discretionary State power. 
856 Beaumartin v. France, Appl. No. 15287/89, Judgment of 25 November 1994. 
857 Ilaşcu et al v Moldova and Russia, Appl. No. 48787/99, Judgment of 4 July 2001. 
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starting the complex analysis of which of the Convention Articles were violated, the Court 
had to establish whether the Republic of Moldavia or/and Russian Federation bear the 
responsibility for the violation of the human rights, which, thus implied a prior assessment of 
the procedural legal issue of the extent of territorial jurisdiction. The facts leading to the 
contested violations occurred in the Transnistria territory, over which the Republic of 
Moldova lost de facto control in 1990, while Russia had been supporting the separatist forces’ 
control over this part of the territory, which was however still recognised internationally as 
part of the Moldavian Republic. The ECtHR held that even if a State no longer exercises de 
facto sovereignty over a territory, it is still bound within the limits of its authority to protect 
its citizens from that territory from human rights violations. In conclusion, the ECtHR 
retained that Moldova had ‘a positive obligation under Art. 1 of the Convention to take the 
diplomatic, economic, judicial or other measures that it is in its power to take and are in 
accordance with international law to secure to the applicants the rights guaranteed by the 
Convention. (para. 331) The State in question must endeavour, with all the legal and 
diplomatic means available to it vis-à-vis foreign States and international organisations, to 
continue to guarantee the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention. 
(para. 333)’. Paragraph 334 of the Court’s judgment858 is of utmost importance as, here, the 
Court recognised precise diplomatic protection duties on the part of the State of nationality. It 
first starts by recognising a sort of minimum standards diplomatic protection duty, by 
requiring the State of nationality to show due diligence in the decision-making procedure 
regarding the exercise of diplomatic protection on behalf of its nationals. The Court continues 
by establishing a clear duty on the state to take particular effective diplomatic protection 
actions when violation of absolute human rights are at issue.859 The Court concludes by 
recognising its jurisdiction to review the appropriateness and sufficiency of the diplomatic 
protection measures chosen by the State in view of securing the human rights of their 
nationals, thus, further limiting the public international law recognised State discretion in the 
exercise of diplomatic protection. 
                                                 
858 ‘Although it is not for the Court to indicate which measures the authorities should take in order to comply 
with their obligations most effectively, it must verify that the measures actually taken were appropriate and 
sufficient in the present case. When faced with a partial or total failure to act, the Court's task is to determine to 
what extent a minimum effort was nevertheless possible and whether it should have been made. Determining that 
question is especially necessary in cases concerning an alleged infringement of absolute rights such as those 
guaranteed by Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention.’ Case Ilascu and others v the Republic of Moldavia and 
Russian Federation, para. 334 
859 Case Ilascu and others v the Republic of Moldavia and Russian Federation, paras. 334- 335. 
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 In casu, the Court held that the Moldavian authorities did not properly fulfil their 
positive obligations to secure the rights guaranteed by the Convention, and failed to take 
enough measures to secure the ECHR rights on behalf of the four Moldovan citizens held in 
the Transnistria territory. The Court found that while the Moldovan Government did engage 
in exchanges for the purpose of ensuring the release of Mr Ilascu, it did not engage in similar 
efforts as regards the other three applicants. Furthermore, the Court noted that, after 2001, the 
case of the applicants has not been raised either with the Transnistrian authorities or the 
Russian government. The Court underlined that the Moldovan Government failed to raise the 
fate of the applicants in the context of negotiations with the Russian Federation, which was 
acting as a guarantor State. Accordingly, the Court concluded that ‘Moldova's responsibility 
could be engaged under the Convention on account of its failure to discharge its positive 
obligations with regard to the acts complained of which occurred after May 2001.’860 
Although the jurisprudence of the ECtHR does not offer numerous instances of 
recognition of a State duty to exercise some sort of diplomatic protection, the X v Federal 
Republic of Germany,861 Ilascu v Moldova and Russia and Beaumarin v France cases do show 
that States have been recognised a positive obligation to exercise diplomatic protection 
measures, and that they no longer possess a completely discretionary power to exercise 
diplomatic protection, at least within the ambit of the ECHR system. The Ilascu case also 
indicates that the measure(s) which a State takes to ensure its positive obligation to exercise 
diplomatic protection for the purpose of ensuring the protection of its nationals’ human rights 
will be carefully scrutinised, and inaction, arbitrary refusal or insufficient measures will be 
sanctioned as violations of the very ECHR based human rights at issue.  
Whether the jurisprudence herein discussed gives sufficient evidence to sustain a State 
duty to exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of nationals, in certain extreme cases, is a 
debatable issue. An evolution in the Court’s jurisprudence from the first decades of the 
European Commission of Human Rights functioning, when diplomatic protection cases were 
dismissed without much assessment, can definitely be identified. It can be safely stated that 
the Beaumarin, Ilascu and Articles 33 and 36 ECHR based cases reflect a certain growing 
States’ opinio juris that, in cases of grave or widespread violation of human rights of 
nationals, States and courts recognise a State duty to exercise diplomatic protection measures. 
                                                 
860 Ibid., para. 352. 
861 European Commission of Human Rights, X v Federal Republic of Germany, decision of 25 September 1965, 
Appl. No. 1611/62, para. 158. For a similar case, see M v Denmark, Appl. No. 17392/90, Decision of the 
European Commission of Human Rights of 14 October 1992. 
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However, no precise diplomatic protection measures have been established as incumbent on 
the State, but, for the moment, only a due diligence type of diplomatic protection action. 
The jurisprudence of the EU Courts – diplomatic protection as a remedial mechanism 
for filling the gaps in European and international human rights law 
The 9/11 attacks showed that terrorism was an international threat that needed to be urgently 
tackled by coherent norms throughout the globe. The response at the international level was 
the adoption by the UNSC of a series of resolutions providing sanctions in the form of asset 
freezing and travel bans against individuals862 who were allegedly involved in terrorist 
activities. The Resolutions further called upon all States and all international and regional 
organisations to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of the resolutions, 
notwithstanding the existence of any rights or obligations conferred or imposed by any 
international agreement. The measures imposed by the initial Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 
1333 (2000) were maintained and improved by several subsequent Security Council 
Resolutions.863 
The EU, as an actor that wants to affirm itself on the international arena, and whose 
Member States are all members of the UN, some sitting in the UNSC, had legal and security 
interests864 to comply with the above-mentioned UNSC resolutions. The Council of the EU 
adopted EU internal secondary legislation closely implementing all the Resolutions adopted 
by the UNSC.865 The implementing procedure followed a two-step procedure: first, a common 
position was adopted under the then second pillar (CFSP) transposing all the UNSC 
                                                 
862 Following the hijackings in the US on 11 September 2001, the UNSC adopted several resolutions, 1373/2001, 
1390/2002 and 1453/2002 directed against the Taliban, Osama bin Laden, and Al-Qaeda. The sanctions imposed 
by these Resolutions are known as the ‘targeted’ or ‘smart’ sanctions. The first resolution of this type was 
adopted by the UNSC in 1999, against individuals associated with Osama bin Laden, who were active on the 
territory of Afghanistan (Resolution instituting the 1267 al –Qaeda and Taliban sanction regime), and provided a 
list of individuals and sanctions applied to them, inter alia, freezing of assets and travel ban. In addition, the 
Resolution established also a committee of the Security Council composed of all its members (‘the Sanctions 
Committee’), responsible in particular for ensuring that the States implement the measures, and in particular the 
sanctions established by the UNSC. The freezing of funds and flight ban were later on further strengthened by 
Resolution 1333 (2000) of the Security Council requiring ‘the States to freeze without delay funds and other 
financial assets of Usama bin Laden and of individuals and entities associated with him as designated by the 
Sanctions Committee and to ensure that no funds or financial resources were made available, by their nationals 
or by any persons within their territory, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of Usama bin Laden or individuals 
and entities associated with him, including the Al-Qaida organization.’ (para. 8(2)). 
863 Inter alia, 1390 (2002), 1452 (2002), 1455 (2003), 1526 (2004) and 1617 (2005); see more in J. Heliskoski, 
‘Commentary of the Ayadi and Hassan cases’, (2007) CMLRev, 1143. 
864 As shown by the bombings in London 2004 and Madrid 2005. 
865 For more details on the adoption of the black lists by the UN and their implementation by the EU, see R. 
Cadin, ‘Le ‘listen ere’ del Consiglio di sicurezza e il loro recepimento da parte dell’Unione europea: quali rimedi 
per I sospetti terroristi?’, in M.R. Saulle, L. Manca (eds.), Terrorismo e migrazioni: due fenomeni 
impropriamente abbinati, ESI, Napoli (2006). 
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resolutions sanctions, second, a then EC Regulation was adopted on the basis of ex-Arts. 60, 
301 and 308 EC Treaty concerning the imposition of the freezing of all funds, financial assets 
and economic resources of the listed persons.866 In addition to implementing the UNSC lists of 
targeted individuals, the EU also drafted its own list of so-called ‘home’ terrorists who were 
however subject to a different set of EU instruments and decision-making, placing the so-
called ‘international’ terrorists867 under an even more precarious legal regime, from the 
perspective of fundamental rights protection. 
Several of these listed ‘international’ individuals brought actions of annulment of the 
EU Regulations868 that were nominating them, (see for e.g. Ayadi, Hassan, Kadi) based on 
similar arguments: infringement of several of their fundamental rights869 and the then 
Community’s lack of competence to adopt these instruments.870 We will concentrate on the 
cases brought by individuals subject to EU Regulations implementing the UNSC Resolutions 
and in particular on the cases brought by Ayadi and Hassan against the EU Council. These 
cases are reflective of how the classical international institution of diplomatic protection can 
still be, in this day and age of multiple remedial means for the protection of human rights, the 
only effective remedial route for individuals listed as ‘international’ terrorists trying to obtain 
a remedy against the violation of their human rights. 
                                                 
866 The UNSC first resolution against the Taliban was implemented by the EU via the CFSP Common Position 
(Common Position 1999/727/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the Taliban, [2000] OJ L 294/1) and 
an EC Regulation (Regulation (EC) No 337/2000 concerning a flight ban and a freeze of funds and other 
financial resources in respect of the Taliban of Afghanistan, [2000] OJ L 43/1). The procedure governing the 
adoption of targeted sanctions post-Lisbon has changed, for a detailed article regarding this issue, see P. Van 
Elsuwege, ‘The Adoption of ‘Targeted Sanctions’ and the Potential for Inter-institutional Litigation after 
Lisbon’, (2011) Journal of Contemporary European Research, 488, paper available also online at 
http://www.jcer.net/index.php/jcer/article/viewFile/401/306  
867 The ‘home’ terrorists were listed in ex-third pillar instruments, whose scope of judicial review was very 
limited, and were not complemented by first pillar type of instruments as in the case of ‘international’ terrorists. 
For more details on the distinction of the legal regimes governing the situation of ‘international’ v ‘home’ 
terrorists, see the Segi case (Case C-355/04, Segi and others v. Council ECR [2007] I-1657) and E. Spaventa, 
‘Fundamental Rights and the Interface between the Second and Third Pillar’, in A. Dashwood and M. Maresceau 
(eds.), Law and Practice of EU External Relations. Salient Features of a Changing Landscape, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press (2008), 132. More details on the pre-Lisbon sanctions regime of the EU can be 
found in the M. Cremona, ‘EC Competence, ‘Smart Sanctions’ and the Kadi Case’, (2009) Yearbook of 
European Law, 559; A.D. Casterleiro, ‘The Implementation of Targeted Sanctions in the European Union’ in 
A.D. Casterleiro and M. Spernbauer (eds), Security Aspects in EU External Policies, EUI Working Papers 
1/2009, 39-50.  
868 It has to be recalled that pre-Lisbon Treaty, the CFSP instruments could have been challenged under only one 
legal argument, namely the incorrect legal basis, if the decision-making procedure should have been the one 
under the then first pillar instead of the second one, see former Art. 47 TEU. 
869 Usually the right to property, fair trial and effective remedy were claimed to have been violated by the 
challenged EU instruments. 
870 Joint Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat, [2008] ECR I-6351, para. 169. For a critical 
assessment of the CJEU choice of legal reasoning justifying the choice of Arts. 60, 301 and 308 EC Treaty for 
the adoption of secondary instruments fighting international terrorism and securing international peace (previous 
EU objectives), see C. Eckes, EU Counter-Terrorist Policies and Fundamental Rights. The Case of Individual 
Sanctions, Oxford University Press (2009). 
 202 
 
 Chafiq Ayadi, a Tunisian citizen resident in Ireland, and Faraj Hassan, a Libyan 
citizen resident in the UK, were subject to the UNSC list of targeted terrorists provided by 
Resolution 1333 (2000) of the Security Council. This Resolution required that their funds and 
financial assets be frozen without delay. The EU conformed by way of adopting two different 
types of instruments under the then two different pillars: first the Common Position 
2001/154/CFSP concerning additional restrictive measures against the Taliban871 
complemented by the Council Regulation No. 881/2002.872 
Under the EU legal system, the legal remedies available to the individuals listed as 
‘international’ terrorists were scarce, as they could only start an action of annulment against 
the EC Regulation, while the Common Position was not subject to such a direct legal action.873 
The situation regarding access to courts of these individuals was even more precarious within 
the UN ‘blacklisting’ regime, which was strongly criticised for its failure to provide access to 
effective legal remedies, thus violating human rights, in spite of the several amendments 
brought to this regime.874 It should be recalled that initially the criteria for listing individuals 
were extremely broad.875 The listed individuals could not directly challenge the decision of the 
Sanction Committee, and the reasons behind the listing were not communicated to them. 
According to section 8 of the Guidelines of the (Sanctions) Committee for the conduct of its 
work, the listed individual had no right to directly challenge the listing decision, or to be 
heard directly by the Sanction Committee.876 The only legal remedy made available by the 
UNSC Resolution was the right of the individuals to request their state of nationality or 
residence to review all the relevant information concerning the listing of the individual. Based 
on the State’s interpretation of the information, the petitioning government had discretion to 
decide on whether to seek to persuade the designated government to submit a request for de-
                                                 
871 Common Position 2001/154/CFSP concerning additional restrictive measures against the Taliban amending 
Common Position 96/746/CFSP, OJ 2001 L 57, p. 1. 
872 Their names were listed in Annex I to Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 imposing certain specific 
restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities associated with Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaida 
network and the Taliban, OJ 2002 L 139/9. 
873 It is precisely the ‘smart sanction’ string of cases which showed the remedial gaps in the EU smart sanctions 
regime, triggering salient discussions during the Revision Treaty (Lisbon Treaty) negotiations on the appropriate 
EU legal regime governing the decision-making procedure and the legal and judicial remedies available to 
individuals whose rights have been violated by this type of EU sanctions. See, F. Francioni, ‘Kadi and the 
Vicissitudes of Access to Justice’ in M. Cremona, F. Francioni, S. Poli (eds.), Challenging the EU Counter-
terrorism measures through the Courts, Academy of European Law Working Paper 2009/10. 
874 See I. Cameron, ‘UN Targeted Sanctions, Legal Safeguards and the European Convention on Human Rights’, 
in (2003) Nordic JIL, 1; F. Merget, F. Hoffmann, ‘The UN as a Human Right Violator? Some Reflections on the 
United Nations Changing Human Rights Responsibility’, (2003) Human Rights Quarterly, 314. 
875 See the 1267 and 1373 UNSC Resolutions regimes. 
876 See the ‘Guidelines of the [Sanctions] Committee for the conduct of its work’ (‘the Guidelines’), adopted on 
7 November 2002, amended on 10 April 2003 and revised (without substantial amendment) on 21 December 
2005, provide in section 8, entitled ‘De-listing’. 
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listing (see 8(d) of the Guidelines).877 Therefore the UN regime initially provided only for 
classical diplomatic protection remedial means, as a prerogative of the State to discretionally 
decide whether to exercise it or not. 
The action of annulment that could have been lodged by ‘international’ terrorists 
against the EC Regulation listing them as associated with terrorist regimes is thus a significant 
improvement compared to the legal black hole that existed for a long period of time at the UN 
level. The effectiveness of the EU based action of annulment is, however, questionable, since 
the EU is merely implementing the UN sanctions. Therefore a de-listing achieved at the EU 
level would be inefficient if the individual was still listed at the UN level. A truly effective 
de-listing at the EU level would thus, in practice, need to be complemented by an action of 
the Member State of the nationality or residence of the listed individual towards the 
designated government seeking to convince the latter to espouse the de-listing claim of the 
individual before the UN Sanction Committee. 
In 2002, Ayadi and Hassan brought actions of annulment of the EC Regulation 
881/2002 on grounds of lack of competence of the EU to adopt the challenged measures, and 
violation of the applicants’ fundamental human rights, the principle of proportionality and the 
principle of subsidiarity by the challenged measures.878 One of the human rights which the 
applicants complained had been violated by the EU via the contested measure was the right to 
an effective judicial review due to the fact the EU Regulation was closely following the 
UNSC ineffective mechanism for reviewing the individual measures for the freezing of 
funds.879 The applicants also complained of the Member States of residence lack of reply to 
their request for assistance in obtaining the removal of their names’ from the Sanctions 
Committee list. According to the complainants, this passive attitude coupled with the 
ineffective UN remedial machinery led to the violation of their right to an effective judicial 
remedy against the sanction of freezing their funds.880 
                                                 
877 According to para. 145 of the CFI judgment in Case T-253/02 Ayadi v Council, Judgment 12 July 2006. ‘The 
Sanctions Committee having, with its Guidelines, interpreted the Security Council resolutions in question as 
conferring on interested persons the right to present a request for review of their case to the government of the 
country in which they reside or of which they are nationals, for the purpose of being removed from the list in 
dispute.’ 
878 Case T-253/02, Chafiq Ayadi v. Council, Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 12 July 2006; Case T-
49/04, Faraj Hassan v. Council and Commission, Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 12 July 2006. The 
circumstances of these cases were similar to the famous Kadi case, op.cit. 
879 Ibid., para. 134. 
880 Ibid., para. 102. 
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To the surprise of the legal academia881, the reply of the former CFI to the applicants’ 
allegations provides more evidence in support of a statu nascendi international customary rule 
recognising an individual right to diplomatic protection in cases of violation of fundamental 
human rights. 
The CFI clarified what it considered to be the obligations of the EU countries when 
they receive requests for de-listing from targeted individuals. The Court held that the 
individual right conferred by the UN Guidelines, namely ‘the right to present a request for 
review of their case to the government of the country in which they reside or of which they are 
nationals, for the purpose of being removed from the list in dispute’, is also recognised under 
the EU level, due to the transposition nature of the EC Regulation. The recognition of a right 
to submit a claim does not add much to the protection of the individual. The added value 
brought by the then CFI to the diplomatic protection of the individual rests in the limitation of 
the Member State’s margin of discretion in considering the request:  
‘[…] the margin of assessment that those authorities enjoy in this respect must be 
exercised in such a way as to take due account of the difficulties that the persons concerned may 
encounter in ensuring the effective protection of their rights, having regard to the specific 
context and nature of the measures affecting them. Thus, the Member States would not be 
justified in refusing to initiate the review procedure provided for by the Guidelines solely 
because the persons concerned could not provide precise and relevant information in support of 
their request, owing to their having been unable to ascertain the precise reasons for which they 
were included in the list in question or the evidence supporting those reasons, on account of the 
confidential nature of those reasons or that evidence.’882  
The Court established precise guarantees in favour of the individuals, which the 
Member States had to respect in relation to submitting the individuals’ requests, which thus 
significantly limited their discretionary power to exercise diplomatic protection type of 
actions:  
‘[…] that individuals are not entitled to be heard in person by the Sanctions Committee, 
with the result that they are dependent, essentially, on the diplomatic protection afforded by 
States to their nationals, the Member States are required to act promptly to ensure that such 
persons’ cases are presented without delay and fairly and impartially to the Committee, with a 
                                                 
881 M. Gani & P. Mathew, Fresh Perspective on the ‘War on Terror’, ANU Press (2008), 258-9; N. Lavranos, 
‘Judicial Review of UN Sanctions by the Court of First Instance’, (2006) European Foreign Affairs Review, 482. 
882 Ibid., para. 148. 
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view to their re-examination, if that appears to be justified in the light of the relevant 
information supplied.’883  
 
The CFI underlined that the right of the individual to have his de-listing request 
reviewed in good faith and appropriately is subject to domestic judicial review based on the 
laws of the State of the petitioned Government. As an example of good practice, the Court 
pointed out the judgment of the Tribunal de première instance de Bruxelles (Court of First 
Instance, Brussels), which ordered the designated State to request, as a matter of urgency, the 
Sanctions Committee to remove the names of two persons from the list in question, on 
sanction of paying a daily penalty.884 The then CFI clearly held that national law preventing 
judicial review ‘of refusal of national authorities to take action with a view to guaranteeing 
the diplomatic protection of their nationals’ is contrary to EU law. This statement 
corresponds to the current day conception of State sovereignty as a concept including also 
responsibility towards the citizen, and framing diplomatic protection not just as a State 
prerogative but also as a State duty subject to limitations imposed by the judiciary.885 
The CFI recognised a sort of diplomatic protection obligation on the part of the State 
of nationality or residence of the listed individual in the form of starting diplomatic 
discussions and exchanges of information that could help it to decide whether to seek to 
convince the designated state to request the removal of the individual’s name from the UN 
list. If the state of nationality or residence is the designated state, then the latter has the 
obligation to consider in good faith the request of the individual and submit a request ‘if that 
appears to be justified in light of the relevant information supplied’. Once the request of 
removal has been submitted, the state of nationality or residence has the obligation ‘to act 
promptly to ensure that such persons’ cases are presented without delay, fairly and 
impartially to the Committee, with a view to their re-examination, if that appears to be 
justified in the light of the relevant information supplied’.886 This procedure is of utmost 
importance for the individual, since he cannot be heard directly by the Sanction Committee 
according to the 1297, 1333, 1373 Resolutions based regimes.887 The CFI required the 
                                                 
883 Ibid., para. 149. 
884 See Tribunal de première instance de Bruxelles (Court of First Instance, Brussels), Fourth Chamber, 
judgment of 11 February 2005 in the case of Nabil Sayadi and Patricia Vinck v Belgian State, case mentioned in 
para.150 of the Ayadi judgment of the CFI. 
885 See para. 152 of the Judgment in the Ayadi case. 
886 Ibid., para.150. 
887 See more in R. Cadin, ‘La Procedura del ‘Delisting’ davanti al Consiglio di Sicurezza: Protezione 
Diplomatica o ‘Supplica’ al Grande Inquisitore?’, op.cit. 
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Member States to provide for judicial review of a refusal by national authorities to take action 
with a view to guaranteeing the diplomatic protection of their nationals. It held that prompt 
state action before the Sanctions Committee is required, unless the concerned State puts 
forward sufficient reasons justifying its refusal to act, which are then submitted to the scrutiny 
of the domestic judiciary. 
Many of the legal scholars who commented on the Ayadi and Hassan judgments have 
interpreted the judgments of the CFI as establishing an obligation on the part of the Member 
States to exercise diplomatic protection to which an individual’s right to receive diplomatic 
protection corresponds.888 The CFI is prudent when referring to diplomatic protection and the 
Member States’ obligations vis-à-vis the listed nationals or residents. The content of the CFI 
recognised individual right to diplomatic protection resembles the Abbasi889 type of individual 
right, whereby an individual is entitled to have his request considered in good faith and 
appropriately, while the executive has an obligation to provide reasons for the refusal which 
are amenable to judicial review.890 The CFI did not recognise an outright State obligation to 
exercise diplomatic protection, except in the very limited situation when the request for 
removal had already been submitted by the designated State and under the old Sanction 
Committee regime, when the individual was denied any right to be heard directly before the 
UN body.891 
In casu, the CFI found that the applicants had the right to contest the lack of reply of 
the resident Member State to their request of removal before the national courts, which are 
bound to admit these claims on the basis of the principles of equivalence and effectiveness of 
EU law. The faith of the claim was then left entirely in the hands of the national courts. 
                                                 
888 See, inter alia, T. Tridimas, EU Law, ‘International Law and Economic Sanctions Against Terrorism: The 
Judiciary in Distress?’, Queen Mary School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 11/2009; G. Porretto, ‘The 
EU, Counter-Terrorism Sanctions against individuals and human rights protection’ in M. Gani and P. Matthews 
(eds) Fresh Perspectives on the ‘War on Terror’ ANU Press (2008), 260-261; N. Lavranos, ‘Judicial Review of 
UN Sanctions by the CFI’, (2006) European Foreign Affairs Review, 483; F. Francioni, ‘The Right of Access to 
Justice to Challenge the Security Council’s Targeted Sanctions’ in U. Fastenrath, R. Geiger, Daniel-E. Khan, A. 
Paulus, Sabine von Schorlemer, and C. Vedder, From Bilateralism to Community Interest: Essays in Honour of 
Judge Bruno Simma, Oxford University Press (2011), 916; Brierly, Brierly’s Law of Nations: An Introduction to 
the Role of International Law, Oxford University Press (2012), 260. 
889 Case No. C/2002/0617A; [2002] EWCA civ 1958, Abbasi v Secretary of State, Court of Appeal (civil 
division), 6 November 2002. 
890 Please see the details in the following section on Domestic Jurisprudence - Jurisprudence from countries with 
common law systems. 
891 On the evolution of the Sanction Committee regime, from the perspective of the EU, see J. Kokott, ‘The Kadi 
Case – Constitutional Core Values and International Law – Finding the Balance?’, (2012) EJIL, 1015; from the 
perspective of international human rights law, L. Ginsborg, The new face of the Security Council since 9/11: 
global counter-terrorism, human rights and international law, EUI PhD thesis (2014); B. Hayes and G. Sullivan, 
‘Blacklisted: Targeted sanctions, preemptive security and fundamental rights’, European Center for 
Constitutional and Human rights Report (2010); R. Cadin, ‘La Procedura del ‘Delisting’ davanti al Consiglio di 
Sicurezza: Protezione Diplomatica o ‘Supplica’ al Grande Inquisitore?’, op.cit. 
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It can be observed that the State duty to exercise diplomatic protection was derived by 
the Court from both international law (the 1267 and 1373 UNSC Resolutions regimes) and 
EU law.892 Such a duty was recognised in the specific circumstances of cases where 
diplomatic protection was the only remedy available to an individual whose fundamental 
rights were significantly restricted by the UN resolutions and respectively by the EU 
secondary measures. The Court did not establish different State duties to exercise diplomatic 
protection depending on whether the listed individual was a national of a Member State or a 
resident within the EU. Therefore it could be presumed that the same obligation would apply 
to the Member States also in relation to their own nationals or the national of another Member 
State if he was listed at the UN level. The duty is not restricted based on the nationality of the 
listed individual, but on the fact of being listed as involved in terrorist activities, under the old 
1267 and 1373 UNSC Resolutions regimes.  
In light of the revision undergone by the UN Sanctions Regime893, the diplomatic 
protection duty is no longer the only procedural mechanism whereby a request of de-listing 
can be submitted before the UNSC. Therefore it could be that the decision of the Court would 
today differ, had the Court be confronted with a similar issue, and possibly no longer arrive at 
the conclusion of establishing a duty to exercise diplomatic protection upon the Member 
States. 
In addition to these cases establishing a Member States’ duty to exercise diplomatic 
protection by way of espousing the de-listing claim of ‘international’ terrorists listed also by 
EU Regulations, there is another string of jurisprudence of the CJEU which can reflect the 
position of the Member States towards the mechanism of diplomatic protection. The EU 
Treaties have provided since the beginning an inter-States mechanism whereby a Member 
State may bring an action before the CJEU against another Member State for an alleged 
infringement of an obligation under the Treaties (current Art. 259 TFEU).894 These EU based 
                                                 
892 EU law which guarantees the protection of fundamental rights within the scope of EU law, see Ayadi and 
Hassa Judgments. 
893 The Security Council Resolution 1904 (2009) of 17 December 2009 established an ‘Office of the 
Ombudsperson’ and granted to the affected individual the possibility to submit de-listing requests before the 
Ombudsperson. The effectiveness of this remedy has been challenged by the CJEU on several occasions, 
including in the latest of its judgment in the Kadi saga (Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P), 
however this is not necessarily of relevance in the present case, since it was not the lack of effectiveness of a 
remedy that was at issue in Ayadi and Hassan, but the total absence of a remedy, except via the request of the 
State. 
894 ‘In order to rule on these two heads of complaint, it must be noted that the procedure established under 
Article 259 TFEU is designed to obtain a declaration that the conduct of a Member State is in breach of EU law 
and to terminate that conduct (see, to that effect, Joined Cases 15/76 and 16/76 France v Commission [1979] 
ECR I-321, para. 27; Case C 456/05 Commission v Germany [2007] ECR I-10517, para. 25; and Joined Cases C 
 208 
 
obligations can include also those related to individual rights derived from EU law. Therefore 
the action brought by a Member State against another Member State for having violated the 
EU rights of its nationals resembles a diplomatic protection claim. Scholars895 have described 
this EU dispute settlement mechanism as ‘plainly politically sensitive’ since it challenges the 
close and good diplomatic relationship existent between the Member States of the EU, on 
which the Union is founded.896 To date, there have been very few cases, namely only four 
reaching the CJEU.897 The first two cases were brought for the purpose of ensuring protection 
of economically related EU rights of the nationals of the applicant State (fishery and free 
movement of goods related rights), while the subsequent two cases moved away from 
economic to political rights of EU citizens.898  
The first case was brought by France against the UK in 1979 concerning violation of 
the UK’s fishery rights of French boats.899 This case is a follow-up of the fishery contention 
between France and the UK already present in the Kramer case.900 In spite of the CJEU 
judgment in the Kramer case, establishing the loss of the UK’s exclusive competence over 
fishery policies in its territorial waters as a result of the exclusive competence acquired by the 
Community over the common agricultural policies, the UK continued to adopt internal Orders 
regulating fishing as well as fishing near its borders by foreign vessels. The fact which 
triggered France’s decision to exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of its nationals was the 
sanctioning of several captains of French vessels caught fishing contrary to the UK’s internal 
Orders, which the UK had already lost competence to adopt. Both the Commission and the 
Court sided with France and held that the UK internal Orders were contrary to Community 
law, since the Community had gained exclusive competence to regulate the fishing policy in 
the Member States waters. The case can be seen as a diplomatic protection case, where 
                                                                                                                                                        
514/07 P, C 528/07 P and C 532/07 P Sweden and Others v API and Commission [2010] ECR I-8533, para. 
119).’ – para. 67 of Case C-364/10 Hungary v Slovakia, Judgment of 16 October 2012. 
895 See S. Weatherill, Cases and Materials on EU law, 11ed., Oxford University Press (2014), 83; K Lenaerts, I. 
Maselis, K. Gutman, EU Procedural Law, Oxford University Press (2014), 5.35 at 183-4; A. Cygan, ‘Current 
Developments in European Union Law: Citizenship of the European Union’, (2013) International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, 492; M. Filippin, ‘A change for future intra-European diplomatic relations? Case 
C-364/10 Hungary v Slovakia, Judgment of 16 October 2012, not yet reported’, see (2013) Maastricht Journal, 
120. 
896 In the words of the preamble to the EU Treaty, ‘an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’. 
897 Case C-141/78 France v. United Kingdom [1979] ECR I-02923; Case C-388/95 Belgium v. Spain [2000] 
ECR I-03123; and Case C-145/04 Spain v. United Kingdom [2006] ECR I-07917. 
898 It seems the evolution of the Union from an economic to a political Union might have also impacted on the 
Member States’ interests in bringing actions by way of this specific EU based diplomatic protection claim. 
899 Case C-141/78 France v. United Kingdom [1979] ECR 02923. 
900 Joined Cases 3, 4, and 6/76 Cornelis Kramer and others [1976] ECR I-1279. 
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France’s actions before the Commission and the Court were based on the injuries suffered by 
its nationals at the hands of another State violating a piece of regional international law.  
The subsequent example of an exercise of diplomatic protection by a Member State 
against another Member States based on rights citizens derive from EU law came decades 
later. In 1995 Belgium brought a case against Spain before the CJEU, in an attempt to protect 
the economic related rights of the wine producers based on strict designation of origin rules of 
the Spanish authorities for Rioja wine.901 
A decade later Spain challenges the UK’s actions regarding the rights of Gibraltar 
citizens to participate in the election of representatives to the European Parliament.902 This 
case resembles more the traditional exercises of diplomatic protection by powerful States 
wishing to assert their own territorial interests rather than those of their citizens. Spain’s 
complaint over the UK legislation concerning the voting rights of the Commonwealth citizens 
of Gibraltar seems to be a disguised Spanish territorial claim over Gibraltar rather than proof 
of actual concern of the voting rights of the Gibraltar citizens. 
The last case to be discussed under this category is a case where the classical 
conception of diplomatic protection intertwines with the current, more modern conception of 
the institution. A Member State espouses the claims of its national for both political State 
reasons and protection of individual rights. The Hungary v Slovakia903 case arose out of 
Slovakia’s restriction of the right of entry to its territory of the Head of the Hungarian State 
on a significant date when the former Czechoslovak Socialist Republic was invaded by the 
troops of the Warsaw Pact, including the troops of the former Hungarian Socialist Republic. 
Hungary decided to ask the Commission to start infringement proceedings against Slovakia 
under Art. 259 TFEU on the basis that the entry restriction imposed on the President, an EU 
citizen, could not be justified by any of the restrictions permitted by Directive 2004/38.904 The 
Commission’s refusal to bring an infringement action against Slovakia, and Slovakia’s 
persistent position that it had not violated EU law by restricting the access of the Hungarian 
Head of State, determined Hungary to bring an action before the CJEU. The Court decided to 
reject Hungary’s action alleging a violation of EU law by Slovakia based on a restriction to 
the free movement of EU citizens not expressly provided by EU law, on grounds that the 
                                                 
901 Case C-388/95 Belgium v. Spain [2000] ECR I-03123. 
902 This is the only case out of the four that resembles an action concerning State rights rather than being related 
to the voting rights of the citizens of Gibraltar. 
903 Case C-145/04 Spain v. United Kingdom [2006] ECR I-07917. 
904 Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside 
freely within the territory of the Member States [2004] OJ L 158 of 30 April 2004. 
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restriction was justified on the basis of the lex specialis public international customary norms 
on the special status of Heads of States.  
Whether raising economic or political individual rights, these cases raised sensitive 
issues among the Member States and are capable of breaking their good diplomatic relations. 
Across these cases, the Court has sided either with the applicant or the defendant Member 
State, depending on which of these State’s claims and thus defended interests correspond with 
the Union interests, reflective of the specific moment in the Union’s evolution. Namely, in the 
1970s, the advance of the economic union and ensuring respect of the Union’s newly 
established competences (France v UK), in the 1990s, defining of the limits of the four 
fundamental freedoms (Belgium v Spain), the start of the 21st century the political rights of the 
Union citizens as established in the founding Treaties (Spain v UK), and recently the 
preservation of the diplomatic relations between the Member States which are increasingly 
shaken by sensitive national history (Hungary v Slovakia). 
We do not have the space here to engage in a detailed comment of these cases, the 
reason for referring to them is the diplomatic protection nature of these inter-states claims, 
which could show the Member States and European court’s position to the use of modern 
diplomatic protection mechanisms. The signals these cases give in relation to the modern use 
of diplomatic protection of individuals are varied and depend on the perspective one takes in 
their interpretation. On the one hand, if they are interpreted from a contextual perspective, 
they could be seen as evidence that States have gradually renounced classical international 
claims to solve their disputes and impose their interests. In light of all the potential cases that 
the Member States could have brought against each other throughout the European integration 
process, there have been only four such cases, of which only Spain v UK and Hungary v 
Slovakia resemble a contention over State’s powers rather than the protection of individual 
rights. The EU project has impacted on the diplomatic affairs of the Member States, which 
started to replace diplomatic disagreements and power battles by use of force or formal last 
resort diplomatic protection actions,905 with diplomatic discussions within the Council and 
European Council framework. These four cases submitted within a period of more than 60 
years are examples of the changing diplomatic affairs and of the Member States’ eagerness to 
protect the EU conferred rights of their citizens. 
On the other hand, the cases heard by the CJEU on the basis of Article 259 TFEU 
seem to indicate that the conception of diplomatic protection actions has not advanced much, 
                                                 
905 That is judicial or arbitral claims submitted before courts. 
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since in all these cases the Member States had something to win economically or politically 
by seeking to protect their citizens’ EU rights that were violated by another Member State. 
One can never know what interests, e.g. the protection of the individuals’ rights or the 
economic and political interests of the Member States, have tipped the balance in favour of 
introducing an international claim against a Member State, and thus possibly endangering 
good diplomatic relations which the Union fervently promotes.906  
Regardless of the extent of changes of the Member States’ conduct of their diplomatic 
affairs, the cases analysed in this sub-section showed that the European courts have departed 
from the traditional conception of diplomatic protection. In the ‘smart sanctions’ judgments, 
the CFI established a duty on the Member States to exercise precise diplomatic protection 
measures on behalf of EU citizens and residents, going as far as having to submit a request of 
removal before the specialised UN body. The inter-Member States cases showed that the 
European courts, although promoting the effectiveness of EU law as a primary objective, will 
give priority to customary international law on diplomatic relations when it is not in conflict 
with fundamental rights. These judgments are thus supporting the current general 
international trend that diplomatic protection can be an effective complementary tool to 
human rights systems for securing protection of human rights, and that in cases of stark 
violation of fundamental rights, courts are gradually establishing a duty on the part of States 




It has been argued that ‘domestic courts are often the primary stage of international law 
developments.’907 This sub-section is dedicated to the study of domestic jurisprudence from 
different geographical regions and legal systems in an attempt to distil the current approach of 
national courts vis-à-vis the nationals’ claims against the State(s) refusing to exercise, or 
improperly or insufficiently exercising diplomatic protection. 
                                                 
906 In his opinion in the Hungary v Slovakia case, AG Bot argued that the diplomatic conduct of a Member States 
that would lead to a break in diplomatic relations with another Member State could constitute a violation of EU 
law: ‘the Member States should not exercise their diplomatic competence in a manner that might lead to a 
lasting break in diplomatic relations between two Member States. Such a break would, in fact, be incompatible 
with the integration process aimed at creating, in the words of the preamble to the EU Treaty, ‘an ever closer 
union among the peoples of Europe’ and would constitute a barrier to the attainment of the essential objectives 
of the Union, including the aim of promoting peace.’ para. 58 of AG Bot Opinion in Hungary v Slovakia. 
907 N. Karazivan, ‘Diplomatic Protection: Taking Human Rights Extraterritorially’, (2006) Canadian Yearbook 
of International Law, 299, 300. 
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It has to be pointed out that not many cases of alleged violation of consular and/or 
diplomatic rights reach domestic courts.908 There are several reasons for the scarcity of 
domestic jurisprudence on diplomatic protection, such as: absence of precise legal obligations 
binding the consular officials towards the nationals, lack of transparency of the executive 
decisions in this field,909 very limited feedback reaching the individual, difficulty in precisely 
identifying the misconduct of the consular or diplomatic official, and the urgency of the help 
which the individual commonly needs. 
The focus in this section will be the judgments delivered by national courts in relation 
to individuals’ claims against their government for failure to exercise diplomatic protection. 
The individuals’ common complaints reaching courts seems to concern the violation of their 
human right(s) to prohibition of torture and ill-treatments, arbitrary detention and unfair trial. 
Cases such as those lodged by the Guantánamo Bay detainees against their States of 
nationality have been among the most mediatized diplomatic protection cases. Several 
controversial cases following the 9/11 attacks will be assessed in this section together with 
other cases of detained nationals complaining of ill-treatment, unfair trials and risk of being 
sentenced to the death penalty while detained abroad.910 These cases required national 
Governments to weigh the protection of the human rights of their nationals abroad with the 
national security interests and preservation of good foreign relations with powerful States. 
Sometimes, the national interests at stake were of high political importance for the State, as 
shown in the Kaunda case reviewed by the South African Constitutional Court. In this 
particular case, South Africa had to consider that a diplomatic intervention on behalf of their 
nationals would have been interpreted by Zimbabwe and Equatorial Guinea as an interference 
in their judicial or legal systems and thus received as a threat to the relatively newly acquired 
national sovereignty of these countries.  
In many of these cases of detention of nationals abroad, consular assistance has been 
preferred by the State of nationality as a much safer choice for the country’s conduct of 
foreign affairs then the exercise of diplomatic protection. The cases to be discussed in this 
section will show that when the country’s own nationals are in custody abroad, the State of 
                                                 
908 According to the CARE Report, Section 4.1.2 Remedies against a refusal to provide consular protection 
(which refers also to cases related to diplomatic protection), the judiciary of certain Member States (Cyprus, the 
Czech Republic, Greece, Ireland, Malta, Luxembourg, Slovakia, Slovenia) have not so far had the occasion to 
deal with complaints against the refusal of consular officials to provide consular assistance/protection. 
909 For example when a female consular official was the one handling the difficult situation of a detained national 
in an Islamic country, and her subsequent failure to achieve anything was then kept from the detainee, see the 
UK – Redress Report of 2012, op.cit. 
910 The cases collected in this sub-section are both disparate case studies and cross-case research. 
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nationality will most probably start with different sorts of consular assistance actions, 
continue with ‘quiet’ diplomatic negotiations once the violation of human rights is clear and 
resort to stronger forms of diplomatic protection measures, including lodging of international 
claims, only when the situation deteriorates and the violation of fundamental human rights of 
the individual in custody abroad is persisting. ‘Quiet diplomacy’911 seems to have been the 
preferred diplomatic protection strategy by the UK, Canada and Australia, in relation to their 
nationals detained in Guantánamo Bay. This type of diplomatic protection action is 
characterised by a lack of transparency of the negotiations between the diplomats of the two 
countries. This lack of transparency increased the uncertainty surrounding the precarious 
situation of the Guantánamo Bay camp detainees and other similar individuals detained for 
allegedly having committed terrorist acts, and who were subjected to ill-treatment and held 
captive with no access to judicial remedies for months.912 Beyond this diplomatic assistance, 
States may take further steps pursuant to international treaties, as well as bring international 
legal proceedings via the procedural mechanism of diplomatic protection. 
The failure of the US legal and judicial systems to afford adequate legal remedies to 
non-US citizens detained in Guantánamo Bay has led these individuals to ask the 
Governments of their States of nationality to intervene on their behalf against the US. When 
faced with the domestic Governments’ refusal to act or to pursue specific measures, the 
detainees lodged complaints before the domestic courts of their States of nationality 
(Australia, Canada, and UK) seeking to force their Governments to take action on their behalf 
before the US government. They argued that absolute and relative human rights were violated 
by the US, and that their Government is complicit to such international violations by not 
taking proper diplomatic action on their behalf. It was assumed by these detained individuals 
that diplomatic protection was their last resort remedy, or that it would enhance their 
prospects for being freed and obtain reparation. Confronted with prolonged deprivation of 
liberty, subject to alleged ill treatments, not privy to the Government’s concrete efforts to 
ensure the respect of their human rights, being consistently refused access to US courts, and 
facing their Government’s refusal to take any action stronger than just informal or quiet 
diplomacy acts, the Guantánamo Bay detainees started judicial proceedings before the 
                                                 
911 D. Bonner, ‘Diplomatic Protection and Guantanamo Detainees: Individuals, the Courts and the Executive’ in 
D. Bonner, Executive Measures, Terrorism and National Security Have the Rules of the Game Changed, Asghate 
(2007). 
912 To be noticed that had these individuals been detained in Europe, Art. 5(3) ECHR would have required the 
local authorities to bring them promptly before a judge, and a custody longer than 4 days was held by the ECtHR 
in breach of this Article (See Oral and Atabay v. Turkey, Appl. No. 39686/02, Judgment of 23 July 2009; 
Nastase-Silivestru v. Romania, Appl. No. 74785/01, Judgment of 4 October 2007). 
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national courts of their countries of nationality or residence. Their applications commonly 
claimed that the Government should undertake firmer diplomatic action and ensure their 
release. These requests were clearly clashing with the generally accepted conception of 
diplomatic protection as a right of the State over which the national executive enjoys broad 
discretion. 
The cases brought before domestic courts by the Guantánamo Bay detainees and other 
individuals from Arab countries detained in camps for having committed terrorist acts, have 
raised the question of whether the state of nationality or of residence has a duty to exercise 
diplomatic protection for its nationals or long-term residents. Such cases have attracted wide 
attention from the press and scholars mostly because they have shown how, in spite of the 
numerous international human rights norms, these can still be ineffective when powerful 
States consider them as a direct threat to their national security. It is ironic how in spite of the 
evolution of modern international law, it is still the widely criticised classic inter-states 
institution of diplomatic protection that ensured reparation of these individuals’ injuries.913 
Since the moment when the ILC rejected the codification of an international norm 
imposing a State duty to exercise diplomatic protection in cases of violation of jus cogens 
norms, national courts have heard new cases of individual’s complaints regarding their 
Government’s conduct of exercising diplomatic protection, which might shed a new light on 
the matter of the legal nature of diplomatic protection. In the following paragraphs recent 
domestic jurisprudence will be assessed in an attempt to understand whether domestic courts 
from different geographical regions and legal systems still show deference to the executive’s 
power to exercise diplomatic protection914 and exclude their jurisdiction over these matters. Or 
have domestic courts departed from the classical conception of diplomatic protection as a 
purely discretionary State prerogative, and reached consensus on a more modern conception 
of the institution? 
                                                 
913 A mechanism that was argued in 2000 to be impenetrable by international human rights due to the rejection of 
Rapporteur Dugard’s proposal to introduce a State duty to exercise diplomatic protection. See G. Erasmus and L. 
Davidson, ‘Do South Africans have a Right to Diplomatic Protection?’ 25 S.A.Y.B. International Law, 113, 127. 
914 French courts used to apply the ‘acte du gouvernement’ doctrine whereby courts held themselves to lack 
jurisdiction to review foreign affairs matters, including the exercise of diplomatic protection on behalf of 
nationals abroad (see more in P. Serrand, L’acte de government. Contribution e la theorie des fonctions 
juridiques de l’Etat, These Paris II 1996); Commonwealth countries apply a similar doctrine, ‘act of States’: ‘the 
Acts of State doctrine is defined as a common law principle of uncertain application which prevents the English 
courts from examining the legality of certain acts performed in the exercise of sovereign authority within a 
foreign country.’ (Lord Nicholls, in House of Lords, November 25, 1998, ex parte Pinochet (1st judgment), ILM 
1998, vol. 37, 1302); on a similar doctrine of courts’ deference to the executive conduct of foreign affairs, see 
the ‘political questions’ doctrine, T.M. Franck, Political questions/Political answers. Does the rule of law apply 




Jurisprudence from countries with continental legal system 
The Rudolf Hess case915 of the German Federal Constitutional Court of 1946 is one of the 
most cited cases as an example of the courts limited recognition of a State duty to exercise 
diplomatic protection.916 The case concerns an individual convicted of crimes against peace by 
the Tribunal of Nuremberg and sentenced to imprisonment. The Constitutional Court was 
required to assess the failure of the government to take appropriate and effective measures in 
order to secure the release of the prisoner. The Government had in fact asked for the release 
of the detainee solely on considerations of humanity in light of Mr Hess’s old age and 
precarious health condition. The court concluded that, while the state had an obligation to 
provide diplomatic assistance to its nationals based on the interpretation of a broadly worded 
constitutional provision, the government had wide discretion in choosing how to fulfil this 
obligation.917 The government obligation was to respect the criteria of rationality and non-
arbitrariness when assessing a national’s claim to diplomatic protection, while ‘the role of 
administrative courts was confined to the review of actions and omissions of the Federal 
Government for abuses of discretion’.918 It can be argued that the German Constitutional 
Court was well in advance of other national courts that, at the time, were still tributary to the 
acts of Government or its equivalent doctrines.  
The Groupement X v Conseil Federal judgment of the Swiss Federal Court is a more 
daring judgment accepting to control the validity of a refusal to exercise diplomatic protection 
and establish the applicability of the administrative legal remedies.919 The Court established 
the individual right to judicial remedy over the executive’s diplomatic protection decision-
making based on an autonomous interpretation of Art. 6 (1) ECHR, which was considered 
relevant to the case, in spite of the absence of a substantive right to diplomatic protection.920 
The Swiss courts established the State’s responsibility for refusal to exercise diplomatic 
                                                 
915 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Dec. 16, 1980, ENTSCHEIDUNGEN 
DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 55,349 (Ger.), translated in (1980) I.L.R. 386. 
916 Although the case was referred by Rapporteur Dugard, this thesis takes a different take on this judgment, 
which is why it was included in the present section. 
917 See more in Bederman, ‘State-to-State Espousal of Human Rights Claims’, (2011) Virginia Journal of 
International Law Online, 1, 8. 
918 International Law Reports, vol. 90, p. 395. 
919 See J.F. Flauss, ‘Le contentieux des décisions de refus d'exercice de la protection diplomatique : à propos de 
l'arrêt du Tribunal fédéral suisse du 2 juillet 2004, Groupement X C./Conseil fédéral (1re Cour civile)’, (2005) 
RGDIP, 407, 407-419. 
920V. Pergantis, op.cit., 383. 
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protection based on domestic norms prescribing the responsibility of the executive for 
damages caused by its personnel. 
It seems that there is a growing number of domestic courts from continental legal 
systems accepting jurisdiction to review diplomatic protection claims.921 However they seem 
to assess the conduct of the Government with increased deference, most often not finding 
violations, except when in cases of lack of total answer from the Government to the 
individual’s requests.922 
Jurisprudence from countries with common law systems 
Before embarking on the legal analysis of the recent and relevant jurisprudence from the 
Commonwealth countries, it is important to note that their domestic laws do not include a 
legal obligation of the State to provide diplomatic protection to their nationals abroad. The 
protection of nationals abroad is part of the administrative category of public law, commonly 
perceived as falling within the realm of the foreign affairs prerogative of the State and, for a 
considerably long period, being held outside the domestic courts’ jurisdiction.923 The cases 
analysed under this sub-section will show that in the last decade significant changes have 
occurred such as: the ‘judicialisation’924 of the area of consular and diplomatic protection of 
the nationals abroad, limiting the State’s discretion in exercising diplomatic protection to the 
extent that in certain jurisdictions and particular circumstances, a legal obligation to exercise 
diplomatic protection and of a certain type was recognised as incumbent upon the State.925 
 
UK courts – Abbasi case926: the doctrine of legitimate expectations as a limited State duty to 
exercise diplomatic protection of nationals abroad 
Mr Abbasi is a British national who was captured in Afghanistan by the US Army and 
transferred to Guantánamo Bay where he was placed in indefinite detention. Having already 
spent eight months without access to a lawyer and unable to challenge the legality of his 
                                                 
921 The conclusion is reached also on the basis of the CARE Report’s Section 4 from each of the 27 National 
Reports. 
922 See the CARE Report, Section 4.1.2 and the sections on cases and practice within Section 4 of each of the 
National Reports in the CARE Report. 
923 R (on the application of Abbasi) v. Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs [2002] EWCA 
Civ 1598. 
924 The term ‘judicialization’ has been first used in the field of diplomatic protection of individuals by V. 
Pergantis, see, III.B The ‘Judicialization’ Paradigm: Judicial Review of Foreign Policy Discretion in ‘Towards a 
‘Humanization’ of Diplomatic Protection?’, (2006) ZaöRV, 351, 379ff. 
925 See, in particular, Khadr v Canada, [2009] F.C.J. No. 462 (the case is commented under the subsequent 
section dedicated to the analysis of the Canadian courts jurisprudence). 
926 R (on the application of Abbasi) v. Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs [2002] EWCA 
Civ 1598 (hereinafter Abbasi). 
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detention before a court, his mother decided to start legal proceedings before the UK courts to 
press the UK Foreign Office to make representations on his behalf before the US Government 
or at least explain why this had not already been done. Although initially this application was 
rejected by the UK Supreme Court,927 on appeal, the UK Court of Appeal, took a ground-
breaking decision and granted leave to intervene, convinced by the gravity and importance of 
the issues raised by the case. The central complaint was the responsibility of the UK 
government to make representations before the US Government or to take other action on 
behalf of Mr Abbasi, a British national, for the purpose of putting an end to his arbitrary 
detention. The case thus raised the question of whether the UK had a sort of duty to exercise 
diplomatic protection of a specific type on behalf of Mr Abbasi, and on which legal basis: 
domestic law, regional human rights law or general international law. Furthermore, given the 
long established doctrine of lack of jurisdiction of UK courts over the exercise of the State 
prerogative over the conduct of foreign policy, the UK Court of Appeal also had to establish 
whether this claim was justiciable, whether the Secretary of State had some sort of duty to 
exercise diplomatic protection, and if so, what the remedy for the violation of this duty by the 
Government could be.  
In particular, Mr Abbasi’s lawyer argued that the UK Government should petition the 
US for his release and return to the UK or at least for ensuring the judicial review of his 
detention, which was persistently rejected by the US courts. In fulfilling this end result, the 
counsellor argued that it was up to the Government to choose the appropriate diplomatic 
means and channels. Unlike similar cases raised before the South African or Canadian courts 
(see the following sections), the counsellor based its application on violation of an allegedly 
jus cogens norm of international law, i.e. prohibition of arbitrary detention928 by the US public 
authorities. 
The first legal question that the UK Court of Appeal had to examine was not however 
the jus cogens nature of the international norm, but a more basic legal question, namely, 
whether it had jurisdiction to examine the legality of a foreign State action. According to the 
Buttes doctrine: 
 ‘An English court will not sit in judgment on the sovereign acts of a foreign government 
or state. It will not adjudicate upon the legality, validity or acceptability of such acts, either 
under domestic law or international law. For a court to do so would offend against the principle 
                                                 
927 Due to the common law doctrine of the courts’ lack of jurisdiction to review the conduct of a foreign country 
or the executive’s conduct in foreign affairs. 




that the courts will not adjudicate upon the transactions of foreign sovereign states. This 
principle is not discretionary. It is inherent in the very nature of the judicial process.’929  
The Court held that it was competent to hear the case despite the fact that the contested 
act was an act adopted by a foreign country, which, based on the principle of comity, would, 
in principle, fall outside its jurisdiction. The UK Court of Appeal justified its choice on the 
fact that the apparent violated fundamental right to liberty and security is a right recognised 
by both common law systems, and by Art. 9 ICCPR, which binds both of the countries.930 It 
seems that the failure of Mr Abbasi to have his claim reviewed by US courts played an 
important role in the decision of the UKCA to admit the case.931  
After having assessed the issue of its competence based on the act of a foreign state 
doctrine, the UKCA assessed whether the doctrine of the foreign acts of the own State pre-
empts the court to judicial review the individual claim. 
The representative of the Government opposed the justiciability of the claim based on 
a long-established doctrine developed in the UK jurisprudence that ‘decisions taken by the 
executive in its dealing with foreign states regarding the protection of British citizens abroad 
are non-justiciable.’932 
In spite of retaining the general rule, whereby the Foreign Office’s discretion to 
exercise its prerogative powers in such a case is ‘a very wide one’ and ‘the court cannot enter 
the forbidden areas, including decisions affecting foreign policy’, the UKCA made a ground-
breaking decision to hold that there is ‘no reason why its decision or inaction should not be 
reviewable’.933  
Having established its jurisdiction to review the inaction of the Government, the Court 
went on to examine whether the Government is held by an international, regional or domestic 
norm to exercise diplomatic protection for its nationals abroad. 
The court noted that international law had not yet recognised any general duty for a 
state to intervene by diplomatic means.934 The Barcelona Traction case and the cautionary 
language of Rapporteur Dugard were invoked as clear indications for the lack of recognition 
of such a State duty. The applicant’s lawyer had in fact recognised that this State’s duty is law 
                                                 
929 See Buttes Gas and Oil Co v Hammer (No 3) [1982] AC 888, 932. 
930 See para. 64 of the Abbasi judgment. 
931 See para. 66 of the Abbasi judgment. 
932 R. v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex parte Pirbhai (107 ILR 462 (1985)); 
Suresh and Manickavasagam v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] EWHC Admin 1028 
(unreported, 16 November 2001). 
933 Ibid., para. 106. 
934 Ibid., para. 69. 
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in progress but argued that the UK should actively contribute to this law in progress.935 The 
UK Court of Appeal was not willing to adopt such a revolutionary approach. It held that such 
a duty can be accepted only if provided by ‘established principles of international law’. 
Having found that international law does not recognise a State duty to exercise 
diplomatic protection for its nationals abroad, the Court passed to the examination of the 
application of ECHR to the present case, and whether this Convention imposes such a State 
obligation. The Court rejected also the argument of a State duty deriving from the ECHR. 
First of all the Court denied the applicability of the Convention in the present case, as it did 
not agree with the personal jurisdiction as a basis for the applicability of the Convention. The 
Court held that Art. 1 ECHR establishes the applicability of the Convention based on 
territorial jurisdiction, which evidently lacked in this case.936 
The last legal norm considered by the UKCA as possible legal basis for the UK duty to 
exercise diplomatic protection was the domestic law based on established government policy 
statements or practices, underpinned by the law of legitimate expectation and justiciable in 
accordance with the principles established in the GCHQ case.937 The Court assessed several 
soft law documents (ministerial orders, parliamentary discussions, and papers submitted by 
the Government to the ILC) in order to establish whether the doctrine of legitimate 
expectations is applicable. According to the Court ‘the doctrine of legitimate expectations 
provides a well-established and flexible means for giving legal effect to a settled policy or 
practice for the exercise of an administrative discretion.’ The expectation may arise from an 
express promise or ‘from the existence of a regular practice which the claimant can 
reasonably expect to continue.’938  
The Court passed to the examination of the State policy to establish whether a duty to 
diplomatic protection in the form requested by the applicant could have been formed as a 
legitimate expectation of the applicant.  
The UK Court of Appeal concluded that there is clear evidence of acceptance ‘by the 
Government of a role in relation to protecting the rights of British citizens abroad, where 
there is evidence of miscarriage or denial of justice.’939 According to the Court, the 
expectations that the Government could have created to its nationals could not have been that 
                                                 
935 Ibid., para. 39. 
936 Ibid., para. 71. 
937 Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374, paras. 81ff. 
938 Abbasi, para. 82. 
939 Ibid., para. 71. 
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they have a right, but ‘merely that the UK will consider making representations, which will be 
triggered by the belief that there is a breach of the international obligations.’940 
The UK Court of Appeal extended its jurisdiction over an area that had been long 
considered under the discretionary power of decision of the State, and outside the realm of 
judicial review. If in CCSV v Minister for Civil Service the Court held that areas of high 
policy, such as ‘the conduct of foreign affairs, the making of treaties or the defence of the 
realm, were regarded as non-justiciable’, in the Abbasi judgment, the Court ruled that it does 
have jurisdiction over one of these high policy areas – the conduct of foreign affairs. The 
basis for this extension was the doctrine of legitimate expectation: as long as the Government 
has acted in a way that creates legitimate expectations to individuals that ‘if subjected abroad 
to a violation of a fundamental right, the British Government will not simply wash their hands 
of the matter and abandon him to his fate’. According to the Court, the UK citizen has a 
legitimate expectation that his request for diplomatic protection will be ‘considered’, and 
‘that in that consideration all relevant factors will be thrown into the balance.’ On the 
concrete question of deciding whether to give satisfaction to the applicant’s requests or not, 
the Court did not depart from its previous jurisprudence, since it concluded that it could not 
speak with a different voice from the executive, thus rejecting the application on the facts. 
On the basis of the policy papers presented by the UK Government, the Court held that 
the legitimate expectations that these statements have created for the British nationals are very 
limited, and do not give a legal entitlement to Mr Abbasi to have legitimate expectations that 
he will receive diplomatic assistance in the form he requested.941  
The Court continued by assessing whether the actions already taken by the 
Government can be considered as fulfilling the obligations arising from the legitimate 
expectations that had been created. The UK Government proved that it had had direct 
discussions with the US Secretary of State and that the official of the UK Foreign Office 
obtained permission to visit the UK detainee in Guantánamo Bay on three separate occasions. 
The purpose of the communication and visits was to ascertain the well-being and the 
treatment of the detainees and not the release of the appellant or the arbitrary nature of his 
detention, as requested by Mr Abbasi’s lawyer. 
                                                 
940 Ibid.. 
941 ‘They indicate that where certain criteria are satisfied, the Government will consider making representations. 
Where to make any representations in a particular case, and if so in what form, is left entirely to the discretion 
of the Secretary of State. […] The Secretary of State must be free to give full weight to foreign policy 
considerations, which are not justiciable. However, that does not mean that the whole process is immune from 
judicial scrutiny. The citizen’s legitimate expectations is that his request will be considered, and that in that 
consideration all relevant factors will be thrown into the balance.’ Abbasi Judgment, para. 99. 
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The court held that such acts were sufficient to fulfil the legitimate expectations and 
rejected the relief sought by the appellant for specific representations. This actually reflects 
the wide discretion recognised by the Court to the executive. The national is not entitled to 
receive under the UK law the external representations that he would like to receive on his 
behalf from the Government, but his legitimate expectations are limited to those directly 
promised by the Government or previously publicly stated based on his freedom of 
conducting the State’s foreign affairs. 
The Abbasi judgment does not recognise an individual right to diplomatic protection 
under domestic, regional human rights, or international law. Its added value for the topic of 
diplomatic protection of individuals is, however, invaluable, due to the domestic judiciary’s 
significant change of its long-standing doctrine of absolute deference towards the executive. 
Just one year before the Abbasi judgment, the Buttes doctrine942 precluded the UK courts from 
reviewing the foreign affairs, especially if related to national security, conduct of the 
executive. Following the Abbasi judgment, the executive prerogative over the exercise of 
consular assistance and diplomatic protection was held to be justiciable. Additionally, the 
executive had to comply with the obligation to consider the individuals’ requests in good faith 
and as much as possible to provide reasons for refusal. 
In conclusion, it can be argued that the Abbasi judgment made two significant 
advances in the field of diplomatic protection of individuals within the common law system. 
It first extended judicial review over the executive consular and diplomatic protection 
prerogative of the Government, including in the delicate matters of violations of human rights 
committed by a foreign State.943 Second, the UKCA recognised that in certain circumstances 
the British national might have a legitimate expectation to receive diplomatic protection from 
the UK Government, and this legitimate expectation is judicially reviewable. 
 
 
Jurisprudence of the South African courts – recognising a limited State duty to exercise 
diplomatic protection of nationals abroad 
Starting from 2004 a string of diplomatic protection cases were brought before South African 
courts by citizens against their Government.944 Of these, the Kaunda case945 decided by the 
                                                 
942 R v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Ex p Ferhut Butt (1999) 116 ILR 607. 
943 More details on this issue can be found in Charlotte Kilroy, ‘Reviewing the Prerogative’, (2003) EHRLR, 
222. 
944 Kaunda v President RSA [2005] (4) SA 235 (CC), Roothman v President RSA [2005] (3) All SA 600 (T); 
Thatcher v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development [2005] (1) SA 375 (C); Van Zyl v Government of 
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South African Constitutional Court in late 2004, and the Von Abo case decided in 2009946 and 
2011947 are proof of the growing recognition of a State duty to exercise diplomatic protection. 
We will first examine the judgment of the South African Constitutional Court in the Kaunda 
case, proceed with the Von Abo case and conclude by summarising the common and recent 
position of the South African courts on the issue of the legal nature of diplomatic protection, 
and point out the avant-garde approaches. 
In 2004, 69 South African citizens held in Zimbabwe on a variety of charges for their 
alleged involvement in plotting a coup against the President of Equatorial Guinea brought 
judicial proceedings initially before the High Court in Pretoria against the Government of 
South Africa and other South African public authorities officials, seeking, in short, to compel 
the Government to take action at the diplomatic level to ensure the applicants’ repatriation in 
South Africa. They also asked that, should the nationals be put on trial in Zimbabwe or 
Equatorial Guinea, the Government would ensure their constitutional rights to dignity, 
freedom, security of the persons (section 9), fair conditions of detention and trial (section 35), 
prohibition of torture and other ill-treatments (section 12), and respect of their dignity be 
upheld at all times by Zimbabwe and Equatorial Guinea.948 The High Court considered that 
the main legal issues raised by this application was whether the Constitution established an 
obligation on the State to exercise protection of the applicants in relation to the detention 
conditions in Zimbabwe and the prosecution they face there, as well as in light of the death 
sentence which they may face in Equatorial Guinea, if they were extradited to this country. 
These issues were held to ‘involve the reach of the Constitution, and the relationship between 
the judiciary and the executive and the separation of powers between them.’949 Therefore they 
were constitutional matters of great importance not only for the applicants but for the entire 
society.  
The High Court rejected the application on the basis of absences of an explicit right of 
the individual to diplomatic protection in international or domestic law, and lack of 
extraterritorial application of the constitutionally protected rights. It is possible that due to the 
                                                                                                                                                        
the RSA [2005] (4) All SA 96 (T), Von Abo v Government of RSA [2009] (2) SA 526 (T) and Government of RSA 
v Von Abo case no 283/10 [2011] 3 All SA 261 (SCA). 
945 Samuel Kaunda and Others v. President of the Republic of South Africa and Others, Constitutional Court of 
South Africa, decision of 4 August 2004, reprinted in: (2005) ILM, 173-233. 
946 Von Abo v President of the Republic of South Africa (CCT 67/08) [2009] ZACC 15; 2009 (10) BCLR 1052 
(CC); 2009 (5) SA 345 (CC) (5 June 2009). 
947 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Von Abo (2011 (5) SA 262 (SCA); [2011] 3 All SA 
261 (SCA)) [2011] ZASCA 65; 283/10 (4 April 2011). 
948 Samuel Kaunda and Others v. President of the Republic of South Africa and Others, Constitutional Court of 
South Africa, decision of 4 August 2004, see paras. 4 and 17. 
949 Ibid., para. 19. 
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constitutional nature of the claims and the legal consequences of the judgment that could 
impact on the constitutional relation between the judiciary and executive, and thus on the 
entire society, the High Court was extremely prudent in its findings and preferred to leave the 
task of legal innovation to the Constitutional Court decision, in case the applicants decided to 
appeal. 
 Following the dismissal, the applicants appealed to the Constitutional Court of South 
Africa. The main gist of the numerous applicants’ claim was that the Government failed to 
comply with their demands of ensuring protection of their constitutional rights to dignity, life, 
freedom and security of the person, the right not to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman 
or degrading way, and also the right to a fair trial (sections 10, 11, 12 and 35 of the 
Constitution), which had been violated by Zimbabwe. Additionally, they complained that the 
Government did not take steps to ensure their repatriation in South Africa, which was 
necessary in light of the possibility of being subjected to a death sentence if extradited to 
Equatorial Guinea. Relying on section 7(2) of the Constitution, which requires the State to 
‘respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights’, the counsel of the 
applicants contended that the State is obliged to protect these rights of the applicants, and the 
only way it can do so in the circumstances of this case is to provide them with diplomatic 
protection, which in the present case should take the concrete form of a request for 
repatriation of the applicants.950 Therefore, the Constitutional Court had to assess two main 
legal issues: whether South Africa had a duty to exercise diplomatic protection either under 
domestic or international norms, and whether constitutional rights could apply outside the 
South African borders. 
The Constitutional Court started its legal reasoning by asking whether a duty of the 
State to exercise diplomatic protection in certain cases is recognised by international and/or 
domestic law. As for the legal nature of diplomatic protection as recognised by international 
law, the Court sided with the Government’s arguments that the general international law 
practice recognises diplomatic protection only as a discretionary right of the State of 
nationality. The Court invoked the failure of Rapporteur Dugard’s proposal for an article 
providing a State duty to exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of nationals as evidence 
that the traditional conception of diplomatic protection is still in force. .  
                                                 
950 Kaunda judgment, para. 21. 
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The Constitutional Court held that a duty might still be deduced from domestic law 
and continued by assessing whether the constitutional provisions of sections 7951 or 3952 
recognise an explicit or implicit right of the citizen to diplomatic protection from the State, 
which, in casu, would take the form of compelling the Government to seek the repatriation of 
the applicants. Justice Chaskalson, writing for the majority, held that the Constitution did not 
provide an express individual right to diplomatic protection. He also rejected the argument of 
the applicants that an implicit right to diplomatic protection can be deduced from the 
constitutional rights to life, dignity, and not to be treated in a cruel, inhuman or degrading 
way, unless the South African Government has been involved in the extraterritorial violation 
of these fundamental rights. 
However, the Court did recognise that in certain limited circumstances, South African 
citizens enjoy an entitlement to request diplomatic protection as part of the constitutional 
guarantee given by section 3.953 However this entitlement to request diplomatic protection 
imposes only an obligation of means and not of results. The corresponding obligation of this 
entitlement is that the executive is obliged ‘to consider the request and deal with it 
consistently with the Constitution’.954 With the recognition of this entitlement, the Court does 
not substantially contribute to the formation of a customary rule of an individual right to 
diplomatic protection, it just adds one more jurisdiction to the plethora of domestic courts that 
have already recognised such a minimum entitlement for the individual which does not pose 
significant problems to the Government’s classical discretionary power to exercise diplomatic 
protection of nationals abroad.955  
In the next paragraphs the Court does go further by admitting that:  
 
‘[If] the request is directed to a material infringement of a human right that forms part 
of customary international law, one would not expect our government to be passive. Whatever 
                                                 
951 Section 7(2) of the South African Constitution requires the state to ‘respect, protect, promote and fulfil the 
rights in the Bill of Rights’. 
952 Section 3 of the South African Constitution provides: ‘(1) There is a common South African citizenship. (2) 
All citizens are — (a) equally entitled to the rights, privileges and benefits of citizenship; and (b) equally subject 
to the duties and responsibilities of citizenship. (3) National legislation must provide for the acquisition, loss and 
restoration of citizenship.’ 
953 Kaunda judgment, para. 67. 
954 Ibid., para. 67. 
955 Certain legal scholars have argued that the majority’s decision recognised a meaningless ‘right’ within the 
context of diplomatic protection, see Pergantis, op.cit., and Booysen ‘The Administrative Law implication of the 
‘customary law is part of the South African law’ doctrine.’ (1997) SAYIL, 46. 
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theoretical disputes may still exist about the basis for diplomatic protection, it cannot be 
doubted that in substance the true beneficiary of the right that is asserted is the individual.’ 956 
 
In the limited circumstances of ‘a gross abuse of international human rights norms’, 
the Court recognises a duty of the Government, consistent with its international obligations to 
‘take action to protect its citizens’ against such violations.957 The Court finds that situations, 
where its nationals are subject to such egregious breaches of international human rights that 
might prevent the nationals from asking for assistance, require the Government to take of its 
own initiative, action and secure diplomatic protection.958 The Court immediately tempers this 
innovative position by pointing out that ‘A court cannot tell the government how to make 
diplomatic interventions for the protection of its nationals’ and cites scholars and foreign 
domestic jurisprudence in support of this statement.959 In spite of the recognition of a State 
duty to diplomatic protection in cases of egregious violation of international human rights, 
and of the jurisdiction of the courts to review the executive conduct in these matters, the 
Court still recognises a wide discretion to the Government in foreign affairs. ‘Courts required 
to deal with such matters will, however, give particular weight to the government’s special 
responsibility for and particular expertise in foreign affairs, and the wide discretion that it 
must have in determining how best to deal with such matters.’ 960 
It is noticeable that the Court referred not only to international judgments but also to 
domestic foreign judgments. This exercise of comparative analysis is laudable, however it 
seemed to come after the Court had already made its decision, and served only for cherry 
picking for the judicial opinions, whether international or domestic, that would support the 
predetermined choices, instead of having recourse to the comparative legal analysis to help it 
find a decision after a careful examination of the cited evidence. The Court confined itself to 
cases already cited by Rapporteur Dugard in support of his proposal for a State duty to 
exercise diplomatic protection.961 The Constitutional Court closely followed the approach of 
the UK Court of Appeal in Abbasi, as regards the role of courts in reviewing the conduct of 
the Government in diplomatic protection matters. The Court held that rationality and bad faith 
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960 Ibid., para. 144. 
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are two main grounds on the basis of which it can review the decisions of the executive 
regarding the exercise of diplomatic protection.962 Similarly to the UK Court of Appeal, the 
South African Constitutional Court emphasised that an arbitrary refusal will be subject to 
judicial review. 
In spite of the advancement of the scope of judicial review over the executive’s 
decision-making in diplomatic protection matters, the Court deferentially concluded that the 
application had to be rejected on the basis of the following grounds: absence of an explicit 
right to diplomatic protection in international or domestic law; the constitutional protected 
rights invoked by the applicants do not apply extraterritorially based on the still applicable 
traditional principle of international law of sovereign equality of States, as established in the 
Lotus case, which generally prohibits the extraterritorial application of domestic law; if a 
South African official had been involved, or was complicit in the violation of these 
constitutional rights abroad, then this participation would have engaged their liability towards 
their citizens, however in the present case the participation of a Government official was not 
proved.  
It has been argued that the Court dispatched too easily the issue of the applicability of 
international customary law to the case.963 Surely human rights, such as those invoked by the 
applicants – the right to life, the right not to be tortured and subjected to ill-treatments, and 
the right to a fair trial – are provided by numerous international treaties, including the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which is held to codify international customary law, 
in the ICCPR and the African Charter of Fundamental Rights which bound all the countries 
involved in the case: South Africa, Zimbabwe and Equatorial Guinea. Since the Court held 
that the Government has a duty to exercise diplomatic protection in cases of egregious 
violation of human rights, more attention should have been paid to the identification of such 
violations in the present case. At times the Court seems to have contradicted itself. For 
instance, although the Court admitted that there might be a real possibility that the applicants 
would be extradited to Equatorial Guinea (paras.104-105), it later asserted that: 
 
‘[…] if the allegations by the applicants that they will not get a fair trial in Equatorial 
Guinea prove to be correct, and they are convicted and sentenced to death, there will have been 
a grave breach of international law harmful to our government’s foreign policy and its 
                                                 
962 Ibid., para. 80. 
963 See Pete and du Plessis, ‘South Africans Abroad and their right to diplomatic protection’, (2006) SAJHR, 
439; M. Olivier, ‘Diplomatic Protection: Right or Privilege’, (2005) SAYIL, 238. 
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aspirations for a democratic Africa. As far as the applicants are concerned the consequences 
would be catastrophic, and they will have suffered irreparable harm.’964 
 
However, several paragraphs later it points out that the danger is scarce since the 
applicants ‘are not in Equatorial Guinea and they have not been put on trial there. No injury 
has been done to them by that country and no injury will be done unless they are put on trial 
there.’ 
As regards the respect of the individual’s entitlement to have his request for diplomatic 
protection duly taken into consideration, the Court pointed out that the applicants’ requests for 
assistance in regard to their deplorable detention conditions, abuses, and denied access to 
lawyers in Zimbabwe, have been taken up by the South African High Commission. And that 
the latter presented these matters to the Zimbabwean authorities. These representations were 
held as fulfilling the Government duty to consider rationally and in good faith its citizen’s 
requests for diplomatic protection. The Court concluded that due to the great sensitivity of the 
events of which the applicants were accused (i.e. the alleged coup plotters, mercenaries 
equipped with large quantity of ammunition – see para. 11), it would not be appropriate for ‘a 
Court to require or propose any approach with regard to timing or modalities different to that 
adopted by government.’965  
There seems to be more support for an individual right to diplomatic protection in the 
minority judgment. The concurring Opinions of Justices O’Regan, Ngcobo and Sachs offer a 
clearer answer to the question of whether a constitutional duty on the government to exercise 
diplomatic protection exists under the South African law. The Justices recognised that the 
Constitution conferred upon the individuals an entitlement to make representations but it also 
imposed based on section 3 an obligation on the state ‘to take steps to seek to protect citizens 
against fundamental breaches of their human rights as recognised by customary international 
law or the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights.’966 Both of the Justices held that 
the death sentence, which the applicants could very well face abroad, was serious enough to 
justify a clear obligation on the Government to take steps to provide diplomatic protection.967  
The scope of this section is not to criticise or praise this judgment, nor to offer an 
exhaustive analysis of the legal and political context of this judgment, but to identify whether 
this controversial judgment does contain seeds of evidence of a recognition of an individual 
                                                 
964 See Kaunda judgment, para. 124. 
965 Ibid., para. 144. 
966 Ibid., para. 97. 
967 Ibid., paras. 88, 94, 116. 
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right to diplomatic protection, in which circumstances, and to what extent. The Court did 
recognise a duty of the Government to ‘take action to protect its citizens’ against ‘a gross 
abuse of international human rights norms’. 
There were other diplomatic protection cases following the Kaunda case. In 2005, the 
Constitutional Court reviewed two more cases, Roothman968 and Van Zyl969, based on 
complaints against the Government’s inaction towards the applicants’ requests to exercise 
diplomatic assistance on their behalf against foreign States. In the Roothman case, the 
applicant attempted to convince the Government to exercise diplomatic pressure on the 
Democratic Republic of Congo to ensure the enforcement of a favourable judgment, while in 
the second case, Van Zyl attempted to convince the South African Government to exercise 
diplomatic protection for the purpose of obtaining compensation for an expropriation of his 
property in the Kingdom of Lesotho. The Court rejected both claims on the grounds of 
absence of an applicable international law that could lead to an international wrongful act in 
the first case, while in the second case, absence of extraterritorial application of constitutional 
provisions and of the Government involvement in the alleged extraterritorial violation of 
rights. 
The next prominent case is the one brought by Von Abo before a South African High 
Court and, contrary to the above-mentioned string of cases, this one clearly recognises an 
individual right to diplomatic protection.970 The 2009 judgment of this court was very 
controversial giving rise to either harsh critiques or high praise.971 This judgment is certainly a 
breakthrough for the conception of diplomatic protection as a right of the individual and for 
the increasing role of the courts vis-à-vis the executive in foreign relations matters. 
After several years of re-investments, Von Abo, a South African national, acquired 
considerable farming properties in Zimbabwe. Following a State policy scheme of the 
Zimbabwe government to expropriate land owned by white farmers, Von Abo was deprived 
of a large part of his farmland without compensation. His efforts to ensure remedy via judicial 
proceedings proved ineffective. Following an unsuccessful exhaustion of local remedies in 
                                                 
968 Roothman v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others (29087/04) [2005] ZAGPHC 266 
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Zimbabwe, Mr Von Abo tried for 6 more years to convince the South African Government to 
act against Zimbabwe’s expropriation of his farmland, but again without success. He then 
started judicial proceedings against the Government of his country of nationality for the 
alleged failure of the latter to ‘take diplomatic steps to protect or fulfil his rights’ without 
‘meaningful explanation for the failure and/or refusal’ based on his constitutional rights.972 In 
a 2009 judgment, the High Court of North Gauteng held that the South African Government 
had failed to fulfil its obligation to exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of Von Abo 
whose property rights had been violated by Zimbabwe.973 
The High Court first found that ‘the requirements necessary for a state to assert a 
claim for diplomatic protection on behalf of its citizen were present’, namely the nationality 
of the country from which diplomatic protection was sought; ‘there had been a violation of an 
international minimum standard; and that the claimant had previously exhausted all 
available internal remedies.’974 The legal basis of the State’s obligation to exercise diplomatic 
protection was the constitutional provision of section 3 and the previous judgment of the 
South African Court in the Kaunda case. Additionally, the Government’s continuous 
reluctance to address Von Abo’s request for diplomatic protection following his expropriation 
without compensation by the Zimbabwe Government was held by the Court to show improper 
consideration of the applicant’s request. As remedy to the violation of the individual’s right to 
diplomatic protection, the Court obliged the Government to take all necessary steps to obtain 
on behalf of the applicants a remedy of their injury caused by the Government of Zimbabwe, 
and to report to the court within a 60 day period the steps that had been taken in this regard. 
The South African Government appealed this judgment before the Supreme Court, 
which overturned the decision of the High Court in a decision from 2011. The Supreme Court 
has shown in the past a deferential approach to the executive’s foreign affairs powers (see the 
Van Zyl judgment of 2008) and continued on the same line also in the Von Abo judgment. The 
Court noted that even though the Kaunda judgment was invoked by the High Court in support 
of its reasoning, it was an erred interpretation of that judgment, based more on the minority 
opinion than on the majority one. 
The common thread throughout these South African cases, starting from 2004 until 
2011, is that international law has been constantly held as not yet recognising a right of a 
national to diplomatic protection, based primarily on the ILC Articles on Diplomatic 
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973 Von Abo v Government of RSA [2009] (2) SA 526 (T). 
974 Ibid., para. 111. 
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Protection, which were concluded in 2006. From 2006 until 2011 important national 
judgments were delivered, recognising a right of the individual to diplomatic protection in 
cases of violation of fundamental human rights,975 however they were not cited by the South 
African courts, especially the Supreme Court in the latest Von Abo case. The Courts seem to 
have agreed only with the more prudent stance of recognising to the nationals only a right to 
have the executive consider their request for diplomatic protection. The accepted legal norms 
on the basis of which the individual could enforce such a right against the South African State 
have pertained to domestic law, and in particular the constitutional provisions. The Courts 
have unanimously agreed that the South African citizen has a right to have his request for 
diplomatic protection considered in good faith and rationally by the executive. This right was 
also recognised by the UK courts to UK citizens. 
These were minimum entitlements, which would have entailed no cost for the 
executive to fulfil, thus it does not reflect a revolutionary change in the traditional conception 
of diplomatic protection.976 Certain South African courts dared to go beyond these minimum 
requirements and interpreted the constitutional provisions as implicitly establishing more than 
a right to have the request for diplomatic protection considered, namely a right to receive 
diplomatic protection.977 Justices O’Reagan and Ngcobo, representing the minority in the 
Kaunda judgment of the South African Constitutional Court recognised a State duty to 
exercise diplomatic protection in cases of violation of fundamental human rights based on 
sections 3 and 7 of the Constitution and the international human rights treaties, in particular 
the African Charter of Fundamental Rights, which bind South Africa. The majority also 
recognised a duty to diplomatic protection, though more limited than the one recognised by 
the minority, namely in cases of egregious violation of human rights, and as long as the 
Government was involved or participated in the alleged extraterritorial violations. This 
modern conception was immediately tempered by emphasising that in no circumstance can 
courts replace the executive in the choices that need to be made in foreign affairs matters. 
It was documented, based on jurisprudence delivered until 2012, that South Africans 
invoked a right to diplomatic protection from their Government in matters related to debt 
                                                 
975 See, for instance, the Khadr judgment of 2009 of the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal discussed in the 
following sub-section, as well as the General Court of the EU judgments in the Ayadi and Hassan cases 
discussed above. 
976 S. Singh, ‘Constitutional and international law at a crossroads: diplomatic protection in the light of the Von 
Abo judgment: South African judicial decisions’, (2011) South African Yearbook of International Law, 298-307. 
977 See the Von Abo v Government of RSA [2009] (2) SA 526 (T), discussed above. 
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collection,978 arrest and detention,979 extradition,980 and expropriation of property.981 Although 
the South African courts, especially the Constitutional and Supreme Courts, were criticised 
for showing too much deference to the Government, as except for Von Abo, all applications 
were ultimately rejected.982 In spite of political considerations, which seem to trump in the 
eyes of the court when faced with the individuals’ request for a particular diplomatic 
protection exercise, the aforementioned judgments of the South African courts represent the 
seeds of a movement towards recognising an individual right to diplomatic protection. The 
first change registered by the judicial approach in this field is the willingness of courts to 
admit diplomatic protection cases for judicial review. Second, there is a general recognition of 
an individual right to have his/her request considered in good faith and rationally by the 
Government. Third, a right to diplomatic protection has been recognised in cases of egregious 
violations of fundamental human rights, and as long as the Government was involved or 
participated in the alleged extraterritorial violations. In spite of all the criticism of the Kaunda 
judgment for having recognised only minimal and theoretical rights to diplomatic protection, 
where, it was argued, there were sound reasons for giving effect to the applicant’s claim, the 
judgment has had an important impact on the subsequent jurisprudence, as proved by the 
2009 judgment of the High Court in the Von Abo case. 
It is clear that cases submitted by individuals before domestic courts, against the 
Government’s reaction to their requests for diplomatic protection, increased in South Africa 
in the last decade, and are likely to continue increasing. The willingness of courts to judicially 
review such cases and assess the merits of the cases also increased, as well as their boldness 
to establish a duty to act on the part of the government, especially in extreme cases, such as 
those where grave violations of human rights of nationals are at issue. A certain variation in 
terms of the scope and force of the State duty to exercise diplomatic protection does exist 
among the different judgments, ranging from a minimal recognised duty to not act arbitrarily 
and provide reasons for the Government’s decisions, to a more stringent and clear duty to 
secure protection in cases of gross abuses of international human rights norms. This duty has 
been more often recognised in the recent jurisprudence983, which could be interpreted as 
                                                 
978 Roothman v President of RSA. 
979 Kaunda, Thatcher v Minister of Justice, Mohamed v President of RSA. 
980 Ibid. 
981 Van Zyl and Others v Government of Republic of South Africa and Others (170/06) [2007] ZASCA 109; 
[2007] SCA 109 (RSA); [2008] 1 All SA 102 (SCA); 2008 (3) SA 294 (SCA) (20 September 2007). 
982 And even the Von Abo case was rejected on appeal by the Supreme Court. 
983 See the Von Abo judgment of 2009 and to a certain extent also the opinion of the Supreme Court in its 2011 
judgment in the same case, which although rejecting the plea of Von Abo against the Government based on the 
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supporting the development of a trend recognising a State duty to act on behalf of the national 
in cases of grave violations of his human rights abroad. 
 
 
Canada – the Khadr case: recognising a limited State duty to exercise diplomatic protection, 
beyond the legitimate expectations doctrine 
Within the framework of the ‘war on terror’, several Canadian citizens with single or dual 
nationalities were detained without a due process and subjected to torture and ill-treatment in 
Arab countries and the US Guantánamo Bay military base. The Canadian Government’s 
reaction to these cases has been criticised as passive and, in certain cases, as even supportive 
of a policy of extraordinary rendition of terrorist suspects to regimes using ill treatments as 
tactics to obtain confessions or evidence.984 
The case of one of the Guantánamo Bay detainees attracted wide media attention, due 
to the fact that he was a minor at the time of his arrest and detention by the US authorities. Mr 
Khadr is a dual national of Canada and Egypt, who had lived almost his entire life in Canada. 
He was first detained in Afghanistan for allegedly having thrown a grenade that killed a US 
soldier. A few months later he was transferred to Guantánamo Bay while still a minor. 
Between 2004 and 2008, Mr Khadr brought several complaints against the Canadian 
Government before the domestic courts of Canada asking, in some of these cases, for remedy 
of the damages he has suffered as a consequence of the Canadian Government’s general 
passivity towards his situation, and involvement in the US actions that violated his absolute 
right to be protected against torture and mistreatments.985 In other judicial claims, Mr Khadr 
asked the Government to disclose data related to the abusive interviews he was subjected to in 
Guantánamo Bay.986 Following a series of repeated applications for judicial review of the 
Government’s refusal to seek his repatriation,987 in 2009, the Federal Court of Vancouver988 
                                                                                                                                                        
facts, it did clearly recognise a duty to exercise diplomatic protection on the part of the Government, see 
Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Von Abo (2011 (5) SA 262 (SCA); [2011] 3 All SA 
261 (SCA)) [2011] ZASCA 65; 283/10 (4 April 2011). 
984 See e.g. Amnesty International (Canada), ‘Restoring his rights, addressing his wrongs. Amnesty 
International's closing submissions to the Committee of Inquiry’ (10 September 2005); see more details in C. 
Forcese, ‘The Obligation to Protect: The Legal Context for Diplomatic Protection of Canadians Abroad’, (2007) 
U.N.B.L.J., 102. 
985 Khadr v. The Attorney General of Canada and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2005 FC 1076, T-536-04); 
Khadr v. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2004 FC 1145, T-686-04. 
986 Khadr v. Canada (Minister of Justice), 2006 FC 509; Khadr v. Canada (Minister of Justice), 2007 FCA 182; 
Canada (Justice) v. Khadr (Minister of Justice), 2008 SCC 28. 
987 For a summary of the different applications submitted by the family of Mr Khadr in 2004, 2006, 2007 and 
2008, please see the Judgment written by Justice O’Reilly in case Khadr v Canada, [2009] F.C.J. No. 462, 
judgment of 23 April 2009, paras. 19-28. 
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finally established a legal duty on Canada to protect Mr Khadr under section 7 of the Charter 
(prohibition of ill-treatment). Subsequently it found that Canada failed to fulfil its legal 
obligation and established as a legal remedy the obligation of the government to request the 
applicant’s repatriation. This finding was also upheld in appeal. In the final appeal of the 
Government before the Supreme Court of Canada, the latter partially retained the 
revolutionary judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court concurred with 
the previous courts’ finding of Canada’s violation of section 7 of the Charter based on the 
sufficient connection between the Government’s participation in the US illegal deprivation of 
Mr Khadr’s liberty and security and the ill-treatment of the minor. The Supreme Court 
departed however from the finding of a remedy in the precise form of the Government’s 
request for repatriation of the applicant to Canada. Although establishing that the royal 
prerogative over the foreign relations of the executive does not exonerate the latter from 
constitutional scrutiny989, and that courts have the power ‘to give specific direction to the 
executive branch of the government’, the Supreme Court quashed the previous judgment 
establishing an obligation of the Government to request repatriation: 
 
‘The appropriate remedy in this case is to declare that K’s Charter  rights were 
violated, leaving it to the government to decide how best to respond in light of current 
information, its responsibility over foreign affairs, and the Charter.’990  
 
It has to be noted that the decision of the Supreme Court to leave the choice of the 
appropriate remedy to the executive is a step back from the human rights based judgment 
delivered by the Federal Court. On the other hand it can be interpreted also as recognition of 
the fact that courts might not have access to the full picture and the complexity of the case, 
and it could be in the best interests of the individual and Canada’s broader national interests to 
leave the choice of remedy to the executive. The Supreme Court does not mention how 
repatriation would jeopardise Canada’s national interest and how it could be against the 
interests of the individual, especially when Mr Khadr’s desire was precisely to be repatriated. 
Furthermore, unlike the previous courts991, the Supreme Court does not place Canada’s duty to 
act towards the individual, and the remedy for the violation of section 7 as falling under the 
ambit of a State duty to exercise diplomatic protection. In the following paragraphs, the first 
                                                                                                                                                        
988 Khadr v Canada, [2009] F.C.J. No. 462. 
989 Canada (Prime Minister) v. Khadr, 2010 SCC 3, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 44, para. 36. 
990 Canada (Prime Minister) v. Khadr, 2010 SCC 3, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 44, paras. 39 and 41. 
991 Khadr v Canada, [2009] F.C.J. No. 462, see, for instance, paras. 42, 48, 89. 
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judgment of the Federal Court will be assessed, since it puts forward ground-breaking 
observations on the legal nature and effects of diplomatic protection as an individual right.  
Following the Government’s disclosure of information992, which proved the 
Government’s conscious participation in ill-treatment practices of the US towards Mr Khadr, 
and the US Supreme Court judgment in Hamdan v Rumsfeld993 holding the Guantánamo Bay 
regime as being in violation of the Geneva Convention, the family of Mr Khadr submitted a 
new application challenging the refusal of the Canadian Government to seek his repatriation 
from Guantánamo Bay to Canada.994 Similarly to previous applications, the application 
submitted in 2008 was based on several sections of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms (sections 6995, 7996 and 12997) and the international obligations incumbent on Canada, 
requiring it to protect individuals under its jurisdiction from torture, ill-treatments and to 
ensure the protection of the rights of the child. This time, the applicant hoped that the newly 
disclosed information, which proved the Government’s conscious involvement in the US ill-
treatment of the applicant, and the US Supreme Court’s judgment holding the international 
illegality of the Guantánamo Bay regime, would be held by the Canadian Federal Court as 
sufficient evidence to prove the connection between the Government’s conduct and the 
extraterritorial violation of human rights. It has to be noted that previous applications were 
rejected by the Federal Court precisely on the basis of the US v Burns998 doctrine which 
required a sufficient link between the acts of the Government and the extraterritorial violation 
of the human rights in order to hold the Government liable under the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms.999 
In assessing his complaint, the Federal Court held that it would need to respond to four 
main legal questions: 1) Have the issues he raised been decided in other previous judicial 
proceedings? 2) Is there a decision of the Government that can be judicially reviewed; and, if 
there is, then is this decision reviewable by the court? 3) Does the Government have a legal 
                                                 
992 Based on requirement established the Supreme Court in its judgment delivered in Canada (Justice) v. Khadr 
(Minister of Justice), 2008 SCC 28. 
993 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006). 
994 Khadr v Canada, [2009] F.C.J. No. 462. 
995 Section 6 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms includes the mobility rights: right to enter, remain, 
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996 Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms includes the right to life, liberty, and security of 
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punishment. 
998 United States v. Burns, 2001 SCC 7, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283. 
999 Khadr v Canada, [2009] F.C.J. No. 462, section IV Issues of the judgment. 
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duty to protect Mr Khadr? and finally, 4) what is the appropriate remedy if that duty is found 
to have been violated?1000 This section will not exhaustively assess all these questions, but will 
focus on the issues of the justiciability of the Government’s decision on diplomatic protection 
matters and on the existence of a State duty to exercise diplomatic protection, and possible 
remedies in case such a duty has been breached. 
The Court started its assessment with the delicate question of whether a decision of the 
Government which touches upon highly sensitive foreign affairs policy choices is amenable to 
judicial scrutiny. The Court admitted that ‘decisions about foreign affairs fall naturally and 
properly to the executive’.1001 However, it continued by summarising the exceptions to this 
rule as established in previous judgments:  
 
‘the exercise of Crown prerogative is beyond the scope of judicial review, except, of 
course, when a right guaranteed by the [Charter ] is violated’;1002 ‘Decisions involving pure 
policy or political choices in the nature of Crown prerogatives are generally not amenable to 
judicial review because their subject matter is not suitable to judicial assessment. But where the 
subject matter of a decision directly affects the rights or legitimate expectations of an 
individual, a Court is both competent and qualified to review it. (Smith v. Canada (Attorney 
General), 2009 FC 228, at para. 26.)’1003  
 
After clarifying that there is no absolute discretionary right of the executive to exercise 
State prerogatives, the Court, in an eloquent exercise of comparative law, assessed the 
jurisprudence of other Commonwealth countries for the purpose of settling the issue of the 
domestic courts’ power vis-á-vis that of the executive in scrutinising the exercise of 
diplomatic protection of individuals. The Abbasi and Mohamed judgments of the UK Court of 
Appeal were clustered together with the Hicks case of the Federal Court of Australia as 
indicative of a clear stance that there is no clear duty to protect citizens under international 
law, or under the common law. These cases were differentiated from the Kaunda case decided 
by South Africa’s Constitutional Court, where a limited duty to protect was established on the 
                                                 
1000 For a more detailed analysis of the judgment, see C. McLachlan, Foreign Relations Law, Cambridge 
University Press (2014), 367-371; C. Forcese, ‘The Obligation to Protect: The Legal Context for Diplomatic 
Protection of Canadians Abroad’, (2007) U.N.B.L.J. 
1001 See para. 40. 
1002 Copello v. Canada (Minister of Foreign Affairs), 2003 FCA 295, at para. 16, relying on Black v. Canada 
(Prime Minister) (2001), 54 O.R. (3d) 215 (C.A.). 
1003 See Khadr, para. 41. 
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part of the State, together with the accepted power of the court to scrutinise, in certain 
circumstances, the discretionary right of the executive to exercise diplomatic protection.  
This jurisprudence was held to establish the domestic court’s power to scrutinise the 
entitlement of the state to exercise diplomatic protection. It was thus used as a legal argument 
in favour of establishing the Canadian court’s power to judicial review of the Government’s 
decision on the basis of the Charter, while also recognising the Government’s margin of 
discretion when dealing ‘with matters that affect international relations and foreign 
affairs.’1004  
Turning to the third legal issue, the State’s duty to exercise diplomatic protection, the 
Federal Court assessed the Canadian Charter of Rights, then several international treaties,1005 
in order to establish whether Canada had certain particular obligations stemming from the 
domestic law and international treaties to ensure that particular human rights were respected 
by the US in the person of the Canadian citizens, Mr Khadr. Based on the aforementioned 
treaties, the Court held that Canada had a clear and judicially enforceable fundamental 
positive and negative obligations in relation to torture and other ill-treatments inflicted by 
foreign States on its minor nationals. The substantive scope of the duty to protect was made of 
the substantive requirements deriving from the aforementioned international treaties and the 
domestic positive obligation of Canada to take action that would ensure their respect (section 
7 of the Charter).1006 The Court did not establish a general duty to protect upon the Canadian 
executive vis-á-vis Mr Khadr. Instead the Court established a more specific obligation 
incumbent upon the State based on the gravity of the injury suffered and the specific 
circumstance of the complainant, namely being a minor throughout all the mistreatments in 
dispute, which justified the imposition of a duty to protect as a principle of fundamental 
justice.1007 
The consequence of finding such a fundamental duty to protect was that Canada 
should have taken the appropriate steps to ensure that Mr Khadr’s treatment conformed with 
the alleged international human rights norms, which, in the present case, was not ensured. 
Finding, first, a violation of the international human rights by the US authorities based on a 
US domestic court judgment, second, the ‘complicity’ of Canadian officials in this violation, 
and finally, Canada’s positive and negative constitutional obligations to secure respect of 
                                                 
1004 Ibid., para. 49. 
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1006 See Khadr, para. 74. 
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those international human rights in the person of its national, the Federal Court decided that 
the appropriate remedy to compensate the violation of domestic obligations by the executive 
was to require Canada to do what it initially should have done, namely to request the 
repatriation of Mr Khadr from the US Guantánamo Bay detention camp.  
It is important to notice that the Court rejected the arguments of the Government, that 
to exercise the required protection would undermine Canada’s good foreign relations with the 
US and also the ongoing efforts to ensure the good treatment of Mr Khadr, on the grounds 
that this justification is not supported by evidence. Justice O’Reilly, responsible for the 
present judgment of the Federal Court, showed that neither the foreign relations with the US, 
nor the situations of the detainees were imperilled in the cases of other countries’ requests of 
repatriation of their detained nationals. 
The 2009 judgment of the Federal Court stands as evidence that domestic courts are 
influenced by foreign judgments, even in matters as delicate and nationally specific as the 
diplomatic protection of citizens. Similarly to the UK jurisprudence, the doctrine of legitimate 
expectations was the sole entitlement recognised until 2009 to the Canadian nationals vis-à-
vis their executive, when injured abroad. If until 2007, the Canadian courts rejected the 
requests to recognise a duty to protect nationals in cases of egregious violation of fundamental 
human rights on the part of the State based on the domestic doctrine of the sufficient 
connection link between the acts of Government and the extraterritorial violation of human 
rights, new evidence influenced the Court to reconsider its previous approach. Thus, in the 
2009 judgment, the Federal Court clearly recognised a duty on the part of the State to exercise 
diplomatic protection of citizens abroad, the violation of which was held to give rise to a very 
concrete remedy in the form of a request for repatriation.  
In the final judgment of the Khadr case, the Supreme Court did not speak of a duty of 
the State to diplomatically intervene, but rather places the emphasis on the executive’s 
violation of a domestic provision due to the Canadian officials’ involvement in the 
extraterritorial violation of international human rights. To somehow balance this intrusive 
finding of a violation on the part of the executive, the Supreme Court recognised a certain 
margin of discretion of the executive in deciding the appropriate remedy for the violation. The 
moderate and deferential judgment of the Supreme Court proves that the legal nature of the 
diplomatic protection of nationals abroad is far from being a settled topic, not only among 




Australia – the Hicks case: judicialisation of diplomatic protection  
Mr Hicks, a dual national of Australia and the UK, was detained for almost six years in the 
Guantánamo Bay camp without being formally charged. During this period, several concerns 
were raised regarding violations of his human rights to due process, prohibition of torture and 
other ill-treatments by the US authorities.1008 Mr Hicks followed two means of redress, both 
based on the diplomatic protection an individual could obtain from his country of nationality. 
First, he attempted to force the UK to ask for his release – similar to previous cases of British 
citizens in which the UK had obtained their release from Guantánamo Bay. In fact, after three 
years of being detained in Guantánamo Bay, the UK had achieved Mr Abbasi’s release, a 
result which was acclaimed in the Australian media and legal scholarship1009, and which Mr 
Hicks also hoped to obtain, after his 6 years of detention. In order to present a diplomatic 
protection request, Mr Hicks first had to acquire British nationality, which he did not possess 
while in the US custody but was entitled to. After considerable efforts to convince the British 
Government to grant him nationality, eventually Mr Hicks was successful. However, he did 
not enjoy this status for very long as the following day the British Government stripped him 
of his British citizenship. The legal proceedings brought by Mr Hicks contesting this removal 
were not successful. Faced with this negative result, Mr Hicks then instituted proceedings 
before the Federal Court of Australia, seeking an order of habeas corpus and judicial review 
of the decision by the Government not to request his release from the Guantánamo Bay 
camp.1010 The applicant argued that the Government had violated his duty to lawfully consider 
his request and therefore it should be obliged to re-consider it in accordance with the law, 
without taking into consideration irrelevant considerations. 
The Government started its defence with a request to reject the application as 
inadmissible based mainly on two doctrines: the acts of a foreign State cannot be subject to 
judicial review; and the ‘political question’ doctrine.  
In reply to the Government’s plea, Justice Tamberlin, responsible for the judgment of 
the Federal Court, held that the doctrine of the acts of State would not preclude him from 
assessing the merits of the case since there is a general presumption that detention is unlawful 
until proved otherwise based on lawful authority. Furthermore, the extraterritorial character of 
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the injury suffered by the applicant does not impede the government to act, as proved by the 
successful result achieved by UK, whose nationals were released by the US from Guantánamo 
Bay following UK’s diplomatic efforts. As to the justiciability of the claim, the Court relied 
heavily on the Abbasi judgment and held that the discretionary exercise of the executive’s 
right to diplomatic protection had to be subjected to judicial control. Justice Tamberlin added 
that the court would review whether the government took into account irrelevant 
considerations in their decision-making process whether to exercise or not diplomatic 
protection on behalf of the individual. Unlike the UK courts, which clearly established the 
limits of the judiciary review in the Abbasi case, the Australian Federal Court held that ‘the 
extent to which the court will examine executive action in the area of foreign relations and 
Acts of State is far from settled, black-letter law’.1011 The case was not heard on the merits, 
since Mr Hicks pleaded guilty to a lesser charge, in exchange for his extradition to Australia 
where he would serve his sentence.1012 
This case shows that Canadian courts follow the general jurisprudential trend of 
departing from the classical doctrines of act of State, limiting the judicial review power of 
domestic courts, and accepting as a general rule to assess the reasonableness and soundness of 
the Government’s decision in relation to exercising diplomatic protection on behalf of their 
nationals. The case discussed herein places the Canadian courts within the modern 
jurisprudential trend which establishes clear diplomatic protection measures to be taken as a 
duty to act incumbent on the executive.  
 
Conclusions on the National Jurisprudence addressing claims of diplomatic 
protection of individuals 
In his First Report, Rapporteur Dugard invoked certain national judgments delivered by 
British, Dutch, Spanish, Austrian, Belgian and French courts in cases submitted by citizens 
dissatisfied with the reply of their States of nationality to their claims for diplomatic 
protection. Although the cases were not decided in the favour of the applicants, the 
Rapporteur viewed these claims as an indication that these nationals had reasons to believe 
that they had a right to receive diplomatic protection from their State of nationality.1013 Since 
then, more cases have been heard by national courts, and more judgments pronounced in 
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favour of the citizens seeking redress against the State conduct on diplomatic protection 
matters. 
The jurisprudence developed after the 9/11 attacks in the aforementioned 
Commonwealth countries does not support the existence of diplomatic protection as a fully-
fledged duty of the State vis-à-vis its nationals abroad, not even in situations of violation of 
absolute human rights or jus cogens norms. However it does indicate the existence of a 
legitimate expectation of the individual to receive protection by means established by the 
State in certain circumstances. These circumstances are more clearly delimitated in the UK 
jurisprudence, such as: when the State formulated a policy capable of giving rise to a 
legitimate expectation, when the State made a promise to the injured individual for diplomatic 
intervention or the normal expectation of a citizen that is subjected abroad to a violation of an 
absolute right. In these particular circumstances the British government is required to not 
‘abandon’ the citizen, but ‘extend its long arm to protect him’.1014 In addition, the 
jurisprudence discussed above also supports the expansion of the domestic courts’ jurisdiction 
over complaints regarding consular and diplomatic protection, a subject matter of foreign 
affairs which was for a long period excluded from judicial review.  
It is evident that from the Commonwealth countries, South Africa has developed a 
body of jurisprudence which is more advanced in supporting the development of a sort of 
State duty to ensure protection abroad of its nationals as part of the constitutional rights 
recognised to the citizen. On the other hand, Australia, Canada, and the UK seem to share the 
same minimal approach towards the legal nature of diplomatic protection, still viewed as the 
discretionary rights of the States. However, by expanding the role of domestic courts over the 
foreign affairs actions and decisions of the executive a step forward has been made, and an 
incipient judicial trend of recognising a more concrete State duty to exercise diplomatic 
protection is also developing in these latter Commonwealth countries. Therefore, the 
executive’s decisions concerning diplomatic protection are now amenable to scrutiny under 
these countries’ public law, as administrative and constitutional matters (South Africa), and 
certainly as part of administrative law for the other Commonwealth countries. 
The obligation of the executive to consider the request of an individual for diplomatic 
protection seems to be generally recognised by domestic courts from different continents. The 
legitimate expectation of a national to receive diplomatic protection based on the State’s 
foreign policy or individual promise is the common minimum denominator that all 
                                                 




Commonwealth domestic courts seem to recognise. Certain jurisdictions went further by 
recognising a limited duty of the State to exercise diplomatic protection. The South African 
Constitutional Court has for example in the 2004 Kaunda judgment recognised a State 
obligation to exercise diplomatic protection in extreme cases of egregious violations of 
fundamental human rights. The Canadian Federal Court of Appeal has also recognised a duty 
incumbent upon Canada to secure concrete diplomatic protection actions for its nationals as 
long as there was a sufficient connection between the Government and the extraterritorial 
violation of human rights. 
One of the main objections raised by the Commonwealth courts against the recognition 
of a general State duty to diplomatic protection was that once citizens cross the national 
borders, their State of nationality no longer has an obligation to ensure human rights 
protection to its nationals, given the territorial application of international human rights 
treaties and of the domestic bills of rights.1015 
The domestic jurisprudence analysed under this sub-section shows there are two trends 
common to both legal systems (continental and common law): nationals have been recognised 
at least a legitimate expectation that their State of nationality will consider their claim for 
diplomatic protection; the executive’s decision to exercise or not diplomatic protection is 
subject to judicial scrutiny in regard to its arbitrariness, good faith and reasonableness. 
Certain national courts went beyond these two de minimis obligations imposed on the State, 
and recognised a more stringent State duty to act on behalf of their nationals. Some courts1016 
have placed the issue of controlling the State’s discretionary exercise of diplomatic protection 
within the realm of guarantees to the right to a due process.  
It is true that these judgments are not in a number that could support an unqualified 
right to diplomatic protection for the individual. However they seem to indicate an evolving 
practice whereby the individual has a general entitlement to protection from their State, and in 
the specific circumstances of grave violation of human rights, the individual seems to be 
entitled to receive more attention and care from the Government, which might be required to 
materialise in concrete diplomatic protection measures. Additionally, this jurisprudence seems 
to suggest that national courts are more and more inclined to review what used to be a 
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‘political question’ decision of the executive. Except of the US courts,1017 which seem to have 
maintained unaltered the political question doctrine, national courts ask from their State’s 
executive to provide reasons for its decision to espouse or not a request from their national for 
an exercise of diplomatic protection. An evolving practice is incrementally spreading in 
Europe and outside, whereby the State can no longer abuse their once discretionary legal right 
to exercise diplomatic protection.1018 
It is thus likely that in the near future, an individual right to diplomatic protection, at 
least in the limited cases proposed by Rapporteur Dugard, will be recognised as a customary 
international norm due to the growing domestic jurisprudence recognising such an individual 
right. 
It cannot be ignored that certain academics have emphasised the pitfalls of the 
increasing role of courts in the realm of foreign affairs matters. Peté and du Plessis1019 argued 
that courts are not the appropriate forum to decide if protection abroad is to be ensured to 
nationals – and if so, what kind and when – since this is an aspect of foreign policy which is 
essentially the function of the executive. Furthermore, it was argued that there are more 
efficient alternative ways of ensuring protection of citizens abroad, namely by engaging in 
negotiation, which the involvement of courts might actually undermine. Similarly Pergantis 
argues that the limitation of the executive’s discretion over foreign policy matters and 
empowering of courts should not be hailed as a step towards the ‘humanization’ of 
international law, but as a shift of discretion from the executive to the judiciary which 
ultimately risks undermining the democratic foundations of the society.1020 For the moment 
domestic courts have adopted a balanced approach between the traditionalist conception of 
complete deference to the executive and a modern human rights based conception of 
determining concrete diplomatic protection measures to be adopted by the Government as 
form of remedy to the violation of the individual’s right to diplomatic protection. It remains to 
be seen how practice will evolve in the future. 
                                                 
1017 In a similar way, see also the very deferential position of French courts towards this matter, which is still 
widely interpreted as falling under the ‘act du gouvernement’ doctrine that would require national courts to reject 
jurisdiction to review foreign affairs related matters. See more in National Report on France in the CARE 
Report. 
1018 See Resolution No. 5/2006 Diplomatic Protection of Persons and Property, the 72nd Conference of the 
International Law Association, held in Toronto, Canada, 4-8 June 2006; Bederman, ‘State-to-State Espousal of 
Human Rights Claims’, (2011) Virginia Journal of International Law Online, 1, 9. 
1019 S. Pete and M. Du Plessis, ‘South African Nationals Abroad and Their Right to Diplomatic Protection - 
Lessons from the Mercenaries Case’, (2006) S. Afr. J. on Hum. Rts., 439.  
1020 Pergantis, op.cit., 386. 
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Conclusion of Chapter 2 
For centuries, the international legal institutions of consular and diplomatic protection of 
natural persons have remained immutable. Society, and in particular its changing needs, has 
directly impacted on these legal institutions, which need to be in a dynamic state of constant 
evolution if they are to survive.1021 There have been two significant developments in modern 
international law which have impacted on the traditional doctrines of consular and diplomatic 
protection: (i) the development of international human rights and the growing role of the 
individual in international relations; and, (ii) the re-defining of the Westphalian State 
sovereignty by including a State obligation towards its population within its territory, but also 
an obligation towards outside populations in cases of significant natural disasters and gross 
violations of human rights.1022 These developments, together with the changing needs of the 
international society characterised by an increased migratory flow of natural persons, have led 
to an increase in individuals’ requests for consular and diplomatic protection from their State 
of nationality or other sending States, which have pressed States to change their traditional 
reactions towards the difficulties their nationals face abroad. These international legal and 
social developments have impacted on all public authorities of the State, from the consular 
and diplomatic officials, to legislature, including domestic courts that have recently 
contributed actively to the so-called ‘humanization’ and ‘judicialisation’ of the diplomatic and 
consular protection powers of the State. 
The opinions and positions formulated in the legal literature1023 and practice show how 
the evolution of the institution of consular and diplomatic protection of individuals oscillates 
between preserving as far as possible the classical State-centric conception of these 
institutions, accepting only a very limited recognition of the role, rights and interests of 
individuals, and shifting to an innovative individual-centric conception of consular and 
diplomatic protection, whereby the interests and rights of the individuals are recognised a 
                                                 
1021 D. Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850-2000, in Trubek, David. & Santos, 
Alvaro (eds.) The New Law and Economic Development. A Critical Appraisal, Cambridge University Press 
(2006). 
1022 See the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ concept developed for the first time by the International Development 
Research Centre in 2011, The Responsibility to Protect, later developed by the UN in the 2005 World Summit 
Outcome Document, U.N.G.A., Resolution 60/1. 2005 World Summit Outcome, U.N. Doc. A/Res/60/1 (2005) 
(hereinafter ‘World Summit Outcome’). See T. Hooge, Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as Duty to Protect? 
Reassessing the Traditional Doctrine of Diplomatic Protection in Light of Modern Developments in 
International Law, University of Toronto, 2010, Master Thesis, available also online; J. Hoffmann & A. 
Nollkaemper, Responsibility to Protect from Principle to Practice, Pallas Publication (2012). 
1023 F. de Vittor, ‘Immunita degli Stati dalla giurisdizione e tutela dei diritti umani fondamentali’, RDI 2/2002; 
M. Attanasio, C. Malara, Salvatore F. Nicolosi, ‘Il Judicial Review del Rifiuto Statale di Agire in L. Panella (ed), 
Protezione Diplomatica in La Protezione Diplomatic: Sviluppi e Prospettive’, Torino (2009), 453-533, 464-467. 
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place alongside the State’s rights, occasionally even superseding the latter in the decision-
making balance. The innovative individual-centric conception has gradually gained 
significant support among academics, practitioners, and States’ authorities.  
The ILC’s Articles on Diplomatic Protection extensively reflect this conception by 
updating the definition of diplomatic protection to recognise also a role for the individual’s 
interests and lessening the rigidity of diplomatic protection requirements. 
Although the ILC and ICJ have not entirely discarded the traditional legal fiction 
conception of diplomatic protection, nor completely endorsed the concept of diplomatic 
protection as a mechanism whereby the State is entirely at the individual’s disposal, they have 
unequivocally embraced a modern conception of diplomatic protection by recognising that the 
individual’s interests play a role in the exercise of diplomatic protection. This is reflected by 
the new definition of diplomatic protection endorsed by the ICJ in the Diallo judgment and 
the recommendation made by the ILC to States, whereby recourse to diplomatic protection is 
encouraged when grave violations of jus cogens norms or fundamental human rights are 
perpetrated by a foreign State to their nationals and non-nationals. 
The current modern conception of diplomatic protection is a balanced approach 
between opposing views of the institution. It is evident that the traditional concept of 
diplomatic protection had to be revisited in terms of its foundations, prerequisites, and 
objectives following the evolution of contemporary public international law in order to ensure 
the continuity and relevance of these institutions on the international scene. The ILC Articles 
reflect the departure from the classical State dominated conception and they have also been 
recently endorsed by the ICJ and States. The revision could not however lead to making 
diplomatic protection a completely individual-centric institution, whereby the State acts only 
as an agent representing solely individual rights. There is evidently a difference between the 
institution of diplomatic protection and international human rights systems based on the 
different roles played by States in the exercise of these mechanisms. This particular difference 
should be preserved since it is precisely the State oriented characteristics of diplomatic 
protection, which give external force to the institution to secure compliance with international 
obligations and complement the enforcement of international human rights norms. Take for 
instance the case of violations of international humanitarian law, where diplomatic protection 
seems to be the best remedial route for claiming compensation on behalf of a high number of 
victims who have suffered grave injuries, and do not usually have the means to overcome the 
procedural hurdles to claim compensation alone. There will always be a State interest 
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involved when one of its nationals is injured abroad, ‘whatever name [it has] - self-
preservation, peaceful coexistence or intercourse’1024 or even some sort of financial interests, 
which will determine the State to bring an international claim against another State. The claim 
of the individual will most probably have more impact on the perpetrator foreign State if 
supported by a State on the international plane, and possibly with higher probability of 
success than the sole individual claim, due to the impact of such a claim on the international 
relations of the violating State. It also has the advantage of alleviating the individual’s cost of 
legal proceedings, as reflected also by the jurisprudence of the ECtHR.1025  
As part of this current modern conception of diplomatic protection, a State obligation 
to exercise diplomatic protection in cases of violation of jus cogens norms is increasingly 
finding endorsement among academics, supported also by State practice and jurisprudence.1026 
While this individual right to diplomatic protection is, for the moment, in statu nascendi, an 
individual, and at times even a ‘human’, right to consular communication and access to 
consular assistance is already well-established.1027 However, this new qualification does not 
discard the role played by the State in the exercise of consular protection, nor does it establish 
an individual right to receive consular assistance and protection, but an obligation upon the 
receiving State to inform the alien of his individual (human) right to an immediate and un-
interrupted communication with the consular officials of his sending State, including thus also 
the right to ask for consular assistance, but not also to receive consular assistance from the 
sending State.  
The exercise of consular assistance and/or protection will usually be preferred by 
States compared to diplomatic protection, and generally it precedes the exercise of diplomatic 
protection measures, due to the fact that the former means of protecting citizens abroad does 
not involve raising the international responsibility of the receiving state, and thus raising 
politically sensitive issues that put to the test the good diplomatic relations between the 
sending and receiving States. 
According to the modern international conception of consular and diplomatic 
protection of individuals, the State has lost its near-sacrosanct discretion to exercise these 
                                                 
1024 Maria S. Albornoz, op.cit.. 
1025 See the specific cases of Georgia v Russian Federation, Appl. Nos. 13255/07, 38263/08, 61186/09; Ukraine 
v Russian Federation, Appl. Nos. 20958/14 and 43800/14. 
1026 See C. Focarelli, op.cit.. 
1027 LaGrand Case (Germany v. United States of America), Judgment of 27 June 2001, ICJ Reports (2001). 
1027 Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America), Judgement of 31 March 2004, 




functions, which now recognise and are guided by a complementary mix of the State’s and 
individual’s interests. At the same time States are showing an increased interest in efficiently 
securing protection of all their nationals abroad, and have more often recourse to delegation of 
consular and diplomatic representation functions to other States from their region or with 
whom they share historical or cultural ties. New actors are thus recognised on the 
international scene, in addition to the State of nationality, signalling that the nationality link is 
no longer an absolute mandatory requirement for the exercise of international consular and 
diplomatic protection of individuals abroad. 
The current consular and diplomatic protection, as described in international 
jurisprudence and custom, reflect the ability to metabolize the benefits of international human 
rights law and modern public international law, while at the same time its operability is 
sometimes regulated by classical norms. This is particularly reflected within the approach of 
domestic courts, which although making salient steps to establish a general judicial review 
competence over the executive’s decision-making in these fields, still preserves a certain 
deference towards the executive’s prerogative over consular and diplomatic protection 
understood as part of the external affairs prerogative of the government. Courageous steps are 
gradually being made by the national judiciaries limiting the absolute discretionary power of 
the executive, in the sense of requiring the Government to respect the principle of adequacy, 
proportionality and non-discrimination, but also in making recommendations for specific 
actions or measures, or even imposing particular consular or diplomatic action on the part of 
the State vis-à-vis its citizens. The legal nature of diplomatic protection has been a topical 
issue raised before several national courts around the globe since the 9/11 attacks. They seem 
to agree on the recognition of a State duty to exercise some sort of diplomatic protection 
under national law.1028  
It is thus likely that in the near future, an individual right to consular and/or diplomatic 
protection, at least in the limited circumstances of grave violations of fundamental rights, as 
proposed by Rapporteur Dugard, will be recognised as a customary international norm. Even 
assuming that such an individual right to protection abroad will not be internationally 
recognised, the institution of diplomatic protection will not disappear from the international 
scene. The particular procedural and financial advantages of having the State espouse the 
                                                 
1028 Abbasi and another v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and another, Kaunda and 
Others v. President of the Republic of South Africa and Others and Van Zyl and Others v. Government of the 
Republic of South Africa and Others. 
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individual’s claim1029 and the gaps in the effective implementation of international human 
rights law will ensure the continuity and relevance of the consular and diplomatic protection 

























                                                 
1029 Particularly present in cases of multiple victims, see for instance the Avena case, or cases of violation of 
international humanitarian law, see Emanuela C. Gilliard, ‘Reparation for Violation of International 
Humanitarian Law’, (2003) International Review of the Red Cross, 529, 549 and E. Benvenisti, ‘Individual 
Remedies for Victims of Armed Conflicts in the Context of Mass Claims Settlements’, in Holger P. 
Hestermeyer, D. König, Nele Matz-Lück, V. Röben, Anja Seibert-Fohr, Peter-Tobias Stoll and S. Vöneky (es), 
Coexistence, Cooperation and Solidarity, Volume II, Martinus Nijholf Publishers (2012), 1085-1107, at 1088. 
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Chapter 3 - The Relationship between the International and EU 
Legal Frameworks on Protecting Individuals Abroad 
I. Introduction 
The previous chapter aimed to discover the current legal features of the classical public 
international legal institutions of consular and diplomatic protection of private individuals. 
The purpose was to establish the current legal nature, conditions and effects of consular and 
diplomatic protection of individuals, and the international actors involved in providing these 
forms of protection to individuals abroad. It found that the current international legal 
framework governing the exercise of consular and diplomatic protection of individuals has 
made significant advancements from the traditional State-centric model of consular and 
diplomatic protection of natural persons. According to the traditional Vattelian conception of 
diplomatic protection,1030 States enjoyed discretionary rights of exercise without any 
corresponding duties towards the nationals. This traditional doctrine, applicable to both 
consular and diplomatic protection, no longer reflects an honest picture of the current 
institutions of consular and diplomatic protection of natural persons. The development and 
growing importance of international human rights and growing role of the individual in 
international relations have led to structural changes in the definition and exercise of the 
international mechanisms of consular and diplomatic protection of natural persons.  
First of all the definition of diplomatic protection expressly mentions that the exercise 
of diplomatic protection is premised on the injury caused to a natural or legal person. 
Individuals are acquiring an increasing list of consular related rights, namely: the right to 
access and communication with the consular officials of their sending State, and to be 
promptly informed by the receiving State of these consular rights; in cases where individuals 
are subject to proceedings facing a death sentence, a growing number of States is also 
recognising a domestic right to free legal assistance from their Governments;1031 finally, 
domestic and regional jurisprudence is increasingly recognising an individual right to 
consular and diplomatic protection from the State of nationality or residence in cases of grave 
violation of human rights abroad. The discretion of the States in exercising consular and 
diplomatic protection of individuals is furthermore limited by the now widely accepted 
competence of domestic courts to review the executive’s prerogative to exercise protection of 
                                                 
1030 Which corresponded also to consular protection. 
1031 For instance, Spain and Mexico, see more details in previous Chapter, section IV. 
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nationals abroad. Furthermore, the increasing use of diplomatic protection as a 
complementary remedial means for the protection of human rights is gradually contributing to 
the formation of a customary norm recognising a State duty to exercise diplomatic protection. 
The conditions for the exercise of protection of individuals abroad, in particular 
diplomatic protection, have changed under the impact of the current needs of society and 
became more accommodating to the needs of the individuals in distress. The ‘nationality’ 
condition necessary for the exercise of diplomatic protection does not need to fulfil the 
Nottebohm ‘genuine’ and ‘effective’ requirement, and it is no longer required as an absolute 
requirement for the exercise of diplomatic protection, since habitual and lawful residence has 
been widely recognised as a legitimate alternative premise. 
New actors have been given the power to exercise consular and diplomatic protection 
of individuals, such as non-nationality Member States and international organisations. In the 
last decades an increasing number of bilateral and regional agreements were concluded 
among States delegating the function of consular and diplomatic representation of the 
Contracting States and their nationals’ interests; while international organisations were 
recognised the competence to exercise functional protection of their agents abroad. 
 Although consular and diplomatic protection of individuals are still primarily defined 
as rights of the State of nationality, their current international regime has recognised 
limitations on the exercise of State’s discretion in relation to the individuals, and have 
acquired a wider personal and substantive scope in application. 
In light of this modernisation of the public international law, the relevant international 
norms on the exercise of consular and diplomatic protection of individuals and the specific 
EU model of protecting Union citizens abroad seem to be more congruent. As depicted in the 
first Chapter, the current EU legal regime of protection of citizens abroad is based on three 
main models: first, the traditional protection of citizens abroad by the individual’s Member 
States of citizenship, which still bears the primary responsibility; second, the 
intergovernmental protection of EU citizens abroad by non-nationality Member States, which 
are represented in the third State where the unrepresented EU citizen is located; third, the 
supranational protection of EU citizens abroad by various EU institutions and bodies and 
under various EU policies and instruments, complementing the Member States’ capabilities. 
From a substantive point of view, the EU does not yet confer to the (unrepresented) Union 
citizen an individual right to consular and diplomatic protection as such from any of the 
Member States or the EU institutions. But, through the EU citizenship, it confers a right to 
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equal treatment in consular and diplomatic protection, enforceable against any of the non-
nationality Member States, but not directly against the EU institutions.1032 For the moment, the 
Member States’ rights to exercise consular and diplomatic protection of individuals is thus not 
altered, but they are required to extend their national consular and diplomatic protection 
systems to all the unrepresented Union citizens abroad. 
In a nutshell, the main innovations of the EU legal framework, from the perspective of 
the general international legal framework, are: the EU wide geographical level of consular 
and diplomatic protection, previously limited to a few Member States; endowing an 
international treaty based obligation to equal protection of citizens abroad with the essential 
characteristics of the Union legal systems (primacy, direct effect and increased level of 
justiciability);1033 and, last, and perhaps the most innovative of all, is the EU’s competence to 
exercise protection, in particular consular, of EU citizens abroad at the request of the Member 
States.1034 
In spite of the revival of international norms on the substantive and personal scope of 
application of consular and diplomatic protection of individuals, and of the primarily inter-
governmental model of the EU legal regime, academics have widely criticised the EU legal 
framework for disregarding the general public international norms governing consular and 
diplomatic protection of individuals.1035 Looking at the European Union as an international 
organisation that should show respect to international law,1036 renowned international legal 
scholars have fervently criticised the EU model for creating norms in conflict with 
international legal norms, which the Union ought to respect, since it is part of the international 
                                                 
1032 For the moment, the role of the Union in providing direct protection to EU citizens abroad is of supporting 
the Member States in ensuring the effective implementation of the EU citizenship right to equal protection 
abroad. See more details in Chapter 4. 
1033 Therefore, any other similar provisions enshrined in a consular and diplomatic cooperation agreement do not 
benefit from these specific characteristics existent only within the EU legal order. 
1034 See Chapter 4. 
1035 See, inter alia, A. Vermeer-Künzli, ‘The Legal Framework of consular assistance: Some inconsistencies 
between EU law and international law on consular assistance’ in by S. Faro, Mario P. Chiti and E. Schweighofer 
(eds), European Citizenship and Consular Protection New Trends in European Law and National law edited, 
Editura scientifica Napoli (2012), 101-111; A. Vermeer-Künzli, ‘Where the Law becomes Irrelevant: Consular 
Assistance and the European Union’, (2011) International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 965; See J. Dugard, 
Seventh Report on diplomatic protection, United Nations General Assembly, A/CN.4/567, United Nations, New 
York, 7 March 2006, p. 10; A. Vermeer-Künzli, ‘Exercising Diplomatic Protection, the fine line between 
litigation, demarches and consular assistance’, (2008) ZaöRV, 339; T. Stein, ‘Interim Report on “Diplomatic 
Protection Under the European Union Treaty”’, in: ILA Committee on Diplomatic Protection of Persons and 
Property, Second Report, New Delhi, 2002, 36-7; P. Vigni, ‘The Protection of EU Citizens: The Perspective of 
International law’ in: J. Larik and M. Moraru (eds.), Ever-Closer in Brussels – Ever-Closer in the World? EU 
External Action after the Lisbon Treaty, EUI Working Paper 2011/10, 91-107. 
1036 Henry G. Schermers, Niels M. Blokker, International Institutional Law: unity within Diversity, 5th revised 
ed. Brill (2011). 
 251 
 
community.1037 The definition of the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad is 
criticised as being worded inappropriately, leading to confusion about whether it includes 
both consular and diplomatic protection.1038 Scholars have argued that, if the EU citizenship 
right to equal protection abroad is considered as including also diplomatic protection, then the 
EU legal framework is ‘fundamentally inconsistent’ with the general public international legal 
norms for two main reasons.1039 First of all due to the violation of the principle of pacta tertii 
nec nocent prosunt1040 by imposing on third countries the EU inter-governmental and 
supranational model of exercising consular and diplomatic protection of EU citizens without 
having first obtained the consent of third countries,1041 which in regard to diplomatic 
protection is mandatory.1042 Therefore the provisions of the VCCR (Article 8), VCDR (Article 
46) and Article 34 VCLT are said to have been violated by the EU Treaties.1043 The second 
scholarly objection relates to the non-conformity of the EU citizenship with the mandatory 
requirement of ‘nationality of claims’ in the case of the exercise of diplomatic protection. The 
EU model does not fall under the few permitted exceptions by current customary international 
law from the nationality of diplomatic claims requirement, i.e. in the case of refugees, persons 
benefiting from subsidiary protection and stateless persons. Furthermore, the EU citizenship 
is argued to not automatically confer the nationality of all the EU Member States, nor to 
ensure the Nottebohm requirement of ‘genuine connection of existence, interests and 
                                                 
1037 A. Vermeer-Künzli, ‘Where the Law Becomes Irrelevant: Consular Assistance and the European Union’, 
(2011) ICLQ, 965–995; See J. Dugard, Seventh Report on diplomatic protection, United Nations General 
Assembly, A/CN.4/567, United Nations, New York, 7 March 2006, p. 10. 
1038 Ibid. 
1039 A. Vermeer-Künzli, ‘The Legal Framework of consular assistance: Some inconsistencies between EU law 
and international law on consular assistance’ in S. Faro, Mario P. Chiti and E. Schweighofer, European 
Citizenship and Consular Protection New Trends in European Law and National law, Editura Scientifica Napoli 
(2012), 101-111; A. Vermeer-Künzli, ‘Where the Law Becomes Irrelevant: Consular Assistance and the 
European Union’, (2011) ICLQ, 965–995; See J. Dugard, Seventh Report on diplomatic protection, United 
Nations General Assembly, A/CN.4/567, United Nations, New York, 7 March 2006, p. 10; A. Vermeer-Künzli, 
‘Exercising Diplomatic Protection, the fine line between litigation, demarches and consular assistance’, (2008) 
ZaöRV, 339; T. Stein, ‘Interim Report on “Diplomatic Protection Under the European Union Treaty”’, in ILA 
Committee on Diplomatic Protection of Persons and Property, Second Report, New Delhi, 2002, 36-7; P. Vigni,  
1040 The principle is enshrined in Art. 34 VCLT. 
1041 According to Rapporteur J. Dugard, in the Seventh Report, ‘Third States are not bound to respect any of the 
provisions contained in treaties and conventions in force within the Union and are not obliged to—and with 
respect to diplomatic protection are unlikely to—accept protection by States that are not the State of nationality 
of an individual Union citizen.’ (para. 20, p.9). 
1042 In relation to consular protection this can be presumed in the absence of opposition, however the third 
country could always decide to oppose if it had not expressly consented to the non-nationality Member States’ 
exercise of consular protection. 
1043 A. Vermeer-Künzli, ‘Nationality and EU citizenship’ in The Protection of Individuals by means of 
Diplomatic Protection, PhD Thesis (2007), 88. 
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sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties’1044 between a national 
of an EU Member State and any other EU Member State.  
Since the EU has not yet severed its umbilical cord with the international legal order, 
in spite of the increasing jurisprudence of the CJEU building the autonomous status of the 
EU,1045 the issue of the relation between the EU regime of protecting EU citizens abroad and 
the current international legal framework on consular and diplomatic protection of individuals 
needs to be addressed. This chapter will specifically address this issue, in an attempt to 
understand whether the critiques brought against the ‘flawed’1046 EU-specific regime are 
legally founded. First, it will assess the more general relation between the international treaty 
and customary norms and the EU law in an attempt to identify the legal and jurisprudential 
rules binding on the EU, and the identification of the legal methods devised by the EU for 
avoiding and solving conflicts between the two legal regimes.  
In spite of the substantial, institutional and procedural modernisation of the institutions 
of consular and diplomatic protection of citizens, the international legal framework does not 
provide norms for the exercise of consular and diplomatic protection of private individuals by 
international organisations. The EU model of protecting EU citizens abroad does provide for a 
supranational model of protecting EU citizens in the world, which has been furthermore 
reinforced post-Lisbon Treaty. In light of these facts, the second section of this chapter will 
assess whether the public international law contains relevant norms binding on the EU in its 
exercise of the supranational model of protection of EU citizens abroad, and whether the EU 
provisions have so far respected them.  
The last section will address the conformity of the EU provisions establishing the 
inter-governmental model of protection of EU citizens, which have been argued to 
fundamentally sidestep the international framework. Particular attention will be dedicated to 
the assessment of the requirements of ‘nationality’ and ‘consent’ for the exercise of consular 
and diplomatic protection of individuals, since they have been argued to raise fundamental 
objections to the EU legal regime conformity with the general international legal framework. 
In addition, the specificity of the legal nature, the material and personal scope of consular and 
diplomatic protection of EU citizens will be addressed and it will be pointed out that due to 
the relative nature of the relevant public international legal norms, the specific characteristics 
                                                 
1044 Nottebohm, para. 23, A. Vermeer-Künzli, op.cit., 88. 
1045 The EU Treaties provisions are clear in relation to the EU obligation to respect international law. The CJEU 
is bound to respect the wording of the Treaties, otherwise it acts ultra vires. 
1046 See J. Dugard, Seventh Report, op.cit., para. 20, p. 9. 
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of the EU model of protecting citizens abroad are not violating or disregarding the general 
international legal framework. 
In addition to the ‘external-internal’1047 relationship between public international law 
and EU law, the chapter will also make some concluding remarks on the internal-external 
influence of the EU-specific regime on the development of international customary norms on 
consular and diplomatic protection of individuals. It will be pointed out that the relationship 
between the international customary norms and EU norms in the field of protection of citizens 
abroad is a two-way fertilisation route. 
 
II.  The Relation between International Customary Law and EU law – 
assessing the EU’s obligation to respect public international law 
Legal commentators have described the relationship between international and EU legal 
orders in somewhat contradictory terms, either presenting the EU as a good international 
citizen1048 or, as being in a ‘closed’ or ‘conflictual’ relationship.1049 The relationship between 
the European Union and public international law has always been a complex legal issue,1050 
with the academic debate recently emphasising the increasing tensions between the principles 
                                                 
1047 This term is preferable to the ‘outsider-insider’ notion used by certain EU external relations scholars (see J. 
Wouters, ‘Can the EU Replace its member States in International Affairs?’ in I. Govaere (eds), Essays in Honour 
of Marc Maresceau, Brill (2014), 130) in relation to the influences of international law on the EU law, since it 
aims to avoid subjective connotations in favour of more neutral ones such as ‘external-internal’ influences. 
1048 T. Dunne, ‘Good citizen Europe’, (2008) International Affairs, 13; R Uerpmann-Wittzack, ‘The 
Constitutional Role of International Law’, in A. Von Bogdandy & J. Bast (eds), Principles of European 
Constitutional Law, 2nd edn, Hart (2010), 138, 143; M. Mendez, ‘The Legal Effect of Community Agreements: 
Maximalist Treaty Enforcement and Judicial Avoidance Techniques’ (2010) EJIL, 83, 88. 
1049 It has to be emphasised that the CJEU, more so than the EU legislator, has recently contributed to the so-
called ‘closed’ or ‘conflictual’ relation of the EU towards international law. See, in particular, J. Odermatt, ‘The 
Court of Justice of the European Union: International or Domestic Court?’ (2014) Cambridge Journal of 
International and Comparative Law, 696; G de Búrca, ‘The European Court of Justice and the International 
Legal Order After Kadi’ (2009) Harvard ILJ 1, 2.; G. de Búrca, ‘The ECJ and the international legal order: a re-
evaluation’, in G. de Búrca and J.H.H. Weiler (eds.), The Worlds of European Constitutionalism, Cambridge 
University Press (2011); F. Casolari, `Giving Indirect Effect to International Law within the EU Legal Order: 
The Doctrine of Consistent Interpretation', in E Cannizzaro, P Palchetti & Ramses A. Wessel (eds), International 
Law as Law of the European Union, Brill (2011), 395; J. Klabbers, ‘Presumptive Personality: The EU in 
International Law’ in M. Koskenniemi (ed), International Law Aspects of the EU, Kluwer Law International 
(1998), 231-253. Recent jurisprudence, in particular the Opinion 2/13, puts in a different perspective earlier 
academic articles which described the CJEU as adopting a ‘very open approach to the effects of international 
agreements within the EU legal order’, see C. Kaddous, ‘Effects of International Agreements in the EU Legal 
Order’, in M Cremona & B de Witte (eds), EU Foreign Relations Law: Constitutional Fundamentals (2008), 311. 
1050 C. Timmermans, ‘The EU and Public International Law’, (1999) European Foreign Affairs Review, 181; 
J.W. van Rossem, ‘Interaction between EU Law and International Law in the Light of Intertanko and Kadi: The 
Dilemma of Norms Binding the Member States but not the Community’, (2009) Netherlands Yearbook of 
International Law, 183; J. Klabbers, ‘International Law and Community Law: The Law and Politics of Direct 
Effect’, (2002) Yearbook of European Law, 292, 292-295.    
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of ‘autonomy’, ‘respect’ and ‘reception’, which define the relation between European and 
international law.1051  
The rules governing the relationship between international and EU legal orders are to 
be found in both international and the EU legal orders. While public international law has few 
relevant provisions, of a general nature, of which the most relevant is Article 31 of the VCLT, 
the EU has developed a wealth of specific norms,1052 meant to protect the autonomous 
character of the Union legal order, while attempting to ensure the respect of general 
international law and international agreements concluded by the Member States prior to their 
accession to the Union.1053  
Under the EU legal order, the norms governing the relationship between international 
and EU law have been mostly crafted by the CJEU as autonomous rules primarily meant to 
safeguard the effectiveness of the specific EU legal order,1054 while respecting also 
international legal norms. These rules do not properly fall under either of the monist1055 or 
dualist1056 doctrines on the classical relationship between the international and domestic legal 
orders.1057 A first step in establishing the position of international law within the EU legal 
order was made by the CJEU in 1974, when the Court established that international treaties 
                                                 
1051 See, in particular Opinion CJEU 2/13 (which builds on the dualist construction of the relation between the 
international and EU law of the CJEU) and the academic comments on this Opinion, in particular, Sionaidh 
Douglas-Scott, ‘Opinion 2/13 on EU accession to the ECHR: a Christmas bombshell from the European Court 
of Justice’ (available at http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2014/12/24/sionaidh-douglas-scott-opinion-213-on-eu-
accession-to-the-echr-a-christmas-bombshell-from-the-european-court-of-justice/ ) and T. Streinz, The 
Autonomy Paradox (available at http://www.verfassungsblog.de/the-autonomy-paradox/#.VRfns2dxmUk ) 
1052 Post-Lisbon Treaty amendment, the founding Treaties have several provisions on the relation between 
international and EU law. See, Arts. 3(5) and 21 TEU on the general obligation of the EU to respect international 
law, and Art. 351 TFEU, mostly (1) and (2), for a more specific provision regarding the relation between pre-
accession agreements concluded by the Member States and EU law. The wealth of rules regarding the status of 
international legal norms within the hierarchy of EU norms, the validity and legal effects of international law 
within the EU legal order are to be found in the CJEU jurisprudence and not EU primary law. 
1053 See Art. 351(1) TFEU. 
1054 See, in particular, Opinion 2/13 on the EU Accession to the ECHR, Judgment of 18 December 2014. 
1055 For supporters of the ‘monist’ view of the EU legal order, see C. Eckes, ‘International Law as Law of the 
EU: The Role of the Court of Justice’, and J.W. van Rossem, ‘The EU at Crossroads: A Constitutional Inquiry 
into the Way International Law is Received within the EU Legal Order’, in E. Cannizzaro, P. Palchetti and 
Ramses A. Wessel (eds), International Law as Law of the European Union, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (2011); 
as well as F.G. Jacobs, ‘Direct Effect and Interpretation of International Agreements in the Recent Case Law of 
the European Court of Justice’, in A. Dashwood and M. Maresceau (eds.), Law and Practice of EU External 
Relations: Salient Features of a Changing Landscape, Cambridge University Press (2008), 13-33. 
1056 See Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro in Joined cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and 
Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Commission [2008] ECR I-6351, para. 21.    
1057 Ramses A. Wessel, ‘Reconsidering the Relationship between International and EU Law: Towards a Content-
based Approach?’ in E. Cannizzaro, P. Palchetti and Ramses A. Wessel (eds), International Law as Law of the 
European Union, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (2011), 10; Gráinne de Búrca and J. H. H. Weiler, The Worlds of 
European Constitutionalism, Cambridge University Press (2011); Katja S. Ziegler, ‘International Law and EU 
law: Between Asymmetric Constitutionalisations and Fragmentation’ in A. Orakhelashvili (ed), Research 
Handbook on the Theory and History of International Law, Edward Elgar (2011). 
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signed by the EU form ‘an integral part of the Community legal order’.1058 In 1992 the same 
status was also recognised to customary international law.1059 Based on this direct 
incorporation status of international law within the EU legal order, the Court held that the EU 
has to respect international law, including customary international law, in the exercise of its 
powers.1060 The fact that the EU is an international organisation has, so far, excluded the EU 
from many international treaties, especially those concluded in times when only States were 
recognised as international actors. However, in certain legal areas, international treaties 
codified customary international norms,1061 and thus an international rule can have dual legal 
basis, customary and written treaty form. In such cases, even if the Union is not a party to an 
international treaty, as long as there is an international customary norm with a similar content 
to a treaty provision, the latter norm will bind the Union and ‘serve as a criterion for the 
validity of activities of the institutions of the European Union’.1062  
Towards the end of the 1990s, the Court also clarified the precise rank of international 
law,1063 including customary international law,1064 within the hierarchy of EU norms, placing 
the international customary norms and treaties, to which the Union is a party, above EU 
secondary norms and just below EU primary law.1065 Some of the jurisprudentially developed 
norms governing the relationship between international and EU law were codified by the 
Lisbon Treaty in 2009. First of all, the EU gained an express international legal personality 
(Article 47 TEU), and it was thus formally recognised as an international actor with legal 
capacity to acquire rights and obligations on the international scene. The founding Treaties 
now require the EU to contribute to the ‘strict observance and development of international 
                                                 
1058 Case C-181/73 Haegeman v Belgium [1974] ECR 449, para. 5; Case C-104/81 Kupferberg v Hauptzollamt 
Mainz [1982] ECR 3641, para. 13; C-162/96 Racke v Hauptzollamt Mainz [1998] ECR I-3633, para. 46; C-
308/06 Intertanko et al. v Secretary of State for Transport [2008] ECR I-4057, para. 38; C-366/10 Air Transport 
Association of America v Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change [2011] ECR I-00000, para. 101 
(‘ATAA’), paras. 73, 101. 
1059 Case C-286/90 Poulsen and Diva Navigation [1992] ECR I-6019. See also Racke, op.cit.; CFI, Case T-
115/94 Opel Austria GmbH v. Council [1997] ECR II-39; Case C-84/95 Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve 
Ticaret AS v. Minister for Transport, Energy and Communications and Others [1996] ECR I-3953. 
1060 Case C-286/90 Poulsen and Diva Navigation [1992] ECR I-6019, para. 9.  
1061 Which is also the case of consular and diplomatic law.  
1062 See AG Kokott Opinion in Case C-533/08, TNT Express Nederland BV v. AXA Versicherung, ECR I-04107, 
[2010], para. 65. A similar conclusion was reached by the Court in the Racke case (paras. 24, 45, 46) in regard to 
the VCLT, and in Poulsen in regard to the Geneva Conventions on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone 
(1958), ‘in so far as they codify general rules recognized by international custom.’ (see Poulsen, para. 10). In the 
specific case of protecting citizens abroad, the international legal framework includes both customary 
international law and treaty provisions (VCCR and VCDR), the latter being a codification of customary 
international law, see E. Denza, Diplomatic Law, a Commentary on the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations (Second Edition), Oxford University Press (1998), 33ff. 
1063 Case C-179/97 Kingdom of Spain v Commission [1999] ECR I-1251. 
1064 See Racke, op.cit., para. 45. 
1065 Case C-179/97 Kingdom of Spain v. Commission [1999] ECR I-1251, para. 11. 
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law’ (Article 3(5) TEU) and to guide its external actions by ‘the respect of the principles of 
the UN Charter and international law’ (Article 21 TEU), and provide that the Union, its 
institutions and the Member States are bound to respect the international agreements 
concluded by the EU (Article 216 (2) TFEU). These Treaty norms are said to codify long 
established jurisprudence of the CJEU.1066 Furthermore Article 3(5) TEU provides that the 
Union shall contribute to the development of international law, indicating that its regional 
norms could add to the international practice and thus contribute to the creation of 
international customary legal norms. However, the precise rank of international norms within 
the EU normative hierarchy, the validity and legal effects of international law within the EU 
legal order have not been codified by the Lisbon Treaty, and they continue to be governed by 
jurisprudentially developed rules.  
The rules on the specific aspects of validity, effects and methods of solving conflicts1067 
between customary international law and EU law can be found in a few landmark judgments 
of the CJEU: Racke,1068 Opel Austria,1069 Intertanko,1070 ATAA1071 and Hungary v Slovakia.1072 In 
2002 Wouters and van Eeckhoutte provided a taxonomy of the rules governing the 
aforementioned aspects, as well as of the role played by customary international norms in the 
interpretation of EU law based on the jurisprudence of the CJEU.1073 Their survey is still 
accurate, with a few judgments decided by the Court post-Lisbon Treaty, which add some 
new facets to the role played by customary international law within the EU legal order. 
                                                 
1066 Such as Poulsen, Racke, Haegeman, see AG Kokott Opinion in ATAA case   and R. Schutze, European 
Union Law, Cambridge University Press (2015), 298ff.  
1067 See, for instance, the ‘declaration of competences’ list attached to international agreements, commonly in the 
form of an Annex, which are meant to clarify for third parties the unique division of competences between the 
Union and the Member States, and possibly also the specific representational issues. See Andrés D. Casteleiro, 
‘EU Declarations of Competence to Multilateral Agreements: A Useful Reference Base?’ (2012) European 
Foreign Affairs Review, 491–509 and M. Cremona, ‘External Relations of the EU and the Member States: 
Competence, Mixed Agreements, International Responsibility, and Effects of International Law’, EUI Working 
Paper 2006/22. 
1068 Case C-162/96 Racke [1998] ECR I-3655. 
1069 Case T-115/94 Opel Austria GmbH v. Council [1997] ECR II-39. 
1070 Case C-308/06 Intertanko [2008] ECR I-4057. 
1071 C-366/10 Air Transport Association of America v Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change [2011] 
ECR I-00000. 
1072 Case C-364/10 Hungary v Slovakia, Judgment of 16 October 2012, nyr. An additional case on the 
relationship between international customary law and EU law is the Diakite case (Case C-285/12, Aboubacar 
Diakité v Commissaire Général aux Réfugiés et aux Apatrides Judgment of 30 January 2014, nyr). This latter 
case is not discussed separately as the Court seems to follow the approach it took in ATAA and Hungary v 
Slovakia, namely of openness towards customary international law. However in the Diakite, the Court did not 
have to assess the validity of EU law on the basis of customary international law, but only to establish whether 
the meaning of the ‘internal armed conflict’ is to be given the meaning established by international humanitarian 
law or a separate, autonomous meaning for the purposes of European law (see more in J. Odermatt, ‘The Court 
of Justice of the European Union: International or Domestic Court?’, op.cit., 696, 714ff. 
1073 J. Wouters and D. van Eeckhoutte, ‘Giving Effect to customary international law Through European 
Community Law’, Institute of International Law KU Leuven WP No. 25/2002. 
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In concreto, the 1998 Racke judgment of the CJEU confirmed that customary 
international law and international treaty law enjoy the same hierarchical rank within the EU 
legal order, and can thus both be used as standards of assessment of the validity of the EU 
secondary legislation.1074 In Opel Austria and Intertanko, customary international law was 
again used by the Court as an instrument for solving conflicts between an international treaty 
signed by the EU1075 or argued to be binding on the EU,1076 and EU law. However, in spite of 
the quite frequent invocation of customary international law in cases raising normative 
conflicts,1077 customary international law was used as an indirect legal basis for challenging 
the validity of EU law, namely as a sort of source of inspiration for finding analogous EU 
principles on the basis of which the conflict was actually solved.1078 It was only in the much 
later judgments delivered in the ATAA and Hungary v Slovakia cases, that the Court assessed 
the validity of EU primary and secondary norms directly in light of customary international 
law.1079 
The ATAA case1080 could be argued to be the first case where the Court assessed the 
validity of an EU Directive – the European Emission Trading Scheme Directive1081 – directly 
in light of international (aviation) law, including relevant principles of customary 
international law. The CJEU was asked to assess whether the ETS Directive, which was 
applied to airlines operating flights also outside the EU and partially over the high seas, 
infringes several customary international law principles, namely: the principle that each State 
has complete and exclusive sovereignty over its airspace; the principle that no State may 
validly purport to subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty; and the principle of 
freedom to fly over the high seas.1082  
                                                 
1074 Racke, para. 46. See also, Katja S. Ziegler, ‘The Relationship between EU law and International Law’, 
University of Leicester School of Law Research Paper No. 13-17/2011, 10. 
1075 See Racke. 
1076 See Intertanko. 
1077 See T. Konstadinides, ‘When in Europe: Customary International Law and EU Competence in the Sphere of 
External Action’, (2012) German Law Journal, Special Issue EU law qua Global Governance Law, 1177. 
1078 See   Racke. 
1079 See AG Kokott Opinion in the ATAA case, stating that ‘the case-law of the Courts of the European Union 
has not given rise to any clear criteria for the determination of whether and to what extent a principle of 
customary international law can serve as a benchmark against which the validity of EU legislation can be 
reviewed’, Case C-366/10 ATAA, Opinion AG J. Kokott, 28.10.2011, para. 109. 
1080 C-366/10 Air Transport Association of America v Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change [2011] 
ECR I-00000. 
1081 Directive 2008/101/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 amending 
Directive 2003/87/EC so as to include aviation activities in the scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance 
trading within the Community published in [2009] OJ L 8/3 of 13.1.2009 (‘ETS Directive’). 
1082 See ATAA, para. 103. 
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Similarly to the Racke case, the Court established in ATAA two restrictive conditions to 
the application of an international legal custom as legal basis for the judicial review of EU 
secondary provisions. The first condition is, however, differently phrased from Racke, 
eliminating one of the conditions that the international customary norm had to fulfil. 
Customary international legal norms ‘are capable of calling into question the competence of 
the EU to adopt the [challenged] act’,1083 while in Racke the Court added that the nature of 
customary international law needed to be ‘fundamental’. The second condition is identical to 
the condition first framed in Racke, and is determined by the same rationale of the imprecise 
wording of the international custom compared to the provisions of international agreements. 
Due to this particular characteristic of international customary law, ‘judicial review must 
necessarily be limited to the question whether, in adopting the act in question, the institutions 
of the European Union made manifest errors of assessment concerning the conditions for 
applying those principles.’1084  
After having established that the three principles of customary international law could, 
in principle, be used as a standard for judicial review of EU secondary legislation, the Court 
passed to establish whether, in casu, there was a conflict between the international customary 
international norms and the norms established by the challenged EU Directive. The Court 
found that, by adopting the Directive, the EU institutions did not trespass on the limits of ‘a 
manifest error of assessment’, and thus the Court did not have to use its usual conflict 
resolution methods of conform interpretation,1085 or balancing the autonomous character of the 
EU legal order with the respect of international law,1086 in order to solve the alleged conflict 
between customary international law and the invoked EU Directive. The ATAA judgment 
added value to the legal effects recognised to customary international law within the EU legal 
order consists in, first, extending the scope of customary international norms that can act as 
legal basis for the legality review of EU provisions. Second, the judgment finally clarifies that 
customary international law can act as a benchmark for directly challenging EU secondary 
provisions, instead of finding an EU principle similar in content to the customary international 
                                                 
1083 Ibid., para. 107. 
1084 Ibid., para. 107. 
1085 C-53/96 Hermès International v FHT Marketing Choice BV [1998] ECR I-3603, para 28; C-61/94 
Commission v Germany [1996] ECR I-3989, para 52 (‘International Dairy Arrangement’). See also AG Op 
ATAA, para. 107 ff. 
1086 Kadi, op.cit.. 
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legal norm, through which the customary international law is internalised and can then act as 
legal basis for the legality review of EU law.1087 
In the Hungary v Slovakia case,1088 the Court had the occasion to go further in the 
exploration of the relationship between customary international law and EU law. This case, 
similarly to the Micheletti case,1089 is one of the rare cases where international law played an 
important role in shaping the scope of EU citizenship. The case raised the question of whether 
the special status of Mr Sólyom as President of Hungary, and thus as a high ranking diplomat, 
takes precedence over his fundamental status of EU citizen, and would thus justify restrictions 
to the EU primary provisions (Article 21 TFEU) and secondary provisions (EU Citizenship 
Directive 2004/38) based on the international customary legal norms governing diplomatic 
relations.  
The Court had thus to balance customary international legal norms with EU primary 
law provisions establishing the fundamental EU citizenship rights, and it ended up giving 
precedence to customary international legal provisions.1090 In a highly political decision it 
decided to give priority to customary international law even though what was at issue was not 
only EU secondary law provisions enshrined in the Citizenship Directive, but also EU 
primary law provisions which, according to the established jurisprudence of the CJEU, are 
hierarchically superior to customary international legal norms, and can be set aside only if the 
Treaty provisions in dispute are amended.1091 The apparent change in the CJEU approach is 
not easily noticeable due to the precedence of the customary international legal norms being 
formulated as a limitation to the exercise of the citizenship right of free movement, in addition 
to limitations such as public security, public policy or public health, which, unlike the 
customary international norms, are expressly provided by the EU Citizenship Directive.1092 
The judgment added value to the relationship between customary international law and EU 
law consists, first, in the recognition of a hierarchically superior place to customary 
international law on the basis of the lex specialis derogat lex generalis principle, which, 
unlike previous cases, this time works in favour of the international rather than the EU norms. 
Second, it can be observed that, unlike the ATAA judgment, the Court did initially find a 
                                                 
1087 As in the Racke case. 
1088 Case C-364/10 Hungary v Slovakia, Judgment of 16 October 2012, nyr. 
1089 Case C–369/90 Micheletti v Delegación del Gobierno en Cantabria [1992] ECR I-4239. 
1090 For a critique on the lack of precision as to the exact customary international legal norms governing the 
special status of the President of Hungary in this case, see Lucia S. Rossi, ‘EU Citizenship and the Free 
Movement of Heads of State: Hungary v. Slovak Republic’, (2013) CMLRev, 1451. 
1091 See Case C-179/97 Kingdom of Spain v Commission [1999] ECR I-1251. 
1092 See Hungary v Slovakia, para. 51. 
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normative conflict. The Court was placed in the difficult position of having to find a midway 
between the two opposing solutions suggested by Hungary and Slovakia, and solve a very 
delicate political issue. It did not choose to find the facts as falling outside the scope of EU 
law, as suggested by the defendant States, nor did it decide to make a strict application of the 
EU citizenship provisions as suggested by the applicant State. Instead the Court reiterated the 
Union obligation to respect international customary law, and the obligation of conform 
interpretation of EU law, which is binding on the Union institutions. By making an innovative 
use of conform interpretation, the Court found an additional limitation to the application of 
the Union citizenship provisions, which has its source outside the EU primary or secondary 
provisions, namely in the lex specialis customary international legal provisions on diplomatic 
relations. Once again the Court found an innovative way of satisfying conflicting interests, i.e. 
those sought by the international customary norms and the EU citizenship provisions, by way 
of an inventive, even if legally erred reasoning,1093 of using the conform interpretation conflict 
resolution tool. 
From the perspective of international law, the main resolution tool of normative 
conflicts is the interpretation in ‘good faith’ provided by Article 31 VCLT which was initially 
meant to address conflicts between international treaty norms, rather than normative conflicts 
stemming from the fragmentation of the general international legal framework. There are 
precise requirements to be followed in fulfilling the obligation of conform interpretation: 
interpretation should be exercised in ‘good faith’, taking into account not only the wording of 
the international norm of reference but also the context and purpose of the norm and also the 
‘relevant rules of international law applicable to the parties.’1094 Based on Article 31 VCLT 
requirements of interpretation, Ziegler deduced that currently Article 31 VCLT serves also ‘to 
avoid conflicts and to preserve unity with other areas of international law, or at least respect 
and reflect comity towards it.’1095 It seems thus that the EU obligation of ‘conform 
interpretation’ and the international tool of interpretation in ‘good faith’ are very similar, and 
pursue similar objectives, i.e. of preserving the unity of legal orders and respect of other areas 
of law. 
                                                 
1093 See Lucia S. Rossi, ‘EU Citizenship and the Free Movement of Heads of State: Hungary v. Slovak 
Republic’, (2013) Common Market Law Review, 1451; M. Filippin, ‘A Change for future intra-European 
diplomatic relations? Case C-364/10 Hungary v Slovakia, Judgment of 16 October 2012’, (2013) MJ, 120. 
1094 According to Art. 31(1) and (3) lit c) VCLT. 
1095 Katja S. Ziegler, ‘The Relationship between EU law and International Law’, University of Leicester School 
of Law Research Paper No. 13-17/2013, 23. 
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It has to be mentioned that the EU devised two other mechanisms of conflict 
avoidance, which commonly apply in cases when Member States are faced with conflicting 
international and EU obligations: Article 351 TFEU which obliges the Union to respect the 
Member States’ international obligations acquired prior to the accession or creation of the 
Union, and disconnection clauses which create a safe haven for the EU obligations diverging 
from the general international legal provisions.1096  
In evaluating the relationship between international and EU law, one has to take into 
account also the very rich legal literature on this topic.1097 The main scholarly approaches to 
this normative relationship can be included under one of the following categories: ‘legal 
pluralism’ or ‘legal constitutionalism’, as opposite doctrines; while post-Kadi1098, scholars 
militate for a middle-way doctrine where the international, regional (including the Union), 
and domestic legal orders are all equally legitimate without a clear hierarchical organisation, 
except in relation to jus cogens norms, or the EU constitutional principles, which sit at the 
apex of this plurality of legal orders and norms.1099 All legal scholars, regardless of whether 
internationalist or European, generally agree that the traditional monist/dualist doctrines 
governing the relationship between international and national legal orders cannot adequately 
describe the different aspects of the relationship between the international legal order and the 
EU legal order. Post-Kadi,1100 it seems that one of the main academic concerns regarding the 
relation between international and EU law, is that the EU will feel free to deviate from 
international law as it suits the EU institutions, or even worse its own ‘judicial vanity’, thus 
disrespecting the Union obligation to ensure respect of international law.1101 
                                                 
1096 M. Cremona, ‘Disconnection Clauses in EC Law and Practice’, C. Hillion and P. Koutrakos (eds), Mixed 
Agreements Revisited: The EU and its Member States in the World, Hart Publishing (2010). 
1097 See, e.g.: J. Wouters, A. Nollkaemper and E. De Wet (eds), The Europeanisation of International Law: The 
Status of International Law in the EU and its Member States, Asser Press (2008); Jan Klabbers, Treaty Conflict 
and the European Union, Cambridge University Press (2009); E. Cannizzaro, P. Palchetti and Ramses A. Wessel 
(eds), International Law as Law of the European Union, Martinus Nijhoff (2011); Gráinne de Búrca and J. H. H. 
Weiler, The Worlds of European Constitutionalism, Cambdriged University Press (2012); Dimitry Kochenov 
and Fabian Amtenbrink (eds), The European Union’s Shaping of the International Legal Order, Cambridge 
University Press (2013); Malcolm D. Evans and P. Koutrakos (eds), The International Responsibility of the 
European Union: European and International Perspectives, Hart Publishing (2013). 
1098 Ramses A. Wessel (eds), International Law as Law of the European Union, Martinus Nijhoff (2011); 
Gráinne de Búrca and J. H. H. Weiler, The Worlds of European Constitutionalism, op.cit.. 
1099 G. de Burca, See also Katja S. Ziegler, ‘International Law and EU law: Between Asymmetric 
Constitutionalisations and Fragmentation’ in Alexander Orakhelashvili (ed), Research Handbook on the Theory 
and History of International Law (Edward Elgar 2011). 
1100 Joined Cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P, Yassin Abdull Kadi & Al Barakaat International Foundation v 
Council and Commission [2008] ECR I-6351. 
1101 G. de Búrca, ‘After the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: The Court of Justice as a Human Rights 
Adjudicator?’, (2013) Maastricht JECL 168, 183; N Petersen, ‘The Reception of International Law by 
Constitutional Courts through the Prism of Legitimacy’, (2012) ZaöRV, 223, 248; C. Eckes, ‘International Law 
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In conclusion, it seems that the Lisbon Treaty shows greater respect towards 
(customary) international law, which can contribute to the EU’s increasingly active global 
role on the international sphere, and respect of international norms within the EU legal order. 
In spite of the aforementioned critiques, the CJEU has taken seriously the conventional EU’s 
obligation to respect customary international law by accepting international customs as a 
direct legal basis for challenging the legal validity of EU secondary norms (ATAA). The 
Hungary v Slovakia judgment seems to have raised even further the status previously 
recognised to customary international law within the hierarchy of EU norms, by seemingly 
conferring to it an equal footing to EU primary law provisions, at least in certain specific 
circumstances. For the first time, the Lisbon Treaty ascertains the responsibility of the Union 
in contributing to the formation of customary international law. The Union, as a coordinated 
28 States practice, definitely has an important word to say in the creation of international 
customs, and could effectively impose its own view.1102 The Lisbon Treaty amendments and 
the recent jurisprudence of the CJEU on the application of customary international law 
indicates that the Union is distancing itself from the conflicting paradigm that has at times 
governed its relation with international law. Furthermore the EU model of protection of EU 
citizens abroad has become a model for other regional legal orders, importing the Union 
intergovernmental model of protecting citizens abroad.1103 It remains to be seen whether the 
relation between customary international law and EU law will continue to develop along a 
two-way fertilisation course.1104 However, in certain concrete cases, avoiding conflict might 
                                                                                                                                                        
as Law of the EU: The Role of the ECJ', in E. Cannizzaro, P. Palchetti & Ramses A. Wessel (eds), International 
Law as Law of the European Union (2011). 
1102 See F. Hoffmeister, ‘The Contribution of EU Practice under International Law’, in M. Cremona and M. 
Marcesceau (eds), Developments in EU External Relations Law, Oxford University Press (2008), 37-127.    
1103 Recently, regional consular sharing agreements in cases of disasters have been agreed in the framework of 
other regional international organisations, such as the ASEAN (see the Guidelines for the Provision of 
Emergency Assistance by ASEAN Missions in Third Countries to Nationals of ASEAN Member Countries in 
Crisis Situation, Manila, Philippines, 29-30 July 2007) and Andean countries (according to Decision 548, the 
Andean Cooperation Mechanism on Consular Assistance and Protection and Migratory Matters was adopted in 
2003. ‘This instrument stipulates that any national of an Andean Community Member Country who is within the 
territory of a third State where his/her country of origin has no Diplomatic or Consular Representation, may avail 
him or herself of the protection of the diplomatic or consular officials of any other Member Country.’, Decision 
548/2003 has not yet been implemented). None of these provisions is so far a legal binding provision, since the 
ASEAN includes the partnership in a soft law instrument, while within the Andean framework, the Decision is 
not yet in force. These provisions do not enshrine an individual right similar to the EU citizenship right to equal 
protection abroad recognised within the EU legal order, but rather keep partnership in consular sharing as an 
inter-governmental framework of cooperation, similar to Decision 95/553/EC, regarding protection for citizens 
of the European Union by diplomatic and consular representations, [1995] OJ, L 314/73 and Decision 
96/409/CFSP, on the establishment of an emergency travel document, [1996] OJ L 168/11. 
1104 The idea of presenting the Union and international law in a mutually beneficial and friendly relationship was 
inspired by Katja S. Ziegler’s progressive papers: Katja S. Ziegler, The Relationship between EU law and 
International Law, University of Leicester School of Law Research Paper No. 13-17/2013; Katja S. Ziegler, 
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be impossible. Once the conflict between international and EU law has occurred, the 
aforementioned conflict resolution tools might not always be helpful, and thus a choice would 
ultimately need to be made between the two legal norms.1105 These situations are those that 
ultimately test the level of respect the Union institutions show to international law.1106 
 
III. The EU supranational model of protecting EU citizens abroad and 
the reality of public international law governing the protection of 
individuals  
The protection of citizens abroad has traditionally been considered to involve consular and 
diplomatic protection of citizens. The appearance of new non-State actors with different forms 
of governance and action has meant that the concept of protection abroad of citizens has taken 
other forms than the aforementioned institutions of international law. For example, several of 
the European Union’s institutions,1107 bodies1108 and missions1109 can provide consular 
assistance and protection to EU citizens in distress abroad and thus complement the Member 
States in the provision of the traditional consular and diplomatic protection of private 
individuals.1110 This is the supranational model of protecting EU citizens abroad, which is part 
of the overall EU legal framework on protecting Union citizens in third countries. Before 
assessing the specifics of the EU model of protecting citizens abroad in light of the current 
public international law, it is important to establish what the legal nature of the EU is, and in 
light of its nature, to clarify the international rules binding on this legal entity.  
The legal nature of the European Union is one of the oldest debated EU law related 
topics, due to the continuous ambiguity preserved by the founding Treaties on this topic and 
the fast developing practice of the EU that is placing the EU in between different legal 
                                                                                                                                                        
‘International Law and EU law: Between Asymmetric Constitutionalisations and Fragmentation’ in Alexander 
Orakhelashvili (ed), Research Handbook on the Theory and History of International Law, Edward Elgar (2011). 
1105 As in Kadi case, see M. Avbelj, ‘The case of Mr. Kadi and the Modern Concept of Law in Kadi on Trial: 
The Multifaceted Analysis of the Kadi Trial’, in M. Avbelk, F. Fontanelli, G. Martinico (eds.), Routledge 
Research in EU law (2014), 49-63, 55. 
1106 See, for instance, the Kadi case compared to Hungary v Slovakia case. 
1107 The European Commission, within the framework of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism, see Decision 
Council Decision 1313/2013 of the European Parliament and Council on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism, 
[2013] OJ L 347/924 of 17.12.2013. 
1108 EEAS and Union delegations, see Bart Van Vooren, ‘A Legal Institutional Perspective on the European 
External Action Service’, (2011) Common Market Law Review, 475. 
1109 Under the European Union’s ESDP missions, protection of citizens may take the form of forceful protection 
by military missions, see J. Larik, ‘Operation Atalanta and the Protection of EU Citizens: Civis Europaeus 
Unheeded?’, in J. Larik and M. Moraru (eds.), Ever-Closer in Brussels – Ever-Closer in the World? EU External 
Action after the Lisbon Treaty, EUI Working Paper LAW 2011/10, 129-144. 
1110 See more details on the role of the Union in securing protection of Union citizens abroad in Chapter 4. 
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categories. The current EU founding Treaties have maintained the previous silence on the 
legal nature of the EU,1111 leaving open the question of what the legal nature of the EU is: a 
sui-generis entity whose autonomy from the international and national legal orders has been 
carefully constructed by the European jurisprudence,1112 or an international organisation, albeit 
a sui generis1113 one, which is still an international organisation from the perspective of third 
parties.1114 The increasing expansion of the Union competences in areas that used to fall under 
the State’s exclusive competences, and expanding across all aspects of the individual’s life, 
have driven more and more scholars to refer to the Union as a sort of Rechtsstaat, or to 
compare the Union with a federation, or confederation of States.1115 Other scholars depart 
from analogies with State-like types of political organisations, and argue that the Union 
resembles new political and legal forms,1116 or a neo-feudal puzzle of multiple 
sovereignties.1117 It seems that the current standard scholarly opinion is that the EU is still an 
international organisation, albeit a sui generis or special one,1118 which the current State-like 
                                                 
1111 Art. 1 TEU refers only to the replacement of the old pillar structure: ‘By this Treaty, the HIGH 
CONTRACTING PARTIES establish among themselves a EUROPEAN UNION, hereinafter called “the 
Union", on which the Member States confer competences to attain objectives they have in common.’ 
1112 See the CJEU jurisprudence, starting with Van Gend en Loos, the Community is ‘a new legal order of 
international law’ (Case 26/62, Van Gend & Loos, [1963] ECR 1); COSTA v Enel, ‘the EEC Treaty has created 
its own legal system’ (Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, [1964] ECR 585) until the recent judgment in Op 2/13: ‘The 
fact that the EU has a new kind of legal order, the nature of which is peculiar to the EU, its own constitutional 
framework and founding principles, a particularly sophisticated institutional structure and a full set of legal 
rules to ensure its operation’, para. 158. By ‘autonomous legal order’ is meant a ‘self-referential order’ that is a 
circular order that generates, validates and sustains itself’, and thus establishes by itself the rules regarding the 
interactions with national and international legal orders, see, N. Tsagourias, ‘Conceptualising the Autonomy of 
the EU: An Idea of Autonomy’ in R. Collins and N. White (eds.), International Organisations: An Idea of 
Autonomy, Oxford University Press (2014), 340. See also, J. Wouters and S. Duquet, ‘The EU and International 
Diplomatic Law: New Horizons’, (2012) The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 31, 33. 
1113 R. Schütze argues that the EU is no longer sui generis, but that, similar to any other federation, it has a ‘dual 
government, dual sovereignty, and also dual citizenship’, see R. Schütze, From Dual to Cooperative Federalism: 
The Changing Structure of European Law, Oxford University Press (2009), 29. 
1114 See, inter alia, Andrés D. Casteleiro, 'EU Declarations of Competence to Multilateral Agreements: A Useful 
Reference Base?', (2012) EFARev, 491. 
1115 J. Habermas, ‘Why Europe needs a Constitution’, in New Left Review 11, September-October 2001, 
http://newleftreview.org/A2343#_ednref22, R. Schütze, From Dual to Cooperative Federalism, Oxford 
University Press (2009); Hartley, The Foundations of European Union Law, Oxford University Press (1996), 
109. 
1116 L. Siedetop, Democracy in Europe, London, Penguin (2000); N.   Tsagourias, ‘Conceptualizing   the   
Autonomy   of   the   European   Union’,   in R.   Collins   and   N.D.   White   (eds.),   International    
Organizations    and    the    Idea    of    Autonomy:    Institutional    in    the    International    Legal    Order, 
Routledge (2011),   339‐352. 
1117 D. Ragazzoni, ‘Identity vs. representation: what makes ‘the people’? Rethinking democratic citizenship 
through (and beyond) Carl Schmitt and Hans Kelsen’, (2011) Perspectives on Federalism, 1, 4-5. 
1118 The ‘sui-generis’ nature being given by the numerous constitutional, supranational features, and expansions 
of State-like competences and symbols. For the sui-generis nature of the European Union legal order, see, for 
example, J. H. Weiler and U. R. Haltern, ‘The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order–Through the Looking 
Glass’ (1996) Harv.Int'l L.J., 411; for the federalist nature of the Union, see R. Schütze, From Dual to 
Cooperative Federalism, op.cit.; the ‘international organization’ versus ‘state’ legal debate is well summarized 
by Katja S. Ziegler, ‘The Relationship between EU law and International Law’, op.cit. 
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features have not yet altered it into a federation, co-federation, or other invented legal form.1119 
There are other scholars who emphasise that, in spite of the Union’s expansion of power and 
of the consequential loss of the Member States’ exclusive powers, the Union is and will 
remain primarily an international organisation, albeit sui generis1120, since the EU rules 
governing the amendment and exit from the founding Treaties are still the classical public 
international legal norms requiring the unanimous consent of the Member States.1121  
The legal nature of the Union remains a source of continuous debate, with different 
legal qualifications being put forward.1122 The overall conclusion following the scholarly 
opinions is that the Union does not fit squarely within any of the traditional classifications: 
federation, co-federation, pluralist legal regime,1123 or international organisation.1124 While 
inventing new names and metaphors might solve the classification dilemma,1125 it will not 
                                                 
1119 It has to be noticed that the EU is still governed by the structural principle of conferred powers, which can be 
seen as a version of the principle of speciality or attributed powers, which govern the functioning of international 
organisations (see ICJ Case of the SS Lotus and J. Klabbers, An Introduction to International Institutional Law, 
Oxford University Press (2008), 64) and differentiate them from States. For scholarly opinions supporting the 
EU’s status of a special international organisation, see J. Alarez, International Organisations as Law-Makers, 
Oxford University Press (2005); J. Klabbers, D. Curtin, R. Wessel, Bruno de Witte, J. Bengoetxea, ‘The EU as 
(More Than) an International Organization’, in J. Klabbers and Å. Wallendahl, Research Handbook on the Law 
of International Organizations, Cheltenham/ Edward Elgar Publishing (2011), 448-465, 449. 
1120 The sui generis type has so far materialised in titles such as Regional Economic Integration Organisations 
(REIOs), and lately regional international organisations. The Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities has a RIO (Regional Integration Organisation) clause, which it has been argued to have been 
included for the purpose of covering the large scope of activities of the EU (see Art. 44: ‘Regional integration 
organisation shall mean an organisation constituted by sovereign States of a given region, to which its member 
States have transferred competence in respect of matters governed by this Convention.’); R. Wessel, ‘Can the 
EU replace the Member States?....’, op.cit., 131. On the previous title of Regional Economic Integration 
Organisation, see E. Paasivirta and P. J. Kuijper, ‘Does one size fit all?: The European Community and the 
Responsibility of International Organisations’, (2005) Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, 169, 205.  
1121 J. Alarez, J. Klabbers, D. Curtin, R. Wessel, Bruno de Witte, J. Bengoetxea, ‘The EU as (More Than) an 
International Organization’, in J. Klabbers and Å. Wallendahl, Research Handbook on the Law of International 
Organizations, op.cit. 
1122 For a more exhaustive overview of some of the legal qualifications of the Union’s legal order, see N. Walker 
and S. Tierney, ‘Introduction: A Constitutional Mosaic? Exploring the New Frontiers of Europe’s 
Constitutionalism’ in N. Walker, M. Shaw and S. Tierney (eds.), Europe’s Constitutional Mosaic, Hart (2011), 
7–8; G. de Búrca and J.H.H. Weiler (eds.), The Worlds of European Constitutionalism, op.cit. 
1123 R. Wessel in E. Cannizzaro, op.cit., 17 
1124 C. Barnard, referred to the legal nature of the Union as being ‘more than an international organization (as 
reflected by the judicially recognized doctrines of supremacy, direct effect, etc.) but less than a federal state (no 
welfare state no sufficient resources, no army etc.)’ in ‘Introduction: The Constitutional Treaty, the 
Constitutional Debate and the Constitutional Process’ in C. Barnard (ed.), The Fundamentals of EU Law 
Revisited: Assessing the Impact of the Constitutional Debate (OUP 2007) 1, 3. While Larik refers to the nature 
of the Union as still ‘in a state of limbo between classic international organization and sovereign State.’ in J. 
Larik, ‘From Speciality to the Constitutional Sense of Purpose: On the Changing Role of the Objectives of the 
European Union’ (2014) International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 935, 957. 
1125 J. Bengoetxea, ‘The EU as (More Than) an International Organization’, in J. Klabbers and Å. Wallendahl, 
Research Handbook on the Law of International Organizations, Cheltenham/Northampton: Edward Elgar 
Publishing (2011), 448-465. 
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change the foundational basis of the Union and the EU Treaties system as embedded in 
general international law,1126 and the view of third countries.1127 
Regardless of which scholarly opinion we choose to embrace in regard to the legal 
nature of the European Union, we cannot deny that the EU is not a State,1128 and that in the 
eyes of third countries and of the Court of Justice of the EU, the European Union is still only 
an international organisation, even if establishing a new kind of legal order, of a peculiar 
nature, with ‘its own constitutional framework and founding principles, a particularly 
sophisticated institutional structure and a full set of legal rules to ensure its operation’.1129 
The European Union now enjoys an express international legal personality, which permits it 
to enter into legal relations with other international actors, and to acquire international rights 
and obligations. However its external competences are limited by the principle of conferral,1130 
which is a reformulation of the international legal principle of speciality1131 within the EU 
legal order. The European Union exists and operates within the broader international legal 
system, where it needs to respect the principles of international law,1132 which bind, primarily, 
international organisations, but also more generally all international actors.1133  
In spite of non-State actors actively participating in international diplomacy, the EU 
and UN being some of the most prominent of them,1134 the international norms governing the 
exercise of consular and diplomatic protection of natural persons1135 are still of a purely inter-
                                                 
1126 Katja S. Ziegler, ‘The Relationship between EU law and International Law’, University of Leicester School 
of Law Research Paper No. 13-17, 20. 
1127 For third countries the EU is still an international organisation, though a special one, which requires insertion 
of specific clauses in international agreements to clarify the division of competences and representations tasks 
between the Union institutions and the Member States, see Andrés D. Casteleiro, ‘EU Declarations of 
Competence to Multilateral Agreements: A Useful Reference Base?’, (2012) European Foreign Affairs Review, 
491; R. Ambast and V. Tyagi, ‘Ambassadors of Europe: An Insight into the Evolution of the European Union 
and International Diplomatic Law’, (2008) Studia Diplomatica, available online at 
http://www.ies.be/files/repo/conference2008/EUinIA_VIII_1_AmbastTyagi.pdf  
1128 See the CJEU in Opinion 2/13, Judgment of 18 December 2014, para. 156: ‘[…] the EU is, under 
international law, precluded by its very nature from being considered a State.’ 
1129 Opinion 2/13, para. 158. 
1130 Art. 5 TEU. 
1131 In addition to the Reparation of Injuries case, see also Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in 
Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep 1996 (July 8) at 66, para. 25. 
1132 See Arts. 3(5) and 21 TEU. 
1133 As in regard to the jus cogens norms. 
1134 J. Wouters and S. Duquet, ‘The Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations’ in in A.F. 
Cooper, J. Heine and R. Thakur (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy (2013); C. Jönsson and M. 
Hall, ‘Communication: An Essential Aspect of Diplomacy’, in C. Jönsson and R. Langhorne (eds.), Diplomacy, 
Sage Publications (2013), 398; A.F. Cooper, ‘The changing nature of diplomacy’, in A.F. Cooper, J. Heine and 
R. Thakur (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy Oxford University Press (2013); K. Mahbubani, 
‘Multilateral diplomacy’, in The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy (2013), 248-262. 
1135 See Chapter 3. 
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States nature.1136 Therefore, it could be argued that the relevant international norms do not 
apply to the EU, which is still an international organisation, even if not a classical one.1137 The 
only relevant rule on the capacity of an international organisation to exercise protection of 
individuals abroad is to be found in the Advisory Opinion of the ICJ delivered in 1948, in the 
Reparation of Injuries case.1138 The Court established that the UN, as an international 
organisation, has the capacity to maintain its rights by bringing international claims on behalf 
of its agents while exercising functions attributed by the UN. Although similar to the exercise 
of diplomatic protection of individuals by States, the ICJ clearly differentiated this protective 
function, entitled ‘functional protection’ recognised to the UN, as an international 
organisation, from the classical diplomatic protection. The emphasis in this judgment was on 
whether the principle of speciality, which determines the limits of international organisations’ 
competences, prohibited the UN to exercise functional protection of its agents injured abroad. 
It is settled law that international organisations are conceived of as derivative subjects of 
international law, possessing only a limited set of powers, namely those established by their 
constitutive charters, in contrast to States, which are the original and complete subjects of 
international law.1139  
The treaty and customary international law norms on the exercise of consular and 
diplomatic protection of individuals are relative norms from which States can derogate on the 
basis of mutual consent and provided they do not breach jus cogens norms. The Barcelona 
Traction judgment serves as an indication that the international norms are de minimis rules 
                                                 
1136 The Vienna Conventions on Consular and Diplomatic Relations, which provide many of the rules of the 
consular and diplomatic law, are still open only to States. See Art. 48 of the VCDR “shall be open for signature 
by all States Members of the United Nations or of any of the specialized agencies or Parties to the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, and by any other State invited by the General Assembly of the United Nations to 
become a Party to the Convention […]”. Additionally, Art. 50 of the VCDR provides that the Vienna 
Convention remains “open for accession by any State belonging to any of the four categories” mentioned in Art. 
48. Similar provisions exist in the VCCR, see Articles 74 and 76. 
1137 The customary international law governing the exercise of consular and diplomatic protection of EU citizens 
is still an exclusive inter-States system, see the 2006 ILC Articles on Diplomatic Protection. The still 
preponderant inter-States relations nature of the international legal order is a more general problem which the 
EU has to confront in many areas of activity. See for instance H. Bruyninckx, J. Wouters, S. Basu and S. Schunz 
(eds.), The European Union and Multilateral Governance: Assessing EU Participation in United Nations 
Human Rights and Environmental Fora, Palgrave Macmillan (2012); J. Wouters, Anna-Luise Chané, ‘Brussels 
meets Westphalia: The European Union and the United Nations’, WP No. 144/August 2014, available online at 
https://ghum.kuleuven.be/ggs/publications/working_papers/new_series/wp141-150/wp144-wouters-chane.pdf  
1138 International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion of 11 April 1949, Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the 
Service of the United Nations, ICJ Reports (1949), 174–220. 
1139 J. Larik, ‘From Speciality to the Constitutional Sense of Purpose: On the Changing Role of the Objectives of 
the European Union’, (2014) International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 935, 957; L. Condorelli and A. 
Cassese, ‘Is Leviathan Still Holding Sway over International Dealings’ in A. Cassese (ed) Realizing Utopia: the 
Future of International Law, Oxford University Press (2012). 
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from which the States can derogate, either internally or regionally.1140 The EU-based 
arrangement of the Member States, although not domestic, and not touching directly on the 
State’s right to exercise diplomatic protection to its own citizens, cannot not be contrary to 
rules that have been held to establish minimum rules of international law. This conclusion is 
also supported by Article 8 of the VCCR and the numerous bilateral and regional treaties on 
consular and diplomatic sharing concluded among States on the basis of Article 8 VCCR,1141 
which have functioned without the opposition of third countries for decades.  
In regard to diplomatic protection, none of the norms governing this institution is 
absolute. The Panevezys judgment1142 confirmed that the nationality of claims requirement can 
be derogated from on the basis of mutual consent among the involved States. Therefore, 
States can derogate from these norms by way of consenting to delegate certain of the 
functions of consular and diplomatic protection of private individuals to an international 
organisation for the purpose of helping them to safeguard their nationals in consular distress 
abroad. As long as this delegated competence is enshrined in the constitutional charter of the 
international organisation, then, from the perspective of general public international law, the 
principle of speciality is respected, and the international organisation can exercise protective 
functions of individuals, in addition to the functional protection of the organisation’s agents.  
Chapter 1 emphasised that one of the Lisbon Treaty innovations in the field of 
ensuring protection of EU citizens abroad, was to clarify the legislative,1143 institutional,1144 
and functional1145 competence of the EU to act in this field. It could thus be concluded that in 
the absence of specific public international norms governing the exercise of consular and 
diplomatic protection of private individuals by international organisations, the European 
Union respected the general principle of speciality, which could have been the only one to 
prevent the EU from exercising such functions, and not the inter-States public international 
norms governing the exercise of consular and diplomatic protection of individuals which 
                                                 
1140 See the Barcelona Traction judgment, ICJ, op.cit., paras. 71, 78-9. 
1141 See Chapter 2, Section IV.3 State practice, and Section V.2.b State practice. 
1142 Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway Case, (1939) PCIJ Series A/B, No. 76 16, 17; Mavrommatis Palestine 
Concessions Case (1924), PCIJ Series A No. 2, at 16: ‘This right [to resort to ‘diplomatic action or international 
judicial proceedings’] is necessarily limited to intervention on behalf [of the state’s] own nationals because, in 
the absence of a special agreement, it is the bond of nationality between the State and the individual which alone 
confers upon the State the right of diplomatic protection.’ 
1143 See Art. 23(2) TFEU, the competence of the Council to adopt Directives to ensure the effective 
implementation of the EU citizenship to equal protection abroad. 
1144 See, in particular, Arts. 35 TEU, 221 TFEU, and Art. 5(10) of the EEAS Decision, the 2013 Union Civil 
Protection Mechanism Decision clarify the EU institutions and bodies with competence to provide consular 
protection of unrepresented Union citizens abroad. 
1145 On the type of services the EU institutions can provide, see more details in Chapter 4, Section VI.1.b. 
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apply purely to the Member States’ exercise of consular and diplomatic protection of citizens 
abroad. 
 
IV.  Exploring the relation between the EU specific legal regime on 
protection of EU citizens abroad with the general international legal 
framework 
It is well known that the European Union legal order has placed the individual at the centre of 
its interests.1146 With the view of bringing the Union closer to its people, the Maastricht Treaty 
replaced the previous scattered regional forms of consular and diplomatic cooperation among 
the Member States based on Article 8 VCCR, with a single regional legal regime that would 
ensure equal protection abroad to all Union citizens.1147 Being part of the Union legal order, its 
specific legal characteristics are applying also to its provisions on the protection of EU 
citizens abroad, which together with the institutional and legal innovations are constructing an 
innovative, different model from the general international model of protection of citizens 
abroad.  
Although the EU citizenship is not an independent source of consular and diplomatic 
protection rights, but rather of extending duties owed to a State’s own citizens to nationals of 
other Member States, the legal nature and effects recognised to this equal treatment right have 
no equivalent under general customary international law. Traditional customary international 
law defined consular and diplomatic protection of individuals as discretionary rights of the 
State, from which States could have derogated from within their domestic legal orders or in 
their bilateral, regional or multilateral relations based on Articles 8 VCR and 46 VCDR. The 
2006 ILC Articles on Diplomatic Protection have preserved the legal nature of a State right 
for diplomatic protection, following the clear rejection of Rapporteur Dugard’s proposal to 
include a State obligation to exercise diplomatic protection for individuals in cases of 
                                                 
1146 See the Preamble of founding Treaties, Art. 1(2) TEU: ‘in which decisions are taken as openly as possible 
and as closely as possible to the citizen.’ A phrase that has been included in all the different versions of the 
founding Treaties; Opinion 1/91, First EEA Case, [1991] ECR; for the metamorphosis of the individual within 
the Union legal order, gradually gaining increasing direct rights (economic, social and then political), see D. 
Kochenov, R. Plender, ‘EU Citizenship: From an Incipient Form to an Incipient Substance? The Discovery of 
the Treaty Text’, (2012) E.L. Rev., 369. 
I-6079, para. 21 
1147 For this argument see more in Madalina B. Moraru, ‘Securing Consular Protection of the EU Citizens 
Abroad: What Role for the EU?’, op.cit., and ‘Practical and Legal Consequences of Absence of EU and Member 
States’ External Representations for the Protection of EU Citizens in Third Countries’, op.cit. 
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violations of jus cogens norms.1148 Since then, the States’ practice of recognising a State duty 
to exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of nationals subjected abroad to grave violations 
of fundamental rights has slowly grown. The Union legal order, Article 20(2)(c) TFEU 
confers a Union citizenship right to equal protection of EU citizens in third countries, while 
Article 46 EU Charter confers a fundamental status to this right to equal consular and 
diplomatic protection to all unrepresented Union citizens.  
The foundation of the equal treatment right to protection abroad is the citizenship of a 
supranational entity, which has been strongly criticised by certain international legal 
scholars.1149 The EU citizenship has been argued not to conform to the ‘nationality of claims’ 
prerequisite for the exercise of consular and diplomatic protection of individuals. According 
to the generally accepted international view of consular and diplomatic protection, an 
individual must have the nationality of the assisting State (consular protection) or of the State 
claiming injury at the time at which the injury is inflicted (diplomatic protection) in order to 
legitimise the exercise of consular assistance or to establish an actual right of the State to 
exercise diplomatic protection.1150 On the other hand, the Union legal regime establishing a 
fundamental right to equal consular and diplomatic protection is premised on the Union 
citizenship, a concept which has various different legal definitions depending on the different 
views shared by legal scholars.1151 Although there is no positive definition of the Union 
citizenship that is unanimously accepted by academics, there is some agreement on what the 
legal concept is not, namely a State-like citizenship within its traditional public international 
legal meaning. The Union citizenship has been criticised for not reflecting a ‘full citizen 
status’,1152 and lacking an equally genuine and solid link between the Union citizens and all 
the Member States.1153 Therefore, the Union citizenship was found not to be fulfilling the 
requirements of nationality of claims for the purpose of diplomatic and consular protection.1154  
                                                 
1148 Special Rapporteur John Dugard proposed a provision for the Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection 
designed to create an obligation to exercise protection in certain, limited, situations. This proposal was rejected. 
For the proposed article see J. Dugard, First Report on Diplomatic Protection, 52nd session, A/CN.4/506 (2000), 
para. 74 
1149 A.Vermeer-Künzli, ‘Nationality and EU citizenship’ in The Protection of Individuals by means of 
Diplomatic Protection, PhD Thesis, 2007, and ‘Where the Law Becomes Irrelevant: Consular Assistance and the 
European Union’; J. Dugard, Seventh Report, op.cit. 
1150 See F. Amerasinghe, ‘The Relevance of Nationality’, in op.cit. 
1151 D. Thym, ‘Towards ‘Real’ Citizenship? The Judicial Construction of Union Citizenship and its Limits’ in M. 
Adams, Henri de Waele, J. Meeusen, G. Straetmans, Judging Europe’s Judges: The Legitimacy of the Case Law 
of the European Court of Justice, Hart (2014). 
1152 S. Kadelbach, ‘Union citizenship’, NYU Jean Monnet Working Paper 9/03.  
1153 See A. Vermeer-Künzli, ‘Nationality and EU citizenship’ in The Protection of Individuals by means of 
Diplomatic Protection, PhD Thesis; L. Azoulai, ‘The (Mis)Construction of the European Individual Two Essays 
on Union Citizenship Law’, EUI Working Paper LAW 2014/14; A. Vermeer-Künzli, ‘Where the Law becomes 
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Third, the implementation of the EU specific provisions by way of horizontal 
cooperation among the Member States (Article 23(1) TFEU), or by way of vertical 
cooperation among the Member States and the Union bodies or institutions1155 without the 
express consent of the receiving non-EU countries is considered by international legal 
scholars as a stark violation of the most fundamental general principles of international law: 
equal state sovereignty and non-intervention in the domestic affairs of States.1156 Last, but not 
least, the EU primary provisions are criticised for introducing a terminological confusion as 
they do not clarify precisely what is the substantive scope of the EU citizenship right to equal 
protection abroad (Article 20(2)(c) TFEU). Instead, it leaves room for confusing the label 
Article 46 EU – Diplomatic and consular protection)1157 with the legal content (protection by 
the consular and diplomatic authorities)1158, while public international law establishes a clear 
division between the institution of consular protection and that of diplomatic protection.1159 
Insofar as diplomatic protection is considered as included within the material scope of the EU 
citizenship right to equal protection abroad, the Union fundamental right is argued to amplify 
the divergence between the Union and international legal regimes.1160  
                                                                                                                                                        
Irrelevant: Consular Assistance and the European Union’, (2011) International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 
965-995; See J. Dugard, Seventh Report on diplomatic protection, United Nations General Assembly, 
A/CN.4/567, United Nations, New York, 7 March 2006, p. 10; A. Vermeer-Künzli, ‘Exercising Diplomatic 
Protection, the fine line between litigation, demarches and consular assistance’, (2008) ZaöRV, 339-340; T. 
Stein, Interim Report on ‘Diplomatic Protection Under the European Union Treaty’, in ILA Committee on 
Diplomatic Protection of Persons and Property, Second Report, New Delhi, 2002, 36-7; P. Vigni, ‘The 
Protection of EU Citizens: The Perspective of International law’ in: J. Larik and M. Moraru (eds.), Ever-Closer 
in Brussels – Ever-Closer in the World? EU External Action after the Lisbon Treaty, EUI Working Paper 
2011/10, 91-107. 
1154 Ibid. 
1155 Art. 35(3) TEU reads as follows: ‘The [The diplomatic and consular missions of the Member States and the 
Union delegations in third countries] shall contribute to the implementation of the right of citizens of the Union 
to protection in the territory of third countries as referred to in Article 20(2)(c) of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union and of the measures adopted pursuant to Article 23 of that Treaty.’ While consular 
assistance types of services can be provided by the European Commission or Union civilian and military mission 
within the framework of other Union policies, such as humanitarian aid, or CSDP missions. Additional 
competences are conferred upon the Union delegations by the EEAS Decisions, see more on the Union role in 
providing help to Union citizens abroad in Chapter 4. 
1156 See A. Vermeer-Künzli, The Protection of Individuals by means of Diplomatic Protection, op.cit., 10 and 25; 
P. Vigni, op.cit. 
1157 See the title of Art. 46 EU Charter. 
1158 Except for the title of Art. 46 EU Charter, the legal concepts of ‘consular protection’ and ‘diplomatic 
protection’ are not expressly used by the EU primary provisions; the EU secondary provisions have so far 
referred only to consular protection. The concept of ‘protection by the diplomatic and consular authorities’ is 
different from the public international law concepts of ‘consular protection’ and ‘diplomatic protection’. 
1159 S. Touzé, ‘Aspects recents (et choisis) de la protection consulaire des citoyens de l’Union europeenne, in 
R.A.E. – L.E.A. 2011/I, 79. See also J. Dugard, Seventh Report, op.cit., para 19: ‘by providing for both consular 
assistance and diplomatic protection, the provision disregards the fundamental differences between these two 
mechanisms.’ 
1160 See, in particular, J. Dugard, Seventh Report, A. Vermeer-Künzli, op.cit.; and S. Kadelbach, op.cit. 
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The aforementioned specific legal nature, foundation and implementation of the EU 
model of ensuring protection of EU citizens abroad have determined international legal 
scholars to challenge the legitimacy of the specific Union legal provisions in light of the 
existent international legal regime, and point out the high probability of future difficulties in 
the adequate implementation of the relevant EU Treaties provisions.1161 
It was shown in the previous two sections that the specific characteristics of the Union, 
in particular, its autonomy from the international legal order, cannot exonerate it from the 
obligation to respect the international treaties it concludes, and other treaty provisions to 
which it is not party to, as long as they codify similar existing customary international legal 
norms. In the case of a conflict between customary international law and EU legal norms, the 
Union and the Member States have an obligation of interpreting the Union provisions or the 
national legislation implementing the relevant Union provisions in conformity with the 
customary international legal norms. If the conflict cannot be solved by way of conform 
interpretation, then the Union institutions or the individuals whose interests have been 
violated can ask the Court to pronounce the invalidity of the EU secondary norms directly 
based on customary international law1162, insofar as the three conditions established in the 
ATAA judgment are met. First, the customary international law invoked is calling into 
question the competence of the EU to adopt the challenged act. Second, this EU secondary act 
is ‘liable to affect rights which the individual derives from EU law or to create obligations 
under EU law in this regard.’ Third, the EU committed ‘a manifest error of assessment 
concerning the conditions for applying those principles.’ Before pronouncing the fundamental 
incompatibility of the EU legal regime with the relevant public international legal norms, 
there are certain legal nuances which will be discussed in the following section, and which 
might present the alleged normative conflict in a different light. 
First of all, it was shown in the previous chapter that the current public international 
legal regime governing consular and diplomatic protection of individuals has evolved from 
the traditional Barcelona Traction form under the impact of international human rights law. 
Evidence of such evolution was found, first, in the States’ recent practice of exercising 
consular and/or diplomatic protection as a sort of obligation for ensuring the protection of 
individuals in cases of violation of fundamental human rights, or of extreme distress. Second, 
a growing domestic jurisprudence was identified, whereby domestic courts accept their 
jurisdiction to review individuals’ complaints against the passiveness, or insufficient, 
                                                 
1161 Ibid. 
1162 See inter alia, Hungary v Slovakia. 
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inadequate action of the executive to help nationals in such cases. This practice of the 
domestic executives and judiciaries was argued to be capable of nuancing the traditional 
portrayal of these legal instruments as discretionary State’s rights. The 2006 ILC Articles on 
Diplomatic Protection have already introduced progressive developments to the traditional 
diplomatic protection institution as regards its definition and foundation, while further legal 
advancements have impacted on both consular and diplomatic protection institutions post-
2006. Additionally, the fact that the Member States’ exercise of their Union obligation to 
protect the Union citizens abroad has not so far been opposed by third countries could be 
interpreted as substantially contributing to the formation of an international custom 
recognising an individual right to consular protection, and secondly to the creation of an 
international custom recognising the Union specific regime as legitimate within the general 
international legal framework. 
In the following paragraphs each of the specific aspects of the Union legal regime 
governing the protection of Union citizens abroad (i.e. the legal nature of the equal protection 
treatment, the non-nationality premise of the protection treatment, and the lack of express 
consent on the part of third countries) will be assessed from the perspective of their 
conformity with the current international legal framework. 
 The first section will argue that the slow but steady formation of a customary 
international norm recognising a limited duty of States to exercise consular and diplomatic 
protection of individuals, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, brings the public 
international legal institutions closer to the specific Union meaning of these mechanisms. 
Furthermore, the international and Union legal regime are not in a passive relationship, but 
they are in a mutually normative influencing relationship, where the international legal 
provisions inform the Union-specific provisions, while the latter contribute to the formation 
of a customary international norm, by supporting the idea of a limited State duty to exercise 
equal protection of individuals abroad. The objective of ensuring protection of individuals 
abroad, and in particular human rights, which drives both international1163 and Union 
mechanisms, shortens the gap between the specific norms of the two legal orders. 
The second section tackles the issue of whether the European Union citizenship fulfils 
the ‘nationality of claims’ requirement under the international legal framework. In particular, 
it will address the main critiques brought to the Union citizenship as a legal concept 
upholding the edifice of the specific Union exercise of equal consular and diplomatic 
                                                 
1163 See J. Dugard, First Report on Diplomatic Protection, op.cit.. 
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protection of Union citizens. Namely, is the Union citizenship an autonomous legal concept 
from the Member State nationality, or does it have a purely dependent status vis-à-vis the 
domestic citizenship?; is the Union citizenship creating direct links between the Union citizen 
and all the Member States, and between the Union citizen and the Union?  
The section will also address one of the fiercest criticisms of the Union citizenship as 
the premise of the Union regime of ensuring protection of Union citizens abroad, that is: its 
‘genuineness’ and ‘effectiveness’ as required by the Nottebohm doctrine. In answering the 
latter question, this thesis relies on the conclusions reached in Chapter 2, namely, that the 
current international law has discarded the Nottebohm genuine link requirement for single or 
dual citizenship cases. It will be pointed out that the absolute requirement of nationality for 
diplomatic and consular protection claims under international law is slowly being replaced 
with other links considered as better reflecting the close connection between an injured 
individual and a State that could offer protection. For instance, residence can reflect the 
individual’s integration into a national society and could thus be considered a social link 
legitimating the exercise of consular and diplomatic protection. As pointed out in Chapter 2, 
‘residence’ is increasingly recognised as a legitimate premise for a State’s exercise of 
consular and diplomatic protection functions. The ‘Union citizenship’ link could be 
interpreted as falling under this developing international trend which has recently recognised   
as legitimate foundation for the exercise of consular and diplomatic protection other 
connecting links than nationality.  
This section will conclude by addressing the issue of third countries’ consent to the 
exercise of the EU model of protecting Union citizens abroad. It will be argued that, in spite 
of the Member States and the Union’s failure of obtaining the express consent of third 
countries to its inter-governmental and supranational model of securing protection of Union 
citizens abroad, there is a geographically widespread and longstanding practice confirming 
the international legitimacy of the EU specific model which could be argued to pre-empt third 





1. The legal nature of consular and diplomatic protection of individuals 
under the EU legal order and contemporary international law  
Chapter 2 presented the evolution of consular and diplomatic protection within the public 
international legal framework, from their incipient forms in antiquity, taking clear shape 
during the formation of the nation-State as exclusive rights of the State, being formally 
recognised as institutions of public international law in the 19th century, and then starting to 
experience a revolutionary transformation post-World War II under the impact of the 
changing public international relations and law, and the development of international human 
rights. It is currently evident that the traditional definition of diplomatic protection as stated 
by the ICJ in Mavrommatis1164 and Barcelona Traction1165 judgments is outdated and has been 
replaced by a more modern definition provided in 2006 by the ILC1166 and confirmed by the 
ICJ, in 2007,1167 as reflecting current general customary international law. The changes 
brought to the legal definition of diplomatic protection are not spectacular, but they constitute 
a salient step in the evolution of this international institution, which for centuries has denied 
any role to the individual in its exercise.1168 The contemporary definition of diplomatic 
protection emphasises its procedural remedial nature and the role of the State as the means to 
invoke the international responsibility of a foreign State for the injuries inflicted upon the 
nationals of the Applicant State.1169 The role of the individual rights and interests are thus 
expressly recognised within the definition of the international legal mechanism of diplomatic 
protection. The individual rights are recognised as the premise of the mechanism.  
However, the legal nature of consular and diplomatic protection has not drastically 
changed. It is still defined as a right of the State of nationality, which has however lost its 
complete discretionary power, since domestic judiciaries increasingly accept jurisdiction to 
review the executive’s decision-making procedure in terms of arbitrariness, discrimination, 
                                                 
1164 Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. U.K.), Judgments, P.C.I.J. Reports 1924, Series A, No 2. 
1165 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1970, 
p. 3. 
1166 See Art.1. 
1167 In the Diallo case, the ICJ completely endorsed the ILC Art. 1 on Diplomatic protection as it had been finally 
adopted by the ILC in 2006: ‘The Court will recall that under customary international law, as reflected in 
Article 1 of the draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection of the International Law Commission (hereinafter the 
“ILC”), “diplomatic protection consists of the invocation by a State, through diplomatic action or other means 
of peaceful settlement, of the responsibility of another State for an injury caused by an internationally wrongful 
act of that State to a natural or legal person that is a national of the former State with a view to the 
implementation of such responsibility” (Article 1 of the draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection adopted by the 
ILC at its Fifty-eighth Session (2006), ILC Report, doc. A/61/10, p. 24).’ ICJ Judgment on Preliminary 
Objections of 24 May 2007, para. 39. 
1168 See more details on this issue in Chapter 2. 
1169 See Art. 1 of the 2006 ILC Articles on Diplomatic Protection. 
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good faith and soundness.1170 Second, Chapter 2 also gathered considerable practice of the 
executives and judiciaries around the globe contributing to the formation of a custom whereby 
States accept certain obligations to exercise diplomatic protection for their nationals abroad. 
The executive has to live up to the legitimate expectations of the nationals in terms of 
receiving a similar consular and diplomatic protection response as other nationals have 
received in similar situations. Practice also seems to support a State obligation to take 
diplomatic protection action in cases of grave violation of fundamental rights of the individual 
by foreign countries. It is only a matter of time until a customary norm will be recognised 
along the lines presented by Rapporteur Dugard in his initial proposal for Article 4 ILC 
Articles on Diplomatic protection as enshrining a State duty to exercise diplomatic protection 
in cases of violation of jus cogens norms. Third, it was pointed out in Chapter 2 that new 
actors are increasingly accepted on the international sphere in addition to the State of 
nationality, to exercise consular and diplomatic protection of individuals in third countries. 
Based on the numerous bilateral and multilateral consular and diplomatic cooperation 
agreements,1171 States have agreed to share the responsibility of ensuring protection of their 
nationals abroad, signalling thus that the international community is more readily accepting 
non-nationality States exercising what used to be a function exclusively exercised, some 
decades ago, by the State of nationality. 
The recognition of the individual’s rights within the legal definition of the international 
institution of diplomatic protection, and of the statu nascendi State duty to exercise 
diplomatic protection of nationals conceptually bring the contemporary international 
mechanism of diplomatic protection closer to the Union fundamental right to equal protection 
abroad of the unrepresented EU citizens. Both the EU and the international legal order accept 
the limitation of the State’s discretion to exercise protective measures of the individual. While 
the trends are fuelled by a similar objective safeguarding the life and rights of individuals, the 
                                                 
1170 See more details in Chapter 2, Section V.2.b – National jurisprudence. 
1171 See, for instance, the Accord entre la Bolivie, la Colombie, l’Equateur, le Pérou et le Venezuela relative aux 
attributions des consuls respectifs dans chacune des Républiques contractantes of July 1911. Consular services 
for Libyans were provided by different States in different parts of the world, for instance: Jordan in Spain, by 
Lebanon in France and Ghana, by Iraq in Iran and Pakistan, and by the UK in other countries. The UK may 
provide consular services for citizens of some Commonwealth countries: Ghanaians, Canadians and Sri Lankans 
in the absence of consulates of those States in third countries. Australia began issuing visas for New Zealanders 
in Argentina in 1984, and providing services for Papua New Guineans in 1975. inter alia, the Helsinki 
Convention on Nordic Co-operation (hereinafter the Helsinki Treaty), concluded on 23th of March 1962 between 
the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Iceland and Norway), or the Agreement on Consular 
Assistance and Cooperation signed between the three Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, before they 
acceded to the EU on 5 February 1999. For the entire list of bilateral and regional agreements between the 
European countries on consular cooperation, see Chapter Three, Section 2.1.2 of the CARE Report. See also Lee 
& Quigley, Consular Law and Practice, op.cit. 62ff. 
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content and actors of the ‘duty to protect’ trend are different in the EU legal order from public 
international law. The EU inter-governmental model of protection does not take into 
consideration, for the moment, the duty to exercise consular and diplomatic protection as 
such, but it imposes a duty to exercise equal protection treatment to all unrepresented Union 
citizens, irrespective of their nationality and restricted to six situations. The public 
international law is now experiencing the development of a ‘humanization’ trend of consular 
and diplomatic protection whereby the State of nationality has a duty to exercise consular and 
diplomatic protection in cases of grave violations of human rights abroad. Due to the 
differences in content and actors, we cannot speak of a ‘conflict’, ‘divergence’, or 
‘fundamental inconsistency’ in relation to the legal nature of the protection of individuals 
abroad recognised under the international, general and EU, regional legal orders.1172 
 
2. The relation between the ‘Union citizenship’ and the ‘nationality of 
claims’ requirements for the exercise of consular and diplomatic 
protection of individuals  
 
The international and EU legal mechanisms of protecting natural persons abroad rely on 
different premises: ‘State nationality’ versus ‘European Union citizenship’. The fact that the 
EU citizenship is not the citizenship of a nation State, but a supra-national type of citizenship, 
conferred by an international organisation, has spurred fervent critiques against the EU 
provisions for creating a legal regime based on a premise that is clearly incompatible with the 
‘nationality of claims’ requirement mandatory for the international admissibility of consular 
and diplomatic protection of individuals.1173 
                                                 
1172 For the ‘conflict’, ‘divergence’, or ‘fundamental inconsistency critiques, see, in particular, A. Vermeer-
Künzli, The Protection of Individuals by means of Diplomatic Protection, PhD Thesis, 86-98; A. Vermeer-
Künzli, ‘Where the Law becomes Irrelevant: Consular Assistance and the European Union’, (2011) International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly, 965; See J. Dugard, Seventh Report on diplomatic protection, United Nations 
General Assembly, A/CN.4/567, United Nations, New York, 7 March 2006, p. 10; A. Vermeer-Künzli, 
‘Exercising Diplomatic Protection, the fine line between litigation, demarches and consular assistance’, (2008) 
ZaöRV, 339-340; S. Kadelbach, ‘Union citizenship’, NYU Jean Monnet Working Paper 9/03. 
1173 A. Vermeer-Künzli, ‘Nationality and EU citizenship’ in The Protection of Individuals by means of 
Diplomatic Protection, PhD Thesis; A. Vermeer-Künzli, ‘Where the Law becomes Irrelevant: Consular 
Assistance and the European Union’, (2011) International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 965; See J. Dugard, 
Seventh Report on diplomatic protection, United Nations General Assembly, A/CN.4/567, United Nations, New 
York, 7 March 2006, p. 10; A. Vermeer-Künzli, ‘Exercising Diplomatic Protection, the fine line between 
litigation, demarches and consular assistance’, (2008) ZaöRV, 339-340; T. Stein, Interim Report on ‘Diplomatic 
Protection Under the European Union Treaty’, in ILA Committee on Diplomatic Protection of Persons and 
Property, Second Report, New Delhi, 2002, 36-7; P. Vigni, ‘The Protection of EU Citizens: The Perspective of 
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International legal scholars have levelled three main criticisms against the Union 
citizenship as a foundation of the Union regime governing the protection of Union citizens 
abroad: first, the Union citizenship is not a State citizenship; second, the derivative nature of 
Union citizenship affects both the acquisition and essence of the Union citizenship, and thus 
requires that a solid, ‘genuine’ and ‘effective’ social link exists between the citizens of the 
Member States and all the other non-nationality Member States; and, third, that these social 
links are not currently established within the EU.1174 These aspects are said to place the Union 
regime in conflict with the traditional international legal norms establishing the ‘nationality of 
claims’ requirement as a mandatory prerequisite, especially for the exercise of diplomatic 
protection of individuals. The current public international legal norms are seen as continuing 
to uphold the traditional conception of State citizenship as the legitimate premise of the 
consular and diplomatic protection of individuals, and requiring its ‘genuineness’ and 
‘effectiveness’, especially in relation to the exercise of diplomatic protection, so as to be held 
admissible on the international plane.1175 The nature of the EU citizenship, its relationship with 
the citizenship of the Member States and the connection it creates between the EU citizens 
and the Member States will be examined for the purpose of understanding whether it can be 
viewed as a legitimate bond justifying – from the perspective of international law – the inter-
governmental model of securing protection of EU citizens abroad. 
First, the nature of the Union citizenship will be explored for the purpose of 
establishing its relation with the Member States’ nationalities and the extent to which the 
modality of acquiring Union citizenship affects its essence. The section will assess the extent 
                                                                                                                                                        
International law’ in J. Larik and M. Moraru (eds.), Ever-Closer in Brussels – Ever-Closer in the World? EU 
External Action after the Lisbon Treaty, EUI Working Paper 2011/10, 91-107. 
1174 S. Kadelbach, ‘Union citizenship’, Jean Monnet Working Paper 9/03; L. Azoulai, The (Mis)Construction of 
the European Individual Two Essays on Union Citizenship Law, EUI Working Paper LAW 2014/14; A. 
Vermeer-Künzli, ‘Where the Law becomes Irrelevant: Consular Assistance and the European Union’, (2011) 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 965-995; See J. Dugard, Seventh Report on diplomatic protection, 
United Nations General Assembly, A/CN.4/567, United Nations, New York, 7 March 2006, 10; A. Vermeer-
Künzli, ‘Exercising Diplomatic Protection, the fine line between litigation, demarches and consular assistance’, 
(2008) ZaöRV, 339-340; T. Stein, ‘Interim Report on Diplomatic Protection Under the European Union Treaty’, 
in ILA Committee on Diplomatic Protection of Persons and Property, Second Report, New Delhi, 2002,36-7; P. 
Vigni, ‘The Protection of EU Citizens: The Perspective of International law’ in: J. Larik and M. Moraru (eds.), 
Ever-Closer in Brussels – Ever-Closer in the World? EU External Action after the Lisbon Treaty, EUI Working 
Paper 2011/10, 91-107. 
1175 S. Kadelbach, ‘Union citizenship’, Jean Monnet Working Paper 9/03; L. Azoulai, The (Mis)Construction of 
the European Individual Two Essays on Union Citizenship Law, EUI Working Paper LAW 2014/14; A. 
Vermeer-Künzli, ‘Where the Law becomes Irrelevant: Consular Assistance and the European Union’, (2011) 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 965-995; See J. Dugard, Seventh Report on diplomatic protection, 
United Nations General Assembly, A/CN.4/567, United Nations, New York, 7 March 2006, 10; A. Vermeer-
Künzli, ‘Exercising Diplomatic Protection, the fine line between litigation, demarches and consular assistance’, 
(2008) ZaöRV, 339-340; T. Stein, ‘Interim Report on Diplomatic Protection Under the European Union Treaty’, 
in ILA Committee on Diplomatic Protection of Persons and Property, Second Report, New Delhi, 2002,36-7. 
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of the Union citizenship’s autonomy from the Member State nationality, which will dictate 
whether the content of Union citizenship brings its closer to the Member States’ citizenship or 
to a kind of supra-national cosmopolitan citizenship that is completely detached from any 
similarity with the State citizenship. The clarification of the content and links created by the 
EU citizenship will determine the extent of the so-called ‘derogation’1176 of the EU inter-
governmental model of protection of EU citizens from the ‘nationality of claims’ international 
requirement for the exercise of consular and diplomatic protection of individuals. The section 
will conclude by pointing out that the EU citizenship has not reached that level of being 
completely detached from the nationality of the Member State(s), and the fact that the content 
of the EU inter-governmental model of protection is actually an equal treatment right, make 
the derivate nature of the EU citizenship a supporting element of this model. Under the EU 
inter-governmental model of protection, one Member State assumes, through EU primary law, 
an obligation to assist a national of another Member State. Therefore the right to equal 
protection abroad is earned by an EU citizen through their possession of another Member 
State nationality. The EU citizenship works only as an umbrella framework multiplying the 
bonds existing between all EU citizens and all the Member States.  
The issue that has for a long period of time troubled the public international legal 
literature is whether the nationality of claims has to pass the test of the Nottebohm ‘genuine’ 
and ‘effective’ link between the individual and the State exercising protection. The EU 
citizenship was argued to not have created a ‘genuine’ and ‘effective’ link between all EU 
citizens and all the Member States.1177 In Chapter 2, it was pointed out that the Nottebohm 
principle of ‘genuine’ and ‘effective’ nationality link was discarded by current principles of 
customary international law in the case of single nationality and replaced with other principles 
in the case of dual nationality. It is thus important to establish first whether the EU citizen still 
needs to fulfil the international requirement of a ‘genuine’ and ‘effective’ social link, and if 
not, whether, in light of the legal content of the EU citizenship right to equal protection 
abroad, EU citizenship needs to reflect certain social links that are capable of creating a bond 
between all the EU citizens and all the Member States, thus justifying the protection of an EU 
citizen by a non-nationality Member State.  
The section will conclude by showing that the increased autonomy and effectiveness of 
EU citizenship rights and recognition of EU citizens’ civic participation has recently 
                                                 
1176 Ibid.. 
1177 See A. Vermeer-Künzli, ‘Nationality and EU citizenship’ in The Protection of Individuals by means of 
Diplomatic Protection, PhD Thesis, op.cit. 
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contributed to a more pronounced sense of social solidarity among the EU citizens, and a 
connection between all EU citizens and the EU countries. Notwithstanding the 
conceptualisation of EU citizenship as both a functional equivalent plurality of Member States 
nationalities and supra-national citizenship, and the elimination of the Nottebohm requirement 
of genuine nationality, the reality is that the exercise of diplomatic protection is still premised 
on State nationality, which the EU citizenship is not, and it is arguable whether the EU 
integration process has reached such a level whereby the EU citizenship confers a social bond 
between all EU citizens and all EU countries justified under public international law. The last 
part of this section assesses the conduct of third countries towards the EU’s exercise of the 
inter-governmental model of protection of EU citizens. It will demonstrate that the 
international legal academic objection to the EU model failing to obtain the consent of third 
countries to the EU’s ‘derogation’ from the traditional State of nationality international model 
of exercising of consular and diplomatic protection of individuals is no longer an issue. 
a. The relation between Union citizenship and Member State(s) citizenship(s) 
– derivative or autonomous Union citizenship? 
Professor Dugard contended in his Final Report on Diplomatic Protection submitted to the 
ILC that the derivative nature of the EU citizenship and the fact that the Union does not have 
any power over the Member States’ nationalities confirms that the Union citizenship does not 
fulfil the ‘nationality of claims’ international requirement for the exercise of consular and 
diplomatic protection, and consequently the Union legal regime is incompatible with the 
current international legal framework.1178 
What exactly Union citizenship is, as a legal status of the individual, is a complex 
question, which, thus far, has given rise to numerous scholarly writings without arriving at a 
final single answer generally accepted by the legal and political literature.1179 Some scholars 
have concentrated on the empty content of the Union citizenship, labelling it as a ‘pie in the 
sky’ or a ‘cynical exercise in public relations on the part of the High Contracting Parties’.1180 
In order to understand the extent of the derivative nature of the Union citizenship, the Treaty 
provisions will first be assessed, followed by their interpretation by the CJEU. In particular, it 
                                                 
1178 See J. Dugard, Seventh Report, op.cit., para. 19, p.9. 
1179 See D. Kochenov, R. Plender, ‘EU Citizenship: From an Incipient Form to an Incipient Substance? The 
Discovery of the Treaty Text’, (2012) ELRev., 369. 
1180 J. Shaw, op.cit.; J. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe, Cambridge University Press, 1999, 344; J. Weiler, 




will be explored whether the derivative nature is limited to the criteria of acquisition of the 
Union citizenship, or does it go further and affect also the substance of the Union citizenship? 
Does Union citizenship create links between all its citizens and all of its Member States? 
Since the establishment of the Union citizenship in 1993, the criteria of acquiring this 
‘supranational’ citizenship has been the citizenship of any of the EU’s States. Therefore, 
unlike State nationality, which is commonly acquired based on domestic criteria such as jus 
soli, jus sanguinis, or succession factors1181, ius tractum1182 has since been the criteria 
recognised by the Union legal order for the acquisition of Union citizenship. The relevant 
Treaty provisions1183 do not make the rights forming an integral part of the Union citizenship 
substantive scope dependent on the Member State’s citizenship. State citizenship functions 
only as a factor triggering the Union citizenship, after this moment, it no longer has the power 
to prohibit, limit, or alter the Union citizenship rights. On the contrary, Article 18 TFEU 
expressly prohibits discrimination based on nationality, and thereby the Member States are 
prohibited from altering the substance of Union citizenship by way of State nationality related 
rules.  
Article 20 TFEU provides a list of rights that are automatically conferred to all Union 
citizens, and are argued to have no equivalent correspondent in the national laws.1184 For 
instance, EU citizens enjoy the right of residence1185 and free movement around the Union, 
which gives access to numerous other EU rights, such as: access to work, establishment of a 
business, and residence all over the territory of the EU, while having the right to be 
accompanied by family members – irrespective of their nationalities. In addition to residential 
and economic rights, the EU citizenship confers also political rights, such as the right to vote 
for the European Parliament and local elections all over the Union, no matter where they 
reside, as well as the right to submit candidature for the European Parliament elections. EU 
citizens also have ‘the right to petition the European Parliament, to apply to the European 
Ombudsman, and to address the institutions and advisory bodies of the Union in any of the 
Treaty languages and to obtain a reply in the same language’.1186 They also benefit from the 
‘protection by the diplomatic and consular authorities of any Member State on the same 
                                                 
1181 See also J. Dugard, Commentary to Art. 4 on State nationality of a natural person. 
1182 See D. Kochenov, ‘Ius Tractum of Many Faces’, (2009) Columbia J.E.L., 169. 
1183 In particular Arts. 19-24 TFEU. 
1184 D. Kochenov and A. Dimitrovs, ‘EU Citizenship for Latvian “Non-Citizens”: A Concrete Proposal’, NYU 
Jean Monnet Working Paper 14/13. 
1185 Art. 21(1) TFEU; Council Directive 2004/38, on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members 
to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member State 2004 O.J. (L 158) 77. 
1186 See more in Art. 20(2)(d) and Kochenov, ‘Ius Tractum of Many Faces’, op.cit. 
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conditions as the nationals of that state’1187 in the States around the world where their own 
Member State of nationality is not represented.  
In order to enjoy some of these rights, the Court has developed certain conditions, 
which are not related to the Member State nationality, but to movement within the Union or 
another cross-border element1188, and a certain degree of integration into the Member State of 
residence.1189 This extensive list of rights is part of the Union citizenship legal concept. 
Whether one chooses to look at the Union citizenship as a plurality of citizenships1190, multi-
layered citizenship,1191 federal citizenship,1192 a ‘transnational status’,1193 a ‘new form of 
membership that transcends the boundaries of the nation-state’,1194 a political concept 
independent of the concept of nationality1195, this extensive list of rights still forms an integral 
part of the Union citizenship automatically conferred upon all Union citizens. As rightly 
pointed out by Kochenov,1196 the precise factor established as criteria for acquisition of Union 
citizenship as an individual’s legal status should not be construed as impairing the very 
substance of this legal status.  
Regardless of the legal definition of Union citizenship that we choose to adopt,1197 
there is one aspect that is common to all of them, namely: the EU citizenship was never 
                                                 
1187 See Arts. 20(2)(c) and 23 TFEU. 
1188 1188 See Arts. 20(2)(c) and 23 TFEU. 
1188 The CJEU has so far been rather generous in finding a cross-border element either in the activity itself that is 
carried out across borders or from the residence in different countries, see C-158/96 Kohl v Union des Caises de 
Malade [1998] ECR I-1931; K. Lenaerts, ‘“Civis europaeus sum”: from the cross-border link to the status of 
citizen of the Union’, Online Journal on free movement of workers within the European Union, 2011/3. 
1189 The integration is given by a certain period of residence and financial resources resulting from employment 
or self-employment that will guarantee the EU citizen will not become a burden on the social services of the 
Member State of residence. Following fulfilment of the conditions, access to welfare services is recognised. See 
N. Reich, Understanding EU law, Intersentia Antwerpen Oxford (2005), 109-112. 
1190 Gareth T. Davies, ‘The entirely conventional supremacy of Union citizenship and rights’ in J. Shaw (ed), 
Has the European Court of Justice Challenged Member State Sovereignty in Nationality Law? EUI RSCAS 
2011/62 and AG Cruz Villalon Opinion in Case C-247/08 Notary Profession [2009] ECR I-9225. 
1191 R. Baubock, ‘The Three Levels of Citizenship within the European Union’ Special Issue EU Citizenship: 
Twenty Years On of the (2014) German Law Journal, 751. 
1192 D. Kochenov,’Ius Tractum…’, op.cit., R. Scutze, op.cit. 
1193 Y. Soysal, ‘Towards a Postnational Model of Membership’ in G. Shafir, The Citizenship Debates, 
Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press (1998), 189, 189 and 198. 
1194 Ibid. 
1195 See AG Maduro Opinion in Rottmann, op.cit., para. 35; Matthew J. Elsmore and P. Starup, ‘Union 
Citizenship – Background, Jurisprudence, and Perspective: The Past, Present, and Future of Law and Policy’, 
(2007) Ybk. Eur. L., 57; Francis G. Jacobs, ‘Citizenship of the European Union – A Legal Analysis’, (2007) Eur. 
L.J., 591. 
1196 D. Kochenov, ‘Ius Tractum of Many Faces: European Citizenship and a Difficult Relationship between 
Status and Rights’, (2009) Colum. J. Eur. L., 169, 188. 
1197 The citizenship of the European Union is a legal concept that has been under constant legal debate and an 
ever-changing area of EU law, see M. Dougan, Niamh Nic Shuibhne and E. Spaventa (eds), Empowerment and 
Disempowerment of the European Citizen, Hart Publishing (2012); D. Kochenov and R. Plender, ‘EU 
Citizenship: From an Incipient Form to an Incipient Substance? The Discovery of the Treaty Text’, (2012) Eur. 
L. Rev., 369. 
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intended to replicate the traditional concept of State citizenship.1198 Just as the European 
Union is a legal entity different to any of the classical legal concepts of ‘State’ and 
‘international organisation’, also its legal products, such as the European Union citizenship, 
are different from the similar legal products of these classical legal concepts, such as the 
traditional conception of State citizenship. Therefore, even if the Union citizenship uses the 
concept of ‘citizenship’, its modes of acquisition are different from the criteria of acquisition 
of State nationality. Namely, birth, residence, succession do not apply to the Union 
citizenship, which requires specific criteria of acquisition – the citizenship of any of the EU’s 
Member States (Article 20 TFEU).1199  
The extent of the derivative nature of the Union citizenship is expressly limited by the 
Treaty provisions by way of describing the Union citizenship as ‘additional to’, instead of 
‘dependent on’ the Member State’s citizenship.1200 Article 20 TFEU has replaced the previous 
‘complementary’ status of EU citizenship in its relationship with the Member State’s 
nationality with ‘additional’, which determined several established academics to support an 
idea of an increased autonomy of EU citizenship from the national one.1201 Secondly, the 
derivative nature of the EU citizenship is further limited by the CJEU which describes the 
Union citizenship as ‘the fundamental status of nationals of the member states’, 1202 destined to 
become the primary identity of the Union citizen.1203 Furthermore, the enjoyment of EU 
                                                 
1198 E. Olsen, ‘The Origins of European Citizenship in the First Two Decades of European Integration’, (2008) J. 
Eur. Public Policy, 40; D. Kochenov, ‘The Present and the Future of EU Citizenship: A Bird’s Eye View on the 
Legal Debate’, NYU Jean Monnet Working Paper 02/12. 
1199 See more on the intricacies of the Union citizenship acquisition and its autonomous status from the Member 
States nationalities in D. Kochenov, ‘Ius Tractum of Many Faces: European Citizenship and a Difficult 
Relationship between Status and Rights’, op.cit..  
1200 See, inter alia, G. Martinico and R. Castaldi, Rethinking (EU) citizenship, Special issue of Perspectives on 
Federalism, Vol. 3, issue 2, 2011; A. Schrauwen, ‘European Citizenship in the Treaty of Lisbon: Any Change at 
all’ (2008) Maastricht Journal or European and Comparative Law, 55, 59-60; J. Shaw (ed), Has the European 
Court of Justice Challenged Member State Sovereignty in Nationality Law?, EUI RSCAS Working Paper 
2011/62. 
1201 After the Lisbon amendment, there is a noteworthy turn of phrase in the key provisions on Union citizenship. 
Art. 9 TEU (placed in the very first Title of the TEU on Common fundamental provisions on the EU) and Art. 20 
TFEU (the specific Treaty Article on citizenship) stipulates that the citizenship of the Union shall be ‘additional 
to’ instead of ‘complementary to’ the national citizenship. According to Shaw and de Waele, the difference in 
terminology is not a mere cosmetic change, but signals that the Union citizenship should now be seen as a self-
standing, independent status from national citizenship, see more in J. Shaw, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon and 
Citizenship’, The Federal Trust European Policy Brief, June 2008; and H de Waele, ‘European Union 
Citizenship: Revisiting its Meaning, Place and Potential’ (2010) European Journal of Migration and Law, 319. 
1202 See Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk [2001] ECR I-6193, para. 31; Case C-209/03 Bidar [2005] ECR I-2119; Case 
C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] ECR I-0000, para. 43; Case C-34/09 Zambrano, Judgment of 8 March 2011, para. 
41. 
1203 This pronouncement of Union citizenship which ‘is destined to be the fundamental status’ of the nationals of 
the EU countries has been repeated in a long line of case-law. See, for instance, Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk [2001] 
ECR I-6193, para. 31; Case C-224/98 D'Hoop v. Office national de l'emploi [2002] ECR I-6191, para. 28; Case 
C-103/08 Gottwald, Judgment of 1 October 2009, nyr, para. 23; Case C-544/07 Rüffler, Judgment of 23 April 
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citizenship rights is established in EU primary and secondary legislative measures 
autonomously interpreted by the CJEU, while the Member States’ prerogatives regarding 
acquisition1204 and loss of nationality have been recently limited by the CJEU.1205  
The CJEU has recently advanced the autonomous character of the EU citizenship by 
replacing the condition of moving into another national community in order to establish the 
scope of EU law and thus assess the conformity of national legislation with EU citizenship 
related norms.1206 The Court has framed the Union citizenship as a rights based paradigm, 
where the substance of the Union citizenship rights is so important for the individual that in 
certain conditions it needs to be completely detached from cross-border and economically 
active requirements. The Rottmann1207 and Zambrano1208 judgments, and to a certain extent 
also Dereci1209 and McCarthy,1210 are fundamental stepping-stones for the creation of a truly 
autonomous status of the Union citizenship.1211 Since then, the conceptual paradigm reflecting 
the gist of the Union citizenship is ‘the genuine enjoyment of Union citizenship rights’.1212 
This precise paradigm as construed in the Zambrano judgment excludes any hierarchical 
relationship between the Union citizenship and Member States’ citizenship, instead, these 
should be seen as two different legal statuses closely inter-linked but at the same time also 
substantially independent. One might even go as far as to argue that the Rottmann judgment 
actually makes Member States citizenship dependent on the Union citizenship since via the 
                                                                                                                                                        
2009, nyr, para. 62; Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] ECR I-0000, para. 43; Case C-34/09 Zambrano, Judgment 
of 8 March 2011, para. 41. In the last two cases there has been a change of terminology, the Court of Justice has 
no longer described the Union citizenship in terms of a future achievement (‘is destined to be’), but already as a 
present result (‘is intended to’) which the citizens of the Member States can thus currently benefit of. 
1204 See C. Jacqueson, ‘Union Citizenship and the Court of Justice: Something New Under the Sun? Towards 
Social Citizenship’, (2002) EUR. L. REV. 260, 262. 
1205 Case C-135/08 Janko Rottmann v. Freistaat Bayern [2010] ECR I-0000. 
1206 See, inter alia, Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] ECR I-0000. 
1207 Case C-135/08 Janko Rottmann v. Freistaat Bayern [2010] ECR I-0000. 
1208 Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] ECR I-0000. 
1209 Case C-256/11 Murat Dereçi, Vishaka Heiml, Alban Kokollari, Izunna Emmanuel Maduike & Dragica 
Stević v. Bundesminister für Inneres [2011] ECR I-0000. 
1210 Case C-434/09 McCarthy [2011] ECR I-0000. 
1211 The recent judgment of the CJEU in the Dano case (C-333/13 Elisabeta Dano and Florin Dano v Jobcenter 
Leipzig, Judgment of 11 November 2014) is a step backward from this case law affirming the autonomous nature 
of EU citizenship, since there the Court of Justice held that the (non-economically active) EU citizen’s rights had 
to be derived from the secondary legislation on free movement, and not simply from Art. 18 TFEU. The 
judgment permitted Member States to limit enjoyment of social benefits for economically inactive EU citizens so 
that they do not become an unreasonable burden on their social assistance system. However this judgment has to 
be understood in the specific circumstances of the case, where Ms Dano did not enter Germany in order to look 
for work, nor was she actively seeking work in that country. It is unclear if the judgment would have remained 
the same if Ms Dano had at least tried to find work. 
1212 Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano, para, 42: ‘the effect of depriving citizens of the Union of the genuine 
enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of their status as citizens of the Union’; Lenaerts 
characterised the Zambrano judgment as ‘emancipating EU citizenship from the constraints inherent in its free 
movement origins’, see K. Lenaerts, “‘Civis europaeus sum’: From the Cross-border Link to the Status of 
Citizen of the Union’, (2011) F.M.W. 6, 7. 
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latter’s legal status an individual can retain their Member State nationality. Furthermore, the 
Union increased its say in the acquisition of Union citizenship by increasing its power over 
nationality matters reserved to the Member States. In spite of the CJEU recognising the 
Member States’ exclusive competence over the acquisition and loss of nationality matters, it 
also required the Member States to have due regard to EU law, even when exercising these 
exclusive powers.1213 The derivative nature of the EU citizenship was furthermore diminished 
when the CJEU permitted the Union citizens to use this legal concept against one’s own 
Member State of nationality with the purpose of eliminating obstacles to free movement of 
persons1214, even non-discriminatory ones.1215  
In spite of the revolutionary steps1216 made by the CJEU in constructing the 
autonomous character of the EU citizenship, each one of these steps seems to have been 
followed by prudent restrictions preventing the extension of the unconditional standing of the 
Union citizenship beyond extreme circumstances.1217 Access to social benefits still requires 
proof of a real link with the Member State of residence, while economically active citizens are 
more readily given access to their Union citizenship rights.1218  
The relationship between the EU citizenship and the nationality of the Member States 
cannot currently be portrayed as a one-way dependent relationship of the supranational 
citizenship on the Member States’ citizenships. The EU legal order, through its different legal 
products such as the principle of non-discrimination, European Union citizenship, protection 
of fundamental rights, and fundamental freedoms, has gradually limited the Member States’ 
discretionary powers over nationality-related matters by way of limiting their discretionary 
                                                 
1213 See Rottmann, para. 41. 
1214 Case C-192/05 K. Tas-Hagen en R.A. Tas v. Raadskamer WUBO van de Pensioen- en Uitkeringsraad [2006] 
ECR I-10451; Case C-224/98 Marie-Nathalie D’Hoop v. Office national d’emploi [2002] ECR I-1691; Case C-
353/06 Stefan Grunkin and Dorothee Regina Paul [2008] ECR I-7639. 
1215 Case C-353/06 Stefan Grunkin and Dorothee Regina Paul [2008] ECR I-7639. The CJEU’s judgments, such 
as Martinez Sala (Case C-85/96 Martínez Sala v. Bayern [1998] ECR I-2691), Garcia Avello (Case C-148/02 
Carlos Garcia Avello v. Belgium [2003] ECR I-11613) and Grunkin (Case C-353/06 Paul and Grunkin [2008] 
ECR I-7639), holding national laws of both the States of residence and nationality as discriminatory, have 
further contributed to creating equality between the different links the individual has with the Member States, of 
both nationality and (actual or future) residence. 
1216 Case C-184/99 Rudy Grzelczyk v Centre public d’aide sociale d’Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve [2001] ECR I-
06193; Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] ECR I-144; Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] ECR I-1177. 
1217 The CJEU judgments of Dano, Dereci and McCarthy seem to prove that in spite of the Micheletti, Rottmann 
and Zambrano cases, the cross-border and ‘economically-oriented’ approach of the Court has never disappeared 
from the EU legal landscape. See also the commentary of the Dano case by D. Thym, ‘EU Free Movement as a 
Legal Construction not as a Social Imagination’, available at http://eutopialaw.com/2014/11/13/eu-free-
movement-as-a-legal-construction-not-as-social-imagination/  
1218 See Joined Cases C-523/11 and C-585/11 Laurence Prinz v Region Hannover and Philipp Seeberger v 
Studentenwerk Heidelberg, Judgment of 18 July 2013, and C-333/13 Elisabeta Dano and Florin Dano v 
Jobcenter Leipzig, Judgment of 11 November 2014. 
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decision-making on: withdrawal of citizenship;1219 conferring privileged rights to their 
citizens, while excluding non-national EU citizens;1220 restricting1221 and banishing non-
national EU citizens from their territory;1222 and even the Member States’ powers to impose 
duties on their citizens, since they have to provide compelling reasons and pass a strict 
proportionality test justifying these duties that hinder the EU citizenship rights.1223 To sum up, 
the derivative nature of the Union citizenship seems to be limited to a single moment in the 
existence of the EU legal concept, namely its acquisition by the citizens of the Member 
States. Furthermore, the EU has over time enlarged its influence over the Member States’ 
power to regulate citizenship matters. The relationship between the Member State’s and 
Union citizenship is one of ‘additionality’ whereby the former helps to acquire the latter, 
while the latter exists in parallel to the former and adds a list of economic, political and social 
rights to the list of domestic citizenship rights.1224 
In addition to emphasising the autonomous status of the EU citizenship from the 
Member States’ citizenship, legal commentators and Advocates General have also portrayed 
EU citizenship as ‘plurality of national citizenships’, which creates equal bonds between the 
individual and the societies of all the Member States.1225 Consequently, the concept of Union 
citizenship is a fortunate mix of trans-national and supra-national links and features which 
permit an interpretation of EU citizenship close to the public international ‘nationality of 
claims’ requirement, while also preserving its autonomous feature from the State nationality. 
In addition to this transnational conception of the EU citizenship, there is also a supra-
national conception whereby a direct sense of belonging of the EU citizen towards the 
European Union has been promoted. Many scholars have strongly criticised the EU 
                                                 
1219 See the Rottmann case. 
1220 See for the non-discrimination based on nationality case law, and for more details, D. Kochenov, ‘Rounding 
Up to the Circle: The Mutation of the member States’ Nationalities under Pressure from EU Citizenship’, in EUI 
RSCAS 2010/23, available at 
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/13634/RSCAS_2010_23.corr.pdf?sequence=3  
1221 According to the Jipa case (Case C‑33/07 Jipa [2008] ECR I‑5157) the Member States have to follow strict 
conditions when imposing restrictions on access to their territory to non-national EU citizens: the conduct of the 
non-national EU citizen needs to constitute ‘a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat to one of the 
fundamental interests of society’ and the restrictive measure envisaged is proportionate. 
1222 Case C-348/96 Criminal proceedings against Donatella Calfa [1999] ECR I-11. 
1223 D. Kochenov, ‘Rounding Up to the Circle: The Mutation of the member States’ Nationalities under Pressure 
from EU Citizenship’, op.cit. 
1224 There is also a scholarly opinion that EU citizenship could in the future supersede State citizenship; for 
commentary and critiques see, R. Bellamy, ‘Evaluating Union citizenship: belonging, rights and participation 
within the EU’, (2008) Citizenship Studies, 597. 
1225 G. Davies, ‘The entirely conventional supremacy of Union citizenship and rights’ in J. Shaw (ed.), Has the 
European Court of Justice Challenged Member State Sovereignty in Nationality Law? EUI RSCAS Working 
Paper 2011/62; Opinion of AG Villalon in the Notaries case, (Case C-47/08 Commission v Belgium [2011] ECR 
I-4105); Opinion of Poiares Maduro, AG in Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] ECR I-0000; Opinion of AG 
Jacobs in Case C-168/91 Kostantinidis [1993] ECR I-1191. 
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citizenship for failing to reflect this sense of ‘Europeanness’,1226 or for creating a truly direct 
link between the citizens and the Union as a community of values, which exists and 
transcends the Member States territory.1227 Although Article 20(2)(c) TFEU establishes the 
non-nationality Member States as bearing primary responsibility to protect EU citizens, the 
EU institutions themselves have been also conferred direct roles. The exercise of consular 
protection of EU citizens by the Commission within the civil protection mechanisms outside 
the EU territory, or by the EU delegations on the basis of Article 35(3) TEU and Articles. 5(9) 
and (10) EEAS Decision, or by the Commission together with the EU delegations within the 
humanitarian aid mechanisms, were argued to require, from the perspective of public 
international law, that the Union citizenship reflects a direct solidarity link between the citizen 
and the Union.1228  
It is precisely this direct link between the Union and the citizen, rather than between 
the Member States and the Union citizens, which is more problematic to prove.1229 The 
conditionality of the enjoyment of European citizenship rights on the existence of a ‘cross-
                                                 
1226 R. Bellamy, ‘Evaluating Union citizenship: belonging, rights and participation within the EU’, op.cit. 
1227 L. Azoulai, ‘The (Mis)Construction of the European Individual Two Essays on Union Citizenship Law’, EUI 
Working Paper LAW 2014/14. The question of whether there is or is not a direct genuine link between the EU 
and the citizens of all the Member States or between the national and any of the other Member States falls under 
the prolific industry of the interdisciplinary topics of Europeanisation, and European identity. These topics have 
concerned political scientists, sociologists, geographers (e.g. M. Keith and S. Pile, Place and the Politics of 
Identity, Routledge (1993)), anthropologists (e.g. M. MacDonald, Towards an Anthropology of the European 
Union, European Commission (1993)) and historians (e.g. H. Mikkeli, Europe as an idea and an identity, 
Houndmills (1998)) and least but not last also legal scholars, see more in A. Favell, E. Recchi, T. Kuhn, Janne S. 
Jensen and J. Klein, ‘The Europeanisation of Everyday Life: Cross-Border Practices and Transnational 
Identifications Among EU and Third-Country Citizens’,   State of the Art, EUCROSS Working Paper no.1/2011, 
available online at 
http://www.eucross.eu/cms/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=7&Itemid=157  
1228 A. Vermeer-Künzli, ‘Nationality and EU citizenship’ in The Protection of Individuals by means of 
Diplomatic Protection, PhD Thesis; A. Vermeer-Künzli, ‘Where the Law becomes Irrelevant: Consular 
Assistance and the European Union’, (2011) International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 965; See J. Dugard, 
Seventh Report on diplomatic protection, United Nations General Assembly, A/CN.4/567, United Nations, New 
York, 7 March 2006, p. 10; A. Vermeer-Künzli, ‘Exercising Diplomatic Protection, the fine line between 
litigation, demarches and consular assistance’, (2008) ZaöRV, 339-340; T. Stein, Interim Report on ‘Diplomatic 
Protection Under the European Union Treaty’, in ILA Committee on Diplomatic Protection of Persons and 
Property, Second Report, New Delhi, 2002, 36-7; P. Vigni, ‘The Protection of EU Citizens: The Perspective of 
International law’ in: J. Larik and M. Moraru (eds.), Ever-Closer in Brussels – Ever-Closer in the World? EU 
External Action after the Lisbon Treaty, EUI Working Paper 2011/10, 91-107; S. Kadelbach, ‘Union 
citizenship’, NYU Jean Monnet Working Paper 9/03. 
1229 Following the conclusions of Section III – The EU supranational model of protecting EU citizens abroad 
and the reality of public international law governing the protection of individuals, the general public 
international legal norms on consular and diplomatic protection of individuals cannot be extrapolated to the 
exercise of protective measures by the Union to its citizens abroad, since the international norms are purely inter-
States norms, while the Union is an international organisation. However a certain link between the Union and the 
citizen needs to be proven, otherwise it could be argued that the Member States are using the veil of the Union to 
violated traditional and foundational principles of international law such as equally state sovereignty and non-
interference in the domestic affairs of other States, and committing also an abuse of their State rights. The direct 
link between the Union and the citizen does not though need to fulfil the precise Nottebohm standards applied to 
the relation between an individual and a State. 
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border’ element and ‘economic activeness’ of the citizen, and the diversity of national 
identities existing within the Union which have to be protected have been argued to hinder the 
creation of a truly direct social link between the Union citizen and the Union.1230 In order to 
create this direct link, it was argued that the autonomous character of the Union citizenship 
needs to grow independently of the proof of the cross-border and/or economically active 
elements1231 that condition the application of many of the EU citizenship rights.1232 In other 
words Union citizenship needs to develop into something more than transnational 
integration1233 in order to be considered as something more than a plurality of Member States 
nationalities.1234 For the moment, the Micheletti,1235 Chen1236 and Garcia Avello1237 judgments 
of the CJEU are viewed as promoting a conception of EU citizenship as a perfect functional 
equivalence of the Member States’ nationalities.1238 Furthermore the principle of non-
discrimination based on nationality has significantly contributed to limit the derivative nature 
of the EU citizenship by limiting the Member States’ powers in nationality matters, and 
strengthening the social ties between an EU citizen and other non-nationality States. For 
instance, the permanent banishment of an EU citizen from a particular Member State is 
prohibited.1239 Furthermore, once residence in a new Member State is established, non-
discrimination on the basis of nationality applies to EU citizens, sometimes, even in cases 
where they objectively fail to meet the minimal requirements set by EU secondary law 
necessary to establish residence at the moment of the dispute.1240  
                                                 
1230 See, inter alia, F. Strumia, Supranational Citizenship and the Challenge of Diversity, Immigrant, Citizens 
and Member States in the EU, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (2013).  
1231 On the criteria of being ‘economically active’ or ‘self-sufficient’ see Directive 2004/38/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to 
move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States. As to the cross-border requirement, see Case 
C-34/09 Zambrano [2011] ECR I-01177, para. 69. 
1232 See L. Azoulai, op.cit. 
1233 L. Azoulai, ‘La citoyenneté européenne, un statut d’intégration sociale’ in Gérard Cohen-Jonathan (ed.), 
Chemins d'Europe. Mélanges en l'honneur de Jean-Paul Jacqué, Paris, Dalloz (2010). 
1234 G. Davies, ‘The entirely conventional supremacy of Union citizenship and rights’ in J. Shaw (ed.), Has the 
European Court of Justice Challenged Member State Sovereignty in Nationality Law? EUI RSCAS Working 
Paper 2011/62. 
1235 It has to be noted that the Micheletti judgment was delivered in 1992, parallel to the adoption of the 
Maastricht Treaty. 
1236 Case C-200/02 Chen v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2004] ECR I-9925. 
1237 Case C-148/02 Garcia Avello v. Belgium [2003] ECR I-11613. 
1238 See P. Magnette, ‘How Can One be European? Reflections on the Pillars of European Civic Identity’, (2007) 
ELJ, 664, 671; Ulrich K. Preuss, ‘Problems of a Concept of European Citizenship’, (2007) ELJ, 280; Opinion of 
AG Maduro in the Rottmann case; and G. Davies, ‘The entirely conventional supremacy of Union citizenship 
and rights’, op.cit. 
1239 Case C-348/96 Criminal proceedings against Donatella Calfa [1999] ECR I-11 
1240 Case C-456/02 Trojani v. CPAS [2004] ECR I-7573. See also D. Kochenov, ‘Rounding Up to the Circle: The 
Mutation of the member States’ Nationalities under Pressure from EU Citizenship’, RSCAS 2010/23, 15, 
available at http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/13634/RSCAS_2010_23.corr.pdf?sequence=3  
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However, these scholarly criticisms against the Union citizenship for failing to deliver 
the objective of creating a true citizenship of the Union, and remaining at the level of a bundle 
of citizenships of the EU Member States,1241 can be turned into an argument in favour of the 
international legitimacy of the EU inter-governmental model of protecting EU citizens 
abroad.1242 For the moment the EU regime of protecting EU citizens abroad consists mostly of 
a non-discriminatory conferral of consular and diplomatic protection by Member State(s) 
represented in situ. The common current legal understanding of EU citizenship as a set of 
links between the individual and the EU Member States1243 brings the Union citizenship closer 
to the international requirement of a State nationality premise for the consular and diplomatic 
protection.  
It is thus evident that, from the perspective of public international law, the derivative 
origin of the EU citizenship is not actually problematic, but rather it can serve as a 
justification for the exercise of equal protective treatment of EU citizens abroad, since it is 
based on the Member State nationality and on the extension of ‘nationality’ like bonds to all 
EU Member States. The substantive scope of EU citizenship is independent of State 
nationality, while Member States have lost their powers to condition the enjoyment of EU 
citizenship rights based on domestic norms, and have seen their prerogatives over the 
acquisition and loss of nationality matters restricted for the purpose of ensuring the ‘genuine 
enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of Union citizenship.’ As rightly 
pointed out by Advocate General Maduro, ‘[Member State citizenship and Union citizenship] 
are two concepts which are both inextricably linked and independent. Union citizenship 
assumes nationality of a Member State but it is also a legal and political concept independent 
of that of nationality.’1244 The EU citizenship is premised on a certain State nationality 
rationale that, through the EU citizenship, is multiplied to a system of functionally equivalent 
links between all EU citizens and all the EU Member States. Therefore, not only does the 
derivative nature of EU citizenship not discard it as a separate legal status of the individual, 
                                                 
1241 See G. Davies, J Heymann, ‘De la citoyennete de l’Union comme revelateur de la nature de l’Union 
europeenne’ (2010) Europe, No. Juin 2010, 8. 
1242 The EU inter-governmental model of protecting EU citizens abroad is the model based on the 
implementation of Art. 20(2)(c) TFEU right to equal protection abroad of unrepresented Union citizens, which 
falls under the primary responsibility of the non-nationality Member States. 
1243 Even the AG Maduro in the Rottmann case, who has been one of the great supporters of the autonomous 
character of the Union citizenship, described Union citizenship first and foremost as the ties between the citizens 
and the EU: ‘That is the miracle of Union citizenship: it strengthens the ties between us and our States (in so far 
as we are European citizens precisely because we are nationals of our States) and, at the same time, it 
emancipates us from them (in so far as we are now citizens beyond our States).’ (para. 23); G. Davies, and M. 
Benlolo Carabot, Les fondements juridiques de la citoyennete europeenne, Bruxelles, Bruylant (2007), 350. 
1244 Opinion of AG Maduro in the Rottmann case, para. 23. 
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but it can also actually help to bring EU citizenship closer to the conception of the 
international premise of consular and diplomatic protection of natural persons. The fact that 
EU citizenship is established on the basis of the nationality of an EU country and that it 
reflects functional equivalent links between the EU citizens and all the Member States is 
conceptualising the premise of the EU legal regime in terms similar to the State nationality 
premise of the international consular and diplomatic protection mechanisms. 
 The EU citizenship provisions have given the EU citizens the right to choose their 
civic, professional and social residences in any of the Member States of the Union. Recent 
social studies show that these legal provisions have given more than choices of lifestyle to the 
EU citizens. According to recent social studies, ‘living, working and engaging with the world 
go beyond the individualised consumption of “choices”, goods and services. In this sense, the 
added value of EU citizenship is not confined to creating a new institutional reality which is 
superimposed on national citizenships. Instead, European Union citizenship contributes to 
making more enriched life horizons possible.’1245 The intensification of economic, cultural, 
social and political exchanges among EU citizens and among EU citizens and Member States, 
under the impact of the European integration, can and has brought the European people closer 
together and ‘enable[d] them to act as co-citizens.’1246 There are genuine ties that have 
developed between the EU citizens and all the EU countries, which could justify the exercise 
of EU-based protection of unrepresented Union citizens by non-nationality Member States in 
third countries from the perspective of public international law. The level of social connection 
between the EU citizens and all the Member States is not perfectly equivalent with the 
Nottebohm genuine link, however this thesis argues that there is no need to establish such a 
perfect equivalence1247, since the current public international law no longer requires the 
fulfilment of the Nottebohm criteria by the nationality test.1248 
                                                 
1245 See European Commission, Directorate-General for Research and Innovation Socio-economic Sciences and 
Humanities, Policy Review – Co-creating the European Union Citizenship, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/research/social-sciences/pdf/co-creating_eu_citizenship.pdf  
1246 Ibid. 
1247 A. Vermeer-Künzli and J. Dugard seem to argue that the requirement of genuine link is still necessary and 
that the EU citizenship has not reached that level of development whereby it established genuine and effective 
links between all EU citizens and all EU countries, which would need to exist in order to legitimise the EU inter-
governmental model of protection of EU citizens abroad, in particular the exercise of diplomatic protection. See 
A. Vermeer-Künzli, ‘Where the Law Becomes Irrelevant: Consular Assistance and the European Union’, (2011) 
ICLQ, 96; A. Vermeer-Künzli, ‘Nationality and EU citizenship’ in The Protection of Individuals by means of 
Diplomatic Protection, PhD Thesis (2007); J. Dugard, Seventh Report on diplomatic protection, United Nations 
General Assembly, A/CN.4/567, United Nations, New York, 7 March 2006, 10. 
1248 For more details, see the following section. 
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In parallel to the concept of EU citizenship as a bundle of functional equivalent links, 
the CJEU has infused autonomous features into the EU citizenship, which coupled with other 
political and social elements contribute to create a second conception of EU citizenship as a 
sort of supranational citizenship, creating links between the EU citizens and the Union. The 
autonomous features of the EU citizenship reflected by the ‘fundamental’ and ‘primary’ status 
which EU citizenship is destined to become1249 have not and will probably never lead to EU 
citizenship superseding State nationality,1250 since the foundational rationale of EU 
citizenship, as in fact of the entire European integration process, is that of mutual recognition 
(in casu mutual recognition of citizenship conferral1251).  
It is currently still being debated whether these jurisprudentially developed 
autonomous features are sufficient to reflect a true European citizenship. Even if the EU 
citizenship would be so conceptualised, it is uncertain whether it could fulfil the Nottebohm 
‘genuine’ and ‘effective’ nationality standards. Since the general public international legal 
norms on consular and diplomatic protection of individuals are inter-States norms, they 
cannot be extrapolated to the exercise of protective measures by the Union to its citizens 
abroad, since the Union is an international organisation. Therefore, the Union citizenship does 
not need to fulfil the strict Nottebohm standards, since they are applied exclusively to the 
relation between an individual and a State. A certain solidarity connection between the Union 
and the citizens would however need to exist in order to avoid allegations that Member States 
are abusing their internationally conferred rights to exercise consular and diplomatic 
protection of their nationals, and violating foundational principles of international law, such 
as equality between sovereign States and non-interference in the domestic affairs of other 
States.1252 
The reality is that the public international legal framework still recognises as a 
legitimate premise for the exercise of consular and diplomatic protection only State 
nationality, while non-nationality States are exceptionally recognised the right to exercise 
                                                 
1249 See the judgment of the CJEU in the Rottmann case and the Opinion of the AG Maduro in the same case. 
1250 C. Shore, Building Europe, Routledge (2000); R. Bellamy, ‘Evaluating Union citizenship: belonging, rights 
and participation within the EU’, (2008) Citizenship Studies, 597. 
1251 See F. Strumia, ‘Supranational Citizenship as Mutual Recognition of Belonging’, in Supranational 
Citizenship and the Challenge of Diversity, Immigrant, Citizens and Member States in the EU, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers (2013). See also the Michelleti judgment ‘[...] it is not permissible for the legislation of a Member 
State to restrict the effects of the grant of the nationality of another Member State by imposing an additional 
condition for the recognition of that nationality with a view to the exercise of the fundamental freedoms provided 
for in the Treaty.’ (para. 10) 
1252 For a more detailed explanation of this argument, please see the following sub-section. 
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consular and diplomatic protection of individuals1253, and, in relation to international 
organisations there is no international legal framework allowing or prohibiting the exercise of 
such mechanisms for private individuals.1254 According to the Reparation of Injuries Advisory 
Opinion of the ICJ, it seems that the general international principle of speciality is the 
foundational principle, which establishes the limits of an international organisation’s actions. 
The inter-States consular and diplomatic laws which govern the exercise of consular and 
diplomatic protection of individuals cannot be extrapolated to international organisations, 
which is why, contrary to academic opinions, we cannot speak of a derogation from the public 
international law in regard to the EU supranational model of protecting EU citizens abroad.1255  
b. Does the Union citizenship need to pass the international ‘genuine 
nationality’ test? 
A second critique raised against the EU citizenship as premise of the EU legal regime of 
protecting EU citizens abroad referred to the absence of the Nottebohm ‘genuine link’ 
between the EU citizen and the non-nationality Member States.1256 The derivative and 
dependent nature of Union citizenship on the Member State citizenship, as well as the absence 
of a solid ‘genuine’ and ‘effective’ link between the EU citizens and all the Member States 
and the Union have been invoked as essential evidence revealing that the EU citizenship is 
                                                 
1253 See more on this issue in the last Section of this chapter. 
1254 For the moment, the public international law has expressly recognised only the functional protection 
competence of international organisations. Under this doctrine, the EU, as an international organisation, would 
be entitled to exercise a functional type of diplomatic protection to the extent of safeguarding its own interests, 
as, for instance, in the case of the conduct of third countries resulting in injury to EU officials. See P. Pescatore, 
‘Les rélations extérieures des Communautés européennes: Contribution à la doctrine de la personnalité des 
organisations internationales’, RC (1961) II 218; See the Advisory opinion Difference Relating to Immunity from 
Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Judgment of 12 October 1998, ICJ 
Reports (1999), 62. The ICJ stated that the immunity of a UN officer can also be invoked against the State of 
nationality of such an officer when this expert acts in the name of the organisation. The same conclusions had 
been reached by the ICJ some years before in the Advisory Opinion on the Applicability of Article VI, Section 
22, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, dealing with the case of Mr 
Mazilu, the Romanian member of the UN Commission on Human Rights, who was hindered by Romania from 
leaving the territory of the State in order to exercise his function at the UN, ICJ Reports (1989) 177.  
1255 See Section III – The EU supranational model of protecting EU citizens abroad and the reality of public 
international law governing the protection of individuals. 
1256 For a detailed account of the criticism of the EU mechanism on account of the absence of the ‘genuine’ link 
test, see A. Vermeer-Künzli , ‘When Law becomes irrelevant: Consular assistance and the European Union’, op. 
cit.; J. Dugard, 2006, op. cit., 10; A. Vermeer-Künzli, ‘Comments on the Green Paper on diplomatic and 
consular protection of Union citizens in third countries’, Leiden University, the Netherlands, on the European 
Commission’s website section entitled ‘Contributions on Diplomatic and consular protection of Union citizens in 
third countries’, available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/ events/news_events_en.htm> (accessed 18 
June 2007). See also R. Wessel and B. van Vooren, ‘The EEAS’ Diplomatic Dreams’, in P. Quinn (ed.), Making 
European Diplomacy Work: Can the EEAS Deliver?, EU Diplomacy Papers 8/2011; J. Wouters and S. Duquet, 
speak also of the possible tension between the EU legal framework and general international norms on 
diplomatic protection of individuals, see ‘The EU and International Diplomatic Law: New Horizons?’, (2012) 
The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 31. 
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not fulfilling the prerequisites imposed by public international law for the exercise of consular 
and diplomatic protection of individuals mechanisms. This section plans to assess whether the 
legal concept of Union citizenship needs to reflect a ‘genuine’ and ‘effective link’ between 
the EU citizens and all the EU countries, according to the Nottebohm international legal 
doctrine.  
Chapter 2 demonstrated that current public international law still bases consular and 
diplomatic protection, in particular the latter, on the nationality link shared between the 
injured individual and the State exercising protection. Public international law recognises to 
States the discretion to establish who is to qualify for their nationality and the criteria for 
acquisition and loss of nationality. The 2006 ILC Articles on Diplomatic Protection have 
codified the current international practice on nationality matters related to the exercise of 
diplomatic protection, and have maintained the traditional autonomy of States in matters 
concerning nationality, such as: who qualifies to be a national and reasons for loss and 
withdrawal of nationality. Based on the current common States practice, Article 4 of the ILC 
Articles on Diplomatic Protection provides a non-exhaustive list of acquisition of nationality 
criteria: ius sanguinis, soli, naturalisation and succession of States. The Article ends with a 
provision requiring that acquisition of nationality must be consistent with international law. 
Over time, public international law has developed certain limitations to the State’s 
prerogatives based on prohibition of fraud, negligence or serious error,1257 abuse of power,1258   
and discriminatory rules based on sex, religion, race, colour or national or ethnic origin.1259 
Based on the customary international law duty to avoid and reduce statelessness,1260 and the 
ICJ’s relevant jurisprudence,1261 Rapporteur Dugard recommends, in his commentary to 
                                                 
1257 See Flegenheimer claim (1958) 25 I.L.R. p.112, 153; I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 5th 
edition Oxford University Press (1998), 422. 
1258 Such as arbitrary deprivation of nationality, see the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions relating to 
the Conflict of Nationality Laws League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 179, p. 89, No. 4137. 
1259 Art. 5(1) of the European Convention on Nationality. Art. 9 of the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 1249 UN Treaties Series, 13. For the view that nationality 
attributed or gained by fraud or negligence cannot be internationally accepted see, Amerasinghe, Diplomatic 
Protection, op.cit., 95. See also P. Vigni, ‘The Protection of EU Citizens: The Perspective of International Law’, 
in J. Larik and M. Moraru (eds.), Ever-Closer in Brussels—Ever-Closer in the World? EU External Action after 
the Lisbon Treaty, EUI Working Paper 2011/10, 91, 93 and 94. 
1260 See the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness UN Treaty Series, vol. 989, 175; third Special 
Protocol concerning Statelessness to the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions relating to the Conflict of 
Nationality Laws League of Nations; Committee of Ministers’ Recommendation No. R (99) 18 on the avoidance 
and the reduction of statelessness; Council of Europe Convention on the Avoidance of Statelessness in relation 
to State Succession, 15 March 2006, CETS 200, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/4444c8584.html  
1261 ICJ Advisory Opinion in The Legal Consequences for States of the continued presence of South Africa in 
Namibia, notwithstanding the Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), ICJ Report (1971), 4. 
 294 
 
Article 4, that a State’s conferral of nationality contrary to international law ‘should not affect 
[individual rights]’.1262 
In a 1955 judgment, the ICJ added a new criterion to the list of public international law 
requirements that needed to be fulfilled by the nationality requirement of diplomatic 
protection claims, also known as the Nottebohm ‘genuine’ nationality link requirement.1263 The 
Court established that nationality, as the premise of the exercise of diplomatic protection, 
should be the legal expression of a social fact which reflects a connection between the 
individual and the State exercising diplomatic protection closer than with any other State and 
based on ‘[…] his tradition, his establishment, his interests, his activities, his family ties, his 
intentions for the near future’1264 
The 2006 ILC Articles on Diplomatic Protection have discarded the Nottebohm 
‘genuine’ and ‘effective’ link requirement.1265 Therefore the current criteria that the 
‘nationality of claims’ need to fulfil according to international law, so as to legitimise an 
exercise of consular and diplomatic protection, currently include only: the acquisition of 
nationality following the domestic law to be respected by the individual; and several norms to 
be respected by State – prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of nationality, prohibition of 
discriminatory rules and reduction of statelessness.1266 These minimal international rules do 
not create, in principle, any problems for the Union legal order since, although the nationality 
issues fall under the exclusive competence of the Member States, these international standards 
are directly binding on the Member States when establishing their domestic rules on 
nationality related aspects, first, in their quality of independent international actors, and 
second, via the primary effect of EU law which incorporates these customary international 
norms. Additionally, Union law prohibits the Member States from arbitrarily depriving their 
citizens of nationality, or creating stateless situations, while the foundational EU general 
principle of prohibiting discrimination based on nationality is binding on the Member States 
even when exercising exclusive competences.1267 Consequently, the extended reach of the 
                                                 
1262 Ibid., 35. 
1263 Nottebohm case (second phase), Liechtenstein v Guatemala, ICJ Reports (1955), 4, 24 and 26. 
1264 Ibid., 24. 
1265 See more details in Chapter 3, section IV.2.b Does the Union citizenship need to pass the international 
‘genuine nationality’ test? 
1266 Johannes M. M. Chan, ‘The Right to a Nationality as a Human Right: The Current Trend towards 
Recognition’, (1991) Hum. Rts. L.J., 1. 
1267 A. Wiesbrock and A. Gajda, ‘Maintaining Ethnic Ties in the Process of EU Enlargement: The Relationship 
between Kin-Minority Laws, EU Anti-Discrimination Law and the Schengen Acquis’, (2012) International 
Journal on Minority and Group Rights, 399. 
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Union law and the double legal basis1268 of the Member States’ obligations to respect the 
relevant international customary norms are potentially preventing conflicts of norms between 
the EU and international legal regimes on the acquisition of nationality. 
The ‘genuine’ nationality link has been abandoned by the current international norms 
in cases of both single and multiple nationalities. Even in cases of consular or diplomatic 
protection claims raised between States of nationality, the Nottebohm ‘effective’ and 
‘genuine’ nationality link was replaced with the ‘predominant’ nationality link.1269 However, 
the predominant link would not necessarily need to be fulfilled in the case of an exercise of 
Article 20(2)(c) obligation by a Member State, as the latter is a non-nationality Member State. 
Therefore the ‘predominant nationality’ would need to be proved only in cases where the 
Member State of nationality of the injured individual would exercise diplomatic protection 
measures against a third country whose nationality is also possessed by the Union citizen.  
In light of the abandonment of the Nottebohm ‘genuine’ and ‘effective’ nationality link 
criteria for the admissibility of diplomatic protection claims by current customary 
international law, the Union citizenship and the Member State nationality no longer need to 
conform to this particular requirement. Even if the ‘nationality’, as premise of consular and 
diplomatic protection of natural persons, is no longer required to fulfil the ‘genuine’ link 
requirement, it cannot be a purely fictive and abstract concept, since customary international 
law prohibits abuses of State’s rights in the field of conferral and withdrawal of nationality.1270 
Therefore, EU citizenship needs to reflect a true sense of social connection between the Union 
citizens and the actors providing protection abroad: primarily, the non-nationality Member 
States and the EU, when requested by the Member States. 
The qualification of the Union citizenship as a ‘pie in the sky’, void of substance 
concept, has long been discarded as no longer reflecting the current reality.1271 Certain legal 
                                                 
1268 Namely, on the basis of customary international legal principles and the EU general principle of respecting 
customary international law. See Section II - The Relation between International Customary Law and EU law – 
assessing the EU’s obligation to respect public international law. 
1269 See Art. 8 2006 ILC Articles on Diplomatic Protection. For more details, see Chapter 2 (Section – 
Eliminating the non-responsibility rule in dual and multiple nationalities cases). 
1270 See the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws; 
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain), Merits, Judgment of 5 February 
1970, ICJ Reports (1970),4, 23; see also the dissenting opinion of Judge Read in the Nottebohm case, arguing 
that instead of developing the Nottebohm ‘genuine’ link requirement, the ICJ could have relied on the abuse of 
the right doctrine; K. Hailbronner, ‘Nationality in Public International Law and European Law’, R. Bauböck and 
others (eds), Acquisition and Loss of Nationality: Policies and Trends in 15 European Countries, Amsterdam 
University Press (2006), 35-104. 
1271 See D. Kochenov and R. Plender, op.cit. 
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and jurisprudential developments in the field of EU-based rights1272 have strengthened the 
sense of belonging and social links both horizontally, across the national communities, and 
vertically, towards the EU. There is an extensive list of rights conferred to the EU citizens, of 
a citizenship nature, fundamental rights, resulting from other primary (e.g. non-discrimination 
related) or secondary EU legal provisions which they can exercise in any of the national 
societies of the EU countries. Furthermore, this list of social, economic, and political rights is 
in a state of continuous evolution under the influence of the EU legislator, the Court of 
Justice, and whose efficient and effective application is closely supervised by the 
Commission.1273 Inevitably the exercise of these EU-based individual rights, and in particular, 
the free movement rights have increased social and cultural interactions between the EU 
citizens and all the Member States, and have created closer bonds between Europeans. In 
addition, they proved able to generate ‘mutual economic benefits for businesses and citizens, 
including those who remain at home, as the EU steadily removes internal obstacles.’1274 Due 
to the effective exercise of this extensive list of transnational rights, the EU citizens are thus 
no longer to be considered as foreigners in any of the EU Member States, but their links with 
the Member State of residence is said to be equal with that of the State of nationality.1275 EU 
citizenship creates ties between the individual and the Member States not just on the basis of 
the right to take up residence and move around the EU territory, but due to the fact of 
possessing the citizenship of an entity whose laws, policies and symbols have pervaded all 
aspects of a citizen life. The legal literature seems to agree that Union citizenship as a 
jurisprudentially developed legal concept is mainly an ‘interstates’ or ‘transnational’ status of 
‘social integration’, creating or encouraging bonds equally connecting the individual with his 
or her home Member State and the societies of other Member States of residence.1276 The 
Member States’ reciprocal recognition of rights based on the EU citizenship has also led to 
                                                 
1272 Such as, inter alia, the entry into force of the EU Charter, the CJEU novel doctrine of ‘genuine enjoyment of 
substance of the rights of European citizenship’, and increasing mediatisation of the EU citizenship rights and 
direct access of the individual to dispute settlement mechanisms. 
1273 The European Commission produces a yearly action plan aiming to eliminate obstacles to the effective 
enjoyment of their Union rights by EU citizens. 
1274 See the European Commission, 2013 Report on EU Citizenship, Brussels, of 8 May 2013, COM(2013) 269 
final. 
1275 See F. Strumia, op.cit., Chapter 4. 
1276 See Opinion of AG Villalon in the Notaries case, para. 137; and Anastasia I. Penot, ‘The transnational 
character of Union citizenship’ in M. Dougan, Niamh N. Shuibhne, E. Spaventa (eds), Empowerment and 
Disempowerment of the Union citizen Hart (2012). 
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the creation of a civic community among the European countries,1277 and of a direct bond 
between the citizen and the Union.1278  
Some of the Lisbon Treaty’s legal innovations increased the civic engagement, which 
has thus contributed to enhancing the social connection between the European citizens, and 
between them and the Member States of the EU. The Lisbon Treaty also increased the role 
conferred to the democratic delegated authority of the EU, the European Parliament, as co-
legislator over almost all the EU affairs, and it conferred a direct legislative role to EU 
citizens. The citizens’ legislative initiative1279 confers directly to the Union citizens the right to 
make legislative proposals to the European Commission which, if the initiative is found to 
fulfil the necessary requirements, will have to put forward this legislative proposal to the 
European Parliament and the Council. This legislative mechanism has been characterised as 
‘bringing Europe closer to its citizens, […] and thus contribute[s] […] to the development of 
a real European public space.’1280 In the first 10 months following the adoption of the 
Regulation implementing Article 11 TEU, 27 requests for such legislative initiatives were 
already registered, on issues ranging from unconditional basic income, high-quality education 
and media pluralism.1281 These legislative developments have led to an increasing sense of 
belonging of the EU citizens towards the Member States and the EU.1282 
The economic, social, and political rights that EU citizens equally enjoy, in their 
different qualities and roles1283, across the Member States based directly on their EU 
citizenship status, do not only have the potential of creating horizontal but also a and vertical 
sense of belonging. As proved by recent Eurobarometer surveys1284, there is an increasing 
number of EU citizens feeling ‘Europeans’, knowing their rights and believing their voice is 
heard by the EU, which proves the these EU-based rights are gradually reaching their full 
                                                 
1277 F. Strumia, op.cit., 289. 
1278 AG Opinion Case C-47/08: ‘the concept of loyalty as an expression of commitment to and solidarity with the 
political community cannot be regarded in itself as a distinctive, exclusive and preclusive characteristic of the 
Member States, such that it inevitably requires the bond of nationality. On the contrary, a European citizen is 
not as such unable to make a commitment of loyalty to the Union... The notary thus operates within a framework 
in which loyalty extends both to the State conferring authority and to the Union assuming it, as well as to the 
other Member States.’ 
1279 See Art. 11 TEU as implemented by Regulation (EU) No. 211/2011 of 16 February 2011 on the citizens’ 
initiative, [2011] OJ L 65/1. 
1280 According to the Vice President for Inter-Institutional Relations and Administration statement, IP/10/1720, 
Brussels, 15 December 2010. 
1281 See the European Commission report on progress towards effective EU citizenship 2011 – 2013, available 
online at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/citizen/files/com_2013_270_en.pdf 
1282 See Standard Eurobarometer No. 82/2014. 
1283 As self-employed, worker, tax-payer, family member, consumer, criminal, etc. 
1284 See Standard Eurobarometer nos. 80, 81 and 82/2014. 
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potential.1285 There are numerous political and sociological studies, which have found sound 
empirical evidence for the fact that the nationals of the Member States have become 
‘Europeans’ in the context of a wide range of aspects of their everyday life. This effect is 
considered to be a direct consequence of the fact that almost every aspect of the day-to-day 
life of EU citizens has been regulated or touched upon by EU policies, ranging from the wide 
variety of certificates attesting the civil status of citizens (birth, marriage, divorce, death), 
health, participation in adjudicatory proceedings (e.g. recognition of civil and criminal 
judgments), shopping1286, acquisition of property, travel, retirement, to sensitive national 
issues such as taxation, currency, and acquisition and loss of national citizenship1287, and 
respect of the EU citizens fundamental rights even in areas said to still pertain to the Member 
States reserved competence.1288 The EU has created its own growing regulatory system that 
has pervaded most of the common aspects of the EU citizens’ daily lives, and has woven 
together all the Member States.  
In a nutshell, it can be argued that, based on the growing sense of belonging between 
the EU citizens and the Member States (particularly those of residence) and the EU, the Union 
citizenship could be considered a legitimate premise for the EU model of protecting EU 
citizens abroad, in terms of not being simply a sham behind which the Member States could 
avoid to conform with the international legal principles of non-intervention in the domestic 
affairs and sovereign equality of States.1289 
                                                 
1285 This practice seems to confirm Habermas’s rights based doctrine, whereby the exercise of the EU extensive 
list of rights contributes to creating a sense of belonging as the source of social solidarity within the EU (see J. 
Habermas, Between facts and norms, Cambridge: Polity Press (1996)). This thesis has been criticised by 
Bellamy as inadequate to ensure the sense of belonging necessary to create an EU-wide demos. (see R. Bellamy, 
op.cit., 601) However Bellamy put forward his critique in 2008, before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, 
and therefore it might not be current anymore; moreover, the present thesis does not argue that the EU rights 
have contributed to a fully-fledged EU demos, or European citizenship as a direct link between the EU citizen 
and the EU, but to the rising horizontal and vertical sense of belonging. 
1286 Even the number of digits that IBAN and BIC codes should have in the EU countries is regulated at the EU 
level, see http://www.presseurop.eu/en/content/article/570181-leviathan-here-brussels . 
1287 Case C-369/90 Micheletti and Others [1992] ECR I 4239, para. 10; Case C-179/98 Mesbah [1999] ECR-I 
7955, para. 29; Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen [2004] ECR I-9925, para. 39; and Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] 
ECR I-1449, paras. 39 and 41; Opinion of AG Sharpston in Joined Cases C-7/10 and C-9/10 Staatssecretaris van 
Justitie v Tayfun Kahveci and Osman Inan; Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] ECR I-0000; and Case C-
434/09 McCarthy [2011] ECR I-0000. 
1288 Such as counter-terrorism measures and foreign affairs related fields. D. Kostakopoulou, ‘The ECJ, Member 
State Autonomy and European Citizenship: Conjunctions and Disjunctions’, in H. Micklitz/B. De Witte (eds.), 
The European Court of Justice and the Autonomy of Member States, Hart (2012). 
1289 For example, the Anglo-Boer war (1899-1902) was justified by Britain as an intervention to protect its 
nationals who owned the gold mines of Witwatersrand. For more details see, J. Dugard, First Report on 
diplomatic protection, presented to the International Law Commission during its 52th session, UN Doc. 
A/CN.4/506, 7 March 2000, 5-6, para. 14 
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c. Concluding remarks on the international legitimacy of the EU citizenship 
as a premise of the EU model of protecting Union citizens abroad  
 
The nationality bond between the individual and the state has considerably weakened its 
position within public international law due to the changing trends pervading the international 
society. For instance, the phenomena of migration and acquisition of dual or multiple 
nationalities, and of the ‘humanization’ of the public international law which progressively 
recognises procedural and substantive international rights to individuals, and access to legal 
remedies has led to the reconsideration of the classical role of the nationality link in public 
international law, and, in particular, within the institutions of consular and diplomatic 
protection.1290 
The principles of equal sovereignty of States and non-intervention in the domestic 
affairs of States have been the foundational principles of the entire international community 
since the formation of the nation State. Due to their salient role in international relations, very 
few restrictions have been permitted – among which the exercise of consular and diplomatic 
protection of nationals in a foreign country. It is precisely the bond of nationality that justifies 
the limitation of these principles of international law and permits the extension of the 
territorial jurisdiction of the State of nationality. As a direct consequence, the nationality 
requirement of consular and diplomatic protection claims is of a strict interpretation and 
application.1291 Under the traditional doctrine, the nationality requirement had to be 
established at both the moment of the injury, at the moment the State exercises assistance or 
lodges the international complaint, and also continuously between these two moments. The 
classical international norms governing the ‘nationality of [diplomatic protection] claims’ 
requirement crystallised in a time when an individual had ties with one single state, and they 
were absolutely exclusive.1292 The growing exodus of persons taking residence in a country 
other than that of their nationality, and the growing trend of individuals acquiring more than 
one nationality by way of naturalization or marriage,1293 has led to a development of cases 
                                                 
1290 See Chapter 2, the section ‘Reconsidering the conditions for the exercise of consular and diplomatic 
protection under the international legal order’; A. Vermeer-Kunzli, ‘Nationality and diplomatic protection A 
reappraisal’, op.cit., 76. 
1291 See Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway Judgment of 1939, p.16; Barcelona Traction Judgment, p.33, para. 36: 
the bond of nationality between the State and the individual is the primary legal source ‘which alone confers 
upon the State the right of diplomatic protection, and it is as a part of the function of diplomatic protection that 
the right to take up a claim and to ensure respect for the rules of international law must be envisaged.’ 
1292 N. Bar-Yaacov, Dual Nationality, London: Stevens and Sons (1961). 
1293 R. Hansen, and P. Weil, (eds.), Dual Nationality, Social Rights and Federal Citizenship in the U.S. and 
Europe, New York/Oxford: Randall Books (2002). 
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where the individuals asked for consular and diplomatic protection from a State other than the 
State of nationality, namely the long-term residence state with which the individual had 
established a stronger connection.1294 Globalisation and the growing international movement 
of people have led to an increasing number of individuals living in a State other than their 
State of nationality, creating effective links with the State of residence rather than the State of 
nationality, as also portrayed by the oft-cited Nottebohm case. Holding the citizenship of more 
than one country has currently become more common. National policies discouraging dual 
citizenship by requiring renunciation or establishing automatic loss of nationality are 
becoming less frequent or not as strictly enforceable.1295 The idea of ‘belonging to a state’ is 
gradually connected with residence, and it is no longer, as in the romantic period of 
international law, exclusively tied with the State of nationality.1296 It is commonly accepted 
that the individual develops multiple connecting links with several States of nationality or 
residence. Therefore the existence of multiples ties, which is said to be a characteristic 
consequence of the Union citizenship and of the European Union project, is not a singular 
regional phenomenon, but is an event occurring around the globe.  
In light of the changing notions of statehood and citizenship1297, residence and social 
integration seem to turn into the real links reflecting the belonging of the individual to a 
certain society, community, and legitimising access to rights under both the international and 
European level.  
The classical absolute requirement of the nationality of claims necessary to legitimise 
an exercise of consular and diplomatic protection has been updated by the ILC in light of the 
contemporary international law. Several ground-breaking limitations were introduced to the 
‘nationality of claims’ premise for an exercise of diplomatic protection of individuals. Art. 8 
of the ILC Articles on Diplomatic Protection prescribes the lawful and habitual residence as 
the legitimate link in relation to certain vulnerable people, such as: stateless individuals and 
                                                 
1294 As signalled by the Nottebohm case, see also E. Schweighofer, ‘European citizenship and consular 
protection’, in S. Faro, Mario P. Chiti, E. Schweighofer (eds.), European Citizenship and Consular Protection 
New Trends in European Law and National Law, Editoriale Stientifica (2012). 
1295 For instance, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Italy, Mexico, Turkey have changed their 
policies to allow dual citizenship. Countries that used to have only jus loci policy have adopted also the jus 
sanguinis policy allowing ethnic descendants to acquire their citizenship. See Segolene B. de Places, ‘Nationalite 
des Etats membres et citoyennete de l’Union dans la jurisprudence communautarie: La consecration d’une 
nationalite san frontiers’ in R.A.E. – L.E.A. 2011/1, 29, 36. 
1296 Peter H. Schuck, Citizens, Strangers, and In-betweens: Essays on Immigration and Citizenship, New York: 
Westview Press (2000); S. Maillard, L’émergence de la citoyenneté sociale européenne, Aix-en-Provence: 
Presses universitaires d’Aix-Marseille (2008); D. Kochenov, ‘Rounding up the Circle: The Mutation of the 
Member States’ Nationalities under Pressure from EU citizenship’, EUI RSCAS WP 2010/23. 




individuals with refugee and subsidiary status. Within the EU legal framework a similar trend 
has developed. It is argued that the very concept of nationality has become redundant, and 
what is said to have become more meaningful is the concept of ‘residence’.1298 
There is an increasing number of EU citizens travelling and living abroad for different 
purposes, whether for education, work, health care, family or other reasons,1299 which has led 
in practice to the intensification of socio-cultural ties among the European citizens. Taking up 
residence in another Member State reflects the connection with another member State which 
would feel entitled to undertake to exercise consular and diplomatic protection in third 
countries, when the Member State of nationality is not represented, not just on the basis of the 
EU primary law obligation, but on the connection that has been formed directly with the EU 
citizen. 
Furthermore, the right to take up residence in any of the Member States recognised to 
all EU citizens is not only an element that has helped in creating the social links between the 
citizen and the Member States, and between the EU citizens and the EU, but it has the 
potential of giving additional international legitimacy to EU citizenship as the premise for 
Art. 20(2)(c) types of consular and diplomatic protection. The 2006 ILC Articles on 
Diplomatic Protection have recognised several exceptions to the State of nationality premise 
for diplomatic protection, among which includes residence – based on the fact that in more 
and more cases it better reflects the tie between an individual and a State, than nationality.1300 
In spite of the evidence signalling a growing social and political link between the EU 
citizens and the Member States,1301 of the elimination of the Nottebohm ‘genuine’ link 
requirement and of the development of an alternative to citizenship as a premise for consular 
and diplomatic protection, the EU citizenship does not fulfil the primary condition, under 
current international law, to be the nationality of the protecting State. The EU provisions 
require the non-nationality State to secure protection of EU citizens abroad, and can request 
the entities of an international organisation, the EU, to help them in securing this protection of 
private individuals. Public international law permits, under certain precise conditions, that 
                                                 
1298 G. Davies, ‘Any Place I Hang My Hat? Or Residence is the New Nationality’, (2005) ELJ, 55; and Segolene 
B de Places, ‘Nationalite des Etats membres et citoyennete de l’Union dans la jurisprudence communautarie: La 
consecration d’une nationalite san frontiers’ in R.A.E. – L.E.A. 2011/1, 29, 41. 
1299 According to Eurobarometer Special Number No. 346, April 2011, ‘New Europeans’: ‘More than one-third 
of Europeans regularly eat food typical of another country, follow news, cultural life or sports from another 
country, are fluent in at least one foreign language or regularly spend holidays or weekends abroad contributes 
to creating genuine social ties between the EU citizens across the EU territory.’ 
1300 See more details in Chapter 2, section – Increasing exceptions to the exclusive nationality link requirement). 




non-nationality States can exercise consular and diplomatic protection. The main condition 
required is the consent of third countries towards the exercise of protection by the non-
nationality State. The following section will explore the precise conditions required by public 
international law for the exercise of consular and diplomatic protection of individuals by non-
nationality States, and in particular the issue of third countries’ consent towards the exercise 
of the Union model of protecting EU citizens abroad.  
 
3.  Assessing the third countries’ consent to the Union model of protecting 
EU citizens abroad 
It was shown that the elimination of the genuine link requirement and increasing role of 
‘residence’ as an alternative premise to ‘nationality’ have not eliminated the strict 
understanding of ‘nationality of claims’ requirement as a State nationality, for the exercise of 
consular and diplomatic protection. It was pointed out that by way of unanimous consent, the 
Member States decided in 1993 to extend the protection treatment they would confer to their 
own citizens abroad also to other EU citizens who are not represented abroad. The recognition 
of this equal protection treatment to all unrepresented Union citizens was argued to create a 
significant deviation from the customary international law, which, in spite of certain legal 
innovations, still allocates consular and diplomatic protection of private individuals primarily 
to the State of nationality. The EU has endowed the non-nationality Member State and its 
institutions and bodies with the power to exercise consular and diplomatic protection of 
private individuals1302, thus challenging the international requirement of ‘nationality of 
claims’, which is mandatory, especially in the case of diplomatic protection. Therefore the EU 
model conferring consular and diplomatic protection functions to non-nationality Member 
States seems to not be conforming, at first glance, to the general international legal 
framework. The specific EU model of inter-governmental protection provided by the EU legal 
regime could, in principle, find a justification under the derogations prescribed by 
international treaty law and jurisprudence, since the international rules imposing the 
‘nationality of claims’ requirement are not of an absolute nature, instead, both the 
international jurisprudence and the Vienna Conventions on Consular and Diplomatic 
Protection have recognised the possibility to derogate under certain conditions. The 
                                                 
1302 As opposed to the Union officials, a type of diplomatic protection which international organisations are 
entitled to exercise under the title of ‘functional protection’. See the ICJ Case of Reparation for Injuries, op.cit. 
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international treaty law and jurisprudence of the ICJ have recognised a certain margin of 
discretion to States, which can deviate from this international norm by way of mutual consent.  
In relation to consular protection, Article 8 of the VCCR1303 recognises the possibility 
that a non-nationality State exercises the protection of the interests of another State and its 
nationals in third countries ‘upon appropriate notification to the receiving State.’ Therefore 
third countries can refuse the exercise of consular protection by non-nationality Member 
States to unrepresented Union citizens.  
In regard to diplomatic protection, the PCIJ held, in the Panevezys case, that ‘[…], in 
the absence of a special agreement, it is the bond of nationality between the State and the 
individual which alone confers upon the State the right of diplomatic protection.’1304 Therefore 
the ICJ recognised the right of the States to derogate from the nationality of claims 
requirement insofar as the new premise is established by unanimous written consent. In 
addition to customary international law, there is also Article 46 of the VCDR1305, which 
enshrines a similar derogation as that provided by Article 8 of the VCCR, however this time, 
the consent of the receiving State is required prior to the exercise of protection by diplomatic 
officials. In international relations such situations arise when a State does not have a 
representation in a third country, or it has broken off consular or diplomatic relations with a 
State.1306 
The EU would have to fulfil the precise requirement of obtaining the consent of third 
countries to its EU model of securing protection of its citizens abroad, which it is argued it 
has not yet fulfilled.1307 
                                                 
1303 Article 8 of the VCCR, entitled – Exercise of consular functions on behalf of a third State, reads as follows: 
‘Upon appropriate notification to the receiving State, a consular post of the sending State may, unless the 
receiving State objects, exercise consular functions in the receiving State on behalf of a third State.’ 
1304 ICJ Panavezys judgment, op.cit., p.17. Another judgment of the PCIJ strengthening the conclusion that 
States can derogate from the nationality of claims requirement is the 1923 judgment delivered in the Decrets de 
nationalite promulges en Tunis case, where it was held that, although States enjoy discretionary competence over 
matters of nationality, these competences can be limited by international law on the basis of conventional 
obligations entered into by the involved States. 
1305 Art. 46 of the VCDR reads as follows: ‘A sending State may with the prior consent of a receiving State, and 
at the request of a third State not represented in the receiving State, undertake the temporary protection of the 
interests of the third State and of its nationals.’ 
1306 B. Sen, A Diplomat’s Handbook of International Law and Practice, 3rd ed, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 
(1998), 267. 
1307 See A. Vermeer- Künzli, ‘The Legal Framework of consular assistance: Some inconsistencies between EU 
law and international law on consular assistance’ in S. Faro, Mario P. Chiti and E. Schweighofer (eds), European 
Citizenship and Consular Protection New Trends in European Law and National law, Editura Scientifica Napoli 
(2012), 101-111; by the same author, ‘Where the law becomes irrelevant: Consular assistance and the European 
Union’, op.cit.; See J. Dugard, Seventh Report on diplomatic protection, United Nations General Assembly, 
A/CN.4/567, United Nations, New York, 7 March 2006, 10; P. Vigni, ‘The Protection of EU Citizens: The 
Perspective of International Law’, in J. Larik and M. Moraru (eds.), Ever-Closer in Brussels—Ever-Closer in the 
World? EU External Action after the Lisbon Treaty, EUI Working Paper 2011/10, 91–107.  
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All the Member States are parties to both the VCCR and VCDR, however since these 
treaties allow only States to be party to them, the Union is not thus directly bound to respect 
these treaties’ rules. However, due to the high number of States that have ratified the 
Conventions, it has been argued that they have gained the status of customary norms1308, 
which means that the EU is thus bound to respect the conditions established by international 
customary law when derogating from the nationality of claims requirement.1309 
The Member States were aware of the possible challenges that the establishment of the 
specific EU regime might pose to the international legal regime already during the adoption of 
the Maastricht Treaty. In order to ensure the required consent of third countries, the founding 
Treaties provided since the establishment of the EU citizenship, an obligation for the Member 
States ‘to start the international negotiations required to secure this protection.’1310 The initial 
proposal for this provision, made during the elaboration of the Maastricht Treaty by the 
Spanish representative, was more strictly phrased.1311 Namely it was proposed that ex-Article 
8C includes an obligation of the Member States to obtain the necessary consent of third States 
as required by the VCCR, instead of just starting ‘international negotiations’. This proposal 
did not made its way into the Treaty but the more lenient obligation ‘to start international 
negotiations’.1312  
Apart from a few exceptions,1313 neither the Member States, nor the Union have 
concluded international agreements with all the countries around the world securing an 
explicit acceptance of the EU exceptional mechanism.1314 The common practice seems to have 
been that notification of the EU provision by way of practice, with few exceptions whereby 
certain Member States did formally inform certain third countries of the EU special 
agreement.1315 Certain Member States justified their lack of notification and start of 
                                                 
1308 See E. Denza, op.cit., 1, 44-45, and Michael J. Garcia, ‘Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: Overview 
of U.S. Implementation and International Court of Justice (ICJ) Interpretation of Consular Notification 
Requirements’, available online at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32390.pdf  
1309 See the Racke case. 
1310 The obligation was first included in Art. 8c Maastricht Treaty and remained unchanged throughout the 
different legal amendments of the founding Treaties, including in the present Art. 23(1) TFEU. 
1311 See more in see Documentation de la RIE, (1991), 333-338 and 405-409 
1312 See Art. 8c of the Maastricht Treaty and current Art. 23 TFEU. 
1313 These Treaties were concluded by Italy: the bilateral agreements signed by Italy after the entry into force of 
the Maastricht Treaty are: the Conventions with Ukraine in 2003 (Article 62), Republic of Moldova in 2000 
(Article 61), Georgia in 2002 (Article 60), Great People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Socialist in 1998 (Article 2) 
and Russian Federation in 2001 (Article 37); and Portugal: the Consular Convention between Portugal and the 
Russian Federation 2001, (Article 36(5)). See CARE Report, Chapter 3, Section 2.1.2. 
1314 See Madalina B. Moraru, ‘Securing consular protection of the EU citizens abroad: what role for the EU?’ 
op.cit. 
1315According to the CARE Report, these countries were Belgium, France and Lithuania. ‘Belgium has advised 
its consular network to inform third countries’ authorities about the practice of extending consular and 
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international negotiations based on the fact that the EU Presidency had already notified third 
countries of the new special agreement between the Member States in 1993.1316  
The procedure prescribed by Article 23(2) TFEU, whereby the Member States would 
need to separately start international negotiations with all the States of the world is definitely 
a cumbersome one, requiring significant administrative, human and financial resources of the 
foreign affairs departments of the Member States. Certain Member States have been opposed 
to such international negotiations, arguing that obtaining such formal consent from third 
countries is unnecessary and an overly ‘major task’ for the domestic executive.1317 In light of 
the Member States’ reluctance to secure the express consent of third countries to its 
derogatory regime, the Commission has considered, since 2006, the possibility of inserting 
consent clauses in mixed agreements, which it will negotiate with third countries.1318 Certain 
Member States, in particular the UK, have opposed the Commission’s proposal, on the basis 
that the EU, and thus the Commission, lacks competence ‘to negotiate consent clauses in its 
existing bi-lateral agreements with third countries for the provision of an ‘EU’ consular 
service’.1319 So far, there has been no public evidence of the Commission already 
implementing this negotiation strategy. 
The EU’s regional agreement of delegating the consular protection function among the 
Member States has thus remained a pacta tertii for third countries,1320 which might pose 
                                                                                                                                                        
diplomatic protection to non-national Union citizens (Art. 8 Vienna Convention). In the same notification 
Belgium asked the authorities of third countries to inform their local authorities of the existence of this type of 
cooperation between the EU Member States.’ France notified Chad of its will be the State providing protection 
for the citizens of the other Member States based on the EU Treaty provision (see Summary Report of Public 
Hearing on the Green Paper of 29 May 2007, p. 11.) Lithuania informed Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria that the 
Republic of Poland exercises consular functions in Rabat and Casablanca (Morocco), Tunisia and Algeria on 
behalf of the Republic of Lithuania, however not on the basis of the EU Treaty provision but, based on the 
Consular Convention between the Republic of Lithuania and the Russian Federation. 
1316 The notification was said to have been made via a verbal note, see Guidelines for the Protection of 
Unrepresented EC Nationals by EC Missions in Third Countries which was adopted by the 241st Political 
Committee on 29 and 30 March 1993. 
1317 See the UK Report in the CARE Report. 
1318 The European Commission has proposed, on several occasions, that Member States include a ‘consent 
clause’ i.e. a clause providing for the agreement of a third State that the consular and diplomatic authorities of a 
represented Member State can provide protection to nationals of unrepresented Member States under the same 
conditions as to its own nationals, within mixed agreements that are to be concluded or amended with non-EU 
countries (see European Commission, Green Paper of 28 November 2006 on diplomatic and consular protection 
of Union citizens in third countries, COM(2006) 712 final – Official Journal C 30 of 10.02.07). In 2011, in a 
Report of the European Commission it was mentioned that ‘the Commission – taking due account of the 
specificity of each negotiation – proposed to include a consent clause in mixed agreements with certain third 
countries. Negotiations are ongoing’. See European Commission, Green Paper on diplomatic and consular 
protection of EU citizens, COM(2006) 712 of 28 November 2006; Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament and the Council, Consular protection for EU citizens in third countries: State of play and 
way forward, Brussels, 23.3.2011 COM(2011) 149 final.  
1319 See the UK Report in the CARE Report. 
1320 See Art. 34 of the VCLT and J. Dugard, Seventh Report, op.cit., paras.19-20 
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problems also within the EU legal order, since the Member States have an obligation to 
exercise consular and diplomatic protection, and the opposition of third countries, preventing 
them from fulfilling their EU obligations, might result in an action of damages lodged by the 
injured individuals.1321 The requirement of acquiring the consent of third countries to the EU 
derogatory regime is though slightly different depending on whether the type of protection 
secured is consular or diplomatic. In the case of consular services (Article 8 VCCR) the 
consent of the third State is presumed if they do not oppose the notification of the delegation. 
While in the case of diplomatic protection, the need to obtain the consent of third countries is 
more stringent, as it is required prior to the actual exercise (Article 46 VCDR). The Member 
States’ non-conformity with the general customary norms and the procedure provided for 
derogations is argued to have salient legal consequences. In the absence of such formal 
consent, the exercise of consular assistance, and particularly diplomatic protection, on behalf 
of non-nationals can lead to a violation of diplomatic and consular law and the principle of 
non-intervention in the domestic affairs of foreign States by the Member States, and thus 
engage their international responsibility.1322 
The 21-years long practice of the Member States and the Union exercising Article 23 
TFEU based consular and diplomatic protection without opposition from third countries could 
be interpreted as a sufficiently long, constant and geographically spread practice indicating 
wide consent to the derogatory EU legal regime. During this period there has been no public 
evidence of objection by third States to the exercise of consular and diplomatic protection by 
the Lead State, non-nationality Member States or the Union institution or bodies alone or in 
collaboration with the Member States on grounds of lack of locus standi, or violations of the 
VCCR and VCDR provisions.1323 This long and generalised practice of tacit acceptance, can 
be argued to have by now crystallised into a customary international norm that stops third 
countries from objecting to future exercises of the EU’s model by a non-nationality Member 
State or the body or institution of the EU.1324 Practitioners have argued that opening now 
negotiations, whether by the Member States or the Union, is not just unnecessary, but might 
even be counter-productive to the interests of the Union since third countries might refuse to 
                                                 
1321 Art. 340 TFEU. 
1322 A. Vermeer-Künzli, ‘Where the Law becomes irrelevant: Consular Assistance and the European Union’, 
op.cit., 965, 985. 
1323 See E. Denza, ‘Commentary to Art. 46 EU Charter’, op.cit., see 46.46 
1324 On the idea that this long and generalised practice has led to the creation of a customary international norm, 




consent if given the option, or ask for special favours in return for their consent.1325 Instead, 
continuing the practice, which has so far been positive towards the EU citizens, is argued to 
be a preferable and prudent approach.1326 
The fact that, so far, no opposition has been raised by third countries should not be 
interpreted as excluding future opposition. There can be situations where the receiving States 
might consider that the advantages of alleviating its burden to ensure protection of aliens in 
distress situations are not outweighed by the injuries caused by such an intervention of the EU 
and the Member States. Cases of consular protection provided by the CSDP police and 
military missions rescuing EU citizens, that lead to the violation of human rights such as the 
prohibition on torture or arbitrary deprivation of life towards nationals of the receiving State, 
or cases where within a particularly hostile relation between the receiving State and the EU, 
the protection of EU citizens is secured by police and military rescue mission intervention 
which is challenged by the receiving State as a violation of its territorial integrity, contrary to 
the prohibition on the use of force.1327 Proving the existence of a customary rule preventing 
change of conduct on the part of third countries will be a cumbersome burden of proof, 
further complicated if the consent of the third country is interpreted as given in regard to a 
particular consular service and in a particular distress situation. The option of securing a 
written consent from third countries might alleviate the burden of proof and protect the EU 
Member States from international legal responsibility. It is, however, unclear what the best 
solution would be in terms of the method of securing the written consent of third countries, 
since it seems that centralising the negotiation at the EU level is not supported by all the 
Member States,1328 while leaving it in the hands of the Member States is counter-productive 
for both the Member States and attaining the objective of unequivocal and unconditional third 
countries’ consent. 
                                                 
1325 E. Denza, op.cit. 
1326 Ibid. 
1327 A. Vermeer-Künzli mentions that opposition was raised against the EU’s intervention in the rescue missions 
of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands in Libya in February 2011. ‘Neither mission was limited to the 
nationals of the respective rescuing states and elicited protest from Libya. The Netherlands mission was 
unsuccessful: the individuals to be rescued and the rescuing crew were captured and the equipment confiscated 
by Col. Gaddafi’s troops. Only after intense negotiations with Greece were the individuals released.’ In ‘Where 
the Law becomes irrelevant….’, op.cit. 
1328 A consent that would be needed since the area does not fall under the EU’s exclusive competence. 
 308 
 
Conclusion of Chapter 3 
The European Union is bound to respect international customary law regardless of the 
growing autonomy of the Union legal order and of its imprecise legal nature.1329 Even a 
complete disconnection and formal re-branding of the Union as a federation, co-federation or 
any other legal metaphor would not exonerate the Union from the obligation of respecting 
international customary law. Until the formal re-labelling of the Union in the founding 
Treaties, third countries are entitled to consider the Union as an international organisation1330 
which, due to its increasing State like features,1331 as reflected also within the area of consular 
and diplomatic protection, will have difficulties in accommodating its international 
organisation status, to an international environment which is still, in many areas, including 
consular and diplomatic relations, regulated primarily by inter-States law. The field of 
consular and diplomatic protection of private individuals is one of the most telling examples 
of this difficulty. The development of the Union’s internal legal provisions recognising a 
growing role to the non-nationality Member States and the Union institutions in this field has 
raised numerous scholarly questions regarding the conformity of the EU model of protecting 
EU citizens abroad with the general international legal framework. 
The international rules governing consular and diplomatic protection of individuals are 
of both conventional (VCCR and VCDR), and customary legal nature.1332 Consequently, the 
Union is bound to respect the general international legal norms on consular and diplomatic 
protection of individuals. In order to enhance the protection abroad of the Member States’ 
citizens while at the same time not increasing their costs, and strengthening the role of the 
                                                 
1329 See the CJEU, Case C-286/90 Anklagemyndigheden v. Peter Michael Poulsen and Diva Navigation Corp. 
[1992] ECR I-6019, para. 9; Case C-405/92 Etablissements Armand Mondiet SA v. Armement Islais SARL [1993] 
ECR I-6133, paras. 13-15; Case C-162/96 A. Racke GmbH & Co. v. Hauptzollamt Mainz [1998], ECR I-3655, 
paras. 45-46 and 51; Case C-308/06 Intertanko [2008] ECR I-4057, para. 51; Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C 
415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat v. Council and Commission [2008] ECR I-6351, para. 291. See also European 
Court of First Instance Case T-115/94 Opel Austria GmbH v. Council [1997] ECR II-39; C-366/10 Air Transport 
Association of America v Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change [2011], para. 101 (‘ATAA’). M. 
Cremona, ‘External Relations and External Competence of the European Union: The Emergence of an Integrated 
Policy’ in P. Craig and G. de Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law, Oxford University Press (2011), 237; and 
Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 
204. See also, T. Konstandinides, ‘When in Europe: Customary International Law and EU Competence in the 
Sphere of External Action’, op.cit.; and J. Wouters and S. Duquet, ‘The EU and International Diplomatic Law: 
New Horizons?’, op.cit., 31, 47 
1330 See R. Ambast and V. Tyagi, ‘Ambassadors of Europe: An Insight into the Evolution of the European Union 
and International Diplomatic Law’, (2008) Studia Diplomatica, 16. 
1331 M. Smith, ‘The European Union and International Order: European and Global Dimensions’, (2007) 
European Foreign Affairs Review, 437, 452; T. Tiilikainen, ‘To Be Or Not To Be?: An Analysis of the Legal 
and Political Elements of Statehood in the EU’s External Identity’, (2001) European Foreign Affairs Review, 
223, 228. 
1332 See the ILC Articles on Diplomatic Protection.  
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Union in securing an effective Union citizenship, the Member States took advantage of the 
derogations permitted by the general international legal framework from the exercise of 
consular and diplomatic protection of individuals, and provided for a specific Union common 
regime of protecting EU citizens abroad. The Union inter-governmental model has, to a 
certain extent, deviated from the legal nature and premise of the classical international legal 
mechanisms of consular and diplomatic protection of natural persons. Namely, it replaced the 
strict State nationality requirement for consular and diplomatic protection exercises with the 
EU citizenship, and it imposed a duty to equal protection treatment on the Member States,1333 
where, under the public international law, States enjoy an unfettered discretionary right to 
exercise consular and diplomatic protection.  
The current international diplomatic law permits derogations from the ‘nationality 
requirement’ in the case of refugees, persons benefiting of subsidiary protection and stateless 
persons, where the nationality link is replaced with legal and habitual residence in a non-
nationality State. However the EU legal regime does not fall under this exception. 
A second derogation is recognised in the case of sharing of consular affairs among 
States, where a third country is delegated by the State of nationality to exercise consular 
protection (Article 8 VCCR) and/or diplomatic protection on his behalf (Article 45 VCDR). 
International treaty law subjects this exception to very strict conditions. Current treaty or 
customary law do not refer to situations where the institutions of an international organisation 
can exercise consular or diplomatic protection on behalf of private persons. The Union 
regime, which is based on a common sharing of consular and diplomatic protection functions 
among the Member States, and among the Member States and the Union, does not precisely 
follow the internationally prescribed derogations and thus raises grounded challenges 
regarding the conformity of the Union derogatory regime with the international legal 
framework. 
According to the current state of play, it seems that the derivative origin of the Union 
citizenship, and the characterisation of Union citizenship as a bundle of equally functional 
links between the Union citizen and all the EU Member States,1334 have the potential of 
bringing the EU legal regime closer to the international framework. The level of concrete 
connection between the EU citizens and the Member States is however argued to not be 
uniform. It has probably not reached that level of belonging to a community of values, a 
                                                 
1333 See Arts. 20(2)(c) and 23 TFEU, Art. 46 EU Charter. 
1334 See the Opinion of AG Maduro in the Rottmann case, para. 23; L. Azoulai, ‘La citoyennete europeenne, un 
statu d’integration sociale’, op.cit. 
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community of the peoples of Europe that is the same regardless of the territory of the Member 
State where the EU citizen decides to take residence.1335  
In conclusion, as long as the Union regime of protecting EU citizens abroad is 
primarily based on a partnership between the Member States and involvement of the EU 
institutions at the request of the Member States, then the Union model of ensuring protection 
of Union citizens abroad is not completely deviating from the models permitted under the 
general international legal framework. The way Union citizenship has been constructed so far, 
as a legal status empowering the Union citizens with equal rights across the Member States 
helps, to a certain extent, to justify the premise of the specific Union exercise of consular and 
diplomatic protection of Union citizens. The elimination of the Nottebohm ‘genuine’ and 
‘effective’ link requirement which the nationality of claims had to fulfil under traditional 
international customary law is simplifying the conditions that the Union citizenship has to 
fulfil and is further accommodating of the Union-specific regional regime. 
The growing social and political connection between the EU citizens and the Member 
States, on the one hand, and the EU citizens and the Union, on the other hand, do not discard 
the reality that the Union citizenship is not a State nationality. Consequently, the EU regime 
needs to fulfil a third requirement under international law in order to be legitimate, namely: to 
obtain the consent of third countries for the exercise of its specific regime of protecting EU 
citizens abroad. The consent of third countries is required by Article 8 VCCR for the exercise 
of consular protection, and by Article 45 VCDR for the exercise of diplomatic protection by 
the non-nationality States. In light of the de minimis nature of international law governing the 
field of consular and diplomatic protection of individuals, the non-nationality Member States 
could, in principle, exercise consular and diplomatic protection of private EU citizens if third 
States expressly consented to this. In spite of the expressly provided Union obligation of 
starting international negotiations, incumbent upon the Member States (Article 23(1)(2) 
TFEU), with few exceptions, the Member States have not so far started to implement this 
positive obligation. They have either expressly refused to fulfil the EU obligation,1336 
                                                 
1335 See L. Azoulai, ‘The (Mis)Construction of the European Individual Two Essays on Union Citizenship Law’, 
EUI Working Paper 2014/14. For a slightly different view, see AG Villalon’s Opinion in Cases 47-61/08, 
‘European Union citizen. In so far as it has a transnational dimension, European citizenship is founded on the 
existence of a community of States and individuals who share a scale of values, a high degree of mutual trust 
and a commitment to solidarity. Given that, on being awarded the nationality of a Member State, an individual is 
introduced into that community of values, trust and solidarity, it would be paradoxical if membership of that 
very community were to constitute the ground for preventing a European Union citizen from exercising the 
rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty’ (para. 138) 
1336 The UK. 
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considering that the Union institutions had already fulfilled it,1337 or that the Union itself is 
better placed to fulfil it1338.1339 The lack of agreement among the Member States on how best to 
proceed with obtaining the express consent of third countries seems to have led to a stalemate 
on the matter of securing conformity with the relevant international legal norms. The 
persistent lack of third countries’ consent can thus lead to the international responsibility of 
the Member States and the EU for violating the principle of non-intervention in the domestic 
affairs when implementing their Union obligation to secure equal protection of EU citizens 
abroad. 
The EU and the Member States might be saved from incurring international 
responsibility or facing prohibition of implementing their derogatory model in third countries 
on the basis of the principle of estoppel, which precludes third countries from changing their 
constant conduct of tacitly recognising, over a period of 21 years, the exercise of consular and 
diplomatic protection by the non-nationality Member States and the EU institutions and 
bodies. The principle of estoppel is based on a long established practice, which might have by 
now obtained the status of an international custom, thus works in favour of the Union and its 
Member States. However, the Union/Member States would have the cumbersome task of 
proving the established practice, and the task will be draconian, since the material scope of 
the consular assistance might have varied throughout the years. It is recommended that before 
a decision is taken in relation to obtaining the formal consent of third countries, one weighs 
the negative reaction and conditionality that third countries might impose in exchange for 
their consent against the likelihood of future situations where third countries’ would actually 
oppose the exercise of the EU model, or invoke the international responsibility of the Member 
States and the Union. 
It will not be an easy task to be successful in an international claim challenging the 
international legitimacy of the Union legal order. If the ICJ is chosen as the appropriate 
forum, the task will probably be more cumbersome on the part of the Member States, due to 
the high standards established by the ICJ for proving the existence of an international 
customary norm.1340 While, if the CJEU is chosen as the appropriate dispute resolution forum, 
the applicant will have a more cumbersome task in light of the strict conditions for 
challenging the validity of EU law based on customary international law. Following the ATAA 
                                                 
1337 Germany. 
1338 Smaller Member States. 
1339 See the CARE Report, Chapter 3, Section 3. 
1340 See Chapter 2 (Section – The requirements for the formation of an international customary norm 
recognising a State duty to exercise diplomatic protection). 
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judgment, three conditions must be met for an individual to claim the invalidity of an EU 
secondary provision based directly on a rule of customary international law. First the 
customary international law invoked is calling into question the competence of the EU to 
adopt the challenged act. Second, this EU secondary act is ‘liable to affect rights which the 
individual derives from EU law or to create obligations under EU law in this regard.’1341 
Third, the EU committed ‘a manifest error of assessment concerning the conditions for 
applying those principles.’1342 To date, Opel Austria is the only case where an EU secondary 
act was held invalid based on a violation of the EU general principle of protection of 
legitimate expectations recognised by the CJEU as a corollary of the customary international 
law principle of good faith.1343 In the case of consular and diplomatic protection of EU 
citizens, the last criteria is not fulfilled as regards the EU institutions, since the EU provisions 
have included an express obligation to start international negotiations whose non-fulfilment is 
incumbent upon the Member States, and not the Union institutions. In case an action of 
damage is brought against the Member States based on the inconsistency of the EU law with 
the relevant international legal norms, the CJEU might be more prone than the ICJ to 
recognise the formation of an international customary norm accepting the international 
legitimacy of the Union regime, or at least a principle of estoppel in relation to the particular 
consular conduct of the Member States.1344 It is difficult to imagine that such a case would, in 
the first place, be admitted due to the limited active locus standi before the CJEU. Third states 
cannot submit claims before the CJEU, while it would be difficult to imagine why a third 
country national would wish to invoke the inconsistency of the EU legal regime. 
In spite of the several inconsistencies between the international and EU legal orders on 
the exercise of consular and diplomatic protection of private individuals ascertained by legal 
scholars, the international and EU legal norms do not conflict in incompatible ways. Practice 
proves that the relationship between the international legal norms and the EU specific rules 
seems to be rather mutually beneficial than conflictual. The EU model of protecting citizens 
abroad can be interpreted as further contributing to the spread of the individual-centred and 
‘humanization’ trends that have pervaded the international mechanisms of consular and 
                                                 
1341 See the CJEU judgment in the ATAA case, para. 107. 
1342 Ibid., para. 110. 
1343 AG Kokott, in her Opinion in the ATAA case, argued that the norm on the basis of which the EU Regulation 
was held invalid was ultimately the EEA Agreement rather than the general principle of EU law or the 
customary international law principle. See also T. Konstadinides, ‘When in Europe: Customary International 
Law and EU Competence in the Sphere of External Action’, op.cit. 
1344 Based on the CJEU previous jurisprudence, giving precedence to the EU law obligations, even when the 
international obligations were recognised as in principle taking precedence over EU law provisions, see Case C-
Portugal v Commission [2000] ECR I-5171. 
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diplomatic protection of natural persons. The Union’s practice of establishing an individual 
fundamental right to consular and diplomatic protection recognised to unrepresented Union 
citizens contributes to supporting the modern international trend whereby consular and 
diplomatic protection of individuals are no longer exclusive discretionary powers of the State 
of nationality but, slowly, also individual rights to some sort of consular and diplomatic 
protection entitlements are recognised. The Member States have taken full advantage of the 
exceptions permitted by the general international legal framework and created a Union 
specific regime that would serve their needs of efficiently responding to the growing consular 
demands of their citizens travelling abroad.  
Despite the prevalent post-Lisbon Treaty objective of strict observance of international 
law, the EU does not limit to a mot-á-mot application of the international rules, but passes it 
through its constitutional and specific objectives lenses. Examples such as Kadi, Micheletti 
and ATAA, where EU law goes beyond a strict reproduction of the relevant international legal 
norms to ensure its own objectives and defend itself from international law, if needed,1345 
resemble to a certain extent the EU’s model of protecting EU citizens abroad. The 
relationship between public international and EU law in the area of protection of citizens 
abroad has been mutually influencing. At times it has been fervently criticised for being 
conflictual, due to the EU’s disregard of the relevant public international norms, argued to not 
accommodate the distinctive EU’s features. However the EU’s model of ensuring protection 
of EU citizens abroad is not per se incompatible with international law, nor is its 
implementation in practice, as proved by the lack of third countries opposition and model 
importation by certain regional organisations.1346 
                                                 
1345 See G. de Burca, ‘Europe’s raison d’etre’, in D. Kochenov and F. Amtenbrink (eds.), The European Union’s 
Shaping of the International Legal Order, Cambridge University Press (2014), 21-38. 
1346 See the regional consular sharing agreements in cases of disasters, which have been consented in the 
framework of other regional international organisation, such as the ASEAN (see the Guidelines for the Provision 
of Emergency Assistance by ASEAN Missions in Third Countries to Nationals of ASEAN Member Countries in 
Crisis Situation, Manila, Philippines, 29-30 July 2007) and Andean countries (according to Decision 548, the 
Andean Cooperation Mechanism on Consular Assistance and Protection and Migratory Matters was adopted in 
2003. ‘This instrument stipulates that any national of an Andean Community Member Country who is within the 
territory of a third State where his/her country of origin has no Diplomatic or Consular Representation, may avail 
him or herself of the protection of the diplomatic or consular officials of any other Member Country.’, Decision 
548/2003 has not yet been implemented). None of these provisions is so far a legal binding provision, since the 
ASEAN includes the partnership in a soft law instrument, while within the Andean framework, the Decision is 
not yet in force. These provisions do not enshrine an individual right similar to the EU citizenship right to equal 
protection abroad recognised within the EU legal order, but rather keep partnership in consular sharing as an 
inter-governmental framework of cooperation, similar to Decision 95/553/EC, regarding protection for citizens 
of the European Union by diplomatic and consular representations, OJ, 1995, L 314/73 and Decision 
96/409/CFSP, on the establishment of an emergency travel document, OJ, 1996, L 168/11. 
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Practice has proved that the interplay between the EU and international legal orders 
has been normatively productive, and mutually encouraging the respect of each other’s norms 
and beneficial to the individual and international relations. The EU’s specific rules on the 
protection of EU citizens abroad have actively contributed to shaping international law.1347  
First of all, the EU requirement incumbent upon the Member States to start 
international negotiations had the potential of creating international norms ensuring the 
international legitimacy of the EU’s model. In spite of the absence of express international 
norms recognising the legitimacy of the EU model of protecting citizens abroad, third 
countries have not opposed to the exercise of this model by the non-nationality Member 
States and Union. The geographically widespread and long-standing consent of third countries 
to the EU’s model of protecting EU citizens abroad can probably be argued to have led to the 
formation of a customary international norm recognising the international legitimacy of the 
EU’s model, and furthermore to the support of the future creation of an individual right to 
receive some sort of consular or diplomatic protection from States.  
The EU has given rise to further normative productivity, by way of offering a model 
for handling the growing consular burden of securing protection to citizens abroad. The EU 
specific model of ensuring protection of EU citizens abroad has by now influenced other 
regional legal orders. The ASEAN and Andean organisations seem to have taken as 
inspiration the EU model, especially the inter-States model of sharing of the citizens’ 
protection burden. Since 2007 and 2003 respectively, the ASEAN and Andean countries have 
recognised an individual right to receive protection abroad from any of the represented States 
when the States of nationality is not represented in loco.1348 The EU’s modern model departing 
from the classical interstate relations and vision of consular and diplomatic protection of 
individuals seems to be seen as an appealable evolution in the eyes of other international 
actors. Therefore, the EU specific model is no longer the sole exception from the international 
legal regime since other regional organisations have developed similar forms of protection of 
unrepresented citizens abroad, at least in regard to the intergovernmental forms of consular 
and diplomatic cooperation. 
Secondly, the portrayal of the EU’s legal regime as incompatible with the international 
legal order is not entirely accurate since the EU norms, as such, are not incompatible per se 
                                                 
1347 On the EU’s general objective of shaping the international legal order introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, see J. 
Larik, ‘Shaping the international order as an EU objective’ in D. Kochenov and F. Amtenbrink (eds.), The 
European Union’s Shaping of the International Legal Order, Cambridge University Press, (2014), 62-87. 
1348 See the ASEAN Andean countries examples. 
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with international law. Article 20(2)(c) TFEU refers to protection by the consular and 
diplomatic authorities of the non-nationality Member States, which, as previously pointed out, 
is permitted by public international law with the condition of obtaining the consent of third 
countries. The requirement of obtaining this consent was expressly included in the Maastricht 
Treaty, in the form of an obligation incumbent upon the Member States to start the 
international negotiations. In the meantime the exercise of consular protection by non-
nationality Member States has achieve wide consensus among third countries. 
 In regard to the exercise of protective functions by the Union institutions, it has to be 
emphasised that former Article 20 EU Treaty (current Article 35 TEU) did not provide a 
principal role in securing protection abroad of EU citizens to the Commission delegations, but 
only a complementary role which has translated in practice mostly in the form of operational 
help during repatriation or evacuation of citizens, rather than consular services in their 
classical Article 5 VCCR form. The post-Lisbon increased protection role of the EU is, first 
of all, a codification of its external practice already consented by third countries. Article 5(10) 
EEAS Decision builds upon Article 35 TEU and the practice of the EU – which followed the 
express requests of the Member States mostly in cases of consular crises. This practice has 
already been consented by third countries mostly due to the benefits it brings to them by 
taking away the burden of protecting aliens during crisis situations. The enhanced role of 
ensuring protection of EU citizens abroad recognised to the EU on the basis of the Lisbon 
Treaty seems to have created more opposition from the Member States rather than third 
countries. The exercise of legislative power directly by the Council in the form of Union 
measures has been fervently opposed by the certain Member States throughout the pre-Lisbon 
Treaty period, while currently the Council and the Commission have clear legislative powers 
for the implementation of the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad. This role, per 
se, is not making the EU legal regime incompatible with international legal norms, since the 
EU’s distinctiveness in terms of internal norms vis-á-vis the international legal order has 
already been accepted by the international community.1349 
In spite of the general development of international law accepting new non-State 
actors, the international norms governing the exercise of consular and diplomatic protection 
of natural persons,1350 are still of a purely inter-States nature. Therefore, it could be argued that 
the relevant international norms do not apply to the EU, which is still an international 
                                                 
1349 B. de Witte, ‘The Emergence of a European System of Public International Law’ in J. Wouters, A. 
Nollenkaemper and E. de Wet (eds.), The Europeanisation of International Law, TMC Asser Press (2008). 
1350 See Chapter 3. 
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organisation, even if not a classical one.1351 The only relevant rule on the capacity of an 
international organisation to exercise protection of individuals abroad is to be found in the 
Advisory Opinion of the ICJ delivered in 1948 in the Reparation of Injuries case1352, which 
does not prohibit the exercise of consular and diplomatic protection of individuals by an 
international organisation as long as this function is included within the international 
organisation constitutive charter. With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the European 
Union has a clear delimitation of its competence to exercise protection of EU citizens 
abroad,1353 therefore it would be argued that the European Union respects the applicable 
international norms, namely the general principle of speciality. 
The EU model of ensuring protection of EU citizens abroad reflects the changing 
conduct of international relations. In public international law, the times when European States 
used to abuse the use of force and other means of interference in the domestic affairs of other 
States, under the guise of diplomatic protection measures have long passed.1354 The current EU 
legal regime of protecting EU citizens is not a veil concealing interventionist intentions. Its 
main objective is to secure the protection of EU citizens as proved by practice, which has 
beneficial consequences also for third countries in terms of alleviating their responsibility of 
taking care of aliens in distress. It is true that the protection of nationals was also put forward 
as the main objective during the aforementioned past times, and that this objective could at 
any times be again abused by States. However, if this practice recurs, third countries would 
better invoke the abuse of rights doctrine rather than their lack of express consent to the EU 
specific model of protecting Union citizens abroad. 
                                                 
1351 The customary international law governing the exercise of consular and diplomatic protection of EU citizens 
is still an exclusive inter-States system, see the 2006 ILC Articles on Diplomatic Protection. The still 
preponderant inter-States relations nature of the international legal order is a more general problem, which the 
EU has to confront in many areas of activity. See for instance H. Bruyninckx, J. Wouters, S. Basu and S. Schunz 
(eds.), The European Union and Multilateral Governance: Assessing EU Participation in United Nations 
Human Rights and Environmental Fora, Palgrave Macmillan (2012); J. Wouters, Anna-Luise Chané, ‘Brussels 
meets Westphalia: The European Union and the United Nations’, WP No. 144/August 2014, available online at 
https://ghum.kuleuven.be/ggs/publications/working_papers/new_series/wp141-150/wp144-wouters-chane.pdf  
1352 International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion of 11 April 1949, Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the 
Service of the United Nations, ICJ Reports (1949), 174–220. 
1353 For more details, see the following chapter. 
1354 The Anglo-Boer war (1899-1902) was justified by Britain as an intervention to protect its nationals who 
owned the gold mines of Witwatersrand, and the United States´ military interventions in the Dominican Republic 
in 1965, in Grenada in 1983 and in Panama in 1989 were carried out on the pretext of defending U.S. nationals, 
for more on this see J. Dugard, First Report on Diplomatic Protection, presented to the International Law 
Commission during its 52th session, UN Doc. A/CN.4/506, 7 March 2000, 5-6, para. 14. See also Amerasinghe, 
‘The Effect of the Calvo Clause’, in op.cit.; J. Dugard, Third Report on Diplomatic Protection, Addendum, 16 




To conclude, the case of the EU model of ensuring protection abroad of EU citizens 
reflects an interdependence and mutual normative influence between the international and EU 
norms, rather than a conflictual relationship with the public international legal order. The 
exercise of the EU supranational model of protecting EU citizens abroad creates a precedent 
in international law, while the EU inter-governmental model is influencing international law 
by shaping existing international legal norms so as to correspond to the modern day needs of 






















                                                 
1355 This effect is referred to by legal academics (see S. Touze, op.cit., and K. Ziegler, op.cit.) as ‘normative 
permeability’ or ‘transversal effect of EU law’, and for a more detailed account, see D. Kochenov and F. 




Chapter 4 - The Unique Role of the European Union in Securing 
the Protection of EU Citizens Abroad 
I. Introduction 
 
Since the introduction of an EU citizenship right to protection abroad, in 1993, the EU has 
overcome numerous legal and political obstacles before reaching the current day expressly 
recognised power to exercise consular and diplomatic protection functions directly to its EU 
citizens in third countries. 
The exercise of consular and diplomatic protection on behalf of individuals has 
traditionally been connected with the State and perceived as falling under its sovereign 
power.1356 As shown in Chapter 3, these mechanisms of protecting citizens abroad were 
developed in an era when only States were formally recognised as international actors. The 
Vienna Conventions on Consular and Diplomatic Relations as well as the current customary 
international law still recognise only the State of nationality, and exceptionally non-
nationality States, as holders of a right to exercise consular and diplomatic protection on 
behalf of natural persons.1357 Since the appearance of international organisations on the 
international sphere, international law has had to accommodate and permit participation of 
this new international actor. To a certain extent the accommodation was made by recognising 
rights and obligations similar to those of States, such as active and passive legation rights,1358 
right to conclude international agreements, functional protection of their officials,1359 and 
immunity recognised to their high officials.  
The entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty has introduced a new actor on the 
international sphere, which could exercise, to a certain extent, State-like consular and 
diplomatic protection functions on behalf of private individuals, who are its citizens. The 
                                                 
1356 J. Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, Oxford University Press (2012), 115ff. 
1357 See Art. 8 VCCR and 45 VCDR. 
1358 See Henry G. Schermers, Niels M. Blokker, International Institutional Law: unity within Diversity, 5th 
revised ed. Brill (2011), 1158-1160. 
1359 See the ICJ’s Advisory opinion Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur 
of the Commission on Human Rights, ICJ Reports (1999), 62. The ICJ stated that the immunity of a UN officer 
can also be invoked against the State of nationality of such an officer when this expert acts in the name of the 
organisation. The same conclusions had been reached by the ICJ some years before in the Advisory Opinion on 
the Applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United 
Nations, dealing with the case of Mr Mazilu, the Romanian member of the UN Commission on Human Rights, 
who was hindered by Romania from leaving the territory of the State in order to exercise his function at the UN, 
ICJ Reports (1989), 177. 
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Lisbon Treaty has further strengthened the role of the Union in this field by introducing 
several institutional, procedural and substantive legal innovations. The most important 
institutional innovation is the replacement of the Commission delegations with Union 
delegations, which are currently representing the entire panoply of Union interests,1360 and 
they can also ensure the protection of Union citizens in third countries.1361 Unlike any other 
international organisation, and, similar to the consular and diplomatic missions of States, the 
Union delegations can protect the interests of the sending State and of its nationals in the 
world. The recognition of legislative powers to the Union Institutions, which can adopt via the 
QMV Directives, represents a procedural amendment meant to ensure the efficiency of the 
EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad, and broadly, protection of the Union citizens 
in the world. The most salient substantive legal innovations with impact on the EU citizenship 
right to equal protection abroad were commented in the first Chapter.  
The present Chapter will aim to offer a more integrated assessment of the impact of the 
Lisbon Treaty on all Union policies which are involved in securing protection of the Union 
citizens abroad. This chapter will first address the added value of the Lisbon Treaty to the 
EU’s role of ensuring protection of unrepresented Union citizens abroad.1362 It will continue 
to analyse the legal status, nature and effects of the EU citizenship right to equal protection 
abroad.1363 The question of the extent of consular and diplomatic functions entrusted to the 
EU will then be addressed.1364 In order to understand the impact of the EU legal regime on the 
Member States’ consular and diplomatic protection functions, the Member States’ national 
systems on consular and diplomatic protection of their citizens will be mapped out.1365 
Finally, the chapter will conclude by discussing the future of the EU’s role in the field of 
protecting unrepresented Union citizens in the future.1366 
                                                 
1360 Art. 221 TFEU. 
1361 Art. 35 TEU and Art. 5(10) EEAS Decision. 
1362 Section II. The Added Value of the Lisbon Treaty - Strengthening the EU’s Role to Ensure Protection of its 
Citizens in the World. 
1363 Section III. The legal status of equal protection abroad – (fundamental) EU citizenship right or entitlement 
to legitimate expectations?; Section IV. What’s in the EU citizen’s right to equal protection abroad? Challenges 
to establish the substantive content of the EU citizenship right; Section V. The legal effects of the Union 
citizenship right to equal protection abroad. 
1364 Section VI. The complex EU institutional architecture ensuring protection of EU citizens abroad. 
1365 Section VII. Mapping the Member States’ national systems of ensuring protection of citizens abroad and the 
top-down impact of the EU model of protecting Union citizens abroad. 
1366 Section VIII. Policy and institutional recommendations to increase the efficiency of protection of the EU 
citizens in the world. 
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II. The Added Value of the Lisbon Treaty - Strengthening the EU’s Role 
to Ensure Protection of its Citizens in the World  
When the Maastricht Treaty introduced for the first time a Union citizenship right to 
protection outside the Union’s borders, the only role envisaged for the Union was limited to 
one sentence in the former EU Treaty, whereby the consular and diplomatic missions of the 
Member States and the Community delegations were obliged to cooperate so as ‘to contribute 
to the implementation of the Union citizen’s right to protection in third countries’.1367 This 
particular obligation of cooperation would be put into practice on a common basis only after 
some 10 years from its introduction, following several consular crises affecting third 
countries, when the Member States realised they could not cope with the consular demands of 
the EU citizens through horizontal cooperation alone.1368 These positive instances of vertical 
cooperation convinced the Member States of the added value of the vertical cooperation, and 
more cases of the Union’s involvement followed.1369  
Unlike the case of other Union citizenship rights, the drafters of the Treaty did not 
endow the Council with specific legislative powers to ensure that the Union citizen’s right to 
equal protection abroad would effectively be applied and developed. Similar to other areas 
touching on sensitive foreign policies, the EU model of consular and diplomatic protection of 
the Union citizens was kept out of the reach of the Union’s legislative power and was left to 
the full control of the Member States’ executives. The provision within Article 8c Maastricht 
Treaty whereby the ‘Member States shall establish the necessary rules among themselves’ 
was interpreted as precluding implementation by way of Union legislative measures. The 
Member States did not act within the Community or Union pillar but outside the EU legal 
order, only taking advantage of the operational facilities of the Council. Until 2007, the 
instruments implementing the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad were adopted 
only in the format of sui-generis international agreements concluded by the Member States 
and non-constraining soft law documents elaborated by Council’s specific Working Group -
COCON. The only legally binding implementing instruments was a hybrid form of act - 
Decisions of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States adopted by the 
Member States acting in their capacity as representatives of the Member States within the 
                                                 
1367 Former Art. 20(2) TEU 
1368 For instance, during the South East Asia tsunami of December 2004. 
1369 For instance in Libya (2010), Mumbai (2008) and Libya again in early 2011. During the Gaza crisis in 
January 2009, nearly 100 people were evacuated in armoured buses thanks to the EU Delegation’s support. In 
most of these cases the Community Civil Protection Mechanism was triggered. 
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institutional framework of the Council. This type of act was usually adopted for making 
political statements or implementing organisational, administrative tasks, and was not 
designed to affect rights of the individuals.1370 The possibility of using the fall-back 
competence (former Article 308 EC Treaty) as legal basis for a Community based act, as 
occurred for the extension of the Civil Protection Mechanism to cover the provision of 
consular protection of EU citizens in third countries,1371 had not been considered, and it is 
argued that, in light of the required unanimous consent, it would have never passed approval 
in the Council.1372 
The Lisbon Treaty brought important changes regarding the role of the Union in 
securing the protection of Union citizens abroad on several accounts,1373 which have the 
potential of changing the previous logic of inter-governmental sui generis decision-making, 
into an area with strong supranational features. It could be argued that the Lisbon Treaty is a 
historical point in time for the purely inter-States international consular and diplomatic law, 
since it clearly establishes an international organisation alongside the States in an area that has 
been traditionally reserved to States. 
A first significant substantive legal innovation, brought by the Lisbon Treaty, is the 
introduction within the Article setting out the Union’s values and general objectives - Article 
3(5) TEU - of a provision establishing that: ‘In its relations with the wider world, the Union 
shall uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its 
citizens.’ The separation of ‘the protection of [Union] citizens’ from the words ‘values’ and 
‘interests’ in this phrase seems to indicate that its nature is distinct from the latter ones, and, 
thus seems to fall under the remaining legitimate category of the Union’s ‘objectives’. One 
might question whether this differentiation between ‘interests’, ‘values’, and ‘objectives’ is 
necessary or indeed useful. In principle, the main difference is between ‘values’ and 
‘interests’, on the one hand, and ‘objectives’, on the other hand. The latter category is said to 
have normative force, due to its interpretative1374, guiding and informing policy-making role, 
                                                 
1370 E.g. Art. 253 TFEU (ex-Art. 223 TEC), Art. 341 TFEU (ex-Art. 289 TEC). 
1371 Council Decision 2007/779/EC of 8 November 2007 establishing a Community Civil Protection Mechanism 
[2007] OJ L 314/9, 9-19. 
1372 Council Decision 2007/779/EC of 8 November 2007 establishing a Community Civil Protection Mechanism 
[2007] OJ L 314/9, 9-19. 
1373 See, for instance: introducing the protection of EU citizens in the world as an express Union objective; 
introducing new external relations actors; enhancing the duty of vertical cooperation among the consular and 
diplomatic missions of the Member States and the external representations of the Union; recognising an express 
internal legislative role for the Council and the Commission, as well as an external action competence. 
1374 According to the CJEU, EU law or domestic law falling under the scope of EU law must be be interpreted 
and applied in the light of the Treaty objectives; this is method of interpretation is known as the teleological 
method of interpretation, which the Court often uses (see Joined Cases 6 and 7/73 Istituto Chemioterapico 
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whether based on specific policy related provisions (Articles 23(2) TFEU), or within the 
general framework of the flexibility clause (Article 352 TFEU) or development of EU’s 
external implied powers (Article 216(1) TFEU).1375 Several legal scholars have incidentally 
referred to Article 3(5) TEU as establishing general Union objectives.1376 It has to be noticed 
that Article 3(5) TEU starts with the words ‘in its relations with the wider world’ thus 
signalling that it refers to external relations ‘values’, ‘interests’, and ‘objectives’. The 
protection of Union citizens is not so general to be qualified as a ‘value’ and being mentioned 
separately from the latter and having a corresponding internal and external Union power 
detailing the protection of Union citizens abroad, one is lead to believe that we are in the 
presence of a Union’s objective. Therefore, it can be argued that Article 3(5) TEU includes 
within the panoply of external relations objectives the ‘protection of its citizens’. An express 
Union objective is now present in the founding Treaty to guide and inform the Union’s 
policy-making and choices for their implementation outside the EU. In the context of the 
highly challenged consular and diplomatic protection functions recognised to the Union1377, 
the objective of ‘protection of [Union] citizens’ can, for instance, orientate and also legitimate 
the Union’s use of Article 35(3) TEU-based external competence. 
A second important substantive legal innovation brought by the Lisbon Treaty to the 
protection of Union citizens abroad is the clarification of the legal nature of the EU citizen’s 
right to equal protection abroad as being both an EU citizenship right,1378 and a fundamental 
right of the EU citizen (Article 46 EU Charter1379). If the Lisbon Treaty clarified the legal 
                                                                                                                                                        
Italiano S.p.A. and CommercialSolvents Corporation v Commission [1974] ECR 223, para. 32; see also   
Opinion 1/91); see also A. Kaczrowska, European Union Law, Routledge (2013), 138-140; K. Lenaerts and José 
A. Gutiérrez-Fons, ‘To Say What the Law of the EU Is: Methods of Interpretation and the European Court of 
Justice’, EUI Working Paper AEL 2013/9; J. Larik, ‘From Speciality to the Constitutional Sense of Purpose: On 
the Changing Role of the Objectives of the European Union’ (2014) International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly, 935, 953. 
1375 It has been argued that the objectives will not serve alone as legal basis for the extension of Union powers, 
they can lead to such a result but only within the limited circumstances codified by Arts. 216(1) TFEU and 352 
TFEU. See J. Larik, ‘From Speciality to the Constitutional Sense of Purpose: On the Changing Role of the 
Objectives of the European Union’ (2014) International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 935, 953; M. Cremona, 
‘A Reticent Court? Policy Objectives and the Court of Justice’ in A. Thies and M. Cremona (eds.) The European 
Court of Justice and External Relations Law - Constitutional Challenges, Hart Publishing (2014). 
1376 J. Larik, From Speciality to the Constitutional Sense of Purpose: On the Changing Role of the Objectives of 
the European Union’ (2014) International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 935, see fn 4. 
1377 In particular the defensive attitude of certain Member States, in particular the UK, which has constantly been 
opposed to recognising consular and diplomatic like functions to the EU, and thus raised oppositions to the 
newly conferred external power of the Union to protection citizens abroad as enshrined in Art. 35(3) TEU and 
Art. 5(10) EEAS Decisions and future inclusion of such power in the proposal for a Directive on consular 
protection of Union citizens abroad. 
1378 The right to equal protection abroad is provided by Article 20(2)(c) TFEU, which is located among the other 
three EU citizenship rights and under the Chapter on Non-Discrimination and Citizenship. 
1379 Article 46 is entitled ‘the right to consular and diplomatic protection’. 
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nature of the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad, the same cannot be said about 
the substantive scope of application of this right. The Treaty of Lisbon did not change the 
wording of the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad, thus maintaining the previous 
concept of ‘protection by the consular and diplomatic authorities of the Member States’ which 
has been criticised for confusing consular with diplomatic protection and for lacking clarity as 
regards the precise types of protection the EU citizenship provision refers to – consular and/or 
diplomatic protection.1380 The added value of the Lisbon Treaty comes from the entry into 
force of the EU Charter and its Articles 46. In addition to strengthening the legal status of the 
EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad by raising it to a ‘fundamental right’, Article 
46 of the EU Charter could be interpreted as offering evidence on the substantive scope of 
application of this right. The Article is entitled ‘diplomatic and consular protection’ and has 
the same content as Articles 20(2)(c) and 23(1) TFEU, and same legal force as the Founding 
Treaties, indicating that the equal ‘protection by the consular and diplomatic authorities of the 
Member States’ could be interpreted as including both consular and diplomatic protection, 
contrary to the view of certain Member States1381 and the majority of the legal scholars, of 
both international and EU law formation,1382 that the EU citizenship right confers only equal 
consular protection.1383  
In terms of institutional innovations, the Lisbon Treaty introduced new actors within 
the Union’s institutional setting responsible for the conduct of its external representation, 
                                                 
1380 See S. Kadelbach, ‘Union citizenship’, NYU Jean Monnet Working Paper 9/03; A. Vermeer-Künzli, ‘Where 
the Law becomes Irrelevant: Consular Assistance and the European Union’, (2011) International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, 965. 
1381 See the UK’s position from a recent report in relation to the Commission’s proposal for a Directive on 
consular protection of unrepresented Union citizens: ‘The Government's view — endorsed by both the 
Committee and its predecessor — has consistently been that: consular services are the responsibility of Member 
States; are, quite rightly, at the top of Ministers' and officials' agenda, at home and abroad; a good level of 
cooperation between Member States already exists, and work was underway to improve it further; missions 
staffed by EU officials could not provide a service of the same standard, with the level of immediate 
accountability that ensured that it remained thus; the Government would resist the expansionist elements in these 
proposals with vigour and determination’. (emphasis added). See the Thirty-third Report of Session 2012-13 of 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, available at: 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmeuleg/86-xxxiii/8615.htm> (accessed June 
2013). 
1382 A. Vermeer-Künzli, ‘Where the Law becomes Irrelevant: Consular Assistance and the European Union’, op. 
cit., pp. 965-995; P. Vigni, The Protection of EU Citizens: The Perspective of International Law’, in J. Larik and 
M. Moraru (eds.), Ever-Closer in Brussels—Ever-Closer in the World? EU External Action after the Lisbon 
Treaty, EUI Working Paper 2011/10, 91–107; E. Denza, ‘Commentary to Art. 46 of the EU Charter’, in S. Peers, 
T. Hervey, J. Kenner, A. Ward (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary, Hart Publishing 
(2014); S. Kadelbach, ‘Union citizenship’, NYU Jean Monnet Working Paper 9/03; J. Dugard, Seventh Report on 
diplomatic protection, United Nations General Assembly, A/CN.4/567, United Nations, New York, 7 March 
2006. 
1383 For a detailed discussion of Art. 46 EU Charter and its relation with Arts. 20(2)(c) and 23 TFEU, see the 
section titled ‘Content of the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad’, in this chapter.  
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which aimed to ensure consistency and coherence of the Union’s foreign policy and enhance 
the image of the Union as an international actor in the eyes of third countries: for instance, the 
President of the European Council, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy1384, who have similar external representation functions,1385 and the 
European External Action Service (EEAS).1386 The Lisbon Treaty provided only for the 
possibility of establishing the EEAS, while its actual establishment, as ‘a functionally 
autonomous body of the European Union, separate from the Commission and the General 
Secretariat of the Council’ was done in 2010 on the basis of a Council Decision,1387 and 
officially launched on 1st of December 2010, following the adoption of a flanking Staff and 
Financial Regulation.1388  
The EEAS became functional in January 2011, after merging several departments from 
the Council1389 and the Commission1390 into the new EEAS.1391 The Commission Delegations 
were replaced with Union delegations, which were endowed with a wider external 
representation task,1392 now operating as diplomatic missions representing all Union’s 
interests and policies.1393 The Delegations are currently the face of the Union in third 
countries, and the Heads of the delegation have now wider powers to act for the purpose of 
ensuring the effective implementation of all the Union’s interests and policies tasks, including 
wide administrative competences, such as concluding contracts and being a party to legal 
proceedings, similar to the powers of the ambassadors and consuls of the Member States.1394 
To the concern of certain Member States1395, the Union delegations have taken over some of 
the international representations functions which the Member States had to fulfil under their 
Union obligations, such as replacing the coordination role of the consular and diplomatic 
missions of the Member States holding the Presidency in third countries. 
                                                 
1384 Hereinafter HR, Art. 18 TEU. 
1385 Art. 15(6), 18 and 27 (2) TEU. The differences between the external representational tasks of the President 
and of the HR are not very clear. While the former represents the Union ‘on issues of common foreign and 
security policy, at this level and in that capacity’, the more general mission of HR is take the lead in the 
Union's common foreign and security policy and is assisted by the EEAS. See J. Wouters and S. Duquet, The 
EU, EEAS and Union Delegations and International Diplomatic Law: New Horizons (Leuven Centre For Global 
Governance Studies, 2011), 7. 
1386 Art. 27(3) TEU. 
1387 Article 1(2) of Decision 2010/427/EU establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External 
Action Service (hereinafter EEAS Decision) [2010] OJ L 201/30. 
1388 2011 EEAS Report. 
1389 The DG E, crisis management, was seconded to the EEAS. 
1390 DG RELEX, external service and part of DG DEV were seconded to the EEAS. 
1391 Art. 4 EEAS Decision and Organisational Chart. 
1392 Art. 221 TFEU. 
1393 Ibid.. 
1394 See Art. 5(8) EEAS Decision. 
1395 Such as the UK and France. 
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The Lisbon Treaty brought several significant innovations capable of enhancing the 
procedural efficiency in the field of protection of EU citizens abroad. First of all, the Lisbon 
Treaty conferred express legislative powers to the Union Institutions, for the purpose of 
adopting Directives ‘establishing the coordination and cooperation measures necessary to 
facilitate’ the equal protection of EU citizens abroad.1396 After consulting the European 
Parliament, the Council acts by qualified majority.1397 The involvement of the European 
Parliament and the replacement of unanimous decision-making with qualified majority voting 
is a significant blow to the long defended sovereignty of the Member States. On the other 
hand, it should be noted that Article 23(2) TFEU maintained part of the inter-governmental 
language as the directives that the Council is entitled to adopt are limited to ‘cooperation and 
coordination’ measures, recalling the pre-Lisbon framework limited to cooperation and 
coordination among the Member States that governed the field. The ‘coordination and 
cooperation’ language of Article 23(2) TFEU gives an indication that the Directive to be 
adopted might not be used for harmonising the national law and practice on the legal nature, 
force, material and personal scope of consular and diplomatic protection of citizens. The 
Council might be entitled to establish only a common model for operational actions in cases 
of assisting EU citizens in distress. Thus, it could be argued that the ambit of the Directive 
mentioned in Article 23(2) TFEU is similar to the ambit of the sui generis measures that the 
Member States could have adopted under the previous pillar structure.1398  
Regardless of whether it is only a ‘coordination and cooperation’ or harmonising 
Directive, the change of the legal nature of the implementing measures brought about by the 
Lisbon Treaty is significant in terms of the judicial guarantees available to individuals. Unlike 
the sui generis Decisions of the Representatives which are not Union acts, Directives are 
subject to the full panoply of EU judicial remedies, thus increasing the effectiveness of the 
EU citizen’s fundamental right to consular and diplomatic protection at both EU and national 
levels. 
In terms of the relevant external competence of the European Union, the Lisbon Treaty 
has clarified, to a certain extent the types of competence enjoyed by the Union,1399 and thus 
the division of competences to act externally between the Union and the Member States. The 
                                                 
1396 The Commission plays the role of legislative initiator, Art. 17 TEU, the European Parliament’s role is not as 
important as the Council, however it has to be consulted (Art. 16(3) TEU), while the Council adopts Directive(s) 
by QMV - Art. 23(2) TFEU. 
1397 Art. 16(3) TEU. 
1398 The so-called Decisions of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting within the 
Council. 
1399 There is an express list of categories of competences, Arts. 2-6 TFEU. 
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EU citizenship or the specific right to equal protection abroad is not mentioned by any of the 
specific categories of competences, whether exclusive (Article 3 TFEU), complementary 
(Article 5 TFEU) or supporting, coordinating or supplementing as provided by (Article 6 
TFEU).1400 In this situation, according to the fall-back competence Articles 4(1) and 216(1) 
TFEU, the EU would enjoy an internal and external competence of enhancing the protection 
of EU citizens abroad that is shared with the Member States.  
Some of the Member States might prefer to have this competence qualified as 
supplementary under Article 6 TFEU, since this would pre-empt the Union’s future 
acquisition of power to the detriment of the Member States, keeping the latter as primary 
actors. However, the only type of competence provided by Article 6 TFEU that might be 
interpreted as covering the equal protection of Union citizens abroad, namely administrative 
cooperation,1401 has a specific EU autonomous meaning, referring to cooperation among the 
national executives for the specific purpose of ensuring the effective transposition of EU law. 
It is arguable whether the specific meaning of Union action under Article 23 TFEU, which is 
after all part of the EU citizenship rights that have so far been subject to EU shared 
competence, could be interpreted as falling under the aforementioned meaning of 
‘administrative cooperation’. A legal scholar argued that the areas enshrined in Article 6 
TFEU are not exhaustive,1402 however, the specific type of supplementary competence would 
have to be mentioned in some other Article within the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, which is not the case with the EU citizenship right. 
 A significant added value of the Lisbon Treaty in terms of further clarifying the EU 
external relations catalogue, is the introduction of an express legal basis for the 
complementary civil protection policy (Article 196 TFEU) and humanitarian aid policy 
(Article 218 TFEU), which can exceptionally be used for the purpose of ensuring consular 
protection of EU citizens in distress abroad. The fact that the Union and the Member States 
share their external competences in this field may entail certain unwelcome legal 
consequences for some of the Member States.1403 It seems that the Member States are already 
experiencing the consequences, as, in light of the fact that the Member States have not started 
                                                 
1400 Certain authors argued that consular and diplomatic protection of EU citizens abroad would fall under the 
ambit of administrative cooperation as provided by Art. 6 (g) TFEU (see S. Battini, ‘The Impact of EU Law and 
Globalisation on Consular Assistance and Diplomatic Protection’ in E. Chiti, Bernardo G. Mattarella (eds.), 
Global Administrative Law and EU administrative Law, Relationships, Legal Issues and Comparison, Springer 
(2011). However, this competence refers rather to the transposition of EU legislation and not the cooperation 
among the consular and diplomatic authorities of the Member States as part of the national administration. 
1401 Art. 6(g) TFEU. 
1402 P. Craig, The Lisbon Treaty: Law, Politics, and Treaty Reform, Oxford University Press (2012), 174. 
1403 Arts. 2(2), 4(2) TFEU. 
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negotiations with third countries with a view to obtain the latter’s consent to the exercise of 
the EU’s specific regime, the Commission proposed to include a consent clause in mixed 
agreements with third countries. According to a Commission Communication of March 2011, 
‘the negotiations are on-going’, however, the Community does not mention which kind of 
negotiating framework will be chosen: the Open Skies method1404 – whereby the Member 
States continue to negotiate and conclude international agreements but under the strict 
supervision of the Commission, or negotiations conducted directly by the Union after 
obtaining a delegation from the Member States to continue the negotiations. 
Another salient procedural innovation was brought by the Lisbon Treaty to the 
obligation of systemic cooperation with the Member States’ consular and diplomatic missions 
in third countries. In order to enhance the practical application of the equal protection of 
unrepresented EU citizens in third countries, the vertical diplomatic cooperation between the 
Union delegations and the Member States’ consular and diplomatic missions was 
strengthened in the Lisbon Treaty. There are currently several different provisions in both EU 
primary and secondary law translating this obligation. A general diplomatic cooperation 
obligation is included in Article 32 TEU applicable within the CFSP ambit, and a 
correspondent obligation is placed within the TFEU in relation to non-CFSP areas (Article 
221 TFEU). Additionally, Article 35(3) TEU provides for a specific vertical diplomatic 
cooperation within the specific area of implementation of the EU citizenship right to equal 
protection abroad. The duty of cooperation is further strengthened by Article 5(9) of the 
EEAS Decision, which provides a general duty of cooperation, while paragraph 10 of the 
same Article endows the Union delegations with the competence to support the Member 
States, upon their request, in their role of providing consular protection to citizens of the 
Union in third countries.  
In addition to the obligation of vertical cooperation, the effective implementation of 
the EU citizen’s right to equal protection abroad is also ensured by adding an obligation of 
horizontal cooperation among the consulates and embassies of the Member States.1405 
A retrospective insight to the Founding Treaty amendments, from Maastricht until the 
Lisbon Treaties, shows the incredible evolution experienced by the EU, in spite of certain 
Member States’ persistent opposition. The EU significantly increased its role into an area that 
has been historically perceived as reserved to States. Ensuring protection of EU citizens 
                                                 
1404 M Cremona, ‘External Relations and External Competence of the EU: the Emergence of an Integrated 
Policy’ in P. Craig and G. de Burca (eds.), The Evolution of EU Law, Oxford University Press (2011), 230-267. 
1405 See Art. 35(1) and (3) TEU. 
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abroad used to be governed by inter-governmental measures, and the Community, its 
delegations, and the Union, were gradually accepted as actors following recent consular crises 
from the early 2000s. The Treaty of Lisbon gave a concrete role to the EU in relation to the 
protection of EU citizens abroad. It can be noted that the EU is now legally obliged to respect 
in all its internal and external policies the Union’s objective of protecting the interests of its 
citizens abroad (Article 3(5) TEU) and has a foreign service (the EEAS)1406 empowered to 
attain this obligation (Article 221 TFEU), while the Member States are required, according to 
Article 4(3) TEU and Article 35 TEU, to cooperate sincerely with the EEAS for the purpose 
of ensuring the Union’s objective of protecting the Union citizens in the world. Comparing 
the EU legal regime established by the Maastricht Treaty with the current framework 
established by the Lisbon Treaty, the EU’s role is definitely clearer and bigger, and with a 
potential to increase depending on the evolving external security and internal financial 
circumstances, and the changing views of the Member States. Large-scale consular crises1407 
have revealed the gaps in the horizontal cooperation, and the necessity of vertical consular 
cooperation in order to promptly respond to the consular demands has certainly played a 









                                                 
1406 The European External Action Service was formally launched on 1 December 2010 and became operational 
in January 2011. See European External Action Service established by Article 27(3) TEU and Council Decision 
2010/427/EU of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action 
Service, [2010] OJ L 201/30. 
1407 See the case of the 2004 South East Asian tsunami, where difficulties in providing prompt relief to EU 
citizens were encountered, see for instance the case of Sweden, the CARE Report, Chapter III section 4.7. The 
European Commission 2006 Green Paper also mentioned that Member States were not well represented in the 
area: 17 Member States had a representation in Thailand, while only 6 had a representation in Sri Lanka. 
European Commission, ‘Green Paper on Diplomatic and Consular Protection’, 28 November 2006 
(COM(2006)712 final) (‘Green Paper’). 
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III. The legal status of equal protection abroad – (fundamental) EU 
citizenship right or entitlement to legitimate expectations?  
The fact that that the EU citizenship to equal protection abroad is formulated differently than 
the other EU citizenship rights, namely, instead of providing a ‘right to equal protection 
abroad’ along the lines of the ‘right to move and reside’,1408 ‘right to vote’1409 and ‘right to 
petition’,1410 the EU legal provisions have always phrased the right in more abstract wording, 
such as ‘right to enjoy […] the protection’1411 and ‘entitlement to protection’1412, which has 
been argued by certain Member States,1413 legal scholars1414 and EU Institutions’ 
representatives1415 as indicating a different legal nature and force of this EU citizenship right 
compared to the other EU citizenship rights. 
The difference between ‘right’ and ‘entitlement’ seems to be that of a different legal 
force, whereby the latter legal concept can be subject to further limitations that do not need to 
follow the same strict conditions as a limitation imposed to a right.1416 In short, ‘entitlement’ 
would grant more leeway for Member States to act discretionally. The distinction between 
‘right’ and ‘entitlement’ is not clear since legal dictionaries seem to define these terms in 
                                                 
1408 Art. 21 TFEU. 
1409 Art. 22 TFEU. 
1410 Art. 24 TFEU. 
1411 See Art. 20(2)(c) TFEU. 
1412 See Art. 46 EU Charter – ‘[…] be entitled to protection […]’. 
1413 For example, Ireland and the UK Ministries of Foreign Affairs. However, the UK has offered different 
opinions. In mid-2005, during hearings before the ECJ, the UK acting as a defendant in a case brought before the 
Court by Spain, argued that consular and diplomatic protection is a right of the individual and not a policy (Case 
C-145/04 Spain v UK [2006] ECR I-17917, para. 54). During the same year, as a response to the Commission 
Green Paper, the UK argued that the same Treaty based provision did not provide for a ‘right’ to the Union 
citizens (!). 
1414 There are certain academic opinions that portrayed former Art. 20 TEC as an illustration of the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), a requirement for joint action between the Member States rather than as an 
individual right like the EU citizen’s right to move and reside within the EU. SeeS. Kadelbach, ‘Union 
citizenship’, NYU Jean Monnet Working Paper 9/03, 30 and Siofra O’Leary, EU Citizenship – The Options for 
Reform, IPPR, 1996, 63; or simply as an entitlement understood as something less than a right, in regard to 
which the State can retain some power of refusal, see Touzé, who emphasises that Art. 46 of the Charter does not 
use the term ‘right’ (‘droit’) but rather the term ‘entitled’ (‘bénéficie’), while other provisions of the Charter do 
confer ‘rights’, see S. Touzé, ‘Aspects récents (et choisis) de la protection consulaire des citoyens de l'Union 
européenne’, (2011) Revue des affaires européennes, 83-85 and J. Wouters, S. Duquet and K. Meuwissen, ‘The 
European Union and Consular Law’, KU Leuven Working Paper 107/2013. 
1415 See for the different opinions of the MEPs. European Parliament – Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and 
Home Affairs, Resolution of 11 December 2007 P6_TA(2007)0592, available at 
http://www.careproject.eu/database/schedaEU.php?eulex=EUEPreport&lang=6 . 
1416 S. Kadelbach, ‘Union citizenship’, NYU Jean Monnet Working Paper 9/03; S. Touzé, ‘Aspects récents (et 
choisis) de la protection consulaire des citoyens de l'Union européenne’, (2011) Revue des affaires européennes, 
83-85; J. Wouters, S. Duquet and K. Meuwissen, ‘The European Union and Consular Law’, KU Leuven Working 
Paper 107/2013, 6-7. 
 330 
 
ways that makes them appear synonymous.1417 ‘Entitlement’ seems to be described as the fact 
or situation of having a right, and it is more commonly used in contract law or social law.  
The opinion put forward by this thesis is that there is not enough legal evidence of a 
clear legal difference between ‘right’ and ‘entitlement’ and thus, contrary to certain legal 
scholarly views,1418 there is no need of making a choice between the two concepts in regard to 
the nature of the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad.1419 
This thesis argues that, even if we were to accept such a clear distinction between the 
concepts of ‘right’ and ‘entitlement’, whereby the latter concept imposes a less binding or 
forceful obligation upon the Member States, there is enough evidence in the founding Treaties 
that the EU citizenship right to equal protection is a ‘right’ with a similar legal nature and 
force as the other EU citizenship rights enshrined in Article 20 TFEU. 
First, Article 8c of the Maastricht Treaty and all its later versions have used the word 
‘shall’ in the wording of the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad, which commonly 
reflects a legal obligation, and it would logically entail a corresponding right to the EU 
citizens. 
Second, the Lisbon Treaty introduced a list of EU citizenship rights in addition to the 
separate legal provision dedicated to each of the four EU citizenship rights. Since all four 
rights were included within a common list, it would seem illogical to differentiate the EU 
citizenship right to equal protection abroad from the other rights as having a different, less 
forceful legal status. 
Third, the now legally binding EU Charter on Fundamental Rights and Freedoms also 
supports its status as a ‘right’. Article 46 of the EU Charter is entitled ‘the right to consular 
and diplomatic protection’ and is part of the Union primary law1420 that binds the Member 
States in their conduct towards the Union citizens. Since there is no legal hierarchy between 
the EU Charter and the EU Treaties, and the wording of Article 46 of the EU Charter is 
identical to the wording of Article 23 (1) TFEU, then, as a consequence, the title of Article 46 
– right to consular and diplomatic protection – indicates that Article 20(2)(c) TFEU enshrines 
                                                 
1417 The Oxford Dictionary, the Legal Dictionary, the Law Dictionary (all accessed online) 
1418 S. Kadelbach, ‘Union citizenship’, NYU Jean Monnet Working Paper 9/03; S. Touzé, ‘Aspects récents (et 
choisis) de la protection consulaire des citoyens de l'Union européenne’, (2011) Revue des affaires européennes, 
83, 83-85. 
1419 Established legal scholars, such as E. Denza, who is coming from a common law system, use inter-
changeably the concepts of ‘right’ and ‘entitlement’ without making a difference between the two. See E. Denza, 
Commentary to Art. 46 of the EU Charter, in The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary, by S. 
Peers, T. Hervey, J. Kenner, A. Ward, Hart Publishing (2014). See also of a similar opinion, P. Vigni, 
‘Diplomatic and consular protection: Misleading Combination or Creative Solution’, EUI Law Working Paper 
2010/11, 5. 
1420 See Art. 6 TEU. 
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an individual right to consular and diplomatic protection recognised to the unrepresented EU 
citizen.1421 The legal force of Article 46 EU Charter should however be interpreted with 
caution in light of Article 52(2) EU Charter, which provides that: ‘Rights recognised by this 
Charter which are based on the Community Treaties or the Treaty on European Union shall 
be exercised under the conditions and within the limits defined by those Treaties.’ 
In conclusion, in spite of some scholarly views and opinions of the Member States, 
there seems to be enough legal evidence that Articles 20(2)(c) and 23 TFEU confer a ‘right’ 
to equal protection abroad to the (unrepresented) EU citizens, which is no less of a ‘right’ 
than the other EU citizenship rights provided by the founding EU Treaties. 
IV. What’s in the EU citizen’s right to equal protection abroad? 
Challenges to establish the substantive content of the EU citizenship right  
1. Introduction 
One of the sharpest critiques raised against the EU citizenship right since its introduction by 
the Maastricht Treaty, which seems to continue also after the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty, concerns the imprecise substantive content of this right.1422 Namely it is not clear 
whether the term ‘protection by the consular and diplomatic authorities of the Member States’ 
should be equated with the public international legal concepts of ‘consular protection’ and 
‘diplomatic protection’. So far the thesis adopted a maximalist understanding of the 
substantive scope of the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad, especially in Chapter 
                                                 
1421 It is important to distinguish between the EU citizen and the unrepresented EU citizen as holder of the right. 
The Treaties and the EU Charter do not confer a right to consular and diplomatic protection to all EU citizens, 
but only to a restricted category, namely, as expressly mentioned by the Treaties, to the ‘unrepresented EU 
citizens’. The notion of ‘unrepresented’ as a condition that a Union citizen has to fulfil in order to enjoy the right 
to consular protection is, currently, exhaustively defined in Art. 1 of Decision 95/553/EC: ‘Every citizen of the 
European Union is entitled to the consular protection of any Member State's diplomatic or consular 
representation if, in the place in which he is located, his own Member State or another State representing it on a 
permanent basis has no: - accessible permanent representation, or - accessible Honorary Consul competent for 
such matters.’ 
1422 A. Vermeer-Künzli, ‘The Legal Framework of consular assistance: Some inconsistencies between EU law 
and international law on consular assistance’ in by S. Faro, Mario P. Chiti and E. Schweighofer (eds), European 
Citizenship and Consular Protection New Trends in European Law and National law edited, Editura scientifica 
Napoli (2012), 101-111; A.Vermeer-Künzli, ‘Where the Law becomes Irrelevant: Consular Assistance and the 
European Union’, (2011) International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 965; See J. Dugard, Seventh Report on 
diplomatic protection, United Nations General Assembly, A/CN.4/567, United Nations, New York, 7 March 
2006, p. 10; A. Vermeer-Künzli, ‘Exercising Diplomatic Protection, the fine line between litigation, demarches 
and consular assistance’, (2008) ZaöRV, 339; T. Stein, ‘Interim Report on “Diplomatic Protection Under the 
European Union Treaty”’, in: ILA Committee on Diplomatic Protection of Persons and Property, Second Report, 
New Delhi, 2002, 36-7; P. Vigni, ‘The Protection of EU Citizens: The Perspective of International law’ in: J. 
Larik and M. Moraru (eds.), Ever-Closer in Brussels – Ever-Closer in the World? EU External Action after the 
Lisbon Treaty, EUI Working Paper 2011/10, 91-107. 
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3 where, for the purpose of doing an exhaustive legal assessment of the conformity of the EU 
legal regime of protecting EU citizens with the public international legal framework, it was 
safer to take into consideration the EU citizenship right as including both equal consular and 
diplomatic protection. Arguments in both directions have been raised by legal scholars, and 
according to the Commission’s latest policy paper on the EU citizenship right to equal 
protection abroad,1423 the EU citizenship right does not exclude diplomatic protection, which 
might in the future, depending on the circumstances, also develop a diplomatic protection 
aspect. Therefore Chapter 3 chose to embrace the maximalist understanding to explore 
whether this development might pose problems in future from the perspective of the EU legal 
regime conformity with public international law. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, public international law recognises two different traditional 
types of assistance that can be provided to natural persons abroad: diplomatic protection and 
consular assistance. Although presenting numerous similarities in terms of legal nature, 
conditions, and objectives, they are not identical and have different legal regimes governing 
their exercise.1424  
Consular and diplomatic protection resemble, in terms of their legal nature, since they 
are both traditionally defined as rights of the State of the nationality, over which the State 
enjoys extensive decision-making powers, which only recently have been made subject, to a 
certain extent, to limitations based on judicially established criteria.1425 One of the important 
differences between these two mechanisms consists in the requirements necessary to be 
fulfilled by the State to legitimately exercise the protection on the international sphere. While 
consular protection, does not have precise requirements, except general ones such as 
nationality of claims,1426 and respect of the local law of the receiving State,1427 diplomatic 
protection, due to its more intrusive effects into the domestic affairs of the receiving States 
and legal consequences on the international plane,1428 has been made subject to more stringent 
requirements clearly prescribed by customary international law.1429  
                                                 
1423 European Commission Staff Working Paper Impact Assessment Accompanying the document Proposal for a 
Directive of the Council on coordination and cooperation measures regarding consular protection for 
unrepresented EU citizens, SEC(2011) 1556 final, Brussels, 14.12.2011. 
1424 For a more detailed commentary of the differences between consular and diplomatic protection under 
international law, please see Chapter 2 Section II. 
1425 See the section ‘National jurisprudence’ in Chapter 2. 
1426 Resulting from Art. 8 VCCR. 
1427 Arts. 5(m) and 55 of the VCCR. 
1428 That is raising the international responsibility of the receiving State. 
1429 See Art. 1 of the 2006 ILC Articles on Diplomatic Protection refers to three requirements: existence of an 
international wrongful act, ‘nationality of claims’, and exhaustion of local remedies. 
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In spite of the current public international law maintaining the legal differentiation 
between consular and diplomatic protection of individuals,1430 the Lisbon Treaty has 
maintained the same convoluted wording of the Maastricht Treaty’s EU citizenship right to 
equal protection by the consular and diplomatic authorities of the Member States.1431 The 
source of clarification of the substantive content of the EU citizenship right might come from 
beyond the founding Treaties, i.e. the EU Charter, which has an Article with the same 
wording as Article 20(2)(c) TFEU, but is entitled ‘diplomatic and consular protection, thus 
indicating that the content of the EU citizenship which is equivalent to the EU fundamental 
right might include both international mechanisms of ‘consular protection’ and ‘diplomatic 
protection’.1432  
Several of the recent consular crisis have shown that consular protection and assistance 
is unequivocally falling under the scope of the EU citizenship right and that their 
understanding is similar to consular protection action as defined by public international law. 
So far, diplomatic protection actions, whether of an informal or formal nature, seem not to 
have been exercised by non-nationality Member States, but rather by the EU institutions for 
certain EU citizens abroad.1433  
The question of the legal content of the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad 
seems to be of utmost relevance in light of the fact that more and more EU citizens find 
themselves outside the Union without protection from their Member State of nationality.1434 
In addition to the issue of whether diplomatic protection is also covered by the EU citizenship 
right, the precise list of protection services has been an issue in practice in light of the clash 
between the EU citizens’ expectations of the right to receive the same kind of help regardless 
of which Member State they resort to,1435 in spite of the various implementing practices of the 
28 Member States. There are very few aspects of the consular and diplomatic protection of 
natural persons on which all the Member States converge, the main trait is that the legal 
nature, substantive, and personal scope of consular and diplomatic protection of individuals, 
and the recognised domestic legal remedies, are differently regulated by the 28 Member 
                                                 
1430 See Chapter 2, section III - Differentiating consular assistance from diplomatic protection as State’s 
mechanisms for protecting citizens abroad. 
1431 Former Art. 20 EC Treaty is now Art. 23 TFEU, while the right is also stipulated in the list of EU citizenship 
rights (Art. 20(2)(c) TFEU). 
1432 Whether Art. 46 EU Charter uses the public international law concepts of ‘consular protection’ and 
‘diplomatic protection’ or autonomous EU concepts is not clarified. 
1433 See more details on this issue in this Chapter, section 1.b - Type of ‘protective’ services. 
1434 For instance, according to the European Commission, ‘more than 30 million EU citizens are estimated to 
permanently live in a third country’, while the Member States are all represented only in four third countries, see 
Annex 2. See C COM (2011) 149/2, 3. 
1435 Flash Eurobarometer No. 294 'EU citizenship' of March 2010. 
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States. The Member States have interpreted the EU citizenship right to equal protection 
abroad through the lens of their specific national models, without making adjustments or 
compromises, thus leading in practice to different models of the EU citizenship right, in terms 
of its legal nature, force and substance. This implementation framework has confused the EU 
citizens, who do not benefit of a publicly available list of the type of protection services they 
enjoy from each of the Member States under the EU citizenship right to equal protection 
abroad. The wording of former Article 20 EC Treaty and, now, Article 23(1) TFEU has also 
been one of the main sources of disagreement between Member States and, in particular, 
between the United Kingdom and the European Commission which adopt different and to a 
certain extent divergent views.1436 
This section will assess whether the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad 
jointly with the EU fundamental right to diplomatic and consular protection confer to the EU 
citizens a right to a concrete list of consular and diplomatic services or only to non-
discriminatory protection treatment, and whether of both consular and diplomatic protection 
type. 
2. The EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad – extending the 
application of the principle of non-discrimination based on nationality 
outside the European Union 
It was mentioned in the introduction that, according to a recent survey, the majority of the EU 
citizens expect to receive the same kind of help they would be given by their Member State of 
origin from the consular and diplomatic representations of any of the other Member States 
under Article 20(2)(c) TFEU.1437 For the moment, this is a utopian ideal rather than the 
reality. Such a common framework for the exercise of protection of the EU citizens 
presupposes either the existence of a Union law that establishes this binding common 
framework which, with the help of the EU Courts, will be applied uniformly across the Union 
territory, or that the 28 national legal frameworks on the exercise of consular and diplomatic 
protection of nationals are almost identical. Unfortunately, neither of these scenarios applies. 
At the moment of writing, the EU legal framework governing the topic of protection of 
the EU citizens abroad is made up of, first, Union primary legal provisions,1438 second, three 
                                                 
1436 See the UK Report in the CARE Report. 
1437 Eurobarometer from March 2010. 
1438 Arts. 20(2)(c) and 23 TFEU and 35 TEU and Art. 46 EU Charter. 
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sui-generis international agreements implementing former Article 20 EC Treaty,1439 an 
impressive amount of soft law – Council Conclusions and Guidelines,1440 and numerous 
papers issued by the Commission.1441  
The Union primary law provisions essentially extend the EU principle of non-
discrimination based on nationality to a new subject area: the protection which consular and 
diplomatic officials of the Member States normally confer to their citizens abroad, and 
territorially: outside the borders of the Union. The fundamental EU citizenship right to 
protection abroad confers to the un-represented EU citizen a right to receive the protection 
treatment which is provided by the represented Member State to its own citizens in third 
countries, and nothing more.  
The only harmonisation comes from the implementing measures, and it is very limited. 
The three Decisions of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States restrict 
the substantive ambit of the equal protection obligation to six mandatory consular related 
circumstances: death; serious accident or serious illness; arrest or detention; victims of violent 
crime; relief and repatriation of distressed citizens; and issue of the ETDs. Therefore the EU 
citizens are entitled to receive the equal protection treatment only in these situations. Some 
                                                 
1439 Decisions: 95/553/EC, 11107/95, 96/409/CFSP. 
1440 During the 15 years of its existence, the COCON committee has adopted an impressive number of 
conclusions and guidelines in the field of consular protection, which however maintain a very broad language, 
sometimes simply reiterating the relevant Treaty provisions: see Guidelines approved by the Interim PSC on 6 
October 2000, Cooperation between Missions of Member States and Commission Delegations in Third 
Countries and to International Organisations, 12094/00; Consular Guidelines on the protection of EU citizens in 
third countries adopted by the COCON and endorsed by the PSC 15613/10, of 5.11 2010; Guidelines on 
Protection of EU citizens in the event of a crisis in a Third Country adopted by the COCON on 26 June 2006 – 
10109/2/06 REV 2; Lead State Concept in Consular Crises, Conclusions adopted by COCON, 10715/07, 
12.07.2006; ‘Common Practices in Consular Assistance’ and ‘Crisis Coordination’ adopted by the COCON, 
10698/10, 9.06.2010; Guidelines for further implementing a number of provisions under Decision 95/553/EC 
adopted by COCON, 11113/08, 24.06.2008. The initial work of the COCON was not disclosed to the public. 
1441 Green Paper - Diplomatic and consular protection of Union citizens in third countries (COM/2006/712 final), 
28/11/2006; Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - Effective consular protection in third 
countries: the contribution of the European Union - Action Plan 2007-2009 - Communication from the 
Commission, 05/12/2007; Accompanying document to the Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee - Effective consular 
protection in third countries: the contribution of the European Union - Action Plan 2007-2009 - Summary of the 
Impact Assessment (SEC/2007/1601) - Commission staff working document, 05/12/2007; Accompanying 
document to the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the 
European Economic and Social Committee - Effective consular protection in third countries: the contribution of 
the European Union - Action Plan 2007-2009 - Impact Assessment (SEC/2007/1600) - Commission staff 
working document, 05/12/2007; European Commission, EU citizenship Report 2010 - Dismantling the obstacles 
to EU citizens’ rights – 27/10/2010; Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and 
the European Economic and Social Committee under Article 25 TFEU On progress towards effective EU 
Citizenship 2007-2010 – 27/10/2010. 
 336 
 
Member States committed to provide consular protection also in other consular related 
situations, but this is the exception rather than the norm.1442  
Decision 11107/95 provides details on the services and procedures that Member States 
can follow under each of the five mandatory circumstances enshrined in Decision 95/553. 
However the Decision is not drafted in mandatory wording, but rather in the form of a 
recommendation in case the Member State decides to offer a particular consular protection 
service. The Member States seem to have approached the Decision as a sort of guideline 
rather than a binding EU secondary legislative act.1443 Therefore the EU legal binding 
provisions do not establish a common set of rights and procedures falling under the ambit of 
‘protection by the consular and diplomatic officials of the Member States’.  
Since the EU legal provisions only prohibit discriminatory conduct on the part of the 
Member States, the possibility of a uniform or coherent legal regime of protection of EU 
citizens abroad might come from the fact that the Member States’ legal regimes and practice 
is similar. After all, the EU countries share common legal principles, values and, to a certain 
extent, legal systems. It has already been pointed out that the domestic legal frameworks vary 
to a great degree on the topic of consular and diplomatic protection of citizens abroad. The 
different national foreign policy interests, historical ties developed by each of the Member 
States with different regions of the world, different ambitions and size of population has 
probably led to the elaboration of different legal frameworks and practice, although they all 
consider the field of consular and diplomatic protection of nationals as a field of 
administrative law and part of the State’s foreign affairs.  
The resistance of the Member States to the adoption of a common harmonised EU 
model of consular and diplomatic protection of EU citizens results from their understanding 
of consular and diplomatic protection of the nationals as one of the ultimate attributes of a 
sovereign State. The loss of the State’s discretionary power to contour the model of protection 
abroad of nationals is thus equated with loss of an important part of the State’s sovereignty, 
which for certain Member States is unacceptable. Currently there are no common consular 
services and procedures from which unrepresented Union citizens might benefit. There is a 
minimum of similar consular services that the Member States seem to provide in the 
                                                 
1442 See more on these Member States in the section in this chapter titled ‘Impact of the EU legal framework on 
consular and diplomatic protection of individuals on the Member States’. 
1443 See the CARE Report Chapter three. 
 337 
 
mandatory situations, however this is based on a case-by-case approach.1444 Therefore, 
according to the Member States’ understanding, there is nothing to stop them from denying a 
certain consular service to an EU citizen, if they do not provide it either to their own citizens. 
In practice, in cases of consular crisis, the Member States have so far effectively provided 
consular help1445 in the form of medical assistance, relief, and evacuation, although the latter 
situation has been more problematic in practice.1446  
In spite of the divergent legal framework which can deprive the EU citizenship right of 
its usefulness, the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad has great potential in terms 
of offering concrete benefits to the EU citizens.  
First of all, the fact that it is envisaged as a mere principle of non-discrimination based 
on nationality does not negate its added value.1447 The EU general legal principle of non-
discrimination based on nationality laid down at the start of the citizenship part of the 
Treaty1448 would not have been of much help to the Union citizens located outside of the 
Union borders, if it was not included within a specific EU citizenship right. The general 
principle of equal treatment applies, as Article 18 TFEU (former Article 12 EC Treaty) 
provides, within the scope of EU law. In the absence of an express EU primary legal provision 
extending the substantive and territorial scope of the legal principle, or of conditions 
necessary to use the fall-back Community competence to enact relevant EU secondary 
provisions1449, the general principle of equal treatment could not have been applied.1450 The 
                                                 
1444 Despite their good intentions, the Member States operate, mostly in consular crisis on the basis of an ad hoc 
type of cooperation, and not on a pre-established contingency plan. However efforts are made to adopt such 
plans by the consular and diplomatic missions of the Member States jointly with the EU delegations. 
1445 According to the information gathered by the author during interviews with Commission and Member States 
representatives in the period of March – July 2011. 
1446 For example, during the 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, it was reported that the external missions of 
certain Member State rescued their own citizens while leaving EU citizens of other nationalities, who did not 
have any consular representation in the country, behind, and thus de facto denying their European citizenship 
right to equal protection abroad. Problems have also been encountered by EU citizens when trying to obtain 
European Travel Documents in situations that were not the result of disasters. Source - the CARE Report, fn 54 
above, Chapter Three, Section Five. 
1447 M. Condinanzi and A. Lang arguing that the right is not innovative, see Cittadinanza dell’Unione e libera 
circolazione delle persone, Milan: Guiffre editore (2009), 49. 
1448 It should be noted that the provision of the general principle of non-discrimination based on nationality at the 
beginning of the Citizenship chapter has been introduced only since the Lisbon amendment. In the EC Treaty, it 
was located in a different part (Part One on Principles) separated from Part two on Citizenship. 
1449 Former Art. 308 EC Treaty required the express provision of a Community objective (to be distinguished 
from Union objective) as one of the positive conditions that had to be fulfilled so as to justify the use of the 
flexibility clause as legal basis for Community legislative measures. See more on the conditions for the use of 
Art. 308 EC Treaty as legal basis for Community acts in K. St. Clair Bradley, ‘Powers and Procedures in the EU 
Constitution: Legal Bases and the Court’ in P Craig and G de Burca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law Oxford 
University Press (2011), 100. See also, Case T-306/01 Yusuf [2005] ECR II-3533, para. 164; Case T-315/01 
Yassin Abdullah Kadi v Council and Commission [2005] ECR II-03649; Case C-436/03 Parliament v Council 
(European cooperative society) [2006] ECR I-3733; and Case C-217/04 UK v Council and European Parliament 
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innovative aspect of Article 8c in the EC Treaty consists precisely in creating the scope of EU 
law necessary for the EU general principle of equal treatment based on nationality to 
apply.1451  
Second, the EU citizenship, as it is currently understood, has the potential of offering 
concrete benefits to the unrepresented Union citizens in third countries if the Member States 
make publicly available a list of their concrete consular services they provide to their own 
citizens abroad. In this case, the EU citizens would benefit from receiving protection in a fix 
number of situations1452 and would know the precise approach of the Member States in regard 
to offering consular protection services. The application of the principle of non-discrimination 
based on nationality in the field of consular protection of Union citizens abroad has been 
argued1453 to require the Member States to follow ‘a quotas’ approach in cases of consular 
crisis where numerous EU citizens require help. On the basis of this strict application of the 
non-discrimination principle, each nationality represented in situ would receive an equal 
number of, for instance, seats on an aircraft. Practice shows that it would be too much to ask 
from the Member States to endorse such a righteous conduct. The Member States have 
usually first secured help for their own citizens and then on a first-come-first-served basis for 
the other nationalities.1454 
Looking at the evolution experienced by the other EU citizenship rights and the current 
consular challenges faced by the Member States, the disillusionment of what the EU 
citizenship right to equal protection abroad actually entails in practice might only be 
temporary. 
It has to be noticed when the EU citizenship rights were first introduced, their scope of 
application was interpreted as limited to an application of the principle of non-discrimination 
based on nationality.1455 In the meantime, the scope of the EU citizen’s rights, especially of 
                                                                                                                                                        
(European Network and Information Security Agency) [2006] ECR I-03771. Pre-Lisbon Treaty, the Council of 
the EU was not conferred internal legislative competence. It is the Lisbon Treaty which provided for the first 
time express internal legislative competence for the Council in the field of the Union citizen’s right to consular 
and diplomatic protection (Art. 23(2) TFEU). 
1450 The ECJ has constantly held that the principle of non-discrimination based on nationality applies only within 
the scope of EU law, see Case C-85/96 Martínez Sala [1998] ECR I-2691; Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk [2001] ECR 
I-6193. 
1451 As happened with the other Treaty-based rights of the EU citizen which developed from a mere application 
of the principle of non-discrimination based on nationality into self-standing rights which the EU citizens can 
invoke solely based on their nationality (Case C-34/09 Zambrano, Judgment of 8 March 2011, para. 41) 
1452 As currently provided by Decisions 95/553 and 96/409. 
1453 Alessandro I. Saliceti, ‘The Protection of EU Citizens Abroad: Accountability, Rule of Law, Role of 
Consular and Diplomatic Services’, op.cit., 91, 97. 
1454 Based on evidence collected while working as a researcher for the Commission financed CARE Project. 
1455 A. Duff, Saving the European Union – The Logic of the Lisbon Treaty, London: Shoehorn (2009). 
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the freedom to reside and move, has been developed by the Court so as to include also 
prohibition of serious inconvenience without proof of actual discrimination based on 
nationality.1456 
A similar evolution can be identified, though to a lesser degree, also in regard to 
another EU citizenship right which, in a way, shares more similarities with the EU citizenship 
right to equal protection abroad, than the freedom to reside and move, since it is clearly 
framed in similar equal treatment language, and applies also in a sensitive area of high politics 
of the Member States: voting rights to the European Parliament elections.1457 Despite the 
explicit equal treatment wording and the high sensitivity of the ‘political rights’ field, the 
Court of Justice in the Aruba case1458 held that the EU citizens have a right to vote for the 
European Parliament’s elections as a normal consequence of the Union citizenship.1459 
A sort of a trend can be identified in the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice, 
whereby, the rights of the EU citizens as recognised by Article 20 TFEU, have a scope that 
goes beyond the application of the principle of non-discrimination based on nationality.1460 
However, this trend has not yet been established in relation to the EU citizenship right to 
equal protection abroad. For the moment, such a judicially developed evolution cannot be 
traced in regard to the right to equal protection abroad, simply because the EU Courts have 
never dealt with the EU citizenship right to protection abroad.1461 The majority of the national 
case law that have reached the EU Courts do not concern the right to equal protection abroad, 
but other consular affairs matters, such as: issuing of visas,1462 financial obligations arising for 
                                                 
1456 Case C-391/09 Runevič-Vardyn and Wardyn, Judgment of 12 May 2011, nyr. 
1457 Whereby citizens of the Member States resident in other Member States have the right to vote in European 
Parliament’s elections under the same conditions as nationals. 
1458 Case C-300/04 Eman and Sevinger v. College vanburgemeester en wethouders van Den Haag (Aruba) 
[2006] ECR I-8055. 
1459 J. Shaw, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon and Citizenship’, The Federal Trust European Policy Brief, June 2008. 
1460 Case C-135/08 Rottmann, Judgment of 2 March 2010; Case C-34/09 Zambrano, Judgment of 8 March 2011. 
1461 The landmark cases of the CJEU in the field of the EU citizenship have so far created either economic or 
social rights for the Union citizens within the borders of the internal market. For economic rights see the 
pronouncements of the CJEU in: Case C-138/02 Collins v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2004] ECR 
I-2703; Case C-258/04 Ioannidis [2005] ECR I-8275; Joined Cases C-482/01 and C-493/01 Orfanopoulos and 
Oliveri [2004] ECR I-5257; Case C-362/88 GB-INNO [1990] ECR I-667. For social rights, see the 
pronouncements of the Court of Justice in Case C-148/02 Garcia Avello v Belgium [2003] ECR I-11613; Case 
C-85/96 Martínez Sala [1998] ECR I-2691; Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk [2001] ECR I-6193; Case C-413/99 
Baumbast [2002] ECR I-7091; Case C-200/02 Chen [2004] ECR I-9925; Case C-158/07 Förster [2008] ECR I-
8507; Case 186/87 Cowan [1989] ECR I-195; Case C-57/96 Meints [1997] ECR I-6689. 
1462 Case T-372/02 Internationaler Hilfsfonds v Commission [2003] ECR II-438; Case C-327/02 Panayotova 
[2004] ECR 1-11055; Case C-139/08 Kqiku [2009] ECR I--2887; C-219/08 Commission v Belgium [2009] ECR 
1-9213; Case C-228/06 Soysal [2009] ECR 1-1031; Case C-244/04 Commission of the European Communities v 
Federal Republic of Germany [2006] ECR I-885; Case C-459/99 Mouvement contre le racisme, l'antisémitisme 
et la xénophobie ASBL (MRAX) v Belgium [2002] ECR I-6591; Case C-257/99 Barkoci and Marcel Malik [2001] 
ECR I- 6557. 
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the Member States as a result of signing a memorandum of understanding between the 
Commission and the Member States on setting up a common diplomatic mission in Abuja 
(Nigeria),1463 hierarchy between the methods of sending judicial documents by post or by 
consular or diplomatic agents under Union law,1464 and the duty of diplomatic protection of 
the Union in regard to vessels (not individuals) of the Member States.1465 
The right to equal protection abroad of the Union citizens has so far remained quite 
underdeveloped in comparison with the other EU citizenship rights and has not been the 
subject of the EU Courts’ jurisprudence. However, this particular EU citizenship right might 
develop in the future beyond the right to non-discriminatory protection on the basis of 
nationality. The EU legislature or the EU Courts might play a role in contributing to the legal 
development of this right in the future. The Council, depending on its choices of content of 
the future directives it may adopt,1466 and the EU Courts use of purposive interpretation1467 in 
relation to these future Council directives, may lead the way to an evolution of the Union 
citizen’s right to equal protection abroad similar to the one experienced by the other Union 
citizenship rights. 
Should the Member States finally agree to adopt common standards in the future, this 
change of attitude will most probably be motivated by the need to overcome the consular 
challenges characteristic of the 21st century, namely the high expectation among their citizens 
of quality consular services coupled with the financial cuts which makes it impossible to fulfil 
these increasing consular demands, rather than by the sense of increased solidarity among the 
Member States or the abstract objective of increasing efficiency of the EU citizenship right to 
equal protection abroad. A failure of the Member States’ Ministries of Foreign Affairs in their 
performance of consular protection has been equated by the media and academia with the 
failure of the State, and it is perhaps this reaction, which Member States strive to avoid, that 
                                                 
1463 Case C-203/07 P Greece v Commission [2008] ECR I-0000. 
1464 See Case C-473/04 Plumex v Young Sports NV [2006] ECR I-1579 – the Union law that was interpreted in 
this case was the Council Regulation (EC) No 1348/2000 of 29 May 2000 on the service in the Member States of 
judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters ([2000] OJ L 160/37). 
1465 However, this duty arose only as a result of an express contractual obligation on the part of the Union, Case 
T-572/93 Odigitria AAE v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities 
[1995] ECR I-2025. 
1466 Based on Art. 23(2) TFEU. It should be noted that the Article does not require the Council to adopt 
implementing legislation, but it only gives it the possibility to do so. 
1467 The purpose of the Treaty Articles, especially those on Union citizen’s rights and fundamental freedoms has 
played a significant role in the Court of Justice’s interpretation of these Articles, whether in cases assessing 
direct effect, or breach of these rights and freedoms. See more in B de Witte, ‘Chapter 12 – Direct Effect, 
Primacy, and the Nature of the Legal Order’ in Craig and de Burca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law, Oxford 
University Press (2011). 
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will push them to advance clarity, common standards and concrete efficiency of the EU 
citizenship right to equal protection abroad.1468 
The current understanding of the EU citizenship right to protection abroad as an equal 
treatment right does not however justify an unreasonable rejection of consular protection by a 
Member State.1469 Being a fundamental right of the EU citizen,1470 a rejection of this right by 
the Member States needs to respect the requirements provided by Article 52 of the EU 
Charter.1471 An outright denial of protection by one of the Member States will empty the 
fundamental right of the Union citizen of any meaningful effect, thus raising serious concerns 
about the respect of the essence and proportionality requirements under Article 52 of the EU 
Charter. Consequently, even if the founding Treaties frame the right to protection abroad as 
an equal treatment right, Article 46 EU Charter in conjunction with Article 52 EU Charter 
would not legitimise a conduct of Member States that does not provide grounded reasons for 
their refusal to ensure protection of an unrepresented Union citizen abroad. The EU 
fundamental rights requirements would have an impact also on the personal scope of 
application of the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad. The Member States will 
have to consider how to ensure the respect of the EU citizen’s right to family life when 
planning the evacuation of the third country nationals who are family members of the EU 
citizen. Even if the right to consular and diplomatic protection is a right of the Union citizen 
as stated in the EU Treaties and the EU Charter, the inclusion of the right to family life in 
Article 7 of the EU Charter seems to require the Member States to take all steps possible to 
ensure that in emergency evacuation, the non-EU family members, especially vulnerable 
categories, will not be separated from the EU citizens.1472  
                                                 
1468 See the National Report on Sweden in the CARE Report, and M. Okano-Heijmans ‘Changes In Consular 
Assistance And The Emergence Of Consular Diplomacy’, in J. Melissen and A.M. Fernández (eds.), Consular 
Affairs and Diplomacy, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (2011). 
1469 As certain Member States have argued. See, for example, the position of the Member States taking the 
approach of the consular and diplomatic protection of nationals as a matter of the executive’s policy in the CARE 
Report, available at http://www.careproject.eu/images/stories/ConsularAndDiplomaticProtection.pdf . 
1470 The right to consular and diplomatic protection is enshrined in Art. 46 EU Charter, which is part of Title V 
on Citizen’s rights. 
1471 According to Art. 52(1) of the EU Charter, limitations and restrictions of the Charter’s fundamental rights 
are possible as long as the following conditions are fulfilled: the limitation must be provided by law; it respects 
the essence of the fundamental rights; it respects the principle of proportionality; it is necessary for the purpose 
of genuinely meeting objectives of general interest as recognised by the Union or there is a need to protect rights 
and freedoms of others.  
1472 For the time being, the Member States have not yet recognised a right to protection abroad of the non-EU 
family member joining the EU citizen, not even in the limited circumstances of emergency evacuation. The 
situation is handled on a case-by-case basis. See more on this in M Moraru and S Faro, ‘La Questione 
dell’Effettivita del Diritto dei Cittadini Europei alla Protezione Diplomatica e Consolare nei Paesi Terzi. I 
Risultati del Progetto CARE’, (2011) Riv. Ital. Dir. Pubbl. Comunitario, and Section 4.1.1 of Chapter three of 




3. Does diplomatic protection fall under the scope of the EU citizen’s right 
to equal protection abroad?  
 
The previous section showed that the content of the EU citizenship right to equal protection 
abroad is the principle of non-discrimination based on nationality. This section will attempt to 
clarify whether the prohibition of discrimination applies to both consular and diplomatic 
protection situations, and whether these concepts should be understood in their public 
international legal meaning.  
As previously mentioned, one of the harshest critiques of the EU citizenship right to 
equal protection abroad, coming from both academics1473 and Member States,1474 refers to the 
lack of clarity regarding the substantive scope of this right. In other words, it is argued that 
the founding Treaties do not clarify what type of protection the individuals are entitled to 
request in third countries – consular and/or diplomatic protection, and what the exact meaning 
of these mechanisms is.  
It has been pointed out that Article 20(2)(c) TFEU does not use the settled public 
international law concepts of ‘consular protection’ and ‘diplomatic protection’, but a new 
concept which is not an established legal concept under the public international law norms – 
‘protection by the consular and diplomatic authorities of the Member States’,1475 and 
consequently, the EU legal regime refers to protection mechanisms different from the 
‘consular and diplomatic protection’ in their classic public international legal meaning.1476 
‘Protection by consular and diplomatic authorities’ should not be automatically equated with 
‘consular protection’ and ‘diplomatic protection’, since the definition of diplomatic protection 
under current customary international law requires additional conditions that are not 
mentioned in the EU legal provisions. It could thus be argued that the EU legal order might 
                                                 
1473 T Stein, ‘Interim Report on “Diplomatic Protection Under the European Union Treaty”’ in: ILA Committee 
on Diplomatic Protection of Persons and Property, Second Report, New Delhi, 2002, 32-39; A. Vermeer-Künzli, 
‘Exercising Diplomatic Protection: The Fine Line Between Litigation, Demarches and Consular Assistance’, 
op.cit. ; P. Vigni, ‘Diplomatic and consular protection: Misleading Combination or Creative Solution?’, op.cit.; 
C. Closa, ‘Citizenship of the Union and Nationality of the Member States’ (1995) CMLRev, 487. 
1474 See the national Reports on France, Ireland, Poland, and the UK in the CARE Report, available at 
www.careproject.eu/database/browse_eu.php  
1475 P. Vigni, ‘The Protection of EU Citizens: The Perspective of International Law’, op.cit. . 
1476 Ibid., see also Art. 1 2006 ILC Articles on Diplomatic Protection and the analysis in Chapter 2 and 3. 
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use autonomous legal concepts, which even though similar to the ones existing under public 
international law, might not have the same meaning.1477  
The substantive content of the EU citizenship right is furthermore confused by the 
different translations of Article 20(2)(c) TFEU in the various official national languages. For 
instance, the Czech, Finish, German and Polish versions of Articles 20(2)(c) and 23(1) TFEU 
use instead of the concept of ‘consular and diplomatic protection’ instead of ‘protection by 
consular and diplomatic authorities’, which thus leave no doubt that the Member States’ 
obligation to offer equal treatment should cover also diplomatic protection. In case of 
different language versions of an EU legal provision, the CJEU has established a set of 
principles to follow in the process of establishing the true meaning of the legal provisions. 
First of all, the CJEU establishes equal legal force to all official language versions of an EU 
legal provision1478 and requires that the divergence created by the different language versions 
is to be solved ‘by interpreting by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of 
which it forms a part.’1479 
A contextual interpretation of current Article 20(2)(c) TFEU might shed light on the 
convoluted content of the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad. At the time of 
drafting the Maastricht Treaty, Spain made a proposal for an Article on the protection of the 
unrepresented EU citizens while outside of the Union. The Article was drafted in clear terms, 
expressly providing for ‘consular and diplomatic assistance and protection’1480 of the citizens 
                                                 
1477 The Union legal order has, so far, developed specific Union definitions for many of the classical public 
international legal concepts, such as ‘citizenship’ (in particular EU citizenship as defined by Art. 20 TFEU. On 
the specificity of the notion of EU citizenship compared to State nationality, see the Opinion of AG Maduro in 
Case C-135/08 Rottmann, in particular para. 23; and G. Martinico and R. Castaldi, ‘Rethinking (EU) 
citizenship’, (2011) Special issue of Perspectives on Federalism,on the further infuse of specificity brought by 
the Lisbon Treaty to the Union citizenship), ‘internal armed conflict’ (C-129/14 Diakite, 30.01.2014, nyr) , ‘ne 
bis in idem’ (C-129/14 PPU Spasic, Judgment of 18 July 2014, nyr), ‘rebus sic standibus’ (Case C-162/96 Racke 
GmbH & Co v Hauptzollamt Mainz [1998] ECR I-3655) . 
1478 CILFIT case, para. 18. 
1479 Case C-100/84 Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland [1984] ECR 01169, paras. 15 and 17; Case C-341/01 PlatoPlastik Robert Frank [2004] ECR I-4883, 
para. 64; C-1/02 Privat-Molkerei Borgmann GmbH & Co. KG [2004] ECR I-03219, para. 25; C- 63/06 UAB 
Profisa v Muitinės departamentas prie Lietuvos Respublikos finansų ministerijos [2007] ECR I-03239, paras. 13 
and 14; Case C-340/08 M and others, (Fourth Chamber) judgement of 29 April 2010, nyr, para. 44. In the latter 
case there were discrepancies between the different language versions of both the EU law at issue (Council 
Regulation no 881/2002) and the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1390 implemented by the 
foregoing Council Regulation. Since it could not base a decision solely on literary interpretation, the ECJ 
interpreted the provision on the basis of the aim of the Regulation and Resolution. 
1480 It can be noticed that the Spanish proposal referred to both ‘protection’ and ‘assistance’ since under Spanish 
national law the two concepts are legally different. In the Spanish legal literature, ‘protection’ involves formal 
complaints before public authorities, while ‘assistance’ refers to the provision of food, clothes, and medicines. 
See E Vilarino Pintos, Curso de Derecho Diplomatico y Consular. Parte general y textos codificadores, Tecnos: 
Madrid (1987), 102-103; A Maresca, Las relaciones consulares, Piernas:Madrid (1974), 215-219. 
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of the European Union from any of the Member States.1481 However, not all of the Member 
States agreed with Spain’s proposal to include both consular and diplomatic protection of the 
unrepresented Union citizens. The Member States reached a compromise by keeping the 
adjectives ‘consular’ and ‘diplomatic’ in relation to the officials securing protection, instead 
of the type of protection to be secured to the unrepresented Union citizens. Thus the emphasis 
was placed on ensuring ‘a’ protection rather than the types of protection. The idea was to 
ensure that unrepresented EU citizens are not left completely unprotected, especially in 
emergency situations.  
It has to be noticed that the provision is similar to the Article 8 VCCR kinds of burden 
sharing agreements concluded among certain European countries before the creation of the 
EU or their accession to the EU. This kind of formulation leaves open the possibility of 
evolutive interpretation of the content of the EU citizenship right depending on the 
development of the European society’s needs.1482 The Member States maintained this attitude 
also later on during the elaboration of the Decision 95/553/EC on the implementation of the 
EU citizen’s right to equal protection abroad. Several delegations of the Member States 
opposed to the original versions of Articles 11-18 of the Decision, which expressly referred to 
diplomatic protection.1483 Since the aforementioned Decision is an international agreement 
which could have been adopted only by unanimous consent, those Articles and consequently 
diplomatic protection did not make its way into the final Decision. The Member States 
decided instead to focus on the mechanism that was requested the most by the EU citizens and 
at the same raised less problematic legal questions, i.e. consular protection.1484 
The contextual interpretation of the Article seems to have revealed a certain division of 
opinions and approaches among the Member States on whether ‘diplomatic protection’ is also 
cover by the equal treatment right. 
The purposive interpretation of the relevant Treaty Articles could offer additional 
supporting evidence for the minimalist or maximalist interpretation of the content of the EU 
                                                 
1481 See Documentation de la RIE, col 18 1991, 333-338 and 405-409. 
1482 A similar example of divided opinions between the Member States leading to a broad definition of a legal 
concept is the well-known broad, all-encompassing definition of the CFSP, see G. Bono, ‘Some Reflections on 
the CFSP Legal Order’ (2006) CMLRev, 358, 358–9. 
1483 T. Stein, ‘Interim Report on “Diplomatic Protection Under the European Union Treaty”’, in: ILA Committee 
on Diplomatic Protection of Persons and Property, Second Report (New Delhi 2002), 36-7. 
1484 The Commission seems to follow the same interpretation, diplomatic protection is not per se excluded from 
the legal content of the Union citizen’s right, but, for the moment, attention is given to the most problematic 
aspect of that right – i.e. consular protection for Union citizens in distress in third countries. See Accompanying 
document to the Commission Action Plan 2007-2009 - Impact Assessment, doc. SEC (2007) 1600 of 5 
December 2007 and the European Commission’s EU citizenship Report 2010 – Dismantling the obstacles to EU 
citizens’ rights, doc. COM (2010) 603 of 27 October 2010. 
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citizenship right to equal protection abroad. In our case, the purpose of Article 20(2)(c) TFEU 
has to be seen in light of the newly introduced Union objective of ensuring protection of the 
Union citizens in the world (Article 3(5) TEU). The objective seems to refer to a general 
protection of the Union citizens in third countries, without distinction or limitations. In the 
same way neither Article 20(2)(c), nor Article 23(2) TFEU make a distinction or exclude 
diplomatic protection from their scope, even if the Member States had multiple occasions 
during several Treaty amendments to introduce such a limitation.  
The maximalist interpretation, whereby diplomatic protection is included in the 
content of the EU citizen’s right to protection abroad, seems to be supported also by Article 
46 EU Charter, which is now part of the EU primary law. As previously mentioned, the 
wording of Article 46 EU Charter is identical with Articles 20(2)(c) and 23(1) TFEU, while 
Article 46 EU Charter is conclusively entitled ‘diplomatic and consular protection’. However 
Article 52(2) EU Charter limits the legal force of the EU Charter Articles whose content is 
similar to those of Treaty provisions, by giving priority to the founding Treaties legal 
provisions, which cannot be altered by the EU Charter. Therefore, Article 52(2) EU Charter 
seems to limit the interpretative force of Article 46 EU Charter, which cannot thus solve the 
issue of the confusing wording of the Treaty provisions. 
 Based on the previous jurisprudence of the CJEU, it could be argued that the EU 
Courts would favour a maximalist interpretation of the EU citizenship right to equal 
protection abroad, if it enhances protection of the other substantive rights of the EU 
citizen.1485  
In Ayadi1486 and Hassan,1487 the General Court of the EU has recognised an obligation 
on the part of the Member States to exercise diplomatic protection for foreign citizens who 
reside within the Union territory. If the Court was willing to go as far as recognising an 
obligation incumbent upon the Member States in regard to third country nationals, it can be 
argued that, furthermore it will do so when a violation of a fundamental right of the EU 
citizens is at stake.  
                                                 
1485 Diplomatic protection is formally speaking only a procedural means whereby the individual’s claims for 
violation of other substantive individual rights is brought forward to the perpetrator State. In cases concerning 
EU citizenship rights, or fundamental human rights, the Court has had in mind the effectiveness of these rights, 
sometimes even to the detriment of the Member States’ interests. See for example, C-200/02 Chen [2004] ECR 
I-9925; Case C-135/08 Rottmann [2010] ECR I-0000; Case C-34/09 Zambrano, judgment of 8 March 2011; and 
the already famous Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi [2008] ECR I-6351. 
1486 Case T-253/02 Ayadi v Council and Commission [2006] ECR II-2139, para. 149 
1487 Case T-49/04 Hassan v Council and Commission [2006] ECR II-52, para. 119. 
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These specific and limited circumstances do not suffice to make a general statement 
that the Court will hold diplomatic protection as part of the Union citizen right to protection 
abroad. Nevertheless, these judgments can suggest that the Court will take into consideration 
not only the Member States’ intentions when drafting the EU legal provision, or their 
interests, but also the objective of the EU citizenship right which is to ensure ‘protection’ of 
the unrepresented Union citizens. According to the public international legal definition of 
diplomatic protection, this form of protection encompasses different measures ranging from 
informal negotiations between high officials, to sending official letters, and submitting an 
international claim. What is important is the fulfilment of the three requirements: the 
existence of an international wrongful act, ‘nationality of claims’, and exhaustion of legal 
remedies.1488  
In practice it could be that an EU citizen held captive or arbitrarily arrested in a third 
country, who has exhausted all the local remedies, is still detained by public officials, or by 
private individuals without the local public authorities taking action. The represented Member 
States might consider taking action and informally negotiating with the local officials, in 
which case this might actually constitute a form of protection close to the public international 
law concept of diplomatic protection.1489 
The majority of legal academics1490 argue that the EU citizenship right includes only 
consular protection and moreover that there is currently no need of interpreting the EU 
citizenship right to equal protection abroad as including also diplomatic protection situations, 
since the purpose of the Article is to secure protection in situ, rather than formal protection by 





                                                 
1488 See Art. 1 2006 ILC Articles on Diplomatic Protection and its commentary by the Rapporteur J. Dugard. 
1489 It has to be noted that the ‘nationality of claims’ would not be fulfilled in these circumstances, but as noted in 
Chapter 3, so far the international community seems to have accepted the EU specific exercise of protection of 
EU citizens abroad. 
1490 P. Vigni, op.cit.; Denza, op.cit.; S. Touzé, op.cit. 
1491 See P. Vigni and E. Denza, op.cit. 
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V. The legal effects of the Union citizenship right to equal protection 
abroad 
 
In light of the different positions currently taken by the Member States on the levels of 
protection to which the Union citizen is entitled under the EU provisions, it is highly possible 
that more situations where the Union citizens will be refused assistance will arise in the 
future.1492 The question that this section plans to assess is whether the Union citizen can 
invoke his Treaty-based right to equal protection abroad before the national courts in order to 
seek redress against such refusals.  
It is settled case law of the EU courts that rights derived from EU law may be invoked 
directly before the national courts if they satisfy the conditions of clear, precise and 
unconditional wording.1493 As Bruno de Witte notes, the Court has, over time, changed its 
strict Van Gend en Loos understanding of these conditions so that, currently, the direct effect 
test boils down to one single condition: ‘is the norm sufficiently operational in itself to be 
applied by a court?’1494 
The main arguments raised by academics1495 against the direct effect of the EU 
citizenship right to equal protection are first, that the substantial content of the right is unclear 
(see the above-mentioned debate on whether diplomatic protection is or is not included),1496 
second, that the right needs further implementing measures to be adopted by the Member 
States in order to be effective,1497 and third, that the exercise of the right by the Member 
                                                 
1492 So far there is few information on cases where EU citizens were denied assistance and protection in third 
countries. For instance, it was reported that during the 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, certain external 
representations of the Member States rescued their own citizens while leaving EU citizens of other nationalities 
who did not have any consular representation in the country behind, and thus were de facto denied their 
European citizenship right to equal protection abroad. Problems have also been encountered by EU citizens 
when trying to obtain European Travel Documents in situations that were not the result of disasters. Source - the 
CARE Report, fn 54 above, Chapter Three, Section Five. 
1493 C-26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1. T.C. Hartley, The Foundations of European Union Law, seventh 
edition, Oxford University Press (2010), 110.  
1494 The ‘justiciability test’ as the author calls it. See Bruno de Witte, ‘Direct Effect, Primacy, and the Nature of 
the Legal Order’, Grainne de Burca and P. Craig (eds), The Evolution of EU Law, 2nd ed, Oxford University 
Press (2011), 331. 
1495 C Closa, ‘Citizenship of the Union and Nationality of the Member States’ (1995) 32 Common Market Law 
Review 502 and S. Kadelbach, ‘European Integration: The New German Scholarship’, NYU Jean Monnet 
Working Paper 9/03; J-P Puissochet, ‘La pratique francaise de la protection diplomatique’ in J-F Flauss (ed), La 
Protection diplomatique- Mutations contemporaines et pratiques nationales, Bruylant (2003), 119-120. 
1496 In addition to this argument, certain Member States argue that the Treaty-based Article needs further 
clarification whether it confers consular assistance and/or protection, as in certain national legal orders the two 
legal concepts are distinct – as, for instance, in: Germany, Ireland, Romania, Spain, and the UK. See more on 
this topic in CARE Report, Chapter three, Section 4.1.1. 
1497 Art. 23(1) TFEU second indent provides: ‘Member States shall adopt the necessary provisions […] required 
to secure this protection.’ 
 348 
 
States depends upon the consent of the receiving third countries which, for the moment, very 
few of the Member States have expressly acquired.1498  
Concerning the questioned clarity of the EU citizen’s right to equal protection abroad, 
it was previously shown that, for the moment, the content of the right is restricted to a 
prohibition of discrimination based on nationality in the field of consular and diplomatic 
protection of the unrepresented EU citizens. It should be noted that in Reyners,1499 the CJEU 
recognised direct effect to former Article 52 EEC Treaty on freedom of establishment based 
on the interpretation of this Article as a prohibition of discrimination.1500 Nowadays it can be 
argued with certainty that the principle of non-discrimination based on nationality enjoys 
direct effect.1501 
As to the contention that the right is not unconditional since it requires the Member 
States to adopt implementing measures, it has to be noticed that the Lisbon Treaty brought a 
change in the wording of Article 23(1) TFEU. Former Article 20 EC Treaty stipulated that 
‘the Member States shall establish the necessary rules among themselves […] required to 
secure this protection’ while current Article 23(1) TFEU reads as follows: ‘The Member 
States shall adopt the necessary provisions […] required to secure this protection.’ Article 23 
TFEU continues in paragraph 2 with an express conferral of legislative competence for the 
Council which can enact directives for the purpose of ‘facilitating such protection’.  
There are two important changes in the wording of the right: the first is the 
replacement of ‘establish rules’ with ‘adopt provisions’, and the second is that the term that 
indicated the purely inter-governmental character of the field, ‘among themselves’, was 
eliminated. As noted by another legal author,1502 the change of wording may indicate that the 
referred measures are those that the Member States have to adopt so as to implement the 
Council directives, since the expression ‘adopt provisions’ is commonly used in the field of 
transposition of directives by the Member States.1503 On the contrary, the previous expression 
                                                 
1498 Art. 23(1) TFEU second indent provides: ‘Member States shall […] start the international negotiations 
required to secure this protection.’ Therefore it recognises the public international law requirements as enshrined 
in Art. 8 of the VCCR and Art. 6 of the VCDR. 
1499 Case C-2/74 Reyners v Belgium [1974] ECR 652, para. 30: ‘After the expiry of the transitional period the 
directives provided for by the chapter on the right of establishment have become superfluous with regard to 
implementing the rule on nationality, since this is henceforth sanctioned by the Treaty itself with direct effect.’ 
(emphasis added) See also Case C-43/75 Defrenne v SABENA [1976] ECR 445. 
1500 See also P. Craig, ‘Once upon a Time in the West: Direct Effect and the Federalization of EEC Law’ (1992) 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 464.  
1501 See Case C-164/07 Wood [2008] ECR I-4143. 
1502 Alessandro I. Saliceti, ‘The Protection of EU Citizens Abroad’, op.cit., 91, 94-5.. 
1503 See for instance Art. 291(1) TFEU: ‘Member States shall adopt all measures of national law necessary to 
implement legally binding Union acts.’ 
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‘establish rules’ conveyed the idea of new norms to be adopted for the purpose of detailing 
the content of the Union citizen’s right. Whether this is or is not the intention of the Member 
States, the Court of Justice constantly rules that the need for further implementing measures 
to be adopted by the Member States is not per se capable of denying direct effect to a Treaty-
based provision. There are numerous examples pointing in this direction, and most of them 
are to be found in the field of fundamental freedoms,1504 however the most relevant example 
for the present topic is the Union citizen’s right to reside and move which the Court has 
recognised as directly effective1505, despite the conditional language of the Treaty provision.  
Former Article 18(1) EC Treaty was firstly conditioned by limits which the Member 
States could impose and secondly by measures which the Member States themselves could 
adopt ‘to give effect to the right’. The latter condition is similar to the one in Article 23(1) 
TFEU. Contrary to the Member States, the Court of Justice in the Baumbast judgment1506 held 
that the need of further implementing measures by the Member States does not prejudice the 
direct effect character of the right to reside and move since the margin of discretion left to the 
Member States is subject to strict judicial review by the national and EU courts. 
Consequently, even if rejecting the interpretation of the new wording of Article 23(1) TFEU 
as a reiteration of the Member States’ duty to adopt national measures transposing the 
relevant EU secondary legislation, in light of the Court’s reasoning in Baumbast, the right to 
equal protection abroad cannot be rejected direct effect solely on the basis of the possible 
limitations the Member States can adopt within the framework of implementing EU 
secondary legislation, since first, these limitations will be subject to the full jurisdiction of the 
EU Courts and the national courts, second, the EU primary provision are operational in 
themselves, as proved by practice.1507  
Lastly, the provision of the Member States’ obligation to start international 
negotiations with third countries for the purpose of obtaining their consent to the exercise of 
the EU specific right to protection of EU citizens abroad cannot be invoked as argument 
against the direct effect of the EU citizenship to equal protection abroad. The CJEU has 
                                                 
1504 For instance, Case C-13/68 Salgoil [1968] ECR 463. Hilson notes that the recognition of direct effect to the 
fundamental freedoms by the European Court of Justice was unexpected, as ‘none of them sit particularly 
happily with the requirements as to clarity, precision and unconditionality.’ See C Hilson, ‘What's in a right? The 
relationship between Community, fundamental and citizenship rights in EU law’ (2004) European Law Review, 
636, 640. 
1505 Case C-431/99 Baumbast [2002] ECR I-7091. 
1506 Case C-431/99 Baumbast [2002] ECR I-7091. 
1507 After the Lisbon amendment, the general rule is that the EU courts have general jurisdiction to review the 
application of the EU Treaties, thus including Arts. 20 and 23 TFEU, unless expressly excluded as is the case of 
the CFSP provisions (Art. 24 TEU). 
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previously recognised direct effect to EU based rights whose content was unclear and legally 
incomplete,1508 due to the fact that the Member States failed to fulfil their obligations to adopt 
implementing legislation within the provided transitional period. In light of this reasoning, the 
persistent failure of most of the Member States to start international obligations for the last 20 
years, despite the initial time limit provided in Article 8c of the Maastricht Treaty,1509 and the 
clearly mentioned obligation in Article 23(1) TFEU, might influence the Court to recognise 
the direct effect to the EU citizen’s right to equal protection abroad should it face such a case 



















                                                 
1508 Reyners – former Art. 52 EC Treaty and Defrenne – former Art. 119 EC Treaty. 
1509 Art. 8C of the EC Treaty reads as follows: ‘Before the 31 December 1993 the Member States shall establish 




VI. The complex EU institutional architecture ensuring protection of EU 
citizens abroad 
Over recent years the EU has redesigned its institutions in an attempt to enhance its role as a 
global actor and increase its leadership on the international arena. The Lisbon Treaty 
introduced new actors with EU external relations functions and re-arranged the division of 
tasks among the existent ones. The creation of the High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy1510, the establishment of the European External Action 
Service (EEAS)1511 and the transformation of the Commission delegations into Union 
delegations1512 are among the most important institutional novelties introduced by the Lisbon 
Treaty. The division of tasks between the Union and the Member States in the ambit of 
external relations has also significantly changed, by increasing the Union’s power of 
international representation and its external relations competences1513 and enhancing the role 
of coherency in external relations, but also across the Union’s entire panoply of policies. 
The EU policies involved in securing protection of (unrepresented) EU citizens abroad 
and adjacent institutional framework are recent topics in the law and politics of EU external 
relations. They have been mostly addressed from the perspective of the institutional 
framework of European diplomacy1514, the role, functions and impact of the EEAS 
creation1515, EU visas policy1516, and only recently, and very briefly, from the perspective of 
the EU consular functions vis-à-vis its citizens in third countries.1517 This section aims to 
                                                 
1510 Art. 18 TEU. 
1511 Art. 27(3) TEU. 
1512 Art. 221 TFEU. 
1513 See, for instance, in the case of trade and investment. For a short account of the evolution of extension of the 
EU’s competerences in this area, see S. Woolcock, ‘EU Trade and Investment Policymaking After the Lisbon 
Treaty’, available at http://www.ceps.eu/system/files/article/2010/02/22-25-Woolcock_0.pdf. See more generally 
on all eu external relations competences, Geert De Baere, ‘EU external action’ in C. Barnard and S. Peers (eds), 
European Union Law, Oxford University Press (2014). 
1514 C. Carta, European Union Diplomatic Service: Ideas, Preferences and Identities, London:Routledge (2012); 
Emerson and others, Upgrading the EU's role as global actor: institutions, law and the restructuring of 
European diplomacy, CEPS (2011); 
1515 R. Balfour, and K. Raik, (eds), ‘The European External Action Service and National Diplomacies’, (2013) 
EPC Issue Paper, nº73; M. Gatti, The European External Action Service and the Implementation of the Union 
Method in European Foreign Policy, PhD Thesis, 2013; J. Bátora, ‘The ‘Mitrailleuse Effect’: The EEAS as an 
Interstitial Organization and the Dynamics of Innovation in Diplomacy’, (2013) Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 598; R. Wessel, R. and Bart Van Vooren, ‘The EEAS's diplomatic dreams and the reality of European 
and international law’, (2013) Journal of European Public Policy, 1350. 
1516 A. M. Fernandez, ‘Consular affairs in the EU: Visa policy as a catalyst for integration?’, (2008) The Hague 
Journal of Diplomacy, 21; by the same author, ‘Local consular co-operation: Administering EU internal security 
overseas’, (2009) European Foreign Affairs Review, 591; ‘Consular affairs in an integrated Europe’, in J. 
Melissen, and A.M. Fernández (eds), Consular affairs and diplomacy, Martinus Nijhof Publishers, (2011). 
1517 This topic has been addressed from either the EU’s external relations topic (G. Porzio, ‘Consular Assistance 
and Protection: An EU Perspective’, (2008) The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 21; K. Raik, ‘Serving the 
citizens? Consular role of the EEAS grows in small steps’, EPC Policy Brief, April 2013; J. Wouters, S. Duquet, 
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address the specific functions the EU possesses post-Lisbon Treaty for securing protection of 
EU citizens abroad, as they result from the various EU internal and external relations policies, 
while also briefly pointing out the post-Lisbon relation between these EU policies and the 
Member States’ consular and diplomatic policies in theory and practice.1518 For this purpose 
the section will first identify the allocation of functions of the main EU institutions with a role 
in securing protection of EU citizens abroad; second, to establish the type of competence the 
EU enjoys in this field and the consular and diplomatic services it can provide to EU citizens 
in need of help in third countries. The section will conclude by outlining the strengthens and 
weakness of the EU’s role in securing protection of EU citizens abroad and will also consider 
the possible recommendations that could solve the current problems identified in this field. 
  
1. The role of the EEAS and the Union Delegations in ensuring protection 
of EU citizens abroad 
Following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU’s triangular external 
representation system was maintained1519, while some of the old actors were replaced with 
newly instituted ones. Currently, the EU is represented externally by the President of the 
European Council (Article 9(b) TEU), the High Representative for Foreign Affairs (Article 
13(2)(a) TEU), and the Commission (Article 17(1) TEU). In addition, the Member States 
preserve their external representation tasks in areas that do not fall under the scope of 
application of EU law.  
The High Representative was specifically designed to bridge the CFSP and non-CFSP 
areas of action, to increase the inter-institutional dialogue between the Commission and the 
Council, as well as consistency and visibility of the EU policies.1520 During the elaboration of 
the European Convention, the idea of an independent body that would help the High 
                                                                                                                                                        
and K. Meuwissen, ‘The European Union and Consular Law’, Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies 
Working Paper, No.107/2013) or from a citizenship and fundamental rights perspective (Alessandro I. 
Saliceti,'The Protection of EU Citizens Abroad: Accountability, Rule of Law, Role of Consular and Diplomatic 
Services', (2011) European Public Law, 191; S. Touzé, ‘Aspects récents (et choisis) de la protection consulaire 
des citoyens de l’Union européenne’, (2011) Revue des affaires européennes, 79; E. Denza, ‘Commentary to Art. 
46 of the EU Charter’, in S. Peers, T. Hervey, J. Kenner, A. Ward (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: 
A Commentary, by Hart Publishing (2014)). 
1518 The specific issue of the EU law on protection of EU citizens abroad, as resulting from the provisions on the 
EU citizenship and EU external relations policies, impact on the Member States’ legal framework and practices 
of consular and diplomatic protection of individuals will be assessed in a separate section in this Chapter. 
1519 See S. Nuttall, ‘Coherence and Consistency’ in C. Hill and M. Smith (eds) The European Union and 
International Relations, Oxford University Press (2005), 93. 
1520 See more in C. Carta, European Union Diplomatic Service: Ideas, Preferences and Identities, op.cit.. 
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Representative in his tasks emerged. The Lisbon Treaty introduced thus a new external 
relations actor, an independent sui generis body, separated from both the Commission and the 
Council Secretariat, and entitled the European External Action Service (EEAS). The EEAS 
itself includes different departments from the Commission and the Council specialised in the 
conduct of external relations of the Union, and the Union delegations.1521 
The entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty introduced a new actor (the European 
Union) on the international sphere that could exercise, to a certain extent, consular and 
diplomatic protection – State-like functions on behalf of private individuals, who were its 
citizens. The Treaty of Lisbon has made the EU directly responsible for the protection of EU 
citizens located outside the European Union.1522 It further strengthened the role of the Union 
in this field by replacing the Commission delegations with Union delegations which are now 
representing all of the Union interests1523, and can also protect Union citizens in third 
countries1524, unlike any other international organisation, and similar to the consular and 
diplomatic missions of States that can protect the interests of the sending State and of its 
nationals.1525 
The idea of ensuring external protection of Union citizens via the Union diplomatic 
delegations did not appear for the first time during the elaboration of the Treaty of Lisbon or 
the Constitutional Treaty. The possibility was put forward for consideration, as early as 1993, 
at the initiative of the Commission, which proposed that protection of the then Community 
citizens should be ensured directly by EC Missions.1526 Starting in 2006, the Commission re-
considered the idea of making the EU delegations directly responsible for the protection of 
EU citizens.1527 Furthermore EU vessels fishing in the maritime waters of third countries with 
which the EU had concluded fishing agreements benefited for many years from the 
diplomatic protection of the Union via the then Commission delegations.1528 It thus seems that 
                                                 
1521 See Arts. 1 and 4 of the EEAS Decision. 
1522 Art. 3(5) TEU. 
1523 Art. 221 TFEU. 
1524 Art. 35 TEU and Art. 5(10) EEAS Decision. 
1525 According to of Art. 5(a) VCCR and Art. 3(1)(b) VCDR. 
1526 Report from the Commission on the Citizenship of the Union, C0M(93)702 final, Brussels, 21 December 
1993, available at: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:1993:0702:FIN:EN:PDF> 
(accessed March 2013). On the history of the Union delegations, see E. Drieskens, ‘What’s in a Name? 
Challenges to the Creation of EU Delegations’, (2012) The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 51. 
1527 See European Commission (2007) Effective Consular Protection in Third Countries: The Contribution of the 
European Union, Commission Action Plan 2007-2009, 5.12.2007, COM(2007) 767 final, at 10. 
1528 For example fishing agreements concluded between the EU and certain third countries include two 
provisions of relevance for the subject: ‘1) Seizure of fishing vessels flying the flag of a Member State shall be 
notified to the Delegation of the Commission of the EU and simultaneously to the consular agent of the Member 
State of the flag; 2) Before any judicial procedure is started, an attempt shall be made to resolve the presumed 
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under areas of exclusive Union competence, the Union had been recognised as having the 
right to exercise diplomatic protection directly to legal persons. However, it is difficult to 
imagine practical situations where private EU citizens, and not legal persons, could by way of 
their actions fall under the exclusive competence of the EU and thus benefit from a right to 
diplomatic protection from the EU before the Lisbon Treaty. 
a. The EEAS and Union delegations’ competence to protect EU citizens 
abroad 
The newly created European External Service has been endowed with the competence to act 
for the protection of the Union citizens, mostly via the Union delegations in third 
countries.1529 The Council Decision qualifies the role of the EEAS in this field as supporting 
the competences of the Member States’ representations in third countries. 
It has to be pointed out that the qualification of the EU delegations’ competence in the 
field of protection of Union citizens abroad, according to Article 5(10) of the Council 
Decision, as ‘supplementary’ does not necessarily imply a qualification of the nature of this 
EU competence as supportive in the sense of one of the three main EU competences from the 
catalogue of competences introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon (Articles 3- 6 TFEU). The 
consular and diplomatic protection of EU citizens in the world is not among the list of 
supplementary competences of the EU enumerated under Article 6 TFEU, nor are they to be 
found under one of the other Articles stipulating the different types of EU competences.1530 
Therefore, according to the fall-back Article 4(1) TFEU, the EU’s competence in the field of 
consular and diplomatic protection of EU citizens is shared with the Member States, without 
necessarily creating a hierarchy between the competences of the Member States and those of 
the EU to secure protection abroad for unrepresented EU citizens. However, the principles of 
subsidiarity1531 would require the EU to adopt policy measures only when necessary and better 
ensuring the objective of ensuring protection of EU citizens by way of actions taken at the EU 
level.  
                                                                                                                                                        
infringement through an administrative procedure.’ The latter provision was interpreted by the then Court of 
First Instance in Case T-572/93, Odigitria, Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 6 July 1995. The Court 
interpreted this provision as a form of diplomatic protection by the EU with respect to vessels that fly the flag of 
a Member State. The Court heldthat the EU Delegation abroad had a ‘duty to provide diplomatic protection’ to 
the detained crew under the fisheries agreement that the European Commission negotiated bilaterally with the 
non-EU countries concerned. For a complete list of these fisheries agreements, see: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/international/agreements/> (accessed March 2014).  
1529 Art. 5(10) Council Decision on EEAS and Art. 221 TFEU. 
1530 Art.3 TFEU on exclusive EU competences, Arts. 4(2) or 5 TFEU on shared competences. 
1531 Art. 5 TEU, and the Protocol No. 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. 
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Article 5(10) of the EEAS Council Decision should be seen more as an operational 
principle guiding the co-operation in practice between the EU delegations and the Member 
States’ external representations in third countries, rather than placing an etiquette on the 
nature of the EU’s overall competence in this field 
b. Type of ‘protective’ services 
The EU with all its institutions is subject to the principle of conferred powers and thus the 
EEAS can exercises only the competences that were granted by the founding treaties to the 
EU. Article 35(2) and (3) TEU expressly empower the EU delegations to contribute to the 
implementation of the EU citizen’s right to equal protection abroad, however they do not 
detail the type of contribution. The involvement of the EU delegations directly ensuring the 
protection of EU citizens abroad is once again provided in Article 221 TFEU, in 
corroboration with Article 3(5) TEU. Additionally, as Article 46 of the EU Charter provides 
that the substantive scope of Article 23 TFEU is both equal consular and diplomatic 
protection, one may think that the EU, through its diplomatic service, can thus ensure directly 
consular and diplomatic protection of EU citizens in third countries. Article 5(10) of the 
Council Decision clearly empowers the EEAS with competence to exercise consular 
protection of EU citizens if the Member States so request.  
It can thus be noted that the extent to which specific sub-categories of consular 
services might be handled by the EU delegations is not regulated in detail by either the 
founding Treaties, or the EEAS Decision. Both primary and secondary EU law only provide 
guiding principles for the responsibilities of the EEAS in the area of consular and diplomatic 
affairs, without detailing the exact consular or diplomatic services that the EU delegations are 
entitled to exercise in relation to EU citizens located outside the Union.1532 Article 221(1) 
TFEU entrusts the EU delegations with only a general external representation for all EU 
external relations competences, without specifying what precise consular and diplomatic 
functions the EU delegations possess. The EU provisions that relocate some of the Member 
States’ external representations tasks to the HR and the EU delegations do not either give 
much detail on the type of consular and diplomatic services the EU delegations are entitled to 
                                                 
1532 The EEAS Chief Operating Officer David O’Sullivan pointed out that the gaps left by the Lisbon Treaty, 
which only provided the legal basis for the EEAS and the very basic provisions of the 2010 Council Decision 
establishing the EEAS, had to be filled by the EEAS itself. Speech by EEAS Chief operating Officer David 
O’Sullivan at the Institute of International and European Affairs in Dublin, 6 October 2011, available at: 




provide to the EU citizens.1533 The EU delegations are taking over the external representation 
tasks of the rotating presidency in third countries. This particular new function will mainly 
consist in CFSP related tasks: the local organisation of summits, ministerial meetings and 
other political dialogue and troika activities (former Article 18 TEU); the organisation and 
chairing of the local cooperation between the Member States diplomatic and consular 
missions (former Article 20 TEU); the coordination of the EU positions and demarches;1534 
agenda-setting; and as spokesperson in third countries,1535 therefore they do not entail 
consular and diplomatic services provided directly by the EU delegations to the EU citizens. 
The transfer of external representations tasks from the Rotating Council Presidency to 
the High Representative, Union delegations and the President of the European Council is a 
welcome step in the light of the past practice which proved that ensuring external 
representations functions by the Member States holding the Rotating Council Presidency in 
third countries was a cumbersome task not only for the small Member States, but also for 
those possessing one of the wider networks of external representations. It was pointed out that 
even during the German Presidency in the first half of 2007, the 27 local Presidencies were 
exercised by seven different Member States. The external representation of the EU becomes 
even more cumbersome for the Member States in those third countries where only a few of 
them are represented, since such Member States would have to exercise the local Presidency 
almost on a continuous basis, with all the financial and non-financial burdens which that 
requires from an embassy. The external representation of the EU in foreign affairs that fell 
within the competence of the Rotating Presidency posed serious problems not only in terms of 
its capacity to cover as many regions as possible, but also in terms of continuity. The 
changing every 6 months of the Member State holding the Rotating Presidency created 
confusion for third countries in terms of the face, name, telephone numbers, and all the 
bureaucratic administrative aspects of external relations. 
The Union delegations have now taken over the coordination of Member States’ 
embassies from the embassies of the Member States holding the Rotating Presidency,1536 
                                                 
1533 The Lisbon Treaty eliminated the external representation power of the Rotating Presidency, and instead 
provided for a general rule on EU representation contained in Arts. 17(1) and 18 TEU.  
1534 European External Action Service, ‘Report by the High Representative to the European Parliament, the 
Council and the Commission’, 22 December 2011, p. 6. 
1535 See M. Gatti, The European External Action Service and the Implementation of the Union Method in 
European Foreign Policy, PhD Thesis, 2013, 39ff. 
1536 Several Reports on the EEAS activities mention the gradual taking over of the external representation and 
internal coordination role from the rotating Council Presidency in third countries and various multilateral fora by 
the EU delegations. See, for example: EEAS, EU diplomatic representation in third countries – second half of 
2011, 11808/2/11 REV 2, Brussels, 25 November 2011, and EEAS, ‘EU diplomatic representation in third 
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however the transfer of the coordination function was not smooth in all cases. 1537 This new 
function will also have an impact on the efficiency of the procedure to ensure protection of 
EU citizens abroad. The fact that the EU is present in more third countries than any of the 
Member States, and that a single entity will ensure coordination of the meetings where 
planning and management of protection is discussed could lead in practice to a more coherent 
and transparent protection procedure. 
 Although, so far, most of the protection secured by the EU to its citizens abroad has 
taken the shape of consular protection, usually provided during consular crisis situations, the 
EU has occasionally exercised, pre- and post-Lisbon Treaty, also diplomatic protection 
actions for the benefit of its citizens detained, or prohibited to return to the Union territory. 
For instance, in October 2007, the EU requested Djibouti to comply with the Cotonou 
Agreement, which expressly subjected economic benefits to the respect of human rights 
within its territory.1538 The Council’s statement comes in response to the arbitrarily arrest of 
an Italian citizen.1539 Post-Lisbon Treaty, it seems the EU’s diplomatic interventions on behalf 
of its citizens located in third countries has increased. For instance, in 2011, on behalf of a 
group of Czech citizens illegally detained in Zambia,1540 and in 2013, in the famous cases of 
Ms Invernizzi, an Italian citizen, whose human rights to exit a country and return to her 
country of nationality and the right to fair trial were violated in Saudi Arabia, facing also the 
death penalty for adultery;1541 or of the Swedish journalist, Dawit Isaak, imprisoned in Eritrea 
for having exercised his freedom of expression.1542 The diplomatic intervention of the HR and 
the EU delegations, conducting negotiations for the repatriation of the citizens or for their 
                                                                                                                                                        
countries – first half of 2012’, 18975/11, Brussels, 22 December 2011; N. Helwig, ‘The New EU Foreign Policy 
Architecture: Reviewing the first two years of the EEAS’, CEPS February 2013, available at: 
<http://www.ceps.be/ceps/dld/7711/pdf . 
1537 For example, P. M. Kaczyński pointed out that in Washington some national ambassadors did not show up 
for local coordination meetings for months. See, P. M. Kaczynski, ‘Swimming in Murky Waters: Challenges in 
Developing the EU’s External Representation’, FII Briefing Paper 88, September 2011, 9. 
1538 Council reply, E-0829/08 of 16 of April 2008, available at: 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2008-0829&language=EN> (accessed 
February 2013). 
1539 Parliamentary question, E-0829/08 of 21 February 2008, available at: 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+E-2008-
0829+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN> (accessed February 2013). 
1540 Written question P-011180/11 Jan Březina (PPE) to the Commission. VP/HR — Detention of Czech citizens 
in Zambia 
1541 Question for written answer to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative) submitted by MEP 
Oreste Rossi, under Rule 117, published in OJ C 308 E, 23/10/2013. 
1542 Question for written answer E-008016/12 to the Commission (Vice-President / High Representative) 
submitted by MEP Olle Schmidt on 11 September 2012, published in OJ C 308E, 23/10/2013. 
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liberation with the local governments, or handing habeas corpus before the local courts 
constitute diplomatic protection actions.1543 
Comparing the catalogue of functions that Member States’ embassies and consulates 
are empowered to exercise in third countries with the list of responsibilities of Union 
delegations, one arrives at the conclusion that there is a significant number of similar consular 
and diplomatic functions which both the Member States’ external representations and the 
embassies of the European Union, an international organisation, can now exercise of behalf of 
the EU citizens in the world.  
The consular functions which a consular mission of a Member State can exercise are 
specified in Article 5 of the VCCR, and they are thirteen in number. Of this list, only the visas 
and the notary related functions are not currently performed by the EU. As to the other 
consular functions, the EU has certain competence to exercise them, including: supervision of 
judicial proceedings in which EU citizens are involved;1544 Article 5(h) safeguarding, within 
the limits imposed by the laws and regulations of the receiving State, the interests of minors 
and other persons lacking full capacity who are nationals of the sending State, particularly 
where any guardianship or trusteeship is required with regard to such persons;1545 and Article 
5(k) and (l) assistance to vessels and ships carrying the EU flag, but also those of the Member 
States, as long as they are carrying out actions which fall under the exclusive competence of 
the EU. For example, fishing agreements1546 concluded between the EU and certain third 
countries include two provisions of relevance to the subject: 1) seizure of fishing vessels 
flying the flag of a Member State shall be notified to the Delegation of the Commission of the 
EU and simultaneously to the consular agent of the Member State of the flag; and 2) before 
                                                 
1543 According to the commentary of Article 1 of the ILC Articles on Diplomatic Protection, ‘“Diplomatic 
action” covers all the lawful procedures employed by a State to inform another State of its views and concerns, 
including protest, request for an inquiry or for negotiations aimed at the settlement of disputes. “Other means of 
peaceful settlement” embraces all forms of lawful dispute settlement, from negotiation, mediation and 
conciliation to arbitral and judicial dispute settlement.’ See Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 
2006, vol. II, Part Two, para. 8, p.26. 
1544 ‘The EU has informed the Ministry of External Affairs of its intention to send representatives from its Delhi-
based missions of Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Hungary, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the EU, to 
attend the court hearing in the case of Human Rights Defender and National Vice-President of the People's 
Union for Civil Liberties, Dr. Binayak Sen, as observers. The hearing is scheduled to take place at the 
Chhattisgarh High Court in Bilaspur on Monday 24 January. This is in line with the EU's agreed policy on 
Human Rights Defenders. The EU has also expressed to the Indian authorities its concern about the conditions 
pertaining to the detention of Dr. Sen’. Available at: 
<http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/india/press_corner/all_news/news/2011/20110121_en.htm> (accessed may 
2013).  
1545 See the reply of the EEAS to the petition of an EU citizen whose child was abducted in Egypt, available at: 
<http://eeas.europa.eu/petitions/2012/20120820_rights_eucitizens_egypt_en.pdf> (accessed May 2013). 
1546 See inter alia, Article L of the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Republic of 
Cote d'Ivoire on fishing off the coast of Cote d'Ivoire, [1990] OJ L 379/0003. 
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any judicial procedure is started an attempt shall be made to resolve the presumed 
infringement through an administrative procedure.1547 Therefore, although the EEAS and EU 
delegations are mostly involved in protecting EU citizens in consular crisis, a certain 
involvement exists also in day-to-day situations and diplomatic protection related cases. 
There is growing cooperation between the EU delegations and the Member States 
whereby the Union delegations have provided the Member States with significant logistic 
assistance on numerous occasions for the purpose of ensuring consular assistance for both 
represented and unrepresented EU citizens in third countries affected by disasters.1548 The 
delegations have helped with the logistics, including: opening their premises to the EU 
citizens and the Member States’ consular and diplomatic officials and helping with 
transportation, communications,1549 and with wider coordination functions of the Member 
States’ consular and diplomatic missions.1550 Furthermore, according to a recent Commission 
study, unrepresented EU citizens perceive Union delegations as ‘natural’ contact points.1551 
In short, the added value of the Treaty of Lisbon in terms of the protection of 
unrepresented EU citizens abroad primarily consists of enhancing the EU’s role, by giving 
more powers and instruments to the EEAS in the field of consular protection of EU citizens, 
and ensuring more efficient horizontal co-operation and co-ordination among the external 
                                                 
1547 This latter provision was interpreted by the General Court in the Odigitria case. The General Court 
interpreted this article as a form of diplomatic protection by the EU with respect to vessels that fly the flag of a 
Member State. 
1548 The most recent example was during the political upheaval in Syria when the EEAS was ready to help with 
the evacuation of around 25,000 EU nationals in Syria and with hosting the diplomatic officials of four Member 
States in the EU delegation in Damascus (A. Miozzo’s statement of May 2012, available at: 
http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/eu-embassy-stays-open-as-expulsions-escalate/74455.aspx 
accessed May 2013). Similar operations were carried out in Libya, Egypt, and Tunisia during the political 
upheaval that affected those countries in the spring of 2011. 
1549 On the general role of the EEAS in the field of consular protection of EU citizens, see the December 2011 
EEAS evaluation report which stated that ‘[…] over the past year we have also seen that the EU Delegations can 
play an important role in the coordination of evacuations of citizens […]’, European External Action Service 
(2011a) ‘Report by the High Representative to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission’ (22 
December 2011). For an academic position on the role of the EEAS in the field of consular protection of EU 
citizens, see Bart van Vooren and R. Wessel, op. cit., and European Parliament, AFET Committee Report on The 
Role of the European External Action Service in Consular Protection and Services for EU citizens, 2013, 
available at: 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/de/studiesdownload.html?languageDocument=EN&file=85428> 
(accessed May 2013). 
1550 As happened, for instance, in Japan, when the EU delegation spontaneously assumed the coordination of 
national capabilities responsibility during the 2011 nuclear disaster. See J. Wouters, S. Duquet and K. 
Meuwissen, ‘The European Union and Consular Law’, KU Leuven Working Paper 107/2013, 10. 
1551 See Commission Staff Working Paper, Impact Assessment, accompanying the document, Proposal for a 
Directive of the Council on co-ordination and co-operation measures regarding consular protection for 
unrepresented EU citizens, SEC (2011) 1556 final, Brussels, 14.12.2011, at p. 28. A similar situation also 
existed before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. According to the declaration of F. Frattini, Director of 
the DG Justice in 2007, 17% of Union citizens interviewed believed that they could seek protection from the 
EU’s Commission delegations. See Public hearing: Diplomatic and consular protection (Centre Borschette) 
Brussels of 29 May 2007. 
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representations of the Member States. The EU’s involvement in Georgia, Egypt, and Libya 
and recently in Syria has demonstrated to the citizens of the EU and to the Member States the 
added value brought by the EU Institutions in this domain. In these emergency situations the 
EU has made use of all its disaster response tools,1552 making sure that help is given to the 
populations of the affected third countries1553 but also to its EU populations caught in the 
midst of disasters. 
In its four years of existence, the role of the EEAS in responding to crises around the 
world and coordinating crisis management missions and operations has grown 
considerably.1554 
Some of the Member States have fervently opposed the recognition of consular powers 
to the EEAS,1555 since the ability to provide consular services to citizens and secure assistance 
in emergency situations has traditionally been defined under the international legal framework 
as a symbol of statehood.1556 In spite of opposition from several Member States, it seems that 
there is a progressive recognition of the EU’s role in exercising consular and diplomatic 
protection functions for the benefit of EU citizens. The difficult task of ensuring external 
representation of the Union by the Member State holding the Rotating Council Presidency as 
well as the need to present a more coherent external image of the Union1557 might have 
influenced the Member States, including those vehemently opposed to the idea of the Union 
taking over more external representations functions, to accept, during the development of the 
                                                 
1552 For a detailed overview of the EU’s panoply of disaster response tools, see F. Casolari, ‘The External 
Dimension of the EU Disaster Response’, in: A. de Guttry, M. Gestri and G. Venturini (eds.), International 
Disaster Response Law, Hague: Springer T.M.C Asser Press, 2012, pp. 129 – 155; and M. Cremona, ‘The EU 
and Global Emergencies – Competence and Instruments’, in: A. Antoniadis, R. Schütze and E. Spaventa (eds.), 
The European Union and Global Emergencies: A Law and Policy Analysis, Hart Publishing, 2011, pp.11-31. 
1553 Usually via the humanitarian assistance instrument. See for example, N. Keoning, ‘The EU and the Libyan 
Crisis: In Quest of Coherence?’, IAI Working Paper of July 2011. 
1554 According to David O’Sullivan, Chief Operating Officer, European External Action Service, the EEAS 
mobilized ‘over 7000 EU military and civilian personnel with about thirty missions launched since 2003. Our 
strength lies in a comprehensive approach enabling us to combine diplomatic, political, military, trade, 
development and humanitarian actions.’ See his Guest Editorial article ‘The EU’s External Action: Moving to 
the Frontline’ in (2014) EFRev, 329, 329–334. 
1555 See, inter alia, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Thirty-third Report of Session 2012-13, Draft Council 
Directive on consular protection for citizens of the Union abroad, available at: 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmeuleg/86-xxxiii/8615.htm>; and the National 
Report on the UK legislation and practice on consular and diplomatic protection of citizens in the CARE Report, 
available at: <http://www.careproject.eu/images/stories/ConsularAndDiplomaticProtection.pdf>  
1556 See the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Article 1. See also K. Raik, ‘Serving the 
citizens?, op. cit.Consular role of the EEAS grows in small steps’, CEPS Policy Brief, 30 April 2013, available 
at: <http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/pub_3488_consular_role_of_the_eeas.pdf> (accessed May 2013).  
1557 See J. Larik, ‘The EU on the Global Stage after the Lisbon Treaty: External Action and the External Action 
Service’, in S. Cassesse, B. Carotti, L. Cassini, E. Cavalieri and E. MacDonald (eds.), Global Administrative 
Law: The Casebook, IRPA–IILJ (2012), 16. 
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Treaty of Lisbon, to transfer more external representation tasks from the national to the EU 
diplomatic sphere. 
However, in spite of the recent attainment of consular and diplomatic functions by the 
EU, the general norm, in both theory and practice, is that the Member State of nationality still 
maintains the primary responsibility for ensuring the protection of EU citizens abroad. In the 
event of the absence of the external representation of the Member State, the responsibility 
falls on the other Member States that are represented in the specific third countries, and, 
lastly, responsibility falls on the EU delegations, if requested by one of the Member States.  
 
2. The role of the Commission, the European Parliament and the Council 
in ensuring protection of EU citizens abroad 
Of these three EU institutions with legislative power, the Commission and the European 
Parliament have supported the development of a more ambitious role for the EU in securing 
protection of EU citizens in the world based on the EU’s newly attributed competences, 
capacity to gather resources, and its more influential negotiation power. Since the 
development of the concept of an EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad, the 
Commission has militated for a stronger role of the EU in the field of ensuring protection of 
EU citizens abroad based on the Member States’ inability to secure efficient consular and 
diplomatic protection of EU citizens abroad, and later on based on the Member States 
inability of ensuring an efficient implementation of the EU citizenship right.  
Strengthening the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad became a key 
priority for the Commission starting in 2006. The Green Paper prepared by the Commission 
was the first policy initiative aimed at finding the appropriate means to increasing the 
efficiency of the EU citizenship right in terms of vertical and horizontal cooperation, finding a 
common framework for the exercise of consular protection and increasing the awareness of 
EU citizens.1558 The proposals envisaged by the Green Paper indicate the Commission’s 
inclination for supranational forms of action. A consent clause to be negotiated by the 
Community with third countries, the establishment of a common rules framework for the 
exercise of the Member States’ obligation to ensure protection abroad of EU citizens, and a 
role for the Commission delegations, are some of the supranational measures envisioned by 
the Commission for tackling the problems in practice. The Community action approach was 
                                                 




not welcomed by certain Member States,1559 which have stressed the lack of competence of the 
Community, Union, and thus the Commission to act, proposing instead to act by way of 
intergovernmental type of actions.1560 
Pre-Lisbon Treaty, the role of the Commission was limited, since it was considered to 
lack legislative power, and had thus adopted only soft law documents, such as: the Green 
Paper, Action Plan, and Impact Assessment. Even if the implementation of the unrepresented 
Union citizen’s right to equal protection abroad was, in the pre-Lisbon period, carried out 
primarily by way of horizontal consular cooperation among the Member States due to the 
Member States’ desire to preserve their full powers in the field of consular and diplomatic 
protection of citizens abroad, once the Member States started to feel overwhelmed by the 
magnitude and frequency of disasters affecting their citizens in third countries, forms of 
vertical consular cooperation started to appear. For instance, the Community Civil Protection 
Mechanism was amended in 2007 for the purposes of also covering consular protection of 
Union citizens in need of urgent help in third countries.1561 Therefore, within the framework 
of the Civil Protection Mechanism, the Commission acquired a small role via the 
Commission’s Monitoring and Information centre (‘MIC’) established within this 
Mechanism. 
To date, the EU’s Civil Protection Mechanism has often been activated for the 
purposes of supporting the Member States in ensuring consular assistance to EU citizens in 
major emergencies in third countries. The Mechanism was activated in past crises such as: 
Libya (2010),1562 Mumbai (2008)1563 and Libya again in early 2011.1564 During the Gaza crisis 
                                                 
1559 In particular the UK, which has been the most reticent of all the Member States in relation to the 
development of any supranational form of action and harmonisation in this field. 
1560 See the CARE Report, Chapter IV and J. Wouters, S. Duquet and K. Meuwissen, ‘The European Union and 
Consular Law’, KU Leuven Working Paper No. 107/2013. 
1561 Preamble 18 of the Civil Protection Mechanism (Council Decision 2007/779/EC Euratom establishing the 
EU Civil Protection Mechanism (Recast), OJ, 2007, L 314/9 reads as follows: ‘The Mechanism could also be 
used for supporting consular assistance to EU citizens in major emergencies in third countries, regarding civil 
protection activities, if requested by the consular authorities of the Member States’. 
1562 In particular, two grants (with a value of €112,000) were awarded to two Member States that had evacuated 
about 150 EU citizens. See Commission Staff Working Paper, Impact Assessment, accompanying the document, 
Proposal for a Directive of the Council on co-ordination and co-operation measures regarding consular 
protection for unrepresented EU citizens, SEC (2011) 1556 final, Brussels, 14.12.2011, p. 18. 
1563 In Mumbai, the Mechanism was triggered by the French Presidency and activated in order to assist severely 
wounded EU citizens after the Mumbai attacks; this operation complemented bilateral operations undertaken by 
Member States to evacuate more than 100 non-wounded EU citizens to Europe. The costs of the evacuation were 
50% co-funded by the Civil Protection Financial Instrument. See Commission Staff Working Paper, Impact 
Assessment, ibid., p. 18. 





in January 2009, nearly 100 people were evacuated in armoured buses thanks to the EU 
Delegation’s support.  
As part of the Commission’s efforts of increasing the effectiveness of EU citizenship, 
the problems faced in the implementation of the EU citizenship right to equal protection 
abroad were addressed in several of the Commission’s policy papers. Supported in its 
endeavours by the European Council, which invited the Commission in 2009, within the 
framework of the Stockholm Programme, to ‘consider appropriate measures establishing 
coordination and cooperation necessary to facilitate consular protection in accordance with 
Article 23 TFEU’1565, the Commission undertook a comparative analysis of the extent and 
nature of discrepancies between the then 27 Member States’ legal frameworks and practice on 
consular and diplomatic protection1566 and an evaluation of the best policy options for an 
instrument that should replace1567 the sui generis inter-governmental implementation 
framework of former Article 20 EC Treaty, consisting of the three Decisions of the 
Representatives of the Governments of the Member States (95/553, 96/409, 11107/95).  
As part of its concern for ensuring an effective implementation of the EU citizenship 
right to equal protection abroad, and mindful of the Union’s obligation to respect international 
law, the Commission has on numerous occasions emphasised the need to obtain the consent 
of the third countries either by way of ‘a unilateral notification to the third countries’ or a 
consent clause introduced in future bilateral agreements concluded by the Member States. The 
cumbersome procedure involved by these solutions has determined the Commission to put 
forward another proposal whereby a consent clause is inserted in mixed agreements with 
certain third countries.1568 In spite of this proposal being put forward to the Member States as 
                                                 
1565 The Stockholm Programme – An open and secure Europe serving and protecting the citizens, Council 
document 170 24/09 of 2 December 2009, [2010] OJ C 115/01, p. 11. 
1566 See the CARE Project (Citizens’ Consular Assistance Regulation in Europe), http://www.careproject.eu/ See 
in addition also the other studies launched by the Commission: a study (2009) on Member States' legislations 
and practices, carried out by the Instituto Europeo de Derecho. An external study (2010) by the consultancy 
GHK supported the Commission in its analysis of policy options and the related costs, focusing on crisis 
situations and financial reimbursement. A second external study (2011) undertaken by the consultancy Matrix 
Insight evaluated Decision 95/553/EC and examined scope for further improvement, see Commission Proposal 
for a Council Directive on Consular Protection for citizens of the Union abroad, COM(2011) 881 final 
2011/0432 (CNS), Brussels, 14.12.2011, fn 19. 
1567 The consular related Decisions provided that they will have to be amended 5 years after they entry into force, 
that is in 2007. Since the Commission has the role of legislative initiator, it took this responsibility also in 
relation to the ‘odd one out’ EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad. 
1568 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council - Consular protection 
for EU citizens in third countries: State of play and way forward, doc. COM (2011) 149/2 of 23 March 2011). 
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the preferred option from all possible solutions, so far the Member States have not all agreed 
with this particular supranational solution.1569 
Although the European Parliament has been quiet on the implementation of the EU 
citizenship right to equal protection abroad during most of this EU citizenship right’s 
existence, its position has changed, particularly after the 2008 Mumbai conflict. Following the 
negative experience of certain MEPs who were left behind by the consular authorities of a 
Member State,1570 based on the fact that they were not co-nationals of those consular officials, 
the European Parliament has gradually increased its voice and its proposals for a stronger role 
of the EU in securing protection of the EU citizens in the world. For instance, the European 
Parliament welcomed most of the Commission’s proposals in this field, starting from the 
Green Paper’s proposals1571 and continuing post-Lisbon Treaty in regard to the Commission’s 
proposal for a Directive on consular protection of Union citizens in third countries.1572 Post-
Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament is calling, even more fervently than the European 
Commission, for a stronger consular role for the EEAS, based on the newly conferred 
protection powers of the Union. The Parliament seems to see in this new consular and 
diplomatic protection role of the EU a way to enhance EU citizenship,1573 the connection of 
the public with the EU, and also the EU’s international position. 
On the other hand, the Council has been more reluctant towards the Commission’s 
proposals, in light of the fact that certain Member States have acted as persistent objectors to 
any initiative that increases the role of the EU in this field. Pre-Lisbon Treaty, the Council 
served only as an institutional setting for the meetings of the Member States where they 
adopted the relevant sui generis Decisions implementing former Article 20 EC Treaty. 
 Compared to the Commission, the Council had a slightly more important role since 
one of its Working Groups was given the task of following the implementation of the EU 
citizenship right to equal protection abroad – the COCON Working Group.1574 The Working 
Group was established immediately after the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty and was 
                                                 
1569 The UK has clearly rejected this proposal in 2006 when it was first put forward by the Commission (Green 
Paper ‘Diplomatic and consular protection of Union citizens in third countries’, COM 2006 712 final, 
28.11.2006), and it seems it has not changed the position, see the UK Report in the CARE Report. 
1570 See the CARE Report, Chapter Conclusions, 665. 
1571 See the Report on the Green Paper: Diplomatic and Consular Protection of Union citizens in third countries, 
European Parliament Committee on civil liberties, justice and home affairs, and G. Porzio, op.cit., 97. 
1572 See more details on this issue in this Chapter, section VIII - Future policy and institutional 
measuresmeasures to increase efficiency ofensure an effective protection of EU citizens protection in the 
worldabroad 
1573 See K. Raik, ‘Serving the citizens? Consular role of the EEAS grows in small steps’, EPC Policy Brief of 30 
April 2013. 
1574 Council Working Group promoting European Consular Cooperation. 
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meant to be a forum of meeting and discussion among consular representatives of the Member 
States. The work of this ‘club of port and cigars’,1575 as it has been called, has been criticised 
by academics for lacking a long-term vision of the European consular cooperation,1576 and for 
keeping a Community policy – the EU citizenship right – intergovernmental.1577  
The Member States had and continue to have a divided position on the EU’s role in the 
field of ensuring protection of EU citizens abroad. While Eastern European and smaller 
countries such as Belgium and Netherlands have supported an increased consular role for the 
EU, other Member States have been reluctant to such a delegation of power. The latter group 
has invoked several objective reasons for their position, such as the EEAS lack of human 
resources and training and lack of EU and Member States’ funds to remedy this situation. 
However, the main reason of opposition is the perception of these former colonial powers of 
the field of citizens’ protection abroad as a core State power with important legal and political 
ramifications that should remain under the State’s exclusive control. It is thus highly likely 
that the Council will maintain the EU citizenship right as the ‘odd one out’ EU citizenship 
right, still attributed to the COCON Working Group that shared a primarily internationalist 
approach to the implementation of this right. 
The final part of this section will assess the benefits of increasing the EEAS 
involvement for both EU citizens in need of assistance and for the Member States’ budgetary 
expenditures. 
3. Institutional policy options for the future 
The principal role of the EEAS, and of the Union delegations as part of the EEAS, is to serve 
the High Representative and the other EU institutions.1578 Ensuring the protection of EU 
citizens abroad has become a very controversial issue due to the alleged limited competence 
of the EU in this field, but most importantly due to the challenges it poses on the Member 
States’ sovereignty. 
The solution, so far, in cases of Member States facing difficulties in ensuring prompt 
consular assistance for all their nationals abroad has generally come from horizontal consular 
cooperation, whether initiated solely through intergovernmental cooperation mechanisms1579 
                                                 
1575 M. Okano-Heijmans ‘Changes In Consular Assistance And The Emergence Of Consular Diplomacy’, in J. 
Melissen and A.M. Fernández (eds.), Consular Affairs and Diplomacy, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (2011), 36. 
1576 Ibid. 
1577 Alessandro I. Saliceti, op.cit... 
1578 K. Raik, ‘Serving the citizens?’, op.cit.. 
1579 For example, under Decisions of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States 95/553/EC 
and 96/409/CFSP, or Lead State arrangements or other burden sharing arrangements such as by creating co-
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or through EU instruments.1580 However with the financial crisis severely affecting all 
Member States’ budgets, horizontal cooperation had already proved to be insufficient in the 
recent consular crisis affecting third countries, and will become increasingly insufficient in 
light of the growing number of unrepresented Union citizens, especially in third countries 
where no Member States are represented.1581 
The solution to the on-going reduction of the external representation network of the 
Member States and their budget allocation for consular and diplomatic assistance services 
therefore has to come also from outside national capabilities. The Treaty of Lisbon has 
revolutionised the conduct of EU foreign affairs both substantially and institutionally.1582 
Among the most relevant amendments with regard to ensuring the protection of EU citizens in 
the world, we should note the establishment of a diplomatic service for the EU1583 which 
includes around 140 Union delegations operating globally and making the EU better 
represented externally than most of the Member States. Indeed, in several third countries1584 
only the EU has an ‘embassy’,1585 while in certain key tourist destinations, such as Cape 
Verde, Fiji and Madagascar, there are only three other Member States that are represented in 
addition to the EU delegation. In this context, what becomes evident is the potential added 
value of the EU delegations for ensuring the protection of unrepresented EU citizens in situ 
by providing certain consular services or opening their premises to EU citizens. Article 5(10) 
                                                                                                                                                        
locations (concentration of two or more diplomatic and/or consular missions in one building/premises), Common 
Visa Application Centres (mutual accreditation of an external service provider at a joint visa application centre) 
or Common Administrative Centres (issuance of Schengen visa by several Member States in the same building 
or by one Schengen member in full representation of all Schengen partners in visa matters). 
1580 As for example, under the Civil Protection Mechanism, Council Decision 2007/779/EC Euratom establishing 
the EU Civil Protection Mechanism (Recast), [2007] OJ L 314/9. 
1581 There are 26 countries outside the EU where no Member State is represented, while the EU has a delegation 
in 8 of these third countries, see more details in Annex 2. 
1582 Spatial constraints do not allow an in-depth analysis here of all substantive and institutional amendments 
brought about by the Treaty of Lisbon in the field of the EU’s external relations. For a complete assessment of 
the Treaty of Lisbon changes in EU external relations, please see M. Cremona, ‘Defining Competence In EU 
External Relations: Lessons from the Treaty Reform Process’, in: A. Dashwood and M. Maresceau (eds.), Law 
and Practice of EU External Relations – Salient Features of a Changing Landscape, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008, and by the same author, ‘The Union’s External Action: Constitutional Perspectives’, in: 
G. Amato, H. Bribosia and B. de Witte (eds), Genèse et Destinée de la Constitution Européenne: Commentaire 
du traité établissant une Constitution pour l’Europe à la lumière des travaux préparatoires et perspectives d’ 
avenir, Bruxelles:Bruylant (2007). 
1583 The European External Action Service established by Article 27(3) TEU and Council Decision 2010/427/EU 
of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service, OJ, 
2010, L 201/30. 
1584 See Annex 1. 
1585 See Annex 1. Although the founding Treaties and the Council Decision establishing the EEAS refer formally 
to Union delegations, academics have also used the term Union ‘embassy’ when referring to Union delegations, 
unlike the Member States, notably, the UK, which have long fought for the Treaty of Lisbon to drop any 
reference to the terms ‘embassy’ or ‘Minister for Foreign Affairs’ used by the Constitutional Treaty. See J. 
Wouters and S. Duquet, ‘The EU and International Diplomatic Law: New Horizons?’, op.cit.. 
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of the EEAS Decision provides only a supporting role for the Union delegations and the 
EEAS, however this competence should not be understood as ‘supporting’ in the meaning of 
Art. 6 TFEU, since according to the TFEU, the Union competence in securing an efficient 
implementation of the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad, and thus including 
consular protection seems to be a shared competence under the fall-back provisions of Article 
4(2) TFEU.  
According to Article 13(2) of the EEAS Council Decision, the role of the EEAS in the 
field of consular protection of the EU citizens in third countries might develop in the future:  
‘The High Representative shall submit a report to the European Parliament, the Council and 
the Commission on the functioning of the EEAS by the end of 2011. That report shall, in particular, 
cover the implementation of Article 5(3) and (10) and Article 9.’ 
The Report on the EEAS activity in the field of consular and diplomatic assistance of 
Union citizens may reveal, in a similar way as the Commission Reports on Union citizenship 
did in regard to Union citizenship, the necessity to adopt further actions to respond to 
problems that occurred in practice. If the EEAS role in this area was insignificant, then there 
would have been no need to include this subject matter in the Report on the EEAS’ 
activities,1586   therefore it can be inferred that the activity of the EEAS is open to future 
changes and amendments. There are three possible roles that the EEAS can develop in the 
area of consular protection of EU citizens: supportive, coordinator and ‘a more complete 
consular service function to be undertaken by the EEAS.’1587  
The EU Institutions and the Member States have different views on what the future 
role of the EEAS should be. Although in favour of a strong presence of the Union in the field 
of ensuring the effectiveness of the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad, the 
Commission, in its proposal for a Directive on consular protection of EU citizens abroad, 
envisages a limited role for the EEAS – namely, limited to supporting the Member States, and 
occasionally coordination action in situ. The European Parliament has taken a consistent 
approach to supporting the EEAS to reach its full potential in regard to its wider role of 
external representation and in particular in regard to ensuring protection of EU citizens 
abroad. The European Parliament has argued for a strong coordination role and has suggested 
                                                 
1586 More on this in the CARE Report, Section 7 of Chapter 3. 
1587 See the presentation of Pierre Vimont, Executive Secretary General of the European External Action Service, 
during a Workshop organised by the European Parliament, ‘The Role of the European External Action Service in 




that the Commission considers the possibility of engaging the EEAS in other day-to-day 
consular services. 
The Member States’ reactions to the role of the EEAS in this field have diverged. 
While certain EU countries with limited resources and few consular missions support an 
increased role for the EEAS in the area of consular and diplomatic protection of Union 
citizens,1588 other Member States are strongly opposed to such legal advancement.1589 
However, in light of the persistent economic crisis and the citizens’ increased demands in 
receiving prompt and quality consular services,1590 some of the Member States, which used to 
play the persistent objector role, have revisited their positions1591 and agreed to further the 
cooperation with the EEAS and the role of the Union delegation in consular matters. For 
instance, the UK agreed to conclude co-location agreements with the EU delegation1592 and 
considers the conclusion of further similar arrangements.1593 
Therefore, the potential role of the EEAS in the area of ensuring protection of Union 
citizens in third countries has not been exhausted, and it is currently only incipient and open 
to increasing power in the future. The future development of the EEAS role in the area of 
ensuring protection of EU citizens abroad should not be driven by the Member States’ fears of 
losing their core sovereign powers, but rather by cost efficiency principles in ensuring the 
EU’s objectives of ensuring an effective protection of (unrepresented) Union citizens 
abroad,1594 which are binding on the Member States. 
Research studies1595 commissioned by the European Parliament on the role of the 
EEAS in the Union’s external representation also militate for an increased role of the EEAS 
in consular affairs in light of the ensuing benefits for the financial resources of the Member 
                                                 
1588 See, for instance, the National Report on Latvia and Estonia, in the CARE Report, which expressly 
recommends such a solution. 
1589 See the position of the UK and France, in the National Reports in the CARE Report. 
1590 See the National Report on Sweden in the CARE Report, and J. Melissen, and Ana M. Fernandez, Consular 
Affairs and Diplomacy; Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, (2011). 
1591 See for instance Czech Republic, in J. Wouters, op.cit.; V. Pertusot, A. Möller and J. Rappold, E. Burke, L. 
van Schaik, P. Ivan, F. Landal, Maria J. Seabra, E. Viilup, I. Molina, A. Sorroza, S. Blockmans, ‘Reviewing 
Member States’ Commitment to the European External Action Service’, EPIN Working Paper No. 34/2012.  
1592 The UK has concluded co-location agreements with the EU and other Member States in Kazakhstan and 
Tanzania. 
1593 Igor Merheim-Eyre pointed out that following a 33% reduction in the budget of the UK Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office in 2010 alone, ‘the FCO has further recognized the need to build strong external 
partnerships to deliver on its strategy, including with the EEAS’, see Review of the Balance of 
Competences: Foreign & Commonwealth Office - Consular Services Evidence from Stakeholders, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/387877/Consular_Evidence.pdf . 
1594 See Art. 3(5) TEU, Arts. 20(2)(c) and 23 TFEU. 
1595 See the Research Project launched by the European Parliament on the role of the EEAS: European 
Parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs on the Strengthening the EU's external representation: the role of the 
EEAS on the Union's external representation. 
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States, but also for increasing coherence of external relations. The EU delegations might take 
on some of the services that are currently duplicated between the Member States.1596  
It has been argued1597 that the role of the EEAS in the area of consular matters should 
not be restricted to the current role of the Union’s institutions in crisis situations1598 and it was 
definitely intended to be broader than what is currently provided in the Council Decision on 
the establishment of the EEAS, Article 5(10): ‘to support the Member States in their 
diplomatic relations and in their role of providing consular protection to citizens of the Union 
in third countries on a resource-neutral basis’. The role of the EEAS could be increased for 
the benefit of both the EU citizens, by way of enhancing the efficiency of the EU citizenship 
right to protection abroad, and the Member States, by rationalising their resources1599, 
possibly recognising to it a higher role in day-to-day consular protection1600 and higher 
participation in co-location agreements with the Member States.1601 While the latter can be 
more easily achieved, without for the moment a huge increase of budgetary expenditure for 
the EEAS, since it has the widest external representation network of all the Member States, 
1602 an increased consular role in the form of issuing ETDs and visas would require a higher 
financial commitment, and for the moment the EEAS exercises its role of providing consular 
                                                 
1596 Emerson et al., Upgrading the EU's role as global actor: institutions, law, and the restructuring of European 
diplomacy, CEPS (2011), 10. 
1597 See Professor Whitman, Rapporteur of the Research Project launched by the European Parliament's 
Committee on Foreign Affairs on the Strengthening the EU's external representation: the role of the EEAS on 
the Union's external representation, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2010/433821/EXPO-
AFET_NT%282010%29433821_EN.pdf  
1598 On the role of the Union Institutions before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, see M. Lindstrom, EU 
Consular Cooperation in Crisis Situations in S. Olsson, Crisis Management in the European Union – 
Cooperation in the Face of Emergencies, Springer (2009): ‘Overall the EU institutions do not have any direct 
consular tasks but rather serve as facilitators supporting the Member States to assist their citizens, for example 
by providing help with logistics such as transportation and communications. Within the EU structure the 
Council Secretariats Joint Situation Centre (SitCen) plays the most prominent role in this regard assisting the 
Presidency or the designated Lead State with the management of communications, especially with Brussels and 
in the framework of the Crisis coordination arrangements (CCA).’ 
1599 It was noted that in 2012 the Spanish Foreign Ministry suffered a 54% budgetary cut, and as a consequence 
agreed to a co-location of diplomatic premises with the EU delegation in Yemen. As a result, a sum of 500,000 
euros was saved in the first year. See Igor Merheim-Eyre, Review of the Balance of Competences: Foreign & 
Commonwealth Office - Consular Services Evidence from Stakeholders, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/387877/Consular_Evidence.pdf. 
1600 Such as issuing Emergency Travel Documents, which for the moment the non-nationality Member States can 
issue on the basis of Decision 96/409/CFSP; and short-term Schengen visas under the framework of the 
Common Visas Code. 
1601 Currently, the EU has concluded co-location agreements with the Member States in the following third 
countries: Kazakhstan – Astana and Almaty (Germany, France, Italy and the UK); Nigeria – Abuja (Germany, 
Italy and Netherlands); and Tanzania – Dar es Salaam (Germany, Netherlands and the UK). 
1602 See Annex 1. 
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protection to citizens of the Union in third countries on a resource-neutral basis.1603 Therefore, 
until the EEAS has a higher budget that could include also the management of visas, the role 
of the EEAS cannot be more than it presently is.  
In light of the national economies’ problems and increasing challenges faced by 
national consular and diplomatic officials it has to be considered whether relying on 
horizontal cooperation among national capabilities is still a better option that the EEAS 
exercising more consular functions in both consular crises and day-to-day situations. In terms 
of ensuring an efficient EU citizenship right to protection abroad, entrusting the EU 
delegation with the primary responsibility of providing protection would be a beneficial step 
since the individual will not have to find out which Member State to approach for help, and 
thus can receive assistance sooner, while the Member States would not have to incur the costs 
of the EU citizens’ consular shopping. As rightly pointed out by one legal commentator: 
 
‘There is no reason at all why in ten years’ time the Union representations in third countries, 
particularly small third countries geographically remote from Europe, should not carry out consular 
duties for all EU citizens in the countries to which they are accredited and in particular provide 
Schengen visas to citizens of these countries wishing to visit the EU. The emergence of a specialized 
corps of consular officials within the External Service would be an entirely logical development, 






                                                 
1603 See Art. 5(10) EEAS Decision. Additionally, the EEAS Review of 2013 pointed out that ‘the Delegations are 
currently neither adequately staffed nor its employees trained to provide complex consular protection on a daily 
basis.’ See also Igor Merheim-Eyre, ‘Review of the Balance of Competences: Foreign & Commonwealth Office 
- Consular Services Evidence from Stakeholders’, op.cit.. 
1604 See Rapporteur Whitman, Strengthening the EU's external representation: the role of the EEAS on the 




VII. Mapping the Member States’ national systems of ensuring protection 
of citizens abroad and the top-down impact of the EU model of protecting 
Union citizens abroad  
The Member States’ systems of consular and diplomatic protection of individuals1605 have 
traditionally displayed a wide variation in legal rules, policies, actors and practices. Each 
national system evolved in a unique historical and cultural context, with certain similarities 
established among some of the European Member States located in the same geographical 
region. Each of them developed different legal and constitutional frameworks within specific 
legal systems,1606 and administrative traditions. These social, legal and historical specificities 
have impacted on the content of the legal rules and policies and the role of public actors in 
securing protection of their citizens abroad. The Member States have therefore organised 
differently their efforts to protect citizens from threats while located outside their borders. 
This great variety among the Member States’ systems of ensuring protection of their citizens 
in the world is not in itself a negative aspect, since the results of the comparative analysis of 
the national systems does not lead to a ‘one best way’ approach. However, from the 
perspective of ensuring the effectiveness of the Member States’ common endeavour under the 
EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad, this great national variety and the resistance 
of certain Member States to change has created problems. It will be pointed out that the great 
variety across national systems of consular and diplomatic protection of citizens affects the 
effectiveness of the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad and ultimately the security 
and safety of Union citizens in the world.  
This section will present the results of a comparative analysis of the Member States’ 
systems on ensuring protection of citizens abroad, concentrating on the commonalties and 
differences. In spite of the great diversity among the national systems, the EU legal 
framework has impacted on the national systems, leading to more or less significant changes 
in the traditional domestic legal frameworks, role of actors and operation of consular and 
diplomatic protection of citizens. This section will very briefly outline the possible reasons 
that may have determined the Member States to loosen their resistance to the top-down 
influence in a core area of State sovereignty. It will be shown that the reasons, although 
                                                 
1605 The Member States’ systems of consular and diplomatic protection of individuals is herein used as the 
overall framework including the relevant domestic legal rules, policies, actors and mechanisms that a Member 
State has in place to protect its own citizens in third countries from different types of threats or assist them in 
day-to-day or crisis situations. 
1606 Continental or common law legal systems. 
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mixed, relate primarily to purely national interests, rather than to a common European public 
good – EU citizens in general or the European integration project.  
There is a ‘growing public expectation’1607 from national consular and diplomatic 
officials to perform and rise up to the assertive claims of their co-nationals requesting equally 
formal consular protection and formal diplomatic protection.1608 Responding effectively to 
these demands becomes more and more difficult in light of the increasing disasters, financial 
cuts and the consequential closing of external representations and capabilities. 
Recent surveys1609 have showed that several Member States had to reduce their 
external representation networks due to, inter alia: budgetary constraints, security issues, or 
as a sign of disapproval of the massive violations of human rights by certain national political 
regimes.1610 In the latter circumstance, the practice has been that either those Member States 
that maintained an external representation in situ secured consular protection for the 
unrepresented EU citizens based upon a Protecting Powers international agreement,1611 or 
directly based upon the EU Treaty provisions on consular co-operation among the Member 
                                                 
1607 Maaike O. Heijmans and J. Melissen, ‘Foreign Ministries and the Rising Challenge of Consular Affairs: 
Cinderella in the Limelight’; Discussion Papers in Diplomacy, Netherlands Institute of International Relations 
‘Clingendael’, 2006. 
1608 See the claims for diplomatic protection submitted by the detainees of Guantanamo Bay and other suspects 
of terrorism subject to ill treatment – e.g. Abbasi, and Al-Rawi, who have been highly mediatised. 
1609 Comparing the list of the Member States’ external representations in third countries from Annex 1 with the 
list of Member States’ external representations from the second half of 2010 drafted by the General Secretariat of 
the Council (see EU diplomatic representation in third countries, 17770/2/09 REV 2 PESC 1795 RELEX 1235 
COCON 47), it resulted that in the last two years, Member States have reduced their external representation 
networks in third countries. It was found that, currently, there are more third countries with no Member States’ 
external representations, and also a further reduction of Member States’ external representations as compared to 
the second half of 2010. For more details on this trend in individual Member States, see Melanie Morisse-
Schilbach, for France, in: B. Hocking and D. Spence (eds), Foreign Ministries in the European Union: 
Integrating Diplomats, Palgrave Macmillan (2005), 123; for Hungary, see 
http://euobserver.com/economic/28315. For the Netherlands, see the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ ‘Nota 
modernisering Nederlandse diplomatie’, 8 April 2011, 10 and 18. 
1610 The UK closed its embassies in Tehran and Bamako, while France closed its embassies on 21 September 
2012 in 22 third countries: Afghanistan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Comoros, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, 




1611 The British embassy in Tehran has been closed since 15 July 2012. Since 1989, whenever the UK severed its 
diplomatic relations with Iran, Sweden has usually exercised the Protecting Power responsibilities on behalf of 
the UK in Iran, including limited consular assistance to British nationals, based upon an international agreement 
regarding the protection of UK interests in Iran. See UKTS no. 45 (1989) printed version and A.V. Lowe, C. 
Warbrick and Vaughan Lowe, ‘Diplomatic Law: Protecting Powers’, (1990) International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly, 471, 471-474. 
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States,1612 or the EU delegation in situ themselves secured consular assistance for the 
unrepresented EU citizens.1613 
Currently, all 27 Member States are represented in only four non-EU countries.1614 The 
consequences of absence of Member State’s external representation in a third country for the 
EU citizens’ protection abroad became clear in the aftermath of recent natural disasters1615 
which affected several third countries.1616 The EU citizens realised that they did not have an 
external representation of their Member State of origin to resort to for help.1617 
There are over 70 countries worldwide with between zero and five Member State 
embassies.1618 On the other hand, the EU has built up a diplomatic service1619, which has a 
network of at least 140 Union delegations operating globally1620 and makes the EU better 
represented externally than most of the Member States. Thus, in many third countries, only 
the EU is represented.1621 
As recent natural and man-made disasters have shown, not even the most committed 
national Foreign Affairs Ministry can effectively fulfil the demands for assistance.1622 As a 
                                                 
1612 As laid down in Art. 23 TFEU. 
1613 See the situation in the summer of 2012 in Syria, where the EU delegation hosted national diplomats of four 
Member States at its premise in Damascus and was prepared to secure the evacuation of the 25,000 EU citizens 
present in Syria, when 13 out of the 19 Member States that were represented had closed their external 
representations. See similar situations in Mali, Iran, Syria, and Libya, according to information available on the 
website of the European Commission, protection of EU citizens abroad, available at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/consularprotection/index.action (last accessed in December 2013). 
1614 The People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the United States of America, and Canada, see 
http://ec.europa.eu/consularprotection/index.action (last accessed in December 2013). 
1615 The notion of disaster is used according to the definition given by the International Law Commission: ‘A 
calamitous event or series of events resulting in widespread loss of life, great human suffering and distress, or 
large-scale material or environmental damage, thereby seriously disrupting the functioning of society.’ ILC, 
protection of persons in the event of disasters, Draft Articles 1-5, Document A/CN.4/629. 
1616 Many regions of the world were affected by major natural or man-made disasters in the last five or six years, 
which caused a great number of deaths and injuries to the population. Examples include the democratic uprising 
in the Southern Neighbourhood in spring 2011, the earthquake and the tsunami that hit Haiti in January 2010, the 
Icelandic volcanic ash cloud of 2010, acts of local or international terrorism (Sharm el-Sheik 2005, the 11 
September 2001 attacks on World Trade Centre in New York), and military conflicts (the Lebanon conflict of 
summer 2006, and the Georgian conflict of August 2008). 
1617 See Madalina B. Moraru, ‘Practical and Legal Consequences of Absence of EU and Member States’ External 
Representations for the Protection of EU Citizens in Third Countries’, in Jean T. Arrighi, R. Bauböck, M. 
Collyer, D. Hutcheson, M. Moraru, L. Khadar and J. Shaw (eds.), Franchise and Electoral Participation of Third 
Country Citizens Residing in the European Union and of European Citizens Residing in Third Countries. Study 
of the European Parliament, Policy Department of Citizens' rights and Constitutional Affairs, 2013. 
1618 See Annex 1: Member States’ External Representations and EU Delegations in third countries. 
1619 The European External Action Service established by Art. 27(3) TEU and Council Decision 2010/427/EU of 
26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service, OJ 2010 L 
201/30. 
1620 See EU External Service Directory, http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/web_en.htm (last accessed in 
December 2013). 
1621 See Annex 1: Member States’ External Representations and EU Delegations in third countries. 
1622 Many regions of the world have been hit by major natural or man-made disasters in the last five or six years 
which have caused a great number of deaths and injuries to the population. For instance, the democratic uprising 
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consequence, the Member States agreed, 20 years ago, to pool their consular and diplomatic 
resources, in an attempt to ensure a minimal consular protection to all those EU citizens who 
are not represented abroad.1623 Although the current EU legal framework confers only a few 
protection services to unrepresented Union citizens1624, in light of the diverse approaches 
Member States have towards consular and diplomatic protection of their citizens, it is 
remarkable that a common agreement between all the Member States was reached and it was 
included in the constitutional EU treaty and thus agreed to be part of the EU primary law, 
which benefits of specific principles that are not characteristic to the field of consular and 
diplomatic protection of individuals.  
Certain Member States (in particular the larger ones and benefiting of an extended 
network of external representation) have traditionally approached consular and diplomatic 
protection of their citizens as a matter of policy falling under the exclusive and discretionary 
power of the executive, supporting the development of an Union framework only along the 
lines of an intergovernmental steered cooperation. While other Member States (in particular 
smaller ones, with a less extended external representation network, and the CEECs) have 
approached consular and diplomatic protection of individuals as a legal right of the citizen 
and supported the development of the Union legal framework in the direction of increasing 
the role of the Union in this field and of a Union steered cooperation. 
This division of positions among the Member States coupled with the fact that the EU 
primary law confers only an EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad, instead of a right 
to consular and diplomatic protection as such, has imbued certain specific characteristics to 
the development of the EU legal framework and practice. 
 As a consequence, the implementation of the EU citizenship right has advanced, until 
recently, only by way of the common minimum denominator among the different Member 
States approaches, which due to the extreme differences existing among their domestic legal 
frameworks, includes only a short list of protection services. For almost 20 years, the 
implementation of the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad was made exclusively 
                                                                                                                                                        
in the spring of 2011, in the Southern Neighbourhood; the earthquake and the tsunami that hit Haiti in January 
2010; the Icelandic volcanic ash cloud of 2010; acts of local or international terrorism (Sharm el-Sheik 2005, 11 
September 2001 Attacks on World Trade Centre in New York); military conflicts (Lebanon conflict of summer 
2006, the Georgian conflict of August 2008). In regard to the recent international crisis: in Libya only 8 Member 
States were represented, while in Bahrain only 4, see Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council - Consular protection for EU citizens in third countries: State of play and way 
forward, doc. COM (2011) 149/2 of 23 March 2011). 
1623 Art.8 c of the Maastricht Treaty and currently Arts. 20(2)(c) and 23 TFEU. 
1624 It has to be remembered that the EU citizenship confers a right to equal consular and diplomatic protection, 
and not a right as such to consular and diplomatic protection from any of the EU countries. 
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via horizontal cooperation forms of action and measures;1625 since 2007, vertical cooperation 
and the role of the Union has been gradually increasing.  
10 years after the formation of the Union, the horizontal cooperation was advanced by 
being established within the framework of a Community instrument with very limited 
involvement from the Commission, mostly in the form of an alert centre coordinating the 
Member States’ capabilities. Consular and diplomatic protection of citizens continues to be 
regarded as an important area of national sovereignty, which has led to the Member States’ 
divergent positions regarding the delegation of national authority to the supranational level of 
the EU. The development of the Union framework on protection of EU citizens abroad is thus 
illustrative of the different national rationales, which has led to the development of the EU 
legal framework mostly as an inter-governmental framework. 
Following the domestic financial cuts and widespread consular crisis in third countries, 
the involvement of the Commission delegations and, post-Lisbon Treaty, more intensively of 
the Union delegations, became necessary in consular crisis situations. The vertical 
cooperation, so far, has taken the form of coordination of actions, demarches, meetings, and 
sharing of diplomatic premises. The fact that vertical cooperation has not yet reached its full 
potential does not mean that the EU legal order has not had an impact on the national 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs. In the following paragraphs, the impact of the EU policies 
governing the protection of EU citizens abroad on the national legal frameworks and practice, 
and the impact of the introduction of new EU external relations actors with power to exercise 
protection of EU citizens abroad on the national consular and diplomatic missions will be 
sketched. 
One of the most striking effects of the EU law on the national consular and diplomatic 
laws and practice is the fact that, since 1993, the consular and diplomatic officials of all the 
Member States have had an obligation derived from EU law to ensure protection of all EU 
citizens who do not have an accessible permanent representation or competent Honorary 
Consul of the Member State of nationality or of a representing State. This protection would 
                                                 
1625 Soft law types of arrangements which sometimes took the name of the Lead State, but otherwise simply 
established the Member States responsible for ensuring consular protection to unrepresented EU citizens among 
all those Member States in loco   (Art. 4 of Decision 95/553); and other burden-sharing agreements on diverse 
consular affairs aspects (Such as: creating co-locations (concentration of two or more diplomatic and/or consular 
missions in one building or facility), Common Visa Application Centres (mutual accreditation of an external 
service provider at a joint visa application centre) or Common Administrative Centres (issuance of Schengen 
visa by several Member States in the same building or by one Schengen member. Many of the Member States 
have concluded agreements with other Member States regarding the representation in visa application 
procedures, often as a result of the Schengen agreement (e.g. Denmark with Sweden, Finland, Germany, France, 
The Netherlands, Austria and Hungary). In some cases these arrangements are based on formal agreements, but 
in other cases only on an exchange of diplomatic notes.) 
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have to be provided on the same conditions as it would be provided to the co-nationals of the 
consular and diplomatic official. Therefore the consular and diplomatic officials of the 
Member States have seen their consular and diplomatic responsibilities in third countries 
increased due to the EU legal framework. In principle, the increase of consular functions is 
balanced by the decrease of consular activity in another third country, while citizens are still 
benefiting of protection from another Member State. However, the burden-sharing is not 
necessarily reciprocal, since some of the Member States have wider external representation 
networks then others,1626 and thus inevitably the consular protection burden will be higher for 
the former category of Member States. This particular lack of reciprocity and the fact that the 
EU citizenship right provided only for a prohibition of discriminatory conduct has not led to 
salient changes in the national legal frameworks and practice of the Member States, which 
have preserved their previous models of ensuring consular and diplomatic protection of 
individuals and, in certain cases, have not even adopted specific legislative provisions 
whereby the EU citizenship right would be introduced to their nationals.  
The EU countries have different approaches on several issues: the types of measures, if 
any, adopted for the implementation of Decisions 95/553/EC and 96/409/CFSP, whether 
consular protection is a right or not, the level of discretion left to the Member States in 
deciding when, to whom and to what degree of consular and diplomatic protection to provide, 
the legal force of the provision interpreted as conferring a right to consular protection, and the 
possibility of conferring financial assistance to citizens in distress.  
Only a few Member States have adopted national provisions for the implementation of 
former Article 20 EC Treaty, because the Article was argued by almost all the Member States 
to be directly applicable in their national legal orders,1627 and thus there was no need of 
further implementing norms. With regard to those Member States that have adopted such 
norms, it seems that the majority of the national norms refer only to consular protection.1628 
                                                 
1626 Such as the UK, France, Germany, and Italy compared to smaller Member States such as the Benelux and the 
Baltic countries. 
1627 Bulgaria, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, the Netherlands and the UK. The CARE national Reports mention that 
there is no specific act whatsoever, and that the Decision is considered to be directly applicable under their 
domestic legal orders based on the explanation that it is part of the EU law, which, in turn, is directly applicable 
in their domestic legal orders. According to the CARE national Report on the Netherlands, the EC Decision was 
published in the national Official Journal. 
1628 Only the Estonian and Latvian provisions may be interpreted as also including diplomatic protection. Section 
53(1) of the 2009 Estonian Consular Act provides that: ‘A representation of the Republic of Estonia protects the 
interests of a citizen of a Member State of the European Union if the Member State of the European Union where 
the person is a citizen does not have a representation in the receiving State and if the receiving State has no 
objections thereto.’ The Lithuanian Consular Statute, in section 11(2), provides that consular missions should 
assist and protect the personal, material and other rights and interests of those EU citizens who have no consular 
representative in a specific area. 
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The implementing measures are of a different ranking and transparency1629 ranging from 
legislative, executive acts to mere guidelines.1630 The Commission has highlighted on several 
occasions the need for adequate legislative implementation and respect of these Decisions by 
all of the EU countries, regardless of the fact that they are not Union acts, but parallel 
agreements concluded between the Member States.1631  
In terms of the legal status of the consular and diplomatic protection recognised by the 
Member States to their own nationals, which on the basis of Article 20(2)(c) TFEU would 
need to be recognised also to the unrepresented Union citizens, less than half of the EU 
countries confer on their citizens a right to consular assistance,1632 certain Member States 
confer consular assistance only as a matter of policy,1633 reserving a high margin of discretion 
with regard to the decision on who should receive such assistance and the exact services that 
are included under the consular assistance procedure.1634 Even among the EU countries 
conferring a right to consular protection, there is discrepancy regarding the legal force of the 
internal norm providing the right. Thus, in certain EU countries the right is a fundamental 
right embodied in the Constitution,1635 in others it results from a legislative provision adopted 
or amended by the national Parliament.1636 Other EU countries have no specific legislative 
provision, however certain legal provisions are interpreted as conferring a similar right.1637 
                                                 
1629 Some of the national measures were not published in official journals; see, Austria, Belgium (partial 
transparency – the Decision has been published in the Official Journal but the further circulars and instructions 
adopted for implementing it were not available to the public), Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, 
and the UK. See more in the CARE Report, Chapter three. 
1630 It has to be pointed out that the duty of cooperation in good faith in relation to the implementation of former 
Art. 20 EC Treaty would have required the Member States to secure an adequate transposition also of the 
Decisions, which were international agreements, and thus the Member States were under a duty to exercise their 
international powers without detracting from EU law or from its effectiveness. 
1631 See more on this in Alessandro I. Saliceti, ‘The Protection of EU Citizens Abroad: Accountability, Rule of 
Law, Role of Consular and Diplomatic Services’, op.cit.. 
1632 As a constitutional right (Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal and Romania); EU 
countries having a legislative provision that is interpreted by the national scholars as providing a right to 
consular protection (Denmark, Finland, Greece, Slovakia and Slovenia); EU countries having no specific 
legislative provision, which according to the national scholars, is interpreted as including a similar right (Italy, 
Sweden). See the CARE Report, Chapter three, section 4.1. 
1633 Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Ireland, Malta, the Netherlands and the UK. 
1634 See, for instance, the UK: ‘The United Kingdom has the discretion to exercise consular assistance to British 
and non-British nationals (including EU citizens) on a case-by-case basis.’ The UK has been a fervent objector 
to this EU citizenship right, arguing that the obligation imposed on Member States by Article 23(1) TFEU is ‘to 
exercise their consular assistance policies in a non-discriminatory way as among EU citizens’. ‘The United 
Kingdom believes that this obligation requires Member States to consider requests for consular assistance by 
unrepresented EU citizens on the same basis as requests by their own nationals.’ Internally the UK does not 
confer a right to consular assistance to their citizens, however under the legitimate expectations doctrine the 
citizen has an entitlement to receive a similar treatment as the one received by another citizen in a similar 
situation. See more in the UK Report in the CARE Report, 522-525. 
1635 As a constitutional right: Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal and Romania. 
1636 Denmark, Finland, Greece, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
1637 See more on this in Section 4.1. 
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All Member States conformed to provide consular assistance in the six mandatory 
cases required by Decision 95/553 and Decision 96/409, namely, death, serious accident or 
serious illness, arrest or detention, victims of violent crime, relief and repatriation of 
distressed citizens (in the case of natural disasters, civil unrest, armed conflict or other crises) 
and issue of Emergency Travel Documents,1638 in the particular event of the loss of travel 
documents. However, certain EU countries were willing to go beyond the list of consular 
functions laid down in Article 5(1) of Decision 95/553/EC and committed to confer assistance 
in other consular situations.1639 Although positive derogation is welcomed, since the 
unrepresented EU citizens receive more help, in practice, it can lead to confusion if a precise 
list of consular services provided by each of the Member States is not publicly available. In 
addition, it seems that a majority of EU citizens would expect the same kind of help 
regardless of which Member State's embassy or consulate they turn to.1640 
Usually, long-term residents, stateless persons, refugees, asylum seekers and non-EU 
family members are not included in the personal ambit of national consular and diplomatic 
protection regimes, and they were not formally covered by the EU citizenship right. Unlike 
the EU citizenship right to free movement and residence, which confers benefits also to the 
third country national who is a family member of the EU citizen that exercises this EU 
                                                 
1638 With the sole exception of Bulgaria. See the CARE national Report on Bulgaria, which mentions that the 
cases of destroyed and temporarily inaccessible travel documents are not stipulated by the Bulgarian law. So far 
no problems have occurred in practice; however, this is mainly due to the fact that there have not yet been many 
applications for issuance of ETDs from other EU citizens than Bulgarians. 
1639 The Czech Republic (according to Art. 4(2) of the Guidelines on consular assistance of EU citizens, 
‘Moreover, the mission can assist – in accordance with its competences – citizens of the European Union which 
have requested for it in other situations.’), Estonia (although section 53 of the 2009 Consular Act is not clear 
enough as to whether paragraph 2 should be interpreted as restricting the material scope of paragraph 1: 
‘Provision of consular assistance to citizens of Member States of European Union: (1) A representation of the 
Republic of Estonia protects the interests of a citizen of a Member State of the European Union if the Member 
State of the European Union where the person is a citizen does not have a representation in the receiving State 
and if the receiving State has no objections thereto. (2) At the request of a Member State of the European Union, 
consular assistance shall be provided if a citizen of the country is in an emergency, has been detained or is 
serving sentence, also in the event of death or other unforeseeable and extraordinary circumstances.’ On the 
other hand it has to be noticed that Estonia has very few representations and it will probably be more in a 
situation of requesting consular assistance then providing it, which limits the relevance of the aforementioned 
question of interpreting the two paragraphs of section 53), Latvia (Art. 11(2) of the Consular Statute provides 
that consuls should assist and protect personal, material and other rights and interests of those EU citizens who 
have no consular representative in a specific area), Lithuania, Spain (See Circular Order n. 3.213), and Sweden 
(According to Regulation (UF 1996:9) regarding Assistance to Citizens in the European Union, Swedish 
embassies and consulates may assist Union citizens in other matters. See more on this in the national Report on 
Sweden. See also the Helsinki Treaty, the Baltic Treaty, the Convention on consular cooperation between the 
Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg and the Kingdom of Belgium of 30 September 1965, and the Agreement between 
the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Austria and the Foreign Minister of the Republic of 
Hungary entered into force on 20 December 2005 which provide for a wider list of consular functions than under 
Art. 5(1) of Decision 95/553/EC. This latter subject is detailed in the CARE Report, section 2.1.2). 
1640 Eurobarometer from March 2010. See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and 
the Council Consular protection for EU citizens in third countries: State of play and way forward COM(2011) 
149/2 Brussels, 23/03/2011, 4. 
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citizenship right, the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad has not yet been 
recognised by the EU institutions as conferring incidental benefits also to the third country 
national (TCN), family member of the EU citizen who is exercising this specific EU 
citizenship right. The reasons are first, the fact that the national legal regimes do not usually 
recognise such a domestic right to the TCN family member, and, second, that the EU 
citizenship right to equal protection or the implementing Decision do not recognise either 
such a right. However, in cases of emergency evacuations, the Member States have, in 
practice, accepted to evacuate the family of the EU citizen, even if the members were not EU 
citizens.1641 A few of the Member States confer consular assistance to the aforementioned 
categories of persons under the same conditions as for nationals/EU citizens but only as a 
matter of policy.1642 The legislation of the Member States is similarly varied in regard to the 
legal remedies recognised to the citizens against the executive conduct in cases of consular 
and diplomatic protection. There is a considerable number of Member States that do not 
confer or admit limited judicial remedies,1643 usually due to the discretionary power of the 
executive over foreign affairs. 
More and more Member States refuse to give financial advances to either nationals or 
EU citizens, due to lack of funds allocated for this purpose. This practice is understandable 
since, given the now scarce financial and human resources, consular and diplomatic services 
must concentrate on the best use of their budgets, e.g., encouraging citizens to pool all their 
available resources, including private resources, to help themselves.  
In addition to the problems resulting from the diverging national legal regimes, the EU 
citizens encounter a second problem, namely of not being properly informed of these various 
domestic models of consular and diplomatic protection, due to the Member States’ lack of a 
common approach on the appropriate means of informing the citizens about their EU 
citizenship right.1644  
On a local or regional level, the consular services of Member States seem to establish a 
working network of assistance that is barely known to citizens but according to certain 
                                                 
1641 See Chapter three of CARE Report. 
1642 See, in particular, the cases of Cyprus, Ireland, UK, and the other EU countries approaching consular 
assistance as a matter of their internal policy in the CARE Report, Chapter three. 
1643 Austria, Belgium, and the Czech Republic – according to the CARE national Reports, these countries argue 
that there is no legal obligation to confer a judicial remedy on their own citizens or EU citizens, since they do not 
recognise a right to consular protection. Certain EU Member States allow for a mere administrative complaint, 
meaning before superior officials (Cyprus, France, and Italy). Finland and Estonia do not offer the possibility of 
making a judicial complaint against the refusal to provide financial assistance. 
1644 The national Report on Sweden points out that one of the reasons for lack of practice under Art. 23 TFEU is 
that citizens are not fully aware of this right. 
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national surveys seems to work effectively as ‘an invisible hand’ in the day-to-day handling 
of consular assistance to EU citizens.1645 While in practice, serious problems have not 
occurred, the EU citizens are still unaware of the precise content of this right, since this would 
actually entail knowledge of each of the now 28 domestic legal frameworks; on top of which 
the case-by-case approach in practice of the Member States confuses the picture even further. 
It seems that, in practice the Member States have not changed much of their legal 
frameworks on consular and diplomatic protection of individuals following the introduction 
of the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad. Some of them have amended the 
existing legislation so as to include an obligation on the part of the consular and diplomatic 
officials to secure protection to unrepresented Union citizens abroad.1646 However, they 
should operate certain changes, particularly increasing transparency and publicity of the right, 
and secondly to ensure effective legal remedies against violations of the EU primary law 
provisions and implementing sui generis acts. 
The introduction of such a right does not mean that the diplomatic and consular 
authorities of the Member States are legally obliged to satisfy all the requests for assistance 
from unrepresented EU citizens, without being able to exercise any margin of discretion. But 
it does mean that the consular and diplomatic authorities have to justify the exercise of their 
discretion when limiting the EU citizenship right. Such limitation would need to comply with 
the EU proportionality test1647: pursuing a legitimate aim, and the limitation has to be 
appropriate and necessary. Furthermore, the injured unrepresented Union citizen must have 
the possibility under national law to contest the administrative decision before a national court 
competent to judicially review the challenged administrative decision.1648 The EU principles 
of equivalence1649 and effectiveness1650 would require the Member States to confer to the 
injured unrepresented EU citizen a similar legal remedy as recognised to the national in a 
                                                 
1645 See the CARE Report, Chapter four. 
1646 See, for instance Estonia. The Consular Law Act of 2003 as amended in 2004 and the latest in 2009 includes 
a provision (53) on the provision of consular assistance services by the Estonian consuls to EU citizens.’ Para. 
53. Provision of consular assistance to citizens of Member States of European Union (1) A representation of the 
Republic of Estonia protects the interests of a citizen of a Member State of the European Union if the Member 
State of the European Union where the person is a citizen does not have a representation in the receiving state 
and if the receiving state has no objections thereto. (2) At the request of a Member State of the European Union, 
consular assistance shall be provided if a citizen of the country is in an emergency, has been detained or is 
serving a sentence, also in the event of death or other unforeseeable and extraordinary circumstances.’ See the 
Estonian Report in the CARE Report. 
1647 Now on the basis of Art. 52 EU Charter. 
1648 Currently under Art. 41 EU Charter. 
1649 Case C-222/86 Heylens, judgment of 15 October 1987; Joined cases C-430/93 and C-431/93 Jeroen van 
Schijndel, later confirmed in joined cases C-222/05 and C-225/05 J. Van der Weerd and others v Minister van 
Landbouw, Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit [2007] ECR I-4233, at paras. 19-22. 
1650 C-126/97 Eco Swiss China Time v. Benetton [1999] ECR I-3055. 
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similar situation, while current Article 47 EU Charter would require the conferral of a legal 
remedy in the absence of one under the domestic legal regime. 
Therefore, in spite of the existent diversity of the domestic legal regimes on consular 
and diplomatic protection of individuals, the EU citizenship right, in conjunction with the EU 
Charter, has had an impact on the domestic legal frameworks. The most obvious is the 
prohibition of the act of State1651, or acte du gouvernment1652 approached in regard to the legal 
remedies and judicial review of claims submitted by the unrepresented Union citizens.  
Therefore the EU law has to a certain extent harmonised the procedural domestic law 
regarding consular assistance. By introducing the EU principle of non-discrimination in 
consular protection of EU citizens, the differences between the diverse domestic 
administrative legal frameworks and practice of the Member States on consular assistance of 
individuals should diminish, however, until problems occur and they are raised before courts, 
the remaining framework still presents sufficiently numerous diverse aspects. 
Despite these recent positive developments, the situation is unsatisfactory because of 
the uncertainty and unpredictability of the forms of protection. The Member Stats very often 
follow a case-by-case approach in practice, which can be problematic in terms of legal 
certainty regarding an EU primary law provision. A case-by-case approach is inspired by 
contingent circumstances and it makes it very difficult to adequately inform Union citizens 
about their rights to consular and diplomatic protection. More generally, the current 
limitations and ambiguities are a serious drawback for the establishment of a genuine 
European citizenship. 
In terms of coordination of national capabilities for the purpose of ensuring protection 
of EU citizens abroad, the Lisbon Treaty has brought salient changes. If pre-Lisbon Treaty the 
coordination tasks were under the responsibility of the consular and diplomatic mission of the 
Member States holding the Rotating Presidency, the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty has 
transferred this task to the Union delegations in third countries1653, and liberated the consular 
and diplomatic missions of their EU derived task of external representation of some of the EU 
foreign affairs in third countries.1654  
                                                 
1651 See Buttes Gas and Oil Co v Hammer (No 3) [1982] AC 888, 932 applied in the UK, but changed in the 
Abbasi judgment, see Chapter 2. 
1652 Followed by French courts. 
1653 Art. 27 TEU. See also, L. Erkelens and S. Blockmans, ‘Setting-Up the EEAS: An Institutional Act of 
Balance’, CLEER Working Paper 2012/1. 
1654 On the shortcomings entailed by the Rotating Presidency's role in diplomatic coordination see D. Rijks, ‘EU 




Member States would also need to take into consideration the EU objectives and 
policies on protection of EU citizens abroad when concluding consular and diplomatic 
cooperation agreements with third countries or among themselves. Since the EU enjoys 
shared competence in this field and it is clear that discriminatory consular or diplomatic 
protection is prohibited, the Member States would need to first assess whether, by concluding 
such agreements, they will hinder the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad and the 
relevant Union objectives. For instance, some of the EU countries concluded among 
themselves before the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty or their accession to the EU consular 
cooperation agreements which confer to their nationals’ assistance in a wider category of 
consular circumstances than the one established by Decisions 95/553/EC and 
96/409/CFSP.1655 According to Article 20(2)(c) TFEU, the Member States are required to 
provide the same level of consular protection to all non-national EU citizens, as they provide 
to their own citizens, without conferring preferential treatment to some of the EU citizens 
possessing the nationality of the Contracting States compared to the other non-national EU 
citizens.1656The EU legal framework, as scattered and minimal as it is, has impacted on the 
Member States’ way of traditionally exercising consular protection of their citizens abroad, 
due to the primacy and direct effect of the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad 
which has required them to extend their consular protection of individuals mechanisms to all 
the other unrepresented Union citizens outside the Union, as well as requiring them to secure 
effective judicial guarantees for violations by the Member States’ consular and diplomatic 
officials of the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad. 
 
 
                                                 
1655 See the CARE Report, Chapter three, Section 2.1.2. 
1656 In practice, it seems the broad language of these bilateral and regional consular cooperation agreements and 
the implementation legislations permits an interpretation of these agreements in conformity with the EU law, 
without the need to amend or terminate them. See previsou footnote for additional sources. 
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VIII. Policy and institutional recommendations to increase the efficiency of 
protection of the EU citizens in the world 
 
In light of the increasing frequency and size of disasters1657 and transboundary threats, and of 
the budgetary pressures on the national foreign affairs ministries1658, the demands on the EU’s 
disaster response capacity are likely to increase. In this context, an efficient use of resources 
will thus require that in addition to the horizontal cooperation between the Member States, the 
latter with also need to increase their vertical cooperation with the EU institutions and bodies. 
The EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad has been regarded by certain 
Member States1659 as a threat to the core of their sovereignty by attempting to limit their 
consular and diplomatic protection rights, long perceived as discretionary under both 
international and domestic legal orders, and advancing the image of the EU as a State. 
Diplomatic and consular protection of individuals has been traditionally considered the 
expression of the State’s sovereignty over persons, and ‘an important component of the 
reciprocal relationship of protection and obedience which exists between citizens and the 
state according to classical political theory.’1660 This traditional conception of consular and 
diplomatic protection of individuals as core elements of the State sovereignty explains the 
very cautious approach of some of the Member States to the implementation of the EU 
citizenship right to equal protection abroad by means other than inter-governmental measures. 
The EU general principles of primacy, effectiveness,1661 transparency, and sincere cooperation 
would have required the Member States to assess whether acting by way of EU secondary 
legislative measures would have better ensured those principles than the sui generis inter-
governmental measures they so far adopted. 
The application of the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad has been fraught 
with inconsistencies in its implementation, which have led in practice to its limited awareness, 
                                                 
1657 See Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, ‘Annual Report on the 
European Union's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Policies and their Implementation in 2013’, 
COM/2014/0537 final. 
1658 The recorded annual number of disasters worldwide has increased fivefold from 78 in 1975 to nearly 400 
today. For more empirical evidence on the increasing disasters and threats, see the Communication from the 
European Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Towards a stronger European disaster 
response: The role of civil protection and humanitarian assistance, COM(2010) 600 final, 26 October 2010. 
1659 In particular, the UK and France. 
1660 S. Kadelback, ‘Union Citizenship’, in Armin von Bogdandy and J. Bast, Principles of European 
Constitutional Law, Hart Publishing (2009), 448. 
1661 On the importance of the principles of primacy and effectiveness of EU law, see CJEU Opinion 2/13 and 
Case C-399/11 Melloni, Judgment of 26 February 2013. 
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understanding and exercise by the EU citizens. The substantive and personal scope of the 
right are not easily identifiable by a normal EU citizen. The content of the EU citizenship 
right as a mere prohibition of discriminatory protection based on nationality coupled with the 
divergent domestic legal frameworks of the 28 Member States on consular and diplomatic 
protection of citizens have created a legal framework whereby the EU citizen enjoys different 
models of protection – ranging from a constitutional right to protection abroad endowed with 
judicial guarantees to no right whatsoever, except to legitimate expectations; receiving 
protection only in the limited six mandatory consular related situations to a more extended list 
of consular related situations, which is very difficult to pinpoint precisely; enjoying protection 
only in the person of the EU citizen, or extended also to his family members who are third 
country nationals. And the list of differences among the national legal frameworks and 
practice continues to various other aspects related to procedure of providing this type of 
protection of individuals.1662 Even the essence of the EU citizenship right to equal protection 
abroad, namely to choose the represented Member State to resort to for help, is affected in 
practice by the Member States which have established burden-sharing agreements among 
themselves allocating responsibility to protect to one particular Member States, without 
ensuring a wide publicity of the list with the Member States responsible for the different third 
countries. The entire process of horizontal cooperation and coordination among the Member 
States is characterised by an ad-hoc approach depending to a large extent on the persons 
involved.1663  
In addition the EU primary and secondary provisions increased the confusion 
surrounding this right, by introducing legal concepts that are not clearly defined. For instance, 
determining who is an ‘unrepresented’ Union citizen under Article 1 of Decision 95/553 
entails determining first the ‘accessibility’ of the permanent representation of the Member 
State of nationality or of another representing State, or competent Honorary Consul. The 
Decision does not provide a definition of the concept it introduces ‘accessibility’. 
Although new EU actors have been endowed with competence to contribute to the 
effective implementation of the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad, i.e. the EEAS 
                                                 
1662 See the section on the Impact of the EU legal framework on protection of EU citizens abroad on the Member 
States, and Chapter three in the CARE Report. 
1663 See Commission staff working paper, Executive summary of the Impact assessment accompanying the 
document proposal for a Directive of the Council on consular protection for citizens of the Union abroad, SEC 
(2011) 1555, 14.12.2011, 2. 
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and Union delegations, their role and allocation of tasks, especially in cases of crises, have not 
been clarified. In practice their potential has clearly not been fully exploited.1664 
In light of this divergent framework, it is no surprise that of the 300,000 cases of 
consular protection reported in 2009, only 16% had as the addressee an unrepresented Union 
citizen, although 79% of the respondent EU citizens declared that they are aware of their EU 
citizenship right to equal protection abroad.1665 
Following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Commission has acquired the 
power to make legislative proposals for a Directive that will facilitate the equal protection 
abroad of unrepresented Union citizens. Therefore the Commission finally has the possibility 
of taking measures to remedy the current divergent framework of implementation of the EU 
citizenship right to equal protection abroad and the suboptimal use of capabilities of the 
relevant competent actors.1666 Given the long-awaited opportunity1667, and following 
sufficient collection of empirical data,1668 the Commission embarked upon the preparation of 
a proposal for a Council Directive1669 that would concentrate of enhancing efficiency of the 
type of protection services that is most solicited by the unrepresented EU citizens and aims to 
                                                 
1664 See the Draft opinion for the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs on the proposal for a 
Council directive on consular protection for citizens of the Union abroad, PE 487.728v01-00, rapporteur: 
Tadeusz Zwiefka, 26.04.2012. 
1665 See Commission staff working paper, Executive summary of the Impact assessment accompanying the 
document proposal for a Directive of the Council on consular protection for citizens of the Union abroad, SEC 
(2011) 1555, 14.12.2011, 2. 
1666 See Art. 23(2) TFEU. 
1667 Since 2006 the Commission has searched for legal ways to eliminate discrepancies between the Member 
States’ exercise of consular protection of unrepresented Union citizens. The most popular method has seemed to 
be by way of pushing forward the Unionization of the Member States’ exercise of consular protection of EU 
citizens. See Green Paper - Diplomatic and consular protection of Union citizens in third countries 
(COM/2006/712 final), 28/11/2006. However, it seems that the Commission’s proposal of 2011 lost its 
integrationist spur in favour of the horizontal cooperation framework, most favoured by the COCON Working 
Group, namely, the sharing of experiences between the diplomatic and consular representatives on their own 
unanimous accord so as to establish common practice. See Proposal for a Council Directive on consular 
protection for citizens of the Union abroad, Brussels, 14.12.2011 COM (2011) 881 final 2011/0432.  
1668 See the four studies carried out by different policy think tanks at the Commission call: 1) ‘A study (2009) on 
Member States' legislations and practices, carried out by the Instituto Europeo de Derecho, examined laws and 
practices of Member States in the field of consular protection, including as regards the implementation of the 
Decision 95/553/EC on unrepresented EU citizens; 2) the CARE (Citizens Consular Assistance Regulation in 
Europe) project activities (2009-2011), realised with the financial support of the Fundamental Rights & 
Citizenship Programme of the European Commission, the legal framework of Member States on consular and 
diplomatic protection was comprehensively analysed. Special attention was given to Article 23 TFEU; 3) An 
external study (2010) by the consultancy GHK supported the Commission in its analysis of policy options and 
the related costs, focusing on crisis situations and financial reimbursement; 4) A second external study (2011) 
undertaken by the consultancy Matrix Insight provided further evidence, including via missions to third 
countries, evaluated Decision 95/553/EC and the current functioning of cooperation and coordination and 
examined how consular protection for unrepresented EU citizens could be further improved.’ See Impact 
assessment accompanying the document proposal for a Directive of the Council on coordination and cooperation 
measures regarding consular protection for unrepresented EU citizen SEC (2011) 1556, 14.12.2011. 
1669 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council - Consular protection 
for EU citizens in third countries: State of play and way forward, COM (2011) 149/2, 23.3.2011. 
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address ‘life and death’ situations for the EU citizens in third countries, namely consular 
protection. In light of the deficient fragmented legal framework created by the Decisions of 
the Representatives of the Member States, it was clear that a Directive would be the most 
recommended legal form in terms of ensuring clear, legally binding norms and legal remedies 
for an EU citizenship right whose importance within the EU legal framework has been 
neglected for a long period. 
In December 2011, the European Commission finalised the proposal for a Directive on 
the Consular Protection of Union citizens abroad1670, which has been approved with 
amendments by the European Parliament1671 and is currently under negotiation within the 
Council. The main issues which the Commission Proposal endeavoured to resolve regard the 
essential aspects of the EU citizenship right: the definition of who is an unrepresented Union 
citizen; the clarification of the rules on allocation of responsibilities between the Member 
States present in a third country, and coordination with the Member States of nationality; the 
clarification of the role of the Union delegation; establishing fixed procedures for the 
management of exercising protection of unrepresented Union citizens in cases of consular 
crises; and establishing a standard reimbursement procedure. 
Of the three main policy options that the Commission could have followed: 
maintaining the current loose horizontal cooperation framework, establishing a minimum 
common horizontal and vertical cooperation framework and tighter common rules, the second 
option was chosen as the best compromise for the time being. Financial reasons played an 
important role in choosing the best policy option, since the costs entailed by the third policy 
option would have entailed considerably higher costs at both national and EU level without 
bringing a considerably higher quality of protection services. In light of the still persistent 
financial crisis and the reticence of some of the big Member States to the EEAS,1672 it was 
unlikely that the third policy option would pass the necessary voting in the Council, therefore 
the second option seemed the only option left. 
                                                 
1670 Proposal for a Council Directive on Consular protection for citizens of the Union abroad, COM (2011) 881, 
14.12.2011 (hereinafter the Proposal). 
1671 The amendments proposed by the European Parliament go beyond the inter-governmental type of 
advancement of the EU citizenship right to protection abroad, i.e. horizontal cooperation among the Member 
States and promoting the Lead State concept. Instead the European Parliament sees the EU's ability to provide 
consular assistance as a way to enhance the meaning of EU citizenship and bring the EEAS closer to the public 
by taking full advantage of the consular functions that the EU primary and secondary law has conferred upon the 
EEAS. See, European Parliament legislative resolution on the proposal for a Council Directive on consular 
protection for citizens of the Union abroad, Rapporteur: Edit BAUER (EPP/SK), 25 October 2012, A7-
0288/2012 / P7_TA-PROV (2012) 0394. 
1672 See the CARE Report, Chapter three, Summary, and Reviewing Member States’ Commitment to the 
European External Action Service, EPIN WP 34/2012. 
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The Commission’s Proposal starts in force, by re-stating the CJEU mantra that ‘the EU 
citizenship is the fundamental status of the citizens of the Union’, and therefore, the EU 
citizens are not required to present their identity documents to prove their status – identity 
documents only have a declaratory value.1673 The main reform consists, primarily, in a clearer 
definition of the unrepresented Union citizen, clarifying the limits of the personal scope of the 
EU citizenship right, bringing the concept of the Lead State within a legally binding EU act 
and establishing a standard reimbursement procedure. Article 3 of the Commission's Proposal 
defines an accessible external representation of the Member States based on the travelling-
time which must be calculated at least on the basis of a same-day return to the place of 
departure, while in emergency situations the time period can be even shorter.1674 It clarified 
that the principle of equal protection treatment applies also to the third country nationals who 
are family members of an EU citizen. Thus, in case a Member State would normally protect 
the third country national who is a family member of one of its citizens, it should confer an 
equal protection also to the third country national who is a family member of an 
unrepresented non-national Union citizen.1675 The Proposal reinforces the right of the EU 
citizen to choose the Member States to resort to for help, permitting derogations insofar as 
clear, transparent, and effective treatment is ensured.1676 The Lead State concept is 
maintained. However rules were introduced aiming to clarify its role in ensuring protection of 
unrepresented Union citizens abroad, including by requiring to expressly include the 
unrepresented Union citizens in the contingency plans which the Lead State would need to 
prepare together with the represented Member States and follow in cases of crises. A step 
forward was made also in regard to ensuring policy coherence with other relevant EU 
policies, such as the Civil Protection Mechanism by, inter alia, providing that a Lead State 
can seek additional support from the EU Civil Protection Mechanism and the crisis 
management structures of the EEAS.1677 The Proposal introduced a reimbursement procedure 
with standard formats for requests and an easier system for tracking the reimbursement costs. 
This reimbursement procedure is meant to complement those available within the EU Civil 
Protection Mechanism. 
                                                 
1673 See recital 12 of the Proposal. 
1674 See Art. 3(2) of the Commission’s proposal. 
1675 See Art. 2. 
1676 Art. 4, namely ‘Member States shall inform the European Commission of any such arrangement in view of 
publication on its dedicated internet site.’ 
1677 See the 1993 Guidelines for the Protection of Non-Represented EC Nationals by EC Missions in Third 
Countries, available in the CARE Database. 
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On a close reading of the Commission’s Proposal, the horizontal character of the 
measures proposed is striking, while the role of the Union delegations is very limited, almost 
inexistent from the proposed Directive. It seems the Commission has changed its previous 
‘Unionist’ approach in favour of a compromise that would reach approval in the Council and 
finally bring an advancement,1678 even if more limited than its previous ambitions.1679 
 On the other hand, the European Parliament amendments concentrated on conferring a 
greater role to the EEAS and Union delegations by either replacing horizontal cooperation 
measures with vertical cooperation or adding vertical cooperation measures within the 
Commission Proposal.1680 First, the European Parliament introduces the Union delegations in 
the list of actors that can provide consular protection to unrepresented Union citizens and to 
which the latter can resort to for help.1681 It replaces the Lead State(s) with the Union 
delegations, which have the primary responsibility of coordination of the Member States’ 
consular and diplomatic authorities in cases of crises, and in day-to-day situations, following 
thus the role which the Union delegations have taken over from the Rotating Presidency.1682 
In order to fulfil these tasks, the European Parliament recommended that the necessary 
financial means should be provided to the EEAS.1683 In addition, the proposed amendments 
introduced the principle of fairness in the distribution of burden-sharing agreements,1684 new 
consular services that should be provided within the 6 mandatory situations,1685 such as 
ensuring access to legal advice, especially in cases of detention,1686 and the provision of 
interpreters or other necessary assistance in order to overcome language barriers.1687  
The European Parliament’s amendments were for the most part clarifying the 
sometimes still convoluted or broadly phrased rules of the Commission, and seemed to be a 
welcome improvement of the text, which were welcomed by the Commission. Most of the 
proposed amendments were accepted by the Commission, with the exception of those 
                                                 
1678 See the reviewing process of Decisions 95/553 and 96/409, which were supposed to be reviewed in 2007 but 
have never been in practice. 
1679 Compare with Decisions 95/553 and 96/409. 
1680 See European Parliament, Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, Report on the proposal 
for a Council directive on consular protection for citizens of the Union abroad, A7-0288/2012, 10.10.2012 
(hereinafter EP Response). 
1681 See Recital 7, 10 and Article 1. 
1682 See Section VI.a. The EEAS and Union delegations’ competence to protect EU citizens abroad. 
1683 See, inter alia, Amendments 14 and 56 of the EP Response. 
1684 Amendment 8 of the EP Response. 
1685 Namely, the situations mentioned by the Proposal:’ (a) arrest or detention; (b) being a victim of crime; (c) 
serious accident or serious illness; (d) death; (e) relief and repatriation in case of distress; (f) need of emergency 
travel documents.’ – Art. 6(2). These have remained unchanged compared to the current legal framework 
established by Decision 95/553 and 96/409.  
1686 See Amendment 36 of the EP Response. 
1687 Amendment 12 of the EP Response. 
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concerning the primary role conferred to the Union delegations in cases of crises and other 
day-to-day consular situations.1688  
The reasons mentioned by the Commission for its rejection refer to the EEAS lacking 
the necessary human and financial resources and its doubt that the increased role will lead in 
practice to better protection. The Commission is more in favour of preserving the Member 
States’ flexibility on the ground, which seems to be necessary, at least in the Commission’s 
view, to achieved improved protection. While the lacking financial and human resources 
could be a solid ground, in light of the EEAS functioning on a neutral resource basis in this 
field, it is unclear why, first, the Member States’ flexibility would be limited by vertical 
cooperation, and, second, how the EEAS with its extended capabilities could in any way harm 
or not improve the protection in practice, when, so far, the involvement of the Union 
delegations has only lead to positive results for both the Union citizens and the Member 
States.1689 As a compromise solution, the Commission proposed to subject the EEAS related 
provisions to a review clause, which would allow the evolution of the Union delegations and 
the EEAS role in this field, in the future, depending on the specific circumstances. 
Until the Council adopts the Directive, the current legal framework governing the 
application of the EU citizenship right to equal protection is governed by the divergent laws 
of the Member States’ governing consular affairs, where the level of protection can vary 
depending on the Member State to which a Union citizen decides to resort to for help. These 
differences have already led to a complicated cooperation and coordination among consular 
and diplomatic authorities of the Member States. It remains to be seen whether the future 
Directive will clarify the scope of consular protection of unrepresented EU citizens and the 
conditions for its exercise as well as to simplify the procedures that consular authorities and 
diplomatic authorities apply between them.1690 
It seems the European integration process has slowly but surely pervaded most of the 
Member States’ reserved areas, whether formally or informally1691, even in areas which 
                                                 
1688 See Commission Communication on the action taken on opinions and resolutions adopted by Parliament at 
the October 2012 I and II part-sessions, SP(2012)767, 15.11.2012. 
1689 See, for instance, the 2012 financial savings of approximately 500,000 euros of the Spanish Foreign Ministry 
following the co-location of diplomatic premises with the EU delegation in Yemen (Igor Merheim-Eyre, Review 
of the Balance of Competences: Foreign & Commonwealth Office - Consular Services Evidence from 
Stakeholders, available online); see more in Section - 5.1 The role of the EEAS and the Union Delegations in 
ensuring protection of EU citizens abroad. 
1690 See Mario P. Chiti, S. Faro, Madalina B. Moraru, E. Schweighofer, ‘Future developments: setting a 
minimum European standard’ in Chapter four - Present and future of consular protection of EU citizens of the 
CARE Report. 
1691 By informally, it is meant changes in the Member States’ legislation or practice stirred by EU practices in 
other fields which impact also on the areas that are recognised by the Treaties as reserved to the Member States –
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national politicians have done their best to shelter from European influence. A paradigmatic 
change has already informally occurred in the Member States’ diplomacies and management 
of consular and diplomatic protection of individuals under the impact of the Union legislation 
and practice.  
Due to perceiving consular and diplomatic protection as a core area of national 
sovereignty, some of the Member States are not willing to delegate policymaking autonomy 
to the EU level, insisting on preserving their national sovereignty and the principle of 
subsidiarity that gives priority to the national levels of authority.1692  
Despite the increasing horizontal cooperation and coordination among the Member 
States within the framework of different EU policies, i.e. in the implementation of the EU 
citizenship right to equal protection abroad, civil protection, humanitarian assistance, civil and 
military CSDP mission, disagreements between the Member States remain regarding the 
degree of supranationality needed in the field of protection of (unrepresented) Union citizens 
in the world. These differences of opinion result from the different approaches that the 
Member States adopt in the national models of consular and diplomatic protection of citizens 
and civil protection, and their need of the EU’s help in ensuring protection of their citizens 
abroad. Though the Commission has recently made several legislative proposals on how to 
improve the EU’s crisis response, only few have passed approval, while others are 
persistently blocked by certain Member States. The tension between the need for solidarity in 
the face of large-scale disasters and the reluctance of the Member States to delegate authority 
from the national to the supranational level is likely to continue to play a major role in the 
further development of European model of ensuring protection of EU citizens in the world. 
However, even the most reluctant of the Member States are re-considering their approaches in 
light of their increasing troubles to ensure an effective response to the demands of the citizens 
in need of protection in third countries. 
Sooner or later the Commission’s proposal for a Directive on Consular Protection of 
Union citizens abroad or another version will be seriously considered by the Council, whether 
due to the specific vision of the Member States holding the EU Presidency, supporting such 
an advancement, or due to an internal or external crisis that has so far commonly been the 
cause for opening policy changes. It may happen that in the future the Council may take 
                                                                                                                                                        
for instance, as in the case of naturalisation laws of the Member States under the influence of EU citizenship. See 
more details on this issue in D. Kochenov, ‘Rounding Up the Circles’, op.cit. 
1692 See the 2014 UK Parliament Report on the proposal for a Directive on Consular Protection of Union citizens 
abroad, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmeuleg/219-v/21910.htm  
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advantage of this prerogative and agree with the Commission policy option, or choose a 
different policy model depending on the specific circumstances. Until that point, which may 
take considerable time in light of the sensitiveness of the topic,1693 the main legal acts 
governing the field of consular protection of Union citizens in third countries, aside the 
Treaties’ provision, are still the Decisions of the Representatives of the Governments of the 
Member States adopted within the Council. 
Conclusion of Chapter 4 
Over the years, the EU has developed a practice of protecting EU citizens, especially 
unrepresented ones, abroad. This practice was based on the EU citizenship provisions and 
other EU policies and instruments used to address global emergencies. For instance, the EU 
used the development cooperation legal basis for adopting humanitarian relief measures for 
civilians hit by a disaster outside the Union,1694 the residual powers for adopting civil 
protection mechanisms which were initially designed to tackle crises outside and inside of the 
Union but were later used also for consular assistance of EU citizens abroad,1695 and use of 
the ESDP military missions for implementing civilian types of crisis management schemes 
which were adopted under the EC Treaty instead of the CFSP/ESDP legal basis.1696 Some of 
these EU instruments on disaster response were adjusted so as to answer not only the needs of 
the affected third countries and their populations, but also the needs of the EU citizens, which 
                                                 
1693 There are several examples in the European integration process of sensitive areas where due to the Member 
States lack of agreement, it took a long time for the Council to act, to the extent that in certain cases the deadline 
provided by the founding Treaties for action to be taken was breached. See, for example, the fields of the 
principle of equal pay for men and women, the situation that arose in Defrenne, Case 43/75 Defrenne v SABENA 
[1976]; the area of freedom to provide service where the Council adopted the Services Directive only in 2006 
(Directive 2006/123/EC of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market); another sensitive field where it 
took around thirty years for the Member States to reach agreement on the European company status – see 
Council Regulation No 2157/2001 of 8 October 2001 on the Statute for a European company published in the OJ 
L no 294 of 10.11.2001, p. 0001 – 0021 , and Regulation No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) published in the OJ L no 
199 of 31.07.2007, p. 0040 – 0049. 
1694 Council Regulation (EC) 1257/96 of 20 June 1996 concerning humanitarian aid, [1996] OJ L 163/1, 
02.07.1996. 
1695 In 2007, the Member States unanimously agreed in the JHA Council to extend the application of a 
Community instrument – the Civil Protection Mechanism (the ‘Mechanism’) – to international crises 
circumstances for the purpose of ensuring consular assistance to unrepresented Union nationals in the form of 
relief and repatriation. See Council Decision 2007/779/EC of 8 November 2007. The Civil Protection 
Mechanism has been used in the 2004 tsunami in South East Asia, the 2006 Lebanese military conflict, the 
Mumbai terrorist attack in November 2008, the 2010 tsunami in Haiti, the 2010 Israeli forest fires, and the 2011 
earthquake/tsunami in Japan. A full register of the application of the Mechanism in international crises can be 
found on the Commission DG Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection website, 
http://ec.europa.eu/echo/civil_protection/civil/index.htm 
1696 See the Council Regulation (EC) No 381/2001 of 26 February 2001 creating a rapid-reaction mechanism 
published in the Official Journal L 57 of 27.02.2001. 
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were present in those countries at the moment the crisis unfolded.1697 Therefore the scope of 
these Community/Union measures enlarged so as to address in addition to the needs of third 
countries and their populations, the needs of EU citizens located in these countries and the 
problems EU countries faced in relation to their own citizens.  
The reason behind this broad interpretation of some of the EU competences, which 
raised concerns about the appropriate legal basis for the EU secondary legislation,1698 was the 
objective of ensuring an effective response to as many as possible disasters,1699 and especially 
to take care of the EU citizens abroad. In spite of these good intentions, in certain 
circumstances, the Union clearly went beyond the conferred powers by making use of certain 
EU legal instruments in a field where there was not yet an EU legislative measure justifying 
the Union external action.1700 It thus became evident that the expressly conferred competences 
became insufficient1701 for the EU’s ambition to become an omnipresent actor capable of an 
efficient response to all of the complexities and negative effects resulting from crises affecting 
third countries.  
The Lisbon Treaty, which was drafted with the aim of strengthening the external 
identity of the Union, codified the abovementioned EU’s practice in the field of emergency 
response. One of the noteworthy changes brought by the Lisbon Treaty, which was absent 
from the Constitutional Treaty, is the provision of the Union’s objective of ensuring 
protection of the Union citizens in the world (Article 3(5) TEU). This newly inserted 
                                                 
1697 See more details in Chapter 1, section 2. The nexus between the EU citizenship right to equal protection 
abroad and EU external relations policies. 
1698 See Peter Van Elsuwege and J. Orbie, ‘The EU’s Humanitarian Aid Policy after Lisbon: Implications of a 
New Treaty Basis’, in I. Govaere and S. Poli, EU Management of Global Emergencies Legal Framework for 
Combating Threats and Crises, Brill Nijhoff (2014), 21-47. 
1699 The examples provided in this paragraph refer to the Union/Community adopting EU/Community measures 
in a field where the member states only were competent to act. However, conflicts between the Union 
Institutions and between the latter and the member states were fuelled also by the Community practice of 
adopting Community measures serving Union measures. See the debate surrounding the correct legal basis for 
smart sanctions. 
1700 Following the success of using the Civil Protection Mechanism during the evacuation procedures from 2004 
in South East Asia (affected by the tsunami) and during the 2006 Lebanese conflict, in November 2007 the 
Member States codified the practice by adopting a Council Decision which expressly provides that the EU Civil 
Protection Mechanism can be used outside of the Union not only for relief of the affected third country and its 
population, but also for the specific purpose of supporting the consular assistance of the EU citizens. (See Article 
2(10) and recital 18 of the preamble of Council Decision 2007/779/EC of 8 November 2007) Thus, the residual 
power (ex-Art. 308 EC Treaty) was used by the Council for enlarging the application of a Community measure 
in a field which during the pre-Lisbon period was reserved to the member states’ actions instead of that of the 
Council (see ex-Art. 20 EC Treaty). During the pre-Lisbon period, protection abroad of EU citizens was not 
stated in the Treaties as a Community objective, nor was it connected to the operation of the internal market in 
order to justify the use of the residual power. 
1701 The European Union, as an international organisation may conduct its international relations only within the 
limits of the powers conferred on it by the founding Treaties, and abstain from encroaching into the member 
states’ own sovereign powers. See present Art. 5(1) TEU, former Art. 5 EC Treaty. 
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objective introduces the Union to third countries as being directly responsible for the 
protection of EU citizens located outside of the Union. The Union now has the competence 
and the necessary infrastructure to fulfil this external objective. Unlike former Article 20 EC 
Treaty, the new Article 23 TFEU has a new paragraph which expressly confers on the Union 
legislative competence to adopt measures in the field of protection abroad of EU citizens, 
while Article 35 TEU enables it to adopt Union measures focused on achieving efficient 
cooperation between the Union and the EU countries in this field. Starting in 2010, the EU 
also has the necessary EU diplomatic infrastructure that will work for the fulfilment of its aim 
to ensure protection abroad of EU citizens.1702 Thus, the post-Lisbon Union has great potential 
for developing a model of protection of EU citizens abroad more effective than the previous 
EU model, which was mostly an inter-governmental one, and surely more effective than the 
traditional international model of protecting citizens abroad.  
Post-Lisbon, the EU has a bouquet of policies that can be used to ensure the protection 
of EU citizens in distress abroad, made of: Article 196 TFEU (civil protection measures), 
Article 214 TFEU (humanitarian aid) while the CSDP (former ESDP) continues to include 
humanitarian and rescue tasks (Article 43 TEU).  
These additional powers conferred by the Lisbon Treaty to the EU in areas which the 
Member States have perceived as exclusive State competence1703 are an indication of the fact 
that the countries of the EU, facing budgetary constraints, could no longer efficiently respond 
to the increasing number of crisis of global magnitude by acting independently, but need the 
added value of the EU institutional framework and its capabilities.  
The Lisbon Treaty has clarified the legal nature and effects of the EU citizenship right 
to equal protection abroad as a fundamental EU citizenship right to be enjoyed by all the 
unrepresented Union citizens in third countries, which has direct effect within the domestic 
legal frameworks of the Member States. The substantive and personal scope of the right has, 
however, remained as convoluted as before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty since its 
wording has not been changed. Therefore the previous divergent application of the EU 
citizenship right created by the content of this right, which is restricted to a prohibition of 
discriminatory protection treatment by the consular and diplomatic officials of the Member 
                                                 
1702 Art. 221 TFEU, Art. 5(10) of the EEAS Decision. 
1703 See the UK, France and Germany Reports in the CARE Final Report, available at http://www.careproject.eu/ 
This idea was re-affirmed by consular representatives of the other EU countries during a Workshop organised by 
the European Commission in Brussels on 23 June 2011. See also M. Ekengren, N. Matzen, M. Rhinard, M. 
Svantesson, ‘Solidarity or Sovereignty? EU Cooperation in Civil Protection’, (2006) European Integration, 468; 
Ana Mar Fernández, Consular Affairs in the EU: Visa Policy as a Catalyst for Integration?, op.cit.. 
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States, coupled with the diverse national legal frameworks on the matter of consular and 
diplomatic protection of citizens abroad was not amended by the Lisbon Treaty. This 
framework has led in practice to increased unawareness among the EU citizens of the 
concrete benefits of this right and its limited exercise in practice. In practice, the EU citizens 
did not know what consular services they were entitled to from the different Member States, 
and thus delays and complaints have occasionally occurred. According to the CARE Report, 
‘Austria has experienced problems when providing assistance to Union citizens, in particular, 
concerning support to family members and visa issues’; Slovakia has experienced problems in 
providing assistance to Union citizens, in particular, concerning questions of visa and travel 
documents; according to the Estonian Report, ‘a representation of one Member State refused 
once to issue an emergency travel document to an Estonian citizen claiming that such 
assistance is provided to its own citizens only’1704. Furthermore during the 2008 attack in 
Mumbai, a team of MEPs and their assistants leading the EP’s trade delegation to Mumbai 
were left behind by a German consul who took with him only the German nationals. France 
failed to give laissez-passer documents to other delegation members while Germany asked 
the MEPs to go to its consulate to fill out forms despite the ongoing state of emergency.1705 
The difficulties encountered by the EU citizens and the Member States during the 
evacuation procedures, the unclear legal content of the EU citizenship right and the divergent 
implementation of this right have led the Commission to draft a proposal for a Directive that 
will potentially improve the effectiveness of the fundamental Union citizenship right to equal 
protection abroad. It remains to be seen how the content of the right and the divisions of tasks 
horizontally, between the Member States and vertically, between the Member States and the 
Union will look in the future. It seems the Commission, the European Parliament and the 
Council have different views on these issues. While the Commission has adopted a more 
moderate approach, attentive to preserving the flexibility of the horizontal cooperation, the 
European Parliament pushes for a greater role and use of the full potential of the EEAS and 
the Union delegations. The Council is, for the moment, in a stand-by, since no advancement 
has been made since 2013 on the text of the Commission proposal for a Directive on Consular 
Protection of the Union citizens in third countries. For the time being the main legislative 
norms are to be found still in the Decisions 95/553 and 96/409, which were supposed to have 
been amended in 2007.  
 
                                                 
1704 CARE Report, Conclusions Chapter, 665. 
1705 See mode details at http://euobserver.com/22/27253  
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Conclusion – The EU Model of Protecting EU Citizens abroad: 
Reality and Prospects 
Since 1993, an EU model of ensuring protection of (unrepresented) Union citizens abroad has 
been developed, in addition to the traditional international model based on the State of 
nationality right to protect its own citizens in foreign States. In spite of the constant 
opposition of certain Member States to the development of this EU model and of the several   
institutional, procedural and policy related shortcomings, the EU model does confer concrete 
protection benefits to the EU citizens travelling or residing in third countries. The thesis 
started with a legal assessment of the establishment and evolution of the European Union’s 
model of protecting the Union citizens in the world. It found that the EU model developed in 
three main stages.  
The first stage began in 1993, when the Maastricht Treaty introduced the foundation 
of the Union model, constituted of the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad, and 
continued during the following decade. Since 1993, all the citizens of the EU countries, 
located in a third country where their Member States of nationality did not have an external 
representation, have had a right conferred directly by the founding Treaties to receive 
protection from the consular and diplomatic authorities of any of the Member States 
represented in that particular third country on the same conditions as the nationals of those 
States.  
This specific EU citizenship right, which is unlike the other EU citizenship rights, due 
to its application outside the Union market, closely followed previous bilateral and 
multilateral models of consular and diplomatic cooperation agreements concluded among 
some of the European countries before the creation of the European Union. The added value 
of the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad introduced by the Maastricht Treaty 
consists, first, in the geographical extension of the previously scattered consular and 
diplomatic cooperation among some of the European countries to all the States of the 
European Union. Second, it ensured a stronger protection for the Union citizens, since the EU 
citizenship right enjoys primacy, direct effect and effective legal guarantees before national 
courts, features which lacked in regard to the international rights recognised by the Member 
States’ arrangements concluded outside the Union’s institutional framework. Although the 
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EU citizenship right is not innovative in terms of its substantive scope of application,1706 the 
legal effects and guarantees with which it is endowed, under the EU legal framework, bring 
the pre-Union or pre-accession inter-States consular and diplomatic cooperation to a new 
(Union) level of cooperation and solidarity, which adds more stringent obligations on the 
Member States for the benefit of all EU citizens.  
The EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad was meant to ensure a prompt and 
effective protection of all the unrepresented Union citizens abroad, strengthen the image of 
the EU on the international sphere, increase the solidarity among the EU countries, and bring 
the citizens of the Member States closer to both the Member States and the European Union. 
The promise of never being left unprotected when the EU citizen is in need of help outside the 
territory of the Union, and the other adjacent objectives, constituted great advancements of 
the EU integration process, which was seemingly gaining ground-breaking State-like features, 
unseen in other international organisations. The theory was not matched by practice.  
The implementation of this EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad and its 
contribution to the advancement of the EU’s international actorness were fraught with many 
difficulties which seriously diminished the effectiveness of this right and did not contribute to 
the strengthening of the Union’s image, but rather to the visibility of the Member States’ 
solidarity.  
For a period of approximately 15 years, the EU legal framework governing the 
protection of EU citizens abroad was made entirely of sui generis international agreements 
concluded by the Member States for the purpose of implementing the EU citizenship right, 
and soft law documents adopted by the Commission and the Council’s COCON Working 
Group. Unlike the other EU citizenship rights, which were implemented by way of 
Community secondary legislative measures, the EU citizenship right to equal protection 
abroad was implemented by international legal instruments, namely through simplified 
international agreements concluded by the representatives of the Member States within the 
Council’s institutional setting. This choice of implementing legal instruments stripped the EU 
citizens of certain legal benefits derived from legal remedies which were commonly available 
in regard to the Community legal measures, such as: the infringement procedures that the 
Commission and a Member State could have started against the Member States for lack of, or 
                                                 
1706 EU law currently requires Member States to ensure consular protection to unrepresented Union citizens in 
only six mandatory circumstances. See Article 5(1) of Decision 95/553/EC and Decision 96/409/CFSP, more 
details in the following Section. 
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inappropriate, transposition of the Community secondary legislation,1707 direct action of 
annulment initiated by the EU citizens, preliminary references sent by national courts, action 
of damages instituted against the Member State before national courts, or against the EU 
institutions before the EU courts by the injured individuals.1708 EU legal remedies were 
available only in regard to the implementation of the EU primary law provision enshrining the 
EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad, and not the sui generis Decisions. Given the 
fact that the relevant Decisions significantly limited the material and personal scope of 
application of the EU citizenship right, the lack of the EU common legal remedies against 
these Decision, while the implementing measures of the other EU citizenship rights benefited 
of the full panoply of EU legal guarantees, contributed to the limited effectiveness of this 
right, and confusion surrounding the practical application of this right. EU citizens were 
unaware of their rights, and the right did not attract academic interest – only being referred to 
when enumerating the EU citizenship rights introduced by the founding Treaties. 
The reason for the exceptional implementing framework of the EU citizenship right 
compared to the other EU citizenship rights was due to the Member States’ majoritarian view 
of consular and diplomatic protection of individuals as a core element of State sovereignty, 
which led the Member States to act by way of purely inter-governmental measures and 
allocating the topic to a Working Group within the Council composed of State consular and 
diplomatic officials.  
In addition to the nature of the implementing instruments, lacking sufficient effective 
legal remedies and transparency at national, EU level and in third countries, the content of the 
EU citizenship right to an equal treatment based on nationality together with the different 
views and approaches of the Member States on the consular and diplomatic protection of 
individuals increased the confusion surrounding the benefits actually conferred by the EU 
                                                 
1707 It has to be noticed that the transposition of Decisions 95/553/EC and 96/409/CFSP was very long, followed 
various procedures among the Member States, ranging from adoption of a legislative measure specifically meant 
to transpose the Decisions, amending existent consular legislation, adopting or amending administrative 
documents, or lacking any transposition act. See more details on this issue in Chapter 1, Section b. ‘A critical 
assessment of the legal nature, effects and remedies of the implementing measures’, and Chapter 4, Section VII. 
‘Mapping the Member States’ national systems of ensuring protection of citizens abroad and the top-down 
impact of the EU model of protecting Union citizens abroad’, and the CARE Report, Chapter 3, Section 2.3 
Implementation of European law into national law. 
1708 Domestic courts can refer preliminary questions to the CJEU on the interpretation and application of these 
Decisions only insofar as their adoption constitutes a violation of the institutional balance of the EU legal 
framework and substantive allocation of competences between the Union and the Member States. See Case C-
370/12, Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland, Ireland, The Attorney General, Judgment of the Court of 
Justice (Full Court) of 27 November 2012. See also Case C-13/07 Commission v Council, case withdrawn, see 
the Opinion of the AG (concerning the legal basis of the Union’s decision on the approval of Vietnam’s 
accession to the WTO); Case 114/12 Commission v Council, Judgment of 4 September 2014. 
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citizenship right. Therefore, in practice, the EU model of protecting EU citizens abroad was 
constituted by various different national models – ranging from treating the protection of 
citizens abroad as a matter entirely reserved to the State of nationality’s executive,1709 to 
recognising a limited individual right,1710 or a constitutional citizenship right to protection 
abroad,1711 which prevented the construction of a coherent and fully efficient Union model 
guaranteeing security and protection of Union citizens in third countries.  
The different, almost divergent views of the Member States on the consular and 
diplomatic protection of citizens have thwarted the development of an effective 
comprehensive EU legal framework on ensuring protection of EU citizens abroad. The 
potential of the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad has been restricted by 
international and ad-hoc agreements of the Member States to a minimum number of consular 
situations. 
In spite of these shortcomings, the emergence of the inter-governmental model of 
protection of EU citizens abroad is a stunning accomplishment in light of the great variety of 
domestic systems of consular and diplomatic protection of nationals abroad, of the national 
security objectives and some of the Member States’ persistent resilience towards any model 
other than the traditional model of protection of nationals abroad. 
The second stage of the development of the EU model of ensuring protection of EU 
citizens abroad started in 2004 when massive international disasters affecting third countries, 
and the EU citizens located there, led the Member States to accept cooperation with EU 
institutions and external policy instruments for the purpose of complementing their capacity 
to secure the effective protection of their citizens abroad. The natural disasters gravely 
affecting South East Asia in 2004, the enlargement of the Union, the turmoil caused by the 
Arab Spring and the financial cuts suffered by the Member States all demonstrated to the 
Member States that protection of Union citizens abroad solely by way of horizontal 
cooperation among the Member States is no longer sufficient to guarantee security to the 
Union citizens in third countries. Slowly, the Member States accepted the help of the Union 
institutions and instruments in securing protection of Union citizens abroad. In 2007, the civil 
protection mechanism was formally extended to address also external natural and man-made 
disasters and to secure consular assistance and protection to the EU citizens located in the 
third countries. In parallel the humanitarian aid, development cooperation instruments, and 
                                                 
1709 For instance, Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Ireland, Malta, Netherlands and UK. 
1710 For instance, Germany, Greece, Italy and Sweden. 
1711 Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal and Romania. 
 399 
 
the military and civilian capabilities of the ESDP missions were accepted as supporting 
instruments in cases the Member States required additional help to secure the prompt and 
effective consular protection of their citizens in the world. 
In parallel to the increased frequency and magnitude of different sorts of disasters and 
threats affecting third countries, Member States started to close some of their external 
representations under the financial crisis pressure1712 – leaving certain geographical areas with 
limited external representations and an increasing number of third countries in which none of 
the Member States are represented. At the same time, the expectations of the Member States’ 
citizens for prompt and effective assistance from their national governments in cases of 
natural or man-made disaster affecting third countries where more and more EU citizens live 
or travel was increasing.1713 Consequently, the pressure on the Member States’ executives to 
find ways of better responding to the needs of EU citizens for urgent protection has also 
increased. This was the context of the Lisbon Treaty elaboration. 
The third stage in the EU model of ensuring protection of EU citizens abroad started 
with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, which conferred an unprecedented power to an 
international organisation (the EU) to exercise State-like consular protection functions, and 
occasionally also diplomatic protection functions, directly with respect to the Union citizens 
in the world. The Treaty of Lisbon significantly changed the previous inter-governmental 
framework and endowed the Union with both internal and external legislative competence 
that it can use for the purposes of increasing the effectiveness of the protection of its citizens 
in the world. Finally the EU was endowed with the normative and institutional setting 
necessary to fulfil its promise of protecting its citizens in the world and of acting as a fully 
operational international actor.1714 
In terms of the substantive legal innovations introduced by the Lisbon Treaty to the 
EU model of protecting EU citizens abroad, we can note, first, the provision of a Union 
                                                 
1712 See, R. Balfour & K. Raik, ‘The European External Action Service and National Diplomacies’, EPC Issue 
Paper No. 73, March 2013; M. M. Schilbach, op. cit., p. 123; for Hungary, see: 
<http://euobserver.com/economic/28315> (accessed April 2013). For Netherlands, see the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs’ ‘Nota modernisering Nederlandse diplomatie’, 8 April 2011, at p. 10 and p. 18; See Annex on Member 
States’ External Representations and EU Delegations in third countries in the European Parliament Report on 
Access to Electoral Rights: Citizenship, Residence and the Franchise in Local, Regional, National and European 
election, Annex drafted by the M. Moraru. 
1713 M. Okano-Heijmans, ‘Changes In Consular Assistance And The Emergence Of Consular Diplomacy’, in: J. 
Melissen and A. M. Fernández (eds.), Consular Affairs and Diplomacy, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011, pp. 
21 -43; J. Melissen, ‘Introduction: The Consular Dimension Of Diplomacy’, in: Melissen and Fernández (eds.), 
op. cit., pp. 1- 21.  
1714 See J. Larik, ‘Shaping the International Order as a Union Objective and the Dynamic Internationalisation 
of Constitutional Law’, CLEER Working Papers 2011/5, 2011, 7. 
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objective of ensuring protection of EU citizens abroad which has the legal force of informing 
and guiding EU policy making. Second, the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad 
was expressly recognised a fundamental right status in the list of rights that EU citizens derive 
directly from EU law. Article 46 of the EU Charter is entitled ‘diplomatic and consular 
protection’ which can support the future development of EU policies on diplomatic protection 
in addition to the, so far, exclusive consular protection focused EU policy strategy. However, 
the substantive and personal scope of the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad has 
remained as convoluted as before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty since its wording 
has not been changed. Therefore the previous divergent application of the EU citizenship right 
created by the content of this right restricted to a prohibition of discriminatory protection 
treatment by the consular and diplomatic officials of the Member States coupled with the 
diverse national legal frameworks on the matters of consular and diplomatic protection of 
citizens abroad were not amended by the Lisbon Treaty.  
One of the institutional innovations introduced by the Lisbon Treaty with the potential 
to remedy the aforementioned divergent implementing framework of the EU citizenship right 
to equal protection abroad is the express conferral of legislative power to the Council to adopt 
directives implementing the EU citizenship right.1715 Since 2012, the Council is assessing a 
Commission’s proposal for a Directive on Consular Protection of unrepresented Union 
citizens abroad. The main issues which the Commission Proposal endeavours to resolve 
regard the essential aspects of the EU citizenship right: the definition of who is an 
unrepresented Union citizen; the clarification of the rules on allocation of responsibilities 
between the Member States present in a third country, and coordination with the Member 
States of nationality; the clarification of the role of the Union delegation; establishing fixed 
procedures for the management of exercising protection of unrepresented Union citizens in 
cases of consular crises; and establishing a standard reimbursement procedure.  
The Commission, the European Parliament and the Council have different views on 
the scope of the Directive, which has led to the current stalemate of the negotiation procedure. 
However, the institutions are exploring possible legislative options, as well as alternatives, 
since the protection of EU citizens in the world is a topical objective of the Union in light of 
the increasing number of security challenges which the Member States have to face. The 
cause of the stalemate is mainly the opposition of certain Member States within the Council to 
any delegation of power to the EU, and their ongoing defensive attitude towards their foreign 
                                                 
1715 Art. 23(2) TFEU. 
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policy independence. Seeing the EEAS as a competitor of their national Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs and more importantly as a challenge to their statehood,1716 several Member States 
have tried to prevent the development of consular functions by the EU, and of the Union 
delegations in the field of consular assistance of Union citizens. On the other hand, the 
European Parliament strongly supports a directive that recognises a greater role to the EEAS 
and Union delegations by replacing some of the key horizontal cooperation concepts and 
instruments, such as the ‘Lead State’, with an enhanced role for the Union delegations, and 
introducing stronger human rights guarantees for the EU citizens. In light of these institutional 
policy roles, the European Commission has changed its previous supranational approach to a 
more accommodating position towards the diverse interests of the Member States, in order to 
ensure its proposal will see daylight as soon as possible. For the moment the directive is still 
under negotiations within the Council, being revised in light of the requests of the UK – 
which was not pleased with even the very few remaining supranational provisions.1717 
Therefore, the current legal framework governing the application of the EU citizenship right 
to equal protection is still governed by the problematic pre-Lisbon Treaty implementing 
framework, where the levels of protection can vary depending on the Member State to which 
a Union citizen decides to resort to for help, without ensuring wide transparency among the 
EU citizens regarding the list of various domestic protection services they are entitled to 
benefit when located in third countries. 
In terms of institutional innovations, one of the most salient innovations introduced by 
the Lisbon Treaty is the creation of the EEAS and the transformation of the Commission 
delegations into Union delegations, which have the potential of increasing the efficient 
consular, but also diplomatic protection of EU citizens in the world. Since its creation, the 
EEAS, of which the Union delegations are part, has already proved beneficial for ensuring 
protection of EU citizens in distress abroad, as demonstrated during the Arab revolutions that 
started in the spring of 2011. In light of the increased number of EU tools that the EEAS can 
use (9 more Situation Rooms, a Crisis Platform, and express Union civil protection 
mechanism),1718 and the demonstrated added value of EU delegations to the coordination of 
                                                 
1716 See R. Balfour and K. Raik, op. cit., p. 17, available at: 
<http://www.fiia.fi/assets/news/The%20EEAS%20and%20National%20Diplomacies.pdf> (accessed March 
2013). 
1717 UK Parliament, European Scrutiny Committee, document of 2 July 2014, available at   
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmeuleg/219-v/21910.htm  
1718 According to A. Miozzo, the Managing Director for Crisis Response at the European External Action 
Service, in a speech given on March 2012 at the Institute of International and European Affairs, the EEAS now 
has 9 Situation Rooms with which to ensure accurate and updated information regarding political situations 
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the Member States’ capabilities for securing protection of EU citizens in distress abroad, the 
recognition of the aforementioned consular coordination and supporting tasks of the EU 
delegations could be of considerable help to the Member States in view of securing protection 
of all EU citizens’ abroad.                                                     
In addition to the criticism directed at the inefficient implementing framework of the 
EU model of protecting EU citizens abroad, academics have sharply criticised the EU legal 
architecture for disrespecting the public international rules governing the exercise of consular 
and diplomatic protection of natural persons. The EU model of protecting Union citizens 
abroad, although respecting the traditional conception of the State of nationality bearing the 
primary responsibility to protect its nationals abroad, adds new actors with new 
responsibilities to protect the Union citizens abroad. The non-nationality Member States have 
been, since 1993, the bearers of an EU primary law obligation to ensure equal protection 
abroad to unrepresented Union citizens, incidentally, the institutions and bodies of a 
supranational organisation – the European Union – were recognised direct powers to secure 
consular protection of Union citizens in cases of consular crisis.1719 Scholars have argued that, 
if the EU citizenship right to equal protection abroad is considered as including also 
diplomatic protection, then the EU legal framework is ‘fundamentally inconsistent’ with the 
general public international legal norms for two main reasons.1720 First of all due to the 
violation of the principle of pacta tertii nec nocent prosunt1721 by imposing on third countries 
the EU inter-governmental and supranational model of exercising consular and diplomatic 
                                                                                                                                                        
worldwide. Another co-ordination instrument entrusted to the EU is the Crisis Platform, which is a new 
instrument created within the framework of the EEAS which, to date, has efficiently ensured the pooling of the 
Member States and the EU’s resources and capabilities for the purpose of assisting EU citizens in third countries 
affected by disasters. The Crisis Platform has now efficiently ensured the co-ordination tasks of the Member 
State taking the Rotating Presidency. There are also several new expressly provided EU competences after the 
entry into force of the Union which can be put in practice by also involving the EU delegations in third countries, 
such as: humanitarian aid (Article 214 TFEU) and civil protection (Article 222 TFEU).  
1719 The EEAS and Union delegations according to current Art. 35 TEU (former Art. 20 TEU), the EEAS 
Decision and Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (Regulation No 230/2014 Establishing an instrument 
contributing to stability and peace, 11 March 2014, OJ L 77/1, succeeding the Instrument for Stability), bodies 
established within the Commission under the Union Civil Protection Mechanism and the CSDP civilian and 
military missions. 
1720 A. M. Vermeer-Künzli, ‘The Legal Framework of consular assistance: Some inconsistencies between EU 
law and international law on consular assistance’ in S. Faro, Mario P. Chiti and E. Schweighofer, European 
Citizenship and Consular Protection New Trends in European Law and National law, Editura Scientifica Napoli 
(2012), 101-111; A. M. Vermeer-Künzli, ‘Where the Law Becomes Irrelevant: Consular Assistance and the 
European Union’, (2011) ICLQ, 965–995; See J. Dugard, Seventh Report on diplomatic protection, United 
Nations General Assembly, A/CN.4/567, United Nations, New York, 7 March 2006, p. 10; A. M. Vermeer-
Künzli, ‘Exercising Diplomatic Protection, the fine line between litigation, demarches and consular assistance’, 
(2008) ZaöRV, 339; T. Stein, ‘Interim Report on “Diplomatic Protection Under the European Union Treaty”’, in 
ILA Committee on Diplomatic Protection of Persons and Property, Second Report, New Delhi, 2002, 36-7; P. 
Vigni. 
1721 The principle is enshrined in Art. 34 VCLT. 
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protection of EU citizens without having first obtained the consent of third countries1722, 
which in regard to diplomatic protection is mandatory.1723 Second, due to the non-conformity 
of the EU citizenship with the mandatory requirement of ‘nationality of claims’ and 
Nottebohm requirement of ‘genuine connection’.1724. The EU model does not fall under the 
few permitted exceptions by current customary international law from the nationality of 
diplomatic claims requirement, i.e. in the case of refugees, persons benefiting from subsidiary 
protection and stateless persons. Since the EU is an international organisation that is part of 
the international legal order, it is required obligated to respect the public international rules. In 
spite of the specificity of the EU model of protecting EU citizens abroad, whereby equal 
consular and diplomatic protection treatment can be provided by both non-nationality 
Member States and the EU institutions and bodies, and of the Member States’ lack of 
concluding agreements with third countries obtaining their consent to the exercise of the EU 
model, the EU legal framework is not in a ‘fundamental’ conflict with the general public 
international legal norms.  
First of all, it has to be pointed out that the current international legal framework 
governing the exercise of consular and diplomatic protection of individuals has made 
significant advancements from the traditional State-centric model of consular and diplomatic 
protection of natural persons. According to the traditional Vattelian conception of diplomatic 
protection,1725 States enjoyed discretionary rights of exercise protection of their citizens 
abroad without any corresponding duties towards the nationals. This traditional doctrine, 
applicable to both consular and diplomatic protection, no longer reflects an honest picture of 
the current institutions of consular and diplomatic protection of natural persons. The 
development and growing importance of international human rights and the increasing role of 
the individual in international relations have led to structural changes in the definition and 
exercise of the international mechanisms of consular and diplomatic protection of natural 
persons. According to the modern international conception of consular and diplomatic 
protection of individuals, the State has lost its near-sacrosanct discretion to exercise these 
functions, which now recognise and are guided by a complementary mix of the State’s and 
                                                 
1722 According to Rapporteur J. Dugard, in the Seventh Report, ‘Third States are not bound to respect any of the 
provisions contained in treaties and conventions in force within the Union and are not obliged to—and with 
respect to diplomatic protection are unlikely to—accept protection by States that are not the State of nationality 
of an individual Union citizen.’ (para. 20, p.9). 
1723 In relation to consular protection this can be presumed in the absence of opposition, however the third 
country could always decide to oppose if it had not expressly consented to the non-nationality Member States’ 
exercise of consular protection. 
1724 Nottebohm, para. 23, Künzli, op.cit., 88. 
1725 Which also corresponded to consular protection. 
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individual’s interests. At the same time States are showing an increased interest in efficiently 
securing protection of all their nationals abroad, and have more often recourse to delegation of 
consular and diplomatic representation functions to other States from their region or with 
whom they share historical or cultural ties. New actors are thus recognised on the 
international scene, in addition to the State of nationality, signalling that the nationality link is 
no longer an absolute mandatory requirement for the exercise of international consular and 
diplomatic protection of individuals abroad. Additionally, the current customary international 
law has discarded the Nottebohm test in relation to both cases of single and multiple 
nationalities. The test that the nationality of a diplomatic claim has to pass under current 
public international law is that the nationality has to be conferred in accordance with the 
domestic law of the sending State, these legal provisions have to respect the international 
norms prohibiting abuses of power and discrimination, and the nationality has to be 
continuous. The EU citizenship is not formally a State nationality, however it is widely 
accepted that it does establish links between all the EU citizens and the EU countries thus 
offering, to a certain extent, a justification for the inter-governmental EU model of protecting 
EU citizens abroad. In addition, the EU citizenship is recognised, more than ever before, for 
establishing the foundation for the creation of a solid link between the EU citizen and the 
Union itself. This conceptualisation of the EU citizenship justifies, to a certain extent, the 
provision of protection by the Union institutions and bodies themselves. It has to be noticed 
that, so far, the EU institutions have exercised primarily consular protection, which is a 
mechanism that is less strict in requiring the nationality of claims pre-requisite, while 
diplomatic protection was exercised in cases of gross violation of human rights of EU citizens 
by third countries. In regard to this latter situation, it has to be noticed that the international 
custom is starting to recognise a State duty to exercise diplomatic protection of nationals 
subject to such grave injuries. The rising importance of fundamental human rights on the 
international sphere seems to increasingly justify exercises of diplomatic protection measures 
by the international society, regardless of whether the initiator is the State of nationality, non-
nationality States or other non-State actors recognised as international subjects of 
international law. 
Even if one rejects the social developments stirred by the EU citizenship in bringing 
the EU citizens closer to the Member States and the Union, the fact is that the EU model 
cannot still be considered as fundamentally inconsistent with the public international law. The 
third countries have for more than 20 years tacitly consented to the exercise of the EU model 
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throughout its different stages of development, starting from the purely inter-governmental 
model and continuing until the current three-pronged model: State of nationality, non-national 
Member States and the EU institutions and the EEAS. In the end, it is in the third countries’ 
interest to consent to a model that albeit not strictly following the precepts of public 
international law, has, so far, brought them only advantages, as third countries no longer have 
to deal with the protection of aliens, allowing them to concentrate on helping their own 
population in distress. Furthermore, the relation between public international law and EU law 
in this field cannot be couched in terms of being ‘conflictual’ or ‘fundamentally inconsistent’, 
since the specific public international legal norms establish minimum standards of conduct, 
from which the States can derogate by way of common accord.  
When addressing the conformity of the EU model of protecting EU citizens abroad 
with the public international legal framework, one has to remember that the EU model also 
has a supranational aspect, which even if, currently, is not widely developed, exists 
nonetheless, and it cannot be governed by the international consular and diplomatic law as 
established by the Vienna Conventions on Consular and Diplomatic Relations and the ILC 
Articles on Diplomatic Protection, but by the general international principle of speciality. The 
EU Treaties’ provisions on protection of Union citizens abroad do respect the principle of 
speciality, by providing clear and express norms establishing the competence of the Union to 
protect its citizens in the world.1726 Therefore, from the perspective of public international law, 
the EU can continue to exercise and develop its three-pronged model of ensuring protection of 
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The extent to which the Union delegations can actually take on more diplomatic and 
consular tasks ultimately depends upon the Member States’ agreement which, for the 
moment, seems to be more difficult to obtain than that of third countries. The practice so far 
has proved that third countries tacitly approve of the EU’s purely inter-governmental and 
supranational model of ensuring protection of its citizens abroad. Therefore, it is up to the 
Member States under their obligation of sincere cooperation with the EEAS,1727 to turn the 
creation of the EU diplomatic service into an opportunity to ensure an effective fulfilment of 
the EU objective of effective protection of Union citizens in the world. 
In conclusion, the norms, policies and mechanisms for ensuring protection of EU 
citizens abroad have gradually widened under the EU legal order from an inter-governmental 
cooperation framework to gradually include the Union institutions (EEAS, bodies under the 
                                                 
1726 Arts. 3(5) and 35(3) TEU, Arts. 20(2)(c), 23, 221 TFEU. 
1727 See, in particular, Arts. 4(3) and 35(3) TEU. 
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Civil Protection Mechanism) and Union policies (civil protection and humanitarian aid). The 
EU legal framework on securing protection of EU citizens in the world is in development, 
with proposals from the European Parliament and certain Member States for the EEAS to take 
up more formal roles and possibly, in the future, also be allocated more financial resources to 
efficiently support the Member States in their consular and diplomatic protection functions. 
The field is in constant development due to the growing internal but also external pressures on 
the Member States to efficiently guarantee security of EU citizens in third countries. For the 
moment, the goal is to ensure protection for those unrepresented Union citizens, supporting 
the under-represented or over-stretched Member States’ consular and diplomatic missions and 
giving concrete effect to the EU citizenship also outside the borders of the Union. 
However, the EU architecture of protection of EU citizens abroad and its 
implementation still present several shortcomings and fall short of the ambitious goals stated 
in various EU official documents. The current framework can advance towards a truly 
coherent framework between the EU’s internal and external relations policies, if Member 
States manage to reach consensus on the content of the Directive which should not translate 
into broadly couched language permitting arbitrary actions, lack of transparency, and even 
discrimination among the EU citizens, among the various third country nationals who are 
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